The attack on Giarabub

Australian cavalry reconnoitered the approaches to Giarabub from the south. About March 19, 1941, the forces that would attack Giarabub were maneuvering into position. They apparently included a battery of the 4th RHA, part of the regiment which was commanded Lt-Col. Jock Campbell. Jock Campbell had concerns about their ability to move artillery across the soft terrain. The battery commander, however, got his guns in position. Some of them were moved by captured Italian tractors. The initial exploratory attack succeeded beyond expectations. The next phase of the attack would happen early on March 21st. The cavalry's objective would the airfield on the north side of Giarabub. The attack went well and Giarabub had fallen. The total casualties for the attackers were 17 killed and 77 wounded. They captured an estimated 50 officers and 1,250 men. This is based on the account in To Benghazi.

General Wavell wanted to send the Australians at Siwa to Greece

General Wavell intended to send the Australians in Siwa to Greece. That meant that to free them up, they needed to capture Giarabub. The cavalry regimental commander Fergusson was seriously wounded while making a personal reconnaissance near Giarabub, so when the time. His successor, George Wootten, had to start planning from scratch. He only knew that Wavell expected the job to be done and for the Australians to be in Mersa Matruh by March 25, 1941. Wootten ordered the cavalrymen to scout south of Giarabub to gauge the feasibility of approaching from that direction, as the other side had defences in depth. This is based on the account in To Benghazi.

In January 1941 at Siwa

By January 4, 1941, the force at Siwa had grown to include 200 men from the 6th Australian Divisional cavalry "in the mobile force" and 109 at the Siwa base, "115 artillerymen with the field and Bofors guns, and 32 engineers". They had been reinforced with "four 25-pounder guns of a British regular regiment". Their Italian counterparts were believed to have 1,200 troops with another 755 Libyans. The Italians were mostly machine gunners (840 were in 6 MG companies). In late December, Brigadier Moreshead was informed that his 18th Australian Brigade would take Giarabub in late January 1941. After the fall of Beghazi, they started to see Italian deserters headed for Giarabub. 218 were captured on February 15th. The 18th Brigade had still not arrived. Moreshead was now 9th Australian Division commander. This is based on the account in To Benghazi.

Siwa reinforced in December 1940

On December 17, 1940, Colonel Fergusson, with the 6th Divisional Cavalry HQ and a second squadron arrived in Siwa. At this date, the main Italian force was at Bardia. The Italians were tired of the continued harrassment at Fort Maddalena and at Garn el Grein, so they abandoned both. The Italian force at Giarabub was about 2,000 men, and greatly outnumbered the two Australian cavalry squadrons. Colonel Fergusson asked for immediate reinforcements, but he had to wait for a gradual help, instead. He received a troop of 40mm Bofors guns. Then there was "a detachment of engineers". The plan had been to starve out the garrison of Giarabub, but Colonel Fergusson realized that Giarabub was being supplied by air. This is based on the account in To Benghazi.

Preparation at Siwa for the attack at Giarabub

The Australians at Siwa were originally equipped with machine-gun carriers and some obsolescent tanks, but these were replaced with 15-cwt and 30-cwt trucks, which were more suitable for cross-desert travel. On Decemeber 11, 1941, Captain Brown, the squadron commander, received his orders to move out towards Giarabub and attack an Italian outpost. They were repulsed by a vigorous Italian (and Libyan) defence. Another operation was ordered on December 16th. The Australians attacked a convoy leaving Garn el Grein, the outpost they had previously attacked. This was more successful, and they Australians returned with four captured trucks. This is based on the account in To Benghazi.

The border region in the south: Giarabub

60 miles to the south of the Egypt-Libyan border lies the oasis of Giarabub, just on the Libyan side of the border. On the Egyptian side is Siwa. To the south lies the Great Sand Sea. To the north is the rough escarpment that descends to the Mediterranean Sea. An attempt to capture Giarabub had been dispatched in July 1940, but the heat and lack of water caused the attempt to fail. In September 1940, the 1/King's Royal Rifle Corps was sent to Siwa. InNovember, it was replaced by a squadron of the 6th Australian Divisional Cavalry, so that the 1/KRRC could with the Support Group at Sidi Barani. This is based on the account in To Benghazi.

Wargame pieces from late 1970's and early 1980's

These are a sample of what we were using as wargame pieces in the late 1970's and early 1980's. They were reduced to 1/16in = 1 foot scale and colored with colored pencils. Now, they could be colorized digitally. They need to be cleaned up, but it seemed like they might prove useful to someone. There are more, including higher-quality drawings done in ink at 1/48 scale.

This is the link to the complete sheet that had these as a small part.

The warning of a counter-attack in February-March 1941

General Mackay had taken command of forces in western Cyrenaica on February 24, 1941. He had the 3rd Armoured Brigade in a reconnaissance role between Marsa Brega and El Agheila. Mackay reinforced Brigadier Savige's 17th Brigade with another battalion, although at half-strength, as two companies were garrisoning Beda Fomm and El Agheila. Air force reconnaissance reported that the 500-vehicle group was now near the area that they were guarding. On March 9, Savige was greeted by the 20th Brigade commander Brigadier Murray, who was to relieve him. The 9th Australian Division was to replace the 6th, so the 6th Australian Division could be sent to Greece. That would leave unseasoned troops to face Rommel's Germans. This is based on the account in To Benghazi.

The Capture of Barce in February 1941

I received an email, today, about the capture of Barce in February 1941. The piece was written by the late Bernard B. Anley, and tells about the capture of Barce by the 2/1 Field Regiment. The Official History credits the 6th Australian Divisional Cavalry, but this piece says that was in error. On September 22, 2005, the mayor's flag from Barce was donated to the North Fort Artillery Museum by the person sending the email.

Late February 1941: Germans in Libya

A troop of the King's Dragoon Guards (KDG) had encountered 8-wheel armoured cars on February 20th, 1941. The troop was commanded by Lieutenant Williams. On February 21, a pilot had seen 16 vehicles, including 3 8-wheel armoured cars. The crews had the distinctive German uniform color. Brigadier Savige had thought that perhaps they were actually Italian Ansaldo AB 40 armoured cars, but was forced to conclude that they were German. General Wavell's staff refused to believe that the Germans, with their Italian allies, could be assembling a significant force at this date. General Wilson had been withdrawn as commander in Cyrenaics, as he was to command the force sent to Greece. General Neame was appointed to replace him. On February 24, a force that included seven German tanks, had fired on armoured cars from the KDG and knocked one out. They took prisoners and then withdrew. This is based on the account in Gavin Long's book To Benghazi.

Late February 1941 in Cyrenaica

It turns out that when the 7th Armoured Division was withdrawn from Cyrenaica, the 17th Australian Infantry Brigade also lost two of its three battalions. In place of them, the 17th Brigade received the King's Dragoon Guards armoured car regiment. They also had one battery of the 2/3rd Field Regiment, two batteries of Light AA, and two Free French companies, with some support troops. The 17th Brigade reported directly to the I Australian Corps command. The other two battalions were sent to the Barce and Benghazi area, under the command of 6th Australian Division. This is based on the account in To Benghazi.

Wavell's plan for Greece

In late February 1941, Wavell had sanctioned General Cunningham to advance to Harar, after Cunningham had captured Mogadishu, in Somaliland. At the same time, General Wavell, confident that he had until at least mid-April before the Germans could be effective in Libya, he decided to only lightly garrison Cyrenaica. He would use the 9th Australian Division and one armoured brigade from the 2nd Armoured Division. That would allow him to send the 6th and 7th Australian Divisions, the New Zealand Division, the 1st Armoured Brigade, and the Polish Brigade Group to Greece. This is based on the account in To Benghazi.

More about February and March 1941 in North Africa

After the decision to stop the offensive after Beda Fomm, General O'Connor was sent back to Egypt as GOC, British Troops. General Neame was left to command the garrison in Cyrenaica, as "Cyrenaica Command". He was left with an Australian infantry brigade and one armoured brigade from the newly arrived 2nd Armoured Division. One of their armoured regiments was equipped entirely with captured M13/40 tanks. They were an odd fixture in the British army, as they had diesel engines, while British tanks were petrol-fueled. The M13/40 tanks had the advantage of largely being very new with low mileage, unlike the remaining veterans of the offensive, which were worn out. General Wavell expected that the newly arrived Germans and their Italian allies would not be ready to advance until mid-April. Rommel attacked on March 31st, instead. This is based on the account in The Desert Generals.

The air force was stripped from O'Connor's force

The air force units attached to O'Connor's army had been largely stripped by the third week in February. There had been four Hurricane squadrons and three Blenheim squadrons. Gavin Long writes that should have been sufficient to establish ascendency over anything that the Germans would have had in February and March. Instead, there was just the No.3 Squadron RAAF at Benina. No.73 Squadron was at Gazala. In East Africa, General Wavell allowed the forces there to continue to advance against the Italians, while the forces in Cyrenaica were stopped and reduced. This is based on the account in To Benghazi.

