Thursday, February 23, 2017

Air attacks on Tobruk becomes increasingly damaging from 24 April 1941 and onwards

The scale of air attacks on Tobruk were increasing and this prompted General Morshead to send a message to the Western Desert Force headquarters. The danger was that the scale of air attacks would make it difficult to use the harbor at Tobruk. Another issue was that the recent losses in aircraft based at Tobruk were not being replaced. Three aircraft had been lost on 23 April 1941, and this already had created a problem. The RAF reacted by deciding to withdraw the remaining two Hurricane fighters on 25 April. That would leave the two Lysander army cooperation aircraft without fighter protection. Tobruk relied on the Lysanders to spot for artillery.

We find that for all of the Western Desert Force, the RAF had only 13 Hurricanes and they could not afford to leave them in Tobruk, as they would likely be lost. The only benefit to Tobruk was that one flight of reconnaissance Hurricanes would continue to support Tobruk.

A sandstorm shut down operations at Tobruk on 26 April. The engineers kept working during the sandstorm to lay more mines, particularly ones that would fire on contact ("hair trigger"). Other engineers worked on the inner defensive minefield behind the Medauuar feature.

The sandstorm died down on 27 April, which allowed the Germans to stage an attack on the heavy anti-aircraft guns with 24 dive bombers. They shot down one dive bomber, but four guns were temporarily disabled. The gun crews took losses, as well. The anti-aircraft commander, Brigadier Slater gathered information about the attack. He found that the initial attack was made by Ju-88's with a fighter escort. They got fire from the heavy anti-aircraft guns. They thought that the next stage was a dive bomber attack on the heavy anti-aircraft guns. Probably many more than fifty dive bombers attacked in groups of at least 12 planes. In some cases, they came out of the sun, so they were not seen before they struck. Two guns sites had guns in a "porcupine formation". These two sites took less damage and the guns were kept in action during the attacks. Two other sites fared worse. At one of the two sites, they had not even seen the dive bombers before they were hit. What they found was that the best thing to do was for the gun crews to continue to fight during the attacks and not dive for cover. We can see the situation by realizing that in the final 20 days of April 1941, Tobruk was attacked by 386 dive bombers during 21 incidents. The anti-aircraft gunners kept their nerve and fought their guns with success. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

Wednesday, February 22, 2017

New information and events from 24 April 1941

One result of the fighting on 24 April 1941 was that the British and Australians got information about enemy units besieging Tobruk. There had been a battle group called the Fabris unit involved in the fighting around Tobruk. That group had been replaced by a battalion from the Italian Trento Division. There were two regiments from the Brescia Division deployed on the west side of Tobruk. There were also units from the German 15th Armored Division present. they included the infantry regiment, one battery of artillery, and an engineer company.

The Medauuar area in Tobruk was an ongoing concern. After the fighting on the 24tg, the Australians worried that there would be a new effort to reoccupy the area where they had been driven from in the battle. Some reconnaissance proved that by 25 April, the area was still empty of enemy troops.

There were further patrol actions by the Australians on 25 April. Infantry from the 2/23rd Battalion drove enemy troops from the positions near the Derna road. The 2/23rd Battalion commander was intent on keeping the enemy at a distance of about 3,500 yards. He was afraid that if the enemy could establish themselves close, it might make his battalion more vulnerable. The area near the battalion had deep wadi's and escarpments. They relied upon the Indian cavalry regiment, the 18th Cavalry for information from their patrols. The word was that there were two posts that had been established. The northern post was found deserted, but the southern post had Germans working on defenses. An Australian patrol ahd surprised them, but were driven off in a fight.

The Australians responded with new a new patrol group. They were slowed by trying to bring mortars along. By the time they arrived at the southern position, the Germans were moving back. The Germans fired machine guns and artillery against the Australians. They did capture some enemy soldiers. They also attacked some enemy vehicles loaded with ammunition. Later, the 18th Cavalry captured an Italian officer and 32 men near the coast. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

Thursday, February 16, 2017

The situation at Tobruk from 24 April 1941

The British Middle East Command's estimate of the Axis forces was that there would by two German armored divisions, the 5th Light Division and the 15th Armored Division. There would also be the Italian Ariete Armored Division and the Trento Mechanized Division. These would all be available by mid-June 1941, as the British intelligence estimate believed. The British Tiger Convoy would arrive at Alexandria, Egypt, by mid-May 1941. General Morshead, at Tobruk, was warned of the estimate.

After a pause in operations, the western side of Tobruk was attacked "at dawn" on 24 April. The start was a heavy artillery barrage that came down on the western defenses. The next move was a large number of infantry moving towards the defenses by 7am. The infantry were closely bunched, which made them good targets for artillery and machine guns. The forward Australian infantry had their Bren guns and Thompson sub-machine guns, which they freely used. One attack came in on the 2/23rd Battalion. British artillery fire was concentrated. Some attackers were pinned in place. Others moved quickly forward as a way to escape the artillery fire. The forward defenses replied with fire that stopped any further forward movement. The attackers were completely stopped by 8am. The Australians came forward to clean up pockets of infantry. By 9:45am, the last of the attackers could be seen in rapid retreat "over the skyline". That was the result of the attack on the right side.

On the left, the attack crossed the side of the Ras el Medauuar. They seem to have been Italians who were having to move over open ground. They encountered men of the 2/48th Battalion. About a company of men moved in between posts S1 and S3. The Australians were taking heavy fire, but British artillery was called in to support them. Following 20 minutes of firing, the Australians took in some 107 prisoners, which include Italian officers and some Germans. Some forty Italians were killed in the fight. Another fight at midday, involving 30 or 40 Germans, resulted in seven prisoners. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

Wednesday, February 15, 2017

The situation at Tobruk and the Egyptian frontier on 24 April 1941

The 22nd Guards Brigade, a familiar unit to those who have long studied the North African Campaign, was holding Halfaya pass. Gott's Support Group was operating in the area between Halfaya and Sidi Barrani. In the Support Group, you had units such as the 11th Hussars, the 7th Armoured Division reconnaissance unit. Colonel Herff was in command of the German units near Halfaya and the Egyptian border. The Support Group raided German transport near Fort Capuzzo and Sidi Aziz. This was a minor British operation, but the way Colonel Herff reported it to Rommel made it sound bigger than it was. Rommel was getting very anxious about the situation near Bardia and Salum. If they were lost, it would endanger the effort to attack Tobruk. At this point, Rommel was saying that their loss would cause the siege of Tobruk to be removed. The suggested solution was to use aircraft to carry reinforcements and supplies to Tobruk. They would need to use submarines near the coast between Tobruk and Salum.

General Halder decided to send General von Paulus to North Africa to talk to Rommel and to get a sense of the true situation. The staff did not trust Rommel and was at the point of losing confidence in him. This might seem strange, given Rommel's success, but you have to remember that this was in the lead up to the attack on Russia on 22 June 1941, and that knowledge was having an impact at the German Army Command. The problem was that the Germans did not know the true situation of the British and Australians, and thought that they were in a better position than they actually were.

There was concern in Tobruk about the defenses against air attack, because heavy losses had been taken on 21 April 1941 due to an attack by 24 German bombers with 21 fighters. The quay was damaged and two ships were sunk. Two more were disabled. British Hurricane fighters were able to shoot down four German aircraft. In response to the attack, the British anti-aircraft gun commander, Brigadier Slater, proposed to start using a barrage pattern of fire, rather than shooting at individual aircraft. On April 23, the barrage defense showed its effectiveness. This is base on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

Wednesday, February 08