Withdrawal in February 1941

The events of February 1941 seem amazing, in retrospect. General Wilson was sent to Barce as military governor of Cyrenaica on February 9. XIII Corps headquarters was withdrawn and General Blamey's I Australian Corps arrived. Starting on February 13, aircraft from Fliegerkorps X, based in Sicily, started bombing Benghazi. By February 18, the 7th Armoured Division was withdrawn and was replaced by the 17th Australian Brigade. At that same date, the navy had to stop supplying Benghazi by sea, due to the lack of air defense. By February 24, the 19th Australian Brigade was ordered to pull back to Gazala to ease the supply situation. The supply situation was aggravated by the withdrawal of air and anti-air assets. This is based on the account in To Benghazi.

What if?

Gavin Long writes in To Benghazi that if O'Connor had been allowed to take Sirte, and "had advanced from there on the 20th [of February, 1941] with full naval and air support, as he wished to do, Hiter would have ceasied reinforcing the Italians and O'Connor would have rapidly occupied Tripolitania and defeated its garrison". As Gavin Long puts it, however, Churchill was focused on the Balkans and wouldn't even consider a further advance. In any case, as a consequence of Churchill's plans, the British and Australian forces had largely vacated western Cyrenaica, and had left a token occupying force that would be easily routed.

Gavin Long argues that the resources were available for an advance to the west in February 1941

Gavin Long points out, in To Benghazi, that the two 2nd Armoured Division tank regiments were just arriving at the time that Rommel traveled to Tripoli. He also writes that the naval and shipping resources required would have been less than what was needed for Churchill's Balkan adventure. He also says that the events in early to mid-1941 showed that German airpower, alone, were not sufficient to stop naval forces from escorting shipping through the Mediterranean Sea. The Germans were not able to put Malta out of action, for example. He also says that airpower was not able to stop the movement and evacuation of the ANZAC forces from Greece.

In January 1941, Wavell's stall believed that capturing Tripoli was feasible

Major-General de Guingand, who had been a Lt-Colonel on Wavell's staff in early 1941, reported that they had believed in January 1941, after the fall of Tobruk and Benghazi, that taking Tripoli was achievable. After the war, General Wavell had written that the logistical probelms, along with worn-out tanks would have precluded the further advance. General Dill, who had long had a defeatist attitude, reportedly, was also against a further advance. We will never know for sure, but the British leadership squandered the opportunity to try, as they allowed time for Rommel and his German reinforcements to be shipped to Tripoli. Rommel was quick to take advantage of British weakness and vacillation by the higher command.

Late February 1941: an opportunity lost

In late February, Axis forces in Tripolitania were very weak. The four Italian infantry divisions were short of artillery, the Ariete division only had light tanks, and there were only several German battalions, one of which was a reconnaissance unit with armoured cars. The HQ of the 5th Light Division arrived in Tripoli on February 21.

General Wavell didn't want to have to supply forces so far to the west, so he was against a further advance. General Dill (CIGS) supported him. They blocked any further advance at a time when it might have succeeded. Instead, they would be faced with another two years of war in North Africa, instead of ending it right then. Instead, they embarked on the Greek adventure, which was doomed to fail from the start, due scale of forces that could be committed and the difficulties on the ground.

Mid-February 1941

As Rommel arrived in Tripoli on February 12, 1941, the 17th (Pavia) Division had been mored forward to the vicinity of Sirte, which is about halfway from El Agheila. Just to the west is Tmed Hassan, which is where the 25th (Bologna) Division was sent. The 132nd (Ariete) Armoured Division was positioned in Buerat, even further west, although close to Tmed Hassan. Positoined forward was the German recon unit (with armoured cars), a German infantry battalion, presumably motorized, and an Italian motorized unit, probably of battalion size. By February 18th, Hitler decided to name Rommel’s unit the Deutsche Afrika Korps. By February 26th, the 15th Panzer Division was allocated to the DAK, and would be shipped to Libya after the 5th Light had been transported. This is based on the account in To Benghazi.

Good books about the Australians in WWII

I am going to pick up two more books from the Australian official history series:

• Australia In The War Of 1939-1945 Series 1 Army, Greece,Crete And Syria, Gavin Long.

• Australia In The War Of 1939-1945 Series 1 Army: TOBRUK & EL ALAMEIN, Barton Maughan.
  

Another good book is

• Springboks in Armour, the South African Armoured Cars in World War 2, Harry Klein.

February 10-12, 1941

On February 10, 1941, part of the 132nd Armoured Division (Ariete) was located in a blocking position west of El Agheila. They faced the 7th Armoured Division Support Group to the east. 7th Armoured Division HQ was south of Beda Fomm, perhaps at Agedabia. At Beda Fomm were the 4th and 7th Armoured Brigades. In the Benghazi area were the XIII Corp HQ and the 17th and 19th Australian Brigades. Cyrenaica Command was near Barce, with the 6th Australian Division HQ. The main Italian force was located in the Tripoli area. This included the rest of the Ariete Division, and the 25th, 27th, and 55th Divisions. On February 12th, General Rommel arrived at Tripoli. He suggested to General Garibaldi that he move the bulk of his forces forward to the Sirte-Buerat area as a blocking force to fight a defensive battle. The German reconnaissance unit was also sent forward. The 5th Light Division and Air Force units would not be in place until about March 20th. This is based on the account in To Benghazi.

German concerns in January and February 1941

It turns out that Hitler and ther German staff were concerned that Italy would collapse, in early 1941, in the face of British successes in Libya and the quagmire in Greece. It was on January 11th that Hitler ordered aid for the Italians. This aid was most notably in the form of the redoubtable Flieger Korps X that was deployed to Sicily. There were also plans to send what became the 5th Light Motorized Division to Libya. The 5th Light Division would have a reconnaissance battalion with armoured cars, three anti-tank battalions with between 27 and 36 guns, thirty tanks, two motor machine gun battalions, and their support units. Gavin Long says that it was about the equivalent of the 7th Armoured Division Support Group. The 5th Light was to be ready for transport to Libya by February 15th. This is based on the account in To Benghazi.

O'Connor's plan for Tripolitania

General O'Connor was ready to advance further into Tripolitania from Sirte on February 20th, 1941. Two armored regiments from the 2nd Armoured Division were set to join him soon, and he had 12 cruiser tanks and 40 light tanks left from the 7th Armoured Division regiments. He was ready to send the 7th Armoured Division Support Group forward to Sirte. The 3rd Hussars received all light tanks and the 6th RTR were equipped with M13/40 tanks. The Italians also expected a further British advance. On February 12th, the Germans and Italians were considering the value of sending German forces to Tripolitania. This is based on the account in To Benghazi.

Churchill had never liked the advance into Libya

Churchill only allowed O'Connnor's advance into Libya, because the way was not open for what Churchill really wanted: to send troops into the Balkans. The main reason that the capture of Cyrenaica happened was because the Greek government had refused British aid in January 1941. All that changed on January 29th, when General Metaxas died. The new Greek government asked for aid, if the Germans entered the war in Greece. Churchill's telegram to Wavell on February 12th made it clear that Churchill had hoped that the offensive would stop at Tobruk, and that the move further west simply complicated Churchill's plan to send troops and equipment to Greece in an effort doomed to failure before it started. Anthony Eden and General Dill were in route to Greece to offer to send a force to Greece to aid in the war. Churchill also had his eye on Crete. O'Connor wanted to take the rest of Libya, and if he had been allowed, it could have happened. Instead, Churchill allowed a respite to the Italians that gave time for Rommel and the Germans to be shipped to Libya. This is based on the account in To Benghazi, with some editorializing by myself.

The 6th Australian Division enters Benghazi

Officials from Benghazi issued an invitation to the Australians to enter Benghazi. "An Arab official from Benghazi appeared and made a speech of welcome to the Australians" at Sidi Chalifa. The cavalry entered Benghazi. They received waves and cheers. The Australians drove up to the town hall, where "the mayor, the bishop, the chief of the police and other dignitaries and officials were awaiting them". This was later in the day on February 6th, 1941. Robertson's brigade entered Benghazi on the 7th. This is based on the account in To Benghazi.

Correlli Barnett on victory at Beda Fomm

General O'Connor spoke Italian, so he talked with the senior Italian general who had surrendered at Beda Fomm. O'Connor told him "I'm sorry you are so uncomfortable. We haven't had time to make proper arrangements." The reply was "Thank you so very much. We do realise that you came here in a very great hurry." General O'Connor expected after such a victory, that Churchill and his commanders would authorize a further advance, as they had every time up to then. O'Connor was ready to continue his blitz into Tripolitania, and push the Italians out of Libya. Churchill would have none of it. He was determined to squander their resources in a hopeless gesture in Greece. This draws on information from Correlli Barnett's book, The Desert Generals.

After the battle on February 7th, 1941

Gavin Long, in To Benghazi, writes that the battlefield, after the fighting ceased, was littered with abandoned and knocked out Italian equipment. There were Lancia and Fiat trucks, many medium tanks painted dark green (almost all M13/40's at this point). He also writes that there were lines of field guns and ammunition, abandoned on surrender. The British took some 20,000 prisoners in the battle. There were 112 Italian medium tanks, large numbers of L3 light tanks, 216 guns, and about "1,500 wheeled vehicles". General Tellara was killed and General Bergonzoli was captured.

The situation on February 7th, 1941

General O'Connor ordered the 6th Australian Division to send a brigade to Ghemines on February 7th, 1941. The 7th Armoured Division Support Group would move south along the road and track that paralleled the road. Meanwhile, at 6:30am, Combe's road block was attacked. Two RHA guns knocked out the lead tank and damaged others, but were knocked out, themselves. The 2/Rifle Brigade attacked, and the whole Italian column surrendered, shortly after 7am. One Italian medium tanks (probably a M13/40) wouldn't surrender and moved into the British position, until a damaged gun from the 106th RHA knocked it out. All Italian resistance ended before 9am. This is based on the account in To Benghazi.

Other actions on February 6th, 1941

The fighting at the head of the Italian column eventually tapered off as darkness fell. So far, 10,000 Italian prisoners had been taken. Those forces that had broken through the 4th Armoured Brigade moved south towards Combe's road block. There were about six layers of knocked out Italian vehicles and tanks at Combe's position. "Combeforce" was attacked by about 30 tanks at 8pm. Mines accounted for three and artillery for another, but four tanks and 30 trucks moved past the road block and headed for Tripolitania.

Earlier in the day, the 1/KRRC "had attacked the Sceleidima fort". Two of their carriers were mined in the attack. At 10am, they could see 10 medium tanks leave the fort and escape. At 10:30am, elements of the 7th Armoured Division Support Group moved in and found that the fort had been abandoned. One 11th Hussars squadron advanced to Soluch, which also had been abandoned. The greater part of the Support Group arrived at 4pm.

This is based on the account in To Benghazi.

By 6pm the Italians had broken through the 4th Armoured Brigade

By 6pm on February 6th, 1941, the head of the Italian column had fought its way through the 4th Armoured Brigade, whose strength was greatly reduced. The 3rd Hussars had 4 cruiser tanks and 24 light tanks. The 7th Hussars had one cruiser tank and 20 light tanks. The 7RTR had ten cruiser tanks and 7 light tanks. Together, they had destroyed 51 M13/40 medium tanks. Their losses were just three cruiser tanks and 7 men. This is based on the account in To Benghazi.

The British tank regiments on February 6th, 1941

As more British tank regiments arrived at Beda Fomm, they were increasingly engaged against Italian tanks. The British had support from artillery, so they were able to successfully engage superior numbers. The 2/RTR was resupplied with ammunition and then returned to the fray with only 6 cruiser tanks. They immediately fought an action against 15 Italian tanks with trucks on the road. The 3rd Hussars and the 7th Hussars fought a large group of tanks. At the same time, the 1/RTR arrived and immediately attacked 30 Italian medium tanks that were trying to break through to the south. Along with their attached artillery battery, they drove the Italians back to the northwest. This is based on the account in To Benghazi.

By 1pm on February 6th, 1941, there had been a big tank battle

Starting from earlier in the morning, the 2/RTR and 7th Hussars had fought a series of engagements against Italian tanks. They actually had to deal with the tail of one column and the head of the next. The brigade commander, Brigadier Caunter, estimated that they had fought as many as 100 Italian tanks. Reinforcements were on the way, thankfully, as the HQ 7th Armoured Brigade and 1/RTR, with an artillery battery, were headed for the battle from Antelat. By 1pm, the 2/RTR was reduced to six cruiser tanks. Only slightly later, the 3rd Hussars was reduced to four cruiser tanks. They were fighting Italian medium tanks (probably largely M13/40's). This is based onthe account in To Benghazi.

The 7th Armoured Brigade and Support Group on February 5th and 6th

The 7th Armoured Brigade and the Support Group were sent off toards Soluch to prevent the Italians from retreating back towards Benghazi. The leading elements were from the 11th Hussars, and they found a fort that was blocking the way. The Support Group was lead by Brigadier Gott, who is well-known to us for his participation in the campaigns of later in 1941 and 1942. The 7th Armoured Brigade altered course to head for Antelat, to reinforce the 4th Armoured Brigade. On the 6th, leading elements of the Italians advancing on the road attacked the blockers. One squadron of the 2nd RTR fought with 12 M13/40's. Both sides moved to reinforce their side and the rest of the 2nd RTR was forced to move to more defensible ground, but eventually drove off the Italians who had lost 8 tanks. The British were taking losses as well. By 1:45pm, "the regiment withdrew to replenish". This is based on the account in To Benghazi.

Beda Fomm and Sidi Saleh on February 5th, 1941

On February 5th, after Colonel Combe had reached Antelat, Jock Campbell's flying column joined his forces. The flying column was the 2/Rifle Brigade and two artillery batteries. From there, armoured cars advanced to Beda Fomm and Sidi Saleh. By noon, the 2/Rifle Brigade and "C" Battery, RHA, were blocking the main road south, along with a parallel track in the hills. When the head of the Italian column reached this point, the guns halted them, and the Italians dismounted and took up positions to fight. At 3pm, a new Italian column arrived with 200-300 troops and surrendered. Soon, another 5,000 surrendered. This group included civilians as well as troops. At 4:30pm, the 4th Armoured Brigade had reached Antelat and heard Combe's communications about the size of the advancing Italian column. They advanced to the road and the 7th Hussars and a squadron of the 2/RTR hit the column in the flank. This is based on the account in To Benghazi.

The capture of Barce on February 5th, 1941

After finding the road towards Barce impassible, the 2/8th Field Company was able to construct a ramp down the escarpment that was negotiable by vehicles. After the 2/1st Field Regiment had "fired six rounds bracketing Barce", they could see a white flag and a flare. the artillerymen moved into Barce, which surrendered at 3pm. Australian cavalrymen, led by Major Onslow, entered from the south and found a large ammunition dump. When the 2/8th Battalion reached Barce, their first task was to restored order and stop Libyans from looting. This is based on the account in To Benghazi, by Gavin Long.

Within sight of Barce on February 5th, 1941 (UPDATED)

The 2/8th Australian Battalion was on the edge of a fertile land, and could see Barce in the distance. They found that "the Italian rearguard had blown six large craters in the road and destroyed a bridge". The leading unit encountered a Hurricane pilot who had been forced to land after shooting down an Italian fighter. He had observed the Italians withdrawing from his hiding place. In the afternoon, the 6th Australian Divisional Cavalry was reconnoitering the area and found an alternate rout that should be passable. Brigadier Robinson sent the 2/4th and 2/11th Battalions in trucks in that direction. The 2/8th would need to continue up the road, as best they could, towards Barce. One squadron of the 11th Hussars, with one tank squadron, led by Colonel Combe, had pushed out of Msus in the early morning and had reached Antelat at 10:32am. The Italians had already withdrawn. This is based on the account in To Benghazi.

We hear of Jock Campbell

General Creagh sent out a "flying column" commanded by Lt-Col Jock Campbell, in response to General O'Connor's order to send a force past Soluch "through Antelat" to block the retreating Italian army. Air reconnaissance could see long lines of vehicles on the road, headed towards Tripolitania. Jock Campbell's force consisted "of the 2/Rifle Brigade and two batteries of artillery". Jock Campbell was a colorful character who appeared periodically on the scene, until he was killed in an automobile accident in March 1942. He was eventually promoted to Major-General, and had a VC. His group was to advance, and be under Colonel Combe's command. The 11th Hussars and Jock Cambell's force (nicknamed "Jockforce") would head for the vicinity of Sidi Saleh to block the road from Benghazi to Agedabia. This is based on the account in To Benghazi.

The 7th Armoured Division on February 4th, 1941

At daybreak on February 4th, 1941, the rememnants of the 7th Armoured Division headed for Mechili. The tank strength was now down to 40 or 50 cruiser tanks (a regiment) and 80 light tanks (barely two regiments). They only had supplies for two days, which reflected the lack of supply transport. A squadron of the 11th Hussars headed the column and drove off 20 Italians when they arrived in Msus. By evening, the 11th Hussars squadron had advanced another 30 miles towards Antelat.

The divisional cavalry bags a wanted foe

In an ambush at the Wadi Derna, troops of the Italian 86th Regiment had fired on the 6th Division Cavalry's medical aid post. The cavalry men had "sworn revenge". On February 4th, 1941, Lieutenant Mills led a troop along a road in the north through Beda Littoria and towards Luigi Razza. At Luigi Razza they encountered a group of 300 forelorn Italian troops marching along the road. The cavalry fired a burst of machinegun fire over their heads and they surrendered. They were part of the 86th Regiment. Two carriers were sent to escort the prisoners to the rear and the rest advanced until they reached another break in the road. This is based on the account in To Benghazi.

The advance on February 4th, 1941

Brigadier Savige's brigade had no move forward in a piece-meal fashion. The 2/5th Battalion was reduced to marching. The 2/6th and 2/7th had borrowed trucks. General Mackay had already decided to push Robertson's 19th Brigade through the 17th, with all battalions on borrowed trucks. Three of 11th Hussars armoured cars lead the advancing 19th Brigade, along with a troop of 6th Australian Division Cavalry. At one point, they surprised Italians laying mines. As they disembarked to remove the mines, they were his by machine gun fire that disabled or destroyed all three armoured cars. This ambush took place near dusk on February 4th. This is based on the account in To Benghazi.

The Italian retreat in early February 1941 (corrected)

The signs seen from air reconnaissance on February 3rd, 1941 led General O'Connor to believe that if he waited longer, the Italians would have succeeded in withdrawing their forces from Cyrenaica without further losses. The plan had been to wait until February 12th to send the 7th Armoured Division across country to block the retreat. The new plan was to send the 7th Armoured Division to Msus as a first step, and then on to Soluch. The 6th Australian Division was to continue to pursue the Italians. The 16th Australian Brigade, sitting at Tobruk, lost their vehicles so that the rest of the 6th Australian Division could continue to advance. Infantry divisions were not normally equipped with enough transport to be "motorized".

February 2nd, 1941 in Western Cyrenaica

The situation on February 2nd was that the 11th Hussars found that first Eluet el Asel had been abandoned by the Italians. Then, as the British and Australians sent patrols out to reconnoiter, they found that not just the fort, but Giovanni Berta and Cahaulan were abandoned. The 6th Australian Divisional Cavalry and carriers from the 2/7th Battalion reached Giovanni Berta in the afternoon. Brigadier Savige made his headquarters in the local school, that night. Progress had been delayed by the need to repair the roads and because of minefields. The 17th Australian Brigade had advanced 70 miles in three days, much of it by foot, and the next phase would require them to rest and recuperate before advancing. They might only have overnight and half of the 3rd to so, however. This is based on the account in To Benghazi.

The advance to Giovanni Berta on February 1st and 2nd, 1941

On February 1st, 1941, he 2/5th Battalion was advancing towards the Italian town Giovanni Berta. The terrain was so bad, that the divisional commander, as well as Brigadier Savige, had thought that the battalion should pull back to better ground, so that they could be transported in trucks. The 2/5th, however, didn't have a radio, and they had moved forward for 5 hours before they were informed of their commanders' decision. It happened that the 2/5th had found an Italian supply depot with food and blankets. Water was available from springs, so the advance could continue "along the north side of the wadi without his vehicles". On February 2nd, the 11th Hussars found that the Italians had withdrawn in the night. Colonel Combe and Brigadier Savige had apparently predicted this, as that had become the pattern. The Italians were attempting to perserve their fighting strength, while slowing the British and Australian advance. This is based on the account in Gavin Long's book To Benghazi.

The 2/6th Australian Battalion on the attack on February 1st, 1941

The 2/6th Australian Battalion was to go over to the attack on February 1st, 1941. The 2/6th was on the track to Chaulan on the previous evening. The battalion, ably led by Porter, would attack with two rifle companies and the carrier platoon. They would be supported by artillery. The carriers would move around the right. When they did, the Italians withdrew. The company on that flank advanced and took at least 380 prisoners. The next objective was to move past Eluet el Asel, an Italian fort that blocked progress towards Givoanni Berta. This is based on the account in To Benghazi.

The 6th Australian Division on January 31st, 1941

By dusk on January 31st, 1941, the 6th Australian Division was positioned in a broad front to the west of Derna. The 2/4th and 2/8th Battalions advanced along the coast road, lead by a company of the 2/4th Battalion. To the South, the 2/5th, 2/6th, and 2/7th Battalions were advancing to the west, towards the general direction of Chaulan. To their southwest were the 11th Hussars and the 6th Divisional Cavalry.Brigadier Savige, on the south side, had his reserve battalion, the 2/7th move up to "form a chain of men along which rations and water could be passed across the wadi to the 2/5th." This is based on the account in Gavin Long's To Benghazi.

A hill dominated the route out of Derna

An Italian rearguard had been in a dominating position to prevent a further advance from Derna. Colonel Mitchell ordered one company to lead an assault in the dark, and the others would advance behind them. The way turned out to be heavily mined. The men carefully proceeded, and started to encounter unsuspecting Italian soldiers. When the Australians reached the top, they "completely surprised fifty Italians in an old fort there and made them prisoners." By the time that they had arrived, they could hear trucks driving away. The Australians started to advance, only to be brought under fire by the next rearguard group, concealed in the difficult terrain. This is based on the account in To Benghazi.

Road Discipline

When General Mackay, commanding general of the 6th Australian Division, arrived at Derna on January 31st, he was appalled by the lack of road discipline. He was also concerned about the obvious signs of looting. The general was not aware of the history, so he made the natural conclusion that it was Australians doing the looting. After his observations about the lack of road discipline, General Mackay wrote instructions to his subordinate commanders on the subject. The immediate need was to prepare to advance to the west, and the division needed to be prepared to face as stubborn resistance as it had at Derna. This is based on the account in Gavin Long's book To Benghazi.

After Derna fell

After Derna fell, the Libyans started looting the Italian settlement. The 2/11 battalion stopped that. Gavin Long writes that when new troops came forward, they carried on with the looting. This included both British and Australians. The Australian "deputy-assistant provost marshal" concluded that Derna had been looted four times:

1. by Italian troops, when the Italian civilians had been evacuated
2. when Italian police were withdrawn and Libyan police were left in charge
3. when Libyan police were withdrawn
4. "by the Arabs when the garrison left town"

The small amount of looting by Australians didn't amount to much, compared to what preceded it. This is based on the account in To Benghazi.

The fall of Derna

Late on January 29th, 1941, the 2/11th Battalion was heavily shelled. Brigadier Louch thought that this might have been a final flurry before Derna was abandoned. He ordered that a patrol should be sent forward after the firing had stopped. They were blocked, and by morning, there were fires visible in Derna. Further attempt to advance were met with machine gun fire. After dawn, some Libyans scaled the escarpment to inform Brigadier Louch that the Italians had withdrawn, and the Australians were able to enter Derna. Derna marked the eastern edge of a fertile area that had been colonized by the Italians. It was an oasis of civilization amid the harsh desert.

While a direct attack on Derna would be difficult, outflanking would succeed

The Italians in the vicinity of Derna were staging a vigorous defence, on January 27-28, 1941. Their artillerymen were firing off large stocks of ammunition that were making the Australians very uncomfortable. Late on January 28th, the 11th Hussars had sent armoured cars to Chauan, where they encountered an Italian group that was situated across the tracks leading to Italian settlements (Gavin Long calls them a "colony"). The 17th Australian Brigade was now positioned to the left of the 19th Brigade. The divisional cavalry was now to their left, and in contact with the 11th Hussars. On the night of Janary 29th, the Italians had withdrawn from Derna. General Bergonzoli, the XXth Corps commander expected an attack, and withdrew before it could occur.

The Australian position in front of Derna seemed precarious

On January 27th, the order had gone out to the Australians to stand off from Derna. As they started the process, the Italians built up a force of about 1,000 very energetic troops. The battalion commander, Dougherty, decided that his battalion needed to pretend to be a larger force. He had some trucks driven back and forth on the Martuba road to raise dust. Meanwhile, a patrol from the 6th Australian Division Cavalry was ambushed and a truck damaged and a carrier knocked out by hidden anti-tank guns. Another troop drove up, into the ambush, where they ran onto mines and were hit by anti-tank and machine gun fire. Through the 27th, the Italians put up a strong fight. That night, though, Shanahan's company captured Fort Rudero, with "290 prisoners and five field guns". This is based on the account in To Benghazi.

General O'Connor decided to do a feint to the west and northwest

After the disappointment of the Italians at Derna escaping, General O'Connor decided that with the forces at his disposal, he could send the 6th Australian Division against Derna to see if the Italians would believe that the general thrust of the offensive would be towards the the west and northwest. The British believe that the Italian 60th Division, with 6,500 troops, was still in the Derna area. The real line of advance was to be across the desert to the southwest, to seal off the Italian escape route. The British were just not ready for that, until almost mid-February. The Australian 17th and 19th Brigades would take Derna, the 16th Brigade would move into Mechili, and the 7th Armoured Division would head for the coast road, "south of Benghazi". This is based on the account in To Benghazi, by Gavin Long.

The Italian escape from Mechili on January 27, 1941

It was early on January 27th that General O'Connor was informed that the Italian force in Mechili had escaped during the night. That happened after General O'Connor had ordered the 7th Armoured Division to prevent such an escape, so we can understand the general's anger. A search from the air found that the Italian column was moving to the northwest. There was some benefit to Mechili being empty, as that allowed free access across the desert. Gavin Long says that at this pint, the 7th Armoured Division had "50 cruiser and 95 light tanks" left. This was when the arrival of two 2nd Armoured Division tanks was expected within about 10 days. Until more fuel and supplies could be brought forward to resupply the 7th Armoured Division, the advance would depend on the 6th Australian Division. This is based on the account in To Benghazi.

"Old stone forts"

On January 26th, 1941, Brigadier Robertson, ordered his brigade to advance on Derna, as there was word that they Italians had pulled back from their forward positions. They quickly found that Derna was still being strongly defended. From one of the old stone forts, artillery was positioned to fire, "point-blank", what I would call "over open sights". The Italians even counterattacked Australian positions, at one point, although they were beaten back. No.3 Squadron RAAF, flying reconnaissance, saw a large Italian force very close to the southwest. Brigadier Robertson was concerned that this force with 200 trucks might be an attack on his weak flank. This changed the plans, as the Australians were now ordered to contain, but not attack the Italians near Derna. General O'Connor still hoped to defeat the force around Mechili, from where it seemed that this Italians

The attack on the airfield, near Derna, was the 2/11 Battalion's first combat experience

The 2/11 Battalion, from the 19th Australian Brigade, was from west Australia, according to Gavin Long. They had not seen any real action until the attack on the airfield near Derna. At 1:30pm on January 25th, 1941, Captain Honner's company moved forward . They quickly outfought some Italian motorcyclists, and then kept moving under heavy fire, until they needed to take cover. On lesson learned from the capture of Bardia was the advantage offered by swift movement. Neither the Northumberland Fusiliers nor the anti-tank guns were able to get close enough to help. Captain Honner personally reconnoitered the forward positions to determine the location of the Italian machiner guns and artillery. Private Graffin lay in the open and fired a BREN gun at the Italian positions. Honner's men were able to find a 3in mortar and 6 bombs, and brought that to the forward position. Honner hoped to overrun the buildings after nightfall. A few mortar bombs did the trick, and they were able to reach the hangers in the dark. While Honner's company was fighting, Captain Egan's company was able to move across a corner of the airfield to the escarpment overlooking Derna. After the fight, Captain Honner's company had lost 2 killed and "21 wounded severely enough to be sent back to the field ambulance and beyond". This is based on the account in To Benghazi.

Italians could fight well

The 6th Australian Divisional Cavalry spearhead, under Onslow's command, was near an airfield on the plain that descends towards Derna. They realized that they would not be able to enter Derna without more troops than they had. It would take an infantry assault. They thought that the airfield might be easily taken. Elements of the 19th Australian Infantry Brigade were arriving on the scene. The cavalrymen offered encouragement, which was needed, as the terrain was flat, with no cover. The Italian fire pinned down the advancing 2/11th Battalion. This was on January 25th, 1941. With darkness, the Australians thought that they should be able to take the buildings from which the heaviest fire was coming. Early on January 26th, the Italians counterattacked, but withdrew after a fight. While this was happening, it bought time for the main Italian body to withdraw, to General O'Connor's disappointment. This is based on Gavin Long's account in To Benghazi.

Near Beda Fomm on February 5th and 6th, 1941

Elements of the 7th Armoured Division had been directed to move west, but when "Combe Force" (as the augmented 11th Hussars battlegroup has become known) was astride the coast road, southwest of Antelat, General Creagh realized that the 7th Armoured Brigade needed to head south as fast as they could go. The 7th Armoured Division Support Group was left in the north to continue fighting there. On February 6th, in the morning, "the fort at Sceleidima was attacked". After three hours, the garrison fled. The Support Group took Soluch and moved west towards Benghazi. The 19th Australian Brigade, from the 6th Australian Division, "reached Barce on February 5th". They also headed for Benghazi, on the 6th. The going was slow due to rain and mined roads. The real action would take place at Beda Fomm on February 6th. Combe Force was astride the coast road, in the south. The 4th Armoured Brigade stop the Italians from breaking through and escaping. The 2nd RTR was down to 19 cruiser and 7 light tanks, at this point. The 7th Hussars were reduced to 1 cruiser and 29 light tanks. They attacked the Italian rear. The 3rd Hussars, with one squadron, were blocking, as best they could, the tracks to Soluch and Sceleidema, out of Antelat. Two squadrons, one of 6 light tanks, and another of 7 cruiser tanks, attacked the Italian column from the east. This is based on the account in Vol.I of the Official History.

The British advance in early February 1941

General O'Connor ordered General Creagh to cut off the Italian retreat from Cyrenaica. Based on air reconnaissance, he ordered the composite force from 11th Hussars, 1st KDG, and artillery (perhaps a later name) to head southwest, rather than to the west.

The advance to Msus in February 1941

With the approval of General Wavell, General O'Connor ordered the advance to Msus. In order to hide their intentions of going across country, the force, partly composed of the 11th Hussars, left Mechili on February 4th, 1941, heading across terrain not previously scouted. The force consisted of the 11th Hussars HQ and C Squadron, along with B Squadron from the 1st King's Dragoon Guards from the 2nd Armoured Division. The rest of the 11th Hussars were detached to operate with the 6th Australian Division and the 7th Armoured Division Support Group. The advance was supported by a flight from the No.208 Army Cooperation squadron. This was a mixed flight of Lysanders and Hurricanes. They reached Msus by 3pm, and found that the Italian garrison had already left. Some armoured cars continued on "towards Antelat". They traveled 30 miles past Msus. The entired 7th Armoured Division moved up to the east of Msus by dawn on February 5th.

General O'Connor's plan in late January 1941

After it was clear that General Babini and the Italian armoured unit had escaped from Mechili, General O'Connor analyzed the situation and made a new plan. He believed that strong Italian forces were posted in the high ground in "the Jebel". There were reports that they were supported by German forces, possibly with 88mm AA guns. A direct assault on Benghazi no longer seemed like a reasonable plan. The indirect approach always was appealing. Send two brigades of the 6th Australian Division along the coast road towards Benghazi. Send the 7th Armoured Division, supported by one infantry brigade towards Msus, across desert in the south. The timing was now an issue. The 7th Armoured Brigade tanks were desperately in need of maintenance. Two 2nd Armoured Division regiments were due to arrive somewhere between February 7th and 9th, 1941. While he waited, he would put the best tanks (cruiser and light) into the 4th Armoured Brigade. Now, a move forward would not be until sometime between February 10th and 11th. This is based on the account in Vol.I of the Official History.

The situation in Western Cyrenaica in late January and early February 1941

General O'Connor had ordered that the 7th Armoured Division not let General Babini's force escape from Mechili, but they succeeded withdrawing to the north in the darkness. The 4th Armoured Brigade attempted to pursue, but rains, soft ground, and mechanical breakdowns, and lack of fuel thwarted that effort. The Italian armoured brigade was still intact, with 100 medium tanks and 200 light tanks. Of course, only slightly more than half were still runners. The British armour was in bad shape, with too many miles and only 50 running cruiser tanks. Marshal Graziani, Governor-General of Libya, decided to save what forces were remaining, and in early February, ordered a withdrawal from Cyrenaica. He left Benghazi on February 3rd. This is based on the account in Vol.I of the Official History.

An incident at Martuba on January 24th, 1941

The force that included elements of the 6th Australian Divisional Cavalry arrived in the area around Martuba at about 4pm. Major Onslow was in command. Suddenly, an Italian CR42 Falco biplane fighter swooped out of the sky, and landed. The pilot was dazed and was immediately captured. The pilot had not realized that his enemy was so far to the west. His aircraft was given to No.3 Squadron RAAF. When Major Onslow's force moved further forward towards the coastal road, he encountered a 1/RTR sqsuadron and "a troop of field guns". They were attacking a blockhouse at Siret el Chreiba, blocking the path to the coastal road. Another airfield was just to the west. This is based on the account in To Benghazi.

Next, Benghazi

Now that the General Staff put a priority on capturing Benghazi, their plans were now more closely aligned with those of General O'Connor. General Maitland Wilson was to be governor of Cyrenaica, which had yet to be totally captured from the Italians. Benghazi was a desirable objective, because the General Staff wanted the port for moving supplies westward in a manner that did not require road transport. While Tobruk was still being entered, elements of the 6th Australian Divisional Cavalry were sent towards Derna. This was on January 23rd, 1941, and the force was a combined arms team with A squadron of the 6th Divionsional Cavalry, a battery of the 2/1 Field Regiment, one troop belonging to J Battery of the RHA (probably anti-tank guns), one troop belonging to the 37th Light AA Regiment, one company of the Royal Northumberland Fusiliers, as well as service and ambulance detachaments. This is based on the account in Gavin Long's book To Benghazi.

Tank vs. tank on January 24th, 1941

On January 24th, a tank-vs-tank battle was fought between a force with about 50 Italian medium tanks (probably mostly M13/40s) against the 4th Armoured Brigade. The battle was fought north of Mechili in Western Cyrenaica. The Italian losses were 8 medium tanks knocked out and one captured. The 4th Armoured Brigade lost one cruiser (possibly an A13 Cru.Mk.IV) and 6 light tanks (probably Lt.Mk.VIB). Sadly, the Italians escaped from Mechili, and the 4th Armoured division was left behind in the pursuit. This is based on the account in Vol.I of the Official History.

The Italian airforce in western Cyrenaica in January 1941

Both the RAF and the Regia Aeronautica (Italian Royal Airforce) were stretched thin in Western Cyrenaica in late January 1941. The Regia Aeronautica was down to about 46 bombers and 34 fighters. Almost none of its ground attack planes were flyable. The RAF was partly suffering from the British success and being at the far end of a long supply line. The RAF was fortunate to have captured large stocks of Italian bombs and aviation gas. Two RAF fighter squadrons were brought forward to Gazala to support the offensive. The Army Cooperation squadrons, usually equipped with Lysanders, were moved to Tmimi. The RAF also carried out a bombing campaign against Italian airfields, and this helped to reduce the Italian airforce to impotence.

By late January 1941, the British focused on Benghazi

The capture of Benghazi had increased priority, even on January 21st, 1941, the day that the Tobruk assault commenced. General O'Connor had plans to send the 7th Armoured Division westward. The 7th Armoured Brigade was to drive towards Derna while the 4th Armoured Brigade would move to Mechili. The move into the western portion of Cyrenaica brought the British out of the desert and into a more fertile land. Benghazi was a substantial port city of 65,000 with a rail connection to the north to Barce and to the south to Soluch. In this region, rain could turn roads and airfields into mud, unlike the desert surface to the east.

The German army moves towards Greece

The German plan was for the 12th Army to move into Bulgaria starting on February 7th, 1941, but the bad weather and ice on the Danube slowed the process. Now, the attack on Greece would happen in early April. The attack on Russia, Barbarossa, was already in preparation. Hitler had wanted to be ready to attack Russia by May 15th, but the coup d'etat in Yugoslavia on March 27th, 1941, roiled the waters. Barbarrosa would now be delayed about a month, into at least mid-June. The situation in Greece actually aided General O'Connor, and gained him time to push the Italians out of eastern Libya (Cyrenaica).

The Germans prepared to attack Greece in early 1941

After the beginning of 1941, German forces moved into Rumania through Hungary. The attack on Greece had been authorized by Hitler on December 13th, 1940. Ostensibly, the reason was to keep Britain out of the Balkans, where they would be a threat to both Italy and Rumania, a major source of oil for the Germans. The Germans would use the 12th Army and Fliegerkorps VIII. Fliegerkorps VIII would be equipped with 39-Ju88, 114 Ju87, 83 Me109, and 38 Me110. That was not a huge force, but the opposition that they would face would be weak, as well. One component of the 12th Army would have four panzer divisions. This is based on the account in Vol.I of the Official History.

Given Wavell's paltry offer, we can understand why the Greeks declined

On Wavell's trip to Athens, starting on January 13th, 1941, he could only offer paltry forces:

• two field artillery regiments
• one or two medium regiments
• one anti-tank regiment
• one cruiser tank regiment
• one or two batteries of AA artillery

Since Germany had not yet intervened, General Metaxas thought that such a small British contingent would only give the Germans further pretext to act. The British assumed that their presence would reassure the Yugoslavs, but General Metaxas had information that they would resist German attack only if they thought that the attack had not been provoked by a British presence at Salonika. The priority for General Metaxas was to resolve the situation in Albania. Not only was the British army not welcome, but the RAF should also wait for events to develop. This suited Air Chief Marshal Longmore, as it bought time to develop airfields, before he was forced to deploy aircraft.

Initially, the Germans were providing support to the Italians in Greece

When the Italian attack on Greece, from Albania, went badly, the Germans made a small effort to give support. They initially provided air transport, starting on December 9, 1940. The next German response was to send troops to Albania. The Italians were not enthusiastic about this prospect. When the Italians demurred, the Germans withdrew the troop offer. By January 1941, the Italian situation had deteriorated in both Albania and Libya. Bardia had fallen and the prospect was that the British would advance further. The Germans were obviously preparing to intervene in Greece and were known to be gathering troops in Rumania. The expected attack would be through Bulgaria, whose government seemed to be increasingly under German influence. The British commanders, above General O'Connor's level, intended to pull troops out of Libya and send them to Greece as soon as Tobruk was taken.

O'Connor's plan for Tobruk and beyond in early 1941

General O'Connor intended to keep the 7th Armoured Division back from the Tobruk assault. He hoped to be able to push the 7th Armoured Division west, intially to Mechili. The 7th Armoured Division Support Group was deployed between Acroma and the coast. The 4th Armoured Brigade was stationed on the flanks of the 6th Australian Divsion. The 7th Armoured Brigade and the 11th Hussars (armoured cars) were sitting west of Tobruk as a blocking force, but ready to advance to the west. Scouts had found a great deal of unoccupied territory and towns to the west, from January 15, 1941 and later. They had gone almost to Mechili. General Mackay asked for the 7th Armoured Division to support his attack on Tobruk, so General O'Connor postponed the advance to Mechili, which he had apparently hoped to do prior to taking Tobruk. This is basee on the account in Gavin Long's To Benghazi.

Prior to the attack on Tobruk in January 1941

One side benefit of the attack on Tobruk being delayed was that the 7th RTR now had 18 running Inf.Mk.II's instead of only 13. The A Squadron of the 6th Australian Divisional Cavalry had been equipped with captured Italian medium tanks, at General O'Connor's orders. 16 tanks, mostly M11/39's but also a few M13/40's were put into running condition. The tanks were marked with big white kangaroos. A squadron was split into three squadrons and reinforced with men from infantry battalion carrier platoons. They were named Dingo, Rabbit, and Wombat. During the night of January 17th, a nasty incident occurred where the brigade major and other officers Brigadier Allen's 16th Brigade and several scouts from were wounded on Italian booby traps. They had gone out to mark the start line, when they ran into trouble. This is based on the account in Gavin Long's book To Benghazi.

Supplying the Greek war effort in early 1941

The initial Italian invasion of Greece was "on the Albanian front". If Germany invaded via Bulgaria, the Greek position would be very difficult. The Greek army had some additional issues. Much of their equipment was either French or German. Britain had no stocks of ammunition for any of the Greek weapons. The United States shipped to Greece what French ammunition that they had left from World War One. They really had very little left. The obvious solution would be to rearm the Greek army "with British weapons". The problem was that the British did not have any extra weapons to supply to Greece. The effort to supply Greece meant that more shipping would be diverted to the Eastern Mediterranean and to the Aegean Sea. Seven convoys with 63 ships were sent in December 1940 and January 1941. The British were diverting more aircraft to Greece. The RAF had lost 30 aircraft against 58 Italian aircraft lost. The RAF was sending more Wellingtons, Blenheim Is, and Hurricanes from their already low stocks.

British air reinforcements to the Middle East in early 1941

Air Chief Marshal Longmore commanded the RAF in the Mediterranean and Middle East. With the government directive to aid Greece, the forces available for North Africa were stripped further. They had hopes for air reinforcements from America, but they quickly found problems with the Curtis Mohawk fighters that meant that they couldn't be used until they had a major modification. Thirty of these had been promised to Greece. 500 Curtis Tomahawk fighters were purchased, but there was no ammunition for the American machine guns in the theater. It was unclear when these aircraft would arrive, as well. The British also had no experience with the aircraft to know its capabilities. Air Chief Marshal Longmore did learn that more aircraft would be sent through March 1941. By then, 100 Hurricanes, 120 Blenheim IVs, 45 Martin Marylands, and 35 Wellingtons would arrive. This is from the account in Vol.I of the Official History.

Everyone expected Germany to attack Greece through Bulgaria in January 1941

The British government was trying to tell what Greece would do in response to a German attack through Bulgaria. No one doubted that would be where the attack would come. Orders to the theater command in the Middle East were influenced by those anxieties. At a time when Bardia had just fallen and Tobruk was about to be attacked, there was less interest in pursuing success than there would have been under other circumstances.

The Balkans in January 1941

When General Wavell went to Athens on January 13th, 1941, everyone expected that the Germans were poised to intervene in Greece. The Greek army was short of transport, AA and anti-tank guns, as well as such a basic thing as clothing for the troops. General Wavell was able to respond by diverting a shipment that had just arrived in Egypt to Greece with transport. He also suggested sending the captured Italian vehicles to Greece, as well. The Greeks estimated that there were six German divisions in southern Rumania. There were four Bulgarian divisions poised, on the border with Greece, as well. General Wavell offered to send some token forces to Greece: 2 field artillery regiments, 1 or 2 medium regiments, 1 tank regiment with cruiser tanks, and only one or two AA batteries. The Greeks declined the offer. This is based on the account in Vol.I of the Official History.

The Germans mined the Suez Canal, starting towards the end of January 1941

One of the things that the Germans could easily do that would cause the maximum disruption was to mine the Suez Canal. Starting in late January 1941, they started dropping mines from aircraft. After abortive minesweeping, the British guessed that they were dealing with both magnetic and acoustic ground mines. As they lacked a facility for sweeping acoustic mines, all that could be done was to interfere with minelaying with AA fire and to mark the location of dropped mines. The navy struggled to keep shipping moving through the canal.

The Greek situation in January 1941

The Greek army was successfully fighting the Italians in the mountains. The Italian divisions had been reduced to two regiments from three, so they felt the lack of infantry. The Greeks were handicapped by the lack of transport and anti-tank guns. They could not risk fighting in the open field, where these deficiencies would be most exploited. The RAF bomber contigent in Greece was limited to operating against Italian lines of communication. Snow and ice was making operations difficult and dangerous. As the RAF was operating from fields near Athens, any raids into Albania were limited, due to the 200 mile distance from their operational fields to the border. Everyone expected the Germans to intervene from Bulgaria, so the tension was great.

The Excess Convoy was the Royal Navy's first taste of operating under strong air attack in the Mediterranean Sea

The best Italian bomber aircraft that the British had to deal with was the SM79 torpedo bomber. When that was augmented by Ju88 and Ju87 divebombers, the British quickly found themselves in trouble. In addition, the mining effort was a continuing danger. The Royal Navy in the Mediterranean Sea was as competent a force as any in world in dealing with air attacks. They had the advantage of having Admiral Cunningham as fleet commander. During early 1941, the Italian fleet, particularly the battlefleet was a danger. The British had nothing to compare with the new Italian battleships, such as the Vittorio Veneto. The rebuilt ships such as the Conte di Cavour and Andrea Doria were also a threat, even though they were not as strong.

The five Excess convoy ships stopped at Gibraltar, before making the run to Malta and Greece. They were delayed while repairs were made to the Renown. The Essex was the ship for Malta. The cargo included 12 Hurricanes in crates. On the night of January 1st, the Northern Prince was stranded as the result of a storm. The 400 troops were taken off and distributed to the AA cruiser Bonaventure and the destroyers. They ship was refloated, but had to turn back.

The Mediterranean Fleet had sailed from Alexandria in what became the standard pattern for running convoys through to Malta. They escorted to more ships bound for Malta, the Breconshire and Clan Macaulay. Concurrently, two convoys, one fast and one slow, had set sail from Malta headed east.

In a foretaste of what was to come, the Royal Navy was suffering under the new scale of air attacks. The cruiser Southampton was disabled and had to be scuttled with torpedoes on January 11th. The aircraft carrier Illustrious was damaged, and this would hamper the Royal Navy's ability to operate in the central Mediterranean. Still, the convoys all passed through without loss.

Hitler's proposal to Mussolini

As early as November 20, 1940, Hitler proposed, in a letter to Mussolini, that the German airforce start operations against British shipping from Italian airbases. Erhard Milch was sent to Italy to make the arrangements. The Germans had hoped that the operation, dubbed "Mittelmeer" would only last until February. Fliegerkorps X was brought from Norway to commence operations from airfields in Sicily. 96 bombers had arrived by January 8th, 1941. By the tenth, 25 Me-110's had arrived. By the 15th, they had a total of 186 aircraft in the theater. They would soon have a big impact on British operations.

The Long Range Desert Group in early 1941

The two Long Range Desert Group patrols arrived back in Cairo in early February 1941 after covering 4,3oo miles. They had left on their mission about 6 weeks before. With most of Cyrenaica now in British hands, the LRDG would need to be based much further west. Colonel Leclerc and his men captured Kufra on March 1st. The HQ and three patrols moved to Kufra in April, as it was well-situated for further operations. This is from the account in Vol.I of the Official History.

The Fezzan operation

In late December 1940, the Long Range Desert Group sent two patrols to attack the Italians at Fezzan. Major Bagnold had coordinated with the Free French in Chad, and found some interest in their participating. Colonel Leclerc asked if they would help the Free French capture Kufra on the way back. The Long Range Desert Group sent a New Zealand and a Guards patrol twoard Fezaan. They had Sheikh Abd del Galil Seif en Nasr with them. He had been carrying on a resistance against Italian rule. The LRDG patrols traveled for 1300 miles and then were joined by the French under Lt-Colonel d'Ornano. They attacked the fort at Murzuk. The fort was too strong to take, but they inflicted a good deal of damage on the Italian aviation capability at that location. The attackers lost five men, including Lt-Colonel d'Ornano. After leaving Murzuk, the force headed for "the French base at Faya", where they met Colonel Leclerc. While the British were scouting ahead, they were attacked from the air and by their Italian counterparts, the Auto-Saharan company. Colonel Leclerc decided to defer the attack on Kufra and sent the British patrols on their way home. This is based on the account in Vol.I of the Official History.

Aircraft in Malta on December 31st, 1940

The air contingent based in Malta on December 31st, 1940 was pretty small:

• No. 830 Squadron Fleet Air Arm: 12 Fairey Swordfish torpedo bombers
• No. 261 Squadron RAF: 16 Hurricanes, plus 4 in reserve
• No. 148 Squadron RAF: 16 Wellingtons, plus 4 in reserve
• No. 228 Squadron RAF: 4 Sunderland flying boats, plus 2 in reserve
• No. 431 Flight RAF: 4 Martin Maryland maritime reconnaissance aircraft ("Glenn Martins") with one in reserve. Eventually, this became No. 69 Squadron
  

This is from Vol.I of the Official History, page 312.

More about the fall of Tobruk, and a correction

By nightfall on the first day of the attack on Tobruk, half of the area had been captured. General Mackay ordered that they would attack to secure the rest in the morning. By 3:45pm on the second day, they had completely subdued the Italian resistance. The commanding general of the 61st Sirte Division surrendered to an Australian battalion commander. The Italian naval detachment also surrendered. The captors were pleased to find that there was still much of the harbor and equipment either in working order or repairable. In any case, the capture of Tobruk took much of two days, not one. This is based on the account in the Official History, Vol.I.

The initiation of the Long Range Desert Group

The Long Range Desert Group were an early Special Forces unit that was authorized by General Wavell in 1939. Major R. A. Bagnold had spent the 1930's with his colleagues becoming adept at navigating the great sand deserts far from the coast. He made a proposal to General Wavell in 1939 for the formation of the unit if Italy entered the war. The French had such a unit, as well, but their exit from the war took them out of the equation. The initial formation was the Long Range Patrol Unit. The Australians were offered the opportunity to participate, but General Blamey didn't want his troops serving outside of Australian units. Three patrols were organized and included some 30 New Zealanders, as well as British soldiers. By November 1940, the men had achieved enough success that General Wavell authorized the expansion into the Long Range Desert Group. The 3rd Coldstream Guards and the 2nd Scots Guards contributed men for a new patrol.

More about the capture of Tobruk

It was the 2/3 Australian Battalion that moved forward at 5:40am on January 21st, 1941. There was an artillery bombardment and the engineers had worked during the night to clear mines and disarm booby traps. It was the 6th Australian Division on the attack. Not more than an hour later, the 16th Brigade, supported by 18 infantry tanks, had pushed through the perimeter into the Tobruk area. They consolidated the gap, setting up to the east and west to protect the gap from attack. The 19th Brigade moved north. They had help through the day from the air. By 3:45pm, Tobruk had fallen. They took 23,000 soldiers and 2,000 sailors prisoner. They captured 208 medium and field guns. There were also 87 tanks captured. This is based on the account in Vol.I of the Official History.

"By early afternoon, 13th Corps was once more counting booty..."

Correlli Barnett, in The Desert Generals, described the scene after the fall of Tobruk: "By early afternoon, 13th Corps was once more county the booty while 7th Armoured Division rolled away to the west." General O'Connor continued to give a textbook presentation of how to conduct blitzkrieg. Half of his enemies were in Cairo and London, sadly enough. O'Connor's answer to the wrong-headedness of his superiors was to move so quickly that the brass would not be able to stop him. They had attacked Tobruk starting at 5:40am on January 21st and by afternoon they had conquered the place. General O'Connor was already moving towards the next prize, Benghazi.

The Tobruk defences

The Italian garrison at Tobruk had half as many men to defend a perimeter that was twice as long as Bardia. The ends of the perimeter were both at the beach. Tobruk, like Bardia, was on the edge of the escarpment. A rough terrain descended to the beach. Tobruk had two lines of concrete emplacements with minefields. There was also a partial anti-tank ditch. Two forts anchored the defences. Fort Pilastrano seems to have been on the highest ground. Fort Solaro overlooked the road to Derna to the west. The first day of the attack took place on January 21st. The 6th Australian Division penetrated the defences just to the east of the El Adem road. By the end of the first day, they had reached Fort Solara and had crossed the Bardia road. This is based on the account in the Official History.

Correlli Barnett says that General O'Connor had a plan to conquer the rest of Libya by the end of February 1941

If Churchill and Wavell had not stopped him, there might have been no place for the Germans to land in North Africa. The mad scheme to aid Greece in the face of German invasion killed the opportunity that Italy could have been knocked out of Libya by O'Connor's blitz into Libya. If you read Churchill's communications in February 1941, you will see that he had become totally unhinged. This was not the last time, sadly, but this would prolong the war and cost Britain much manpower, equipment, and time to recover what was lost in this month. Correlli Barnett, in The Desert Generals, on pages 50 to 56, tells the whole sale tale. As I am a Churchill enthusiast, it pains me greatly to read the story.

Another view of the capture of Tobruk in January 1941

Correlli Barnett wrote that on January 11th, 1941, Hitler made the decision to send troops to support the Italians in Libya. The event that caused this determination was the fall of Bardia. A new formation, the 5th Light Division, organized as a mixed division of tanks and motorized infantry, would be formed and sent to Libya. The move would start on February 15th. General Wavell really wasn't perpared to fight a blitzkrieg-style campaign, but General O'Connor had his forces already investing Tobruk, so he allowed the campaign to continue. Typically, during this period, the British were trying to do everything "on the cheap", with insufficient forces and equipment. The attempt to save Greece was a forlorn effort because of this, and the situation in the Western Desert would be compromised by the same problem, along with too many WWI-minded officers at various levels. This is based on the account in Correlli Barnett's book, The Desert Generals.

The 7th Armoured Division in January 1941

The 7th Armoured Division had lost considerable strength in the course of a month. In any case, they could not take Tobruk, unaided. They had 69 cruiser tanks and 126 light tanks. The 8th Hussars and 6th RTR were withdrawn from the field and their tanks were distributed among the remaining units. At the same time, the 2nd Armoured Division was arriving in the Middle East. It was equipped with two cruiser regiments and two light tank regiments. Their tanks were in poor condition, but they were moved up to Cyrenaica (Eastern Libya) in early February 1941. General Mackay planned the attack on Tobruk with the 6th Australian Division and the remnants of the 7th RTR playing a prominent part.

Supplies held up the attack on Tobruk

The British were stretched to supply the 7th Armoured Division and the 6th Australian Division at Tobruk. The attack was delayed due to the need to stockpile supplies to support an attack. The systems and organizations were still being developed that would ultimately be used for the rest of the war. They had succeeded in building successive depots across the desert, but the rapid push to Tobruk, after the quick fall of Bardia meant that they had finally outstripped their logistic support. The port at Sollum was operated by a detachment managed by General Wilson. This allowed General O'Connor and 13th Corps to focus on the advance. After a brief period, General Wavell assumed control of 13th Corps from the Theater Headquarters. For some reason, Bardia was only used for transshipping supplies to Greece, and Sollum was the main center for receiving supplies.

The Greek campaign started to impact Compass in January 1941

The desert offensive was impacted by the vain effort to aid Greece. The Middle East lost three RAF squadrons. Alexandria lost its Hurricane squadron while the Western Desert lost one Blenheim and one Gladiator squadron. If the British only had the Italians to deal with, it was not a great loss. The problem was that the German Luftwaffe was gathering in Sicily to take control of the Central Mediterranean Sea. They were to make life very difficult for Malta, the Royal Navy, and even the army in the desert.

After Bardia, Tobruk (January 1941)

Tobruk was close enough to Bardia that the 19th Australian Brigade left the Bardia environs later in the day on January 6th and was on the outskirts of Tobruk's defences by morning. The British 16th Infantry Brigade moved up to the southeast. The 4th Armoured Brigade moved further west on the south side of Tobruk. The 7th Armoured Brigade Support Group and the 7th Armoured Brigade moved into a blocking position to the west of Tobruk. The Italian airforce was pushed out of range of Tobruk. Fighters had to operate from Maraua, which was 170 miles from Tobruk. The RAF, however, had moved forward, so they were in position to continue to provide support.

The capture of Bardia

The Italians losses at Bardia were immense. They had lost 40,000 men, killed, wounded, or prisoners. The booty included:

• 400 guns
• 13 medium tanks
• 117 light tanks
• 200-300 vehicles

"The Corps Commander, General Berganzoli escaped." The Italian army in Libya lost 8 divisions to Operation Compass, as of early January 1941. The British response was to send the 7th Armoured Brigade to cut the road west from Tobruk. The infantry was quickly sent towards Tobruk. General O'Connor knew well how to do blitzkrieg.

The assault on Bardia on January 3rd, 1941

The attack on Bardia started at 5:30am on January 3rd, 1941. The 2/1st Australian Battalion had reached its objective by 7am. The 7th RTR advanced at 7am and worked in conjunction with the 2/2nd Australian Battalion crossed the Bardia-Fort Capuzzo road. Meanwhile, the 6th Divisional Cavalry had advanced two miles in the direction of Bardia. They had their Bren carriers and little else. Six Italian medium tanks attacked and were eventually knocked out by two anti-tank guns. The 2/6th Battalion lost two platoons in a diversionary attack in the north. The battleships Warspite, Valiant, and Barham bombarded Bardia at 8:10am. The Illustrious provided air cover and spotter aircraft. The monitor Terror and the gunboats assisted the bombardment. The RAF hit airfields in the Italian rear. The second wave of the attack started at 11:10am, when the 17th Australian Infantry Brigade attacked from the south, along the road.

The Australians established themselves near Bardia, starting in late December 1940

The commanding general of the 6th Australian Division, Major-General Mackay took charge of the area around Sollum starting December 21st. The Australians immediately started aggressive patrolling about the Bardia defences. The goal was to establish control of the area right up to Bardia's perimeter. The RAF had been photographing Bardia to determine the extent of the defences. The duties of 16th Australian Division patrols was to gather intelligence about the details of the Italian defences around Bardia. The Italians defended their perimeter but did only minimal patrolling. The 6th Australian Division, minus many of their divisional support units, was augmented by the 7th RTR with only 23 Matildas still runners and about 120 artillery pieces. The 1st Royal Northumberland Fusiliers were the only available machine gun battalion. General Mackay chose to attack the western side, about 2-1/2 miles south of the road to Tobruk. This is based on the account in Vol.I of the Official History. He had finalized his plan on December 28th, 1940.

The commanders-in-chief decided to give Compass the priority on December 26th, 1940

After taking steps to strip the attack against the Italians in Libya of resources, the Commanders-in-Chief decided abruptly to give that front priority. The goal was to capture Tobruk, although Bardia was still waiting to be assaulted. The logistic situation became even more difficult, as supplies had to be accumulated for a continuation of the offensive. Marshal Graziani realized that the British were having difficulties, and his immediate reaction was to make a strong defence of both Bardia and Tobruk. Mussolini endorsed the idea, but Marshal Graziani immediately had doubts about the wisdom of such a plan. Meanwhile, General Bergonzoli ("Electric Whiskers") was able to bring the troops from the border region into Bardia to strengthen the defences. The raw 6th Australian Division would make the assault on what they supposed was a force of 20,000 men in Bardia. This is based on the account in Vol.I of the Official History.

The water shortage during Compass (December 1940)

A contingency plan for keeping Mersa Matruh supplied if the Italians had succeeded in cutting the supply line allowed the British to supply their troops being gathered for an assault on Bardia. The navy had organized a unit with the sole purpose of keeping Matruh supplied. Now, they were used to bring supplies to the troops in eastern Libya, near Bardia. Sollum would provide a useful port, but at first it was not yet in working order. The greatest problem was the water supply. Fort Capuzzo had storage tanks, but the water was contaminated with salt, so it was unusable. 12,000 gallons were shipped by road from Mersa Matruh. Part of the problem was the 4 gallon can, which would often leak. The navy used the gunboats Aphis and Ladybird, the water-carrier Myriel, and the monitor Terror to bring water forward in sufficient quantities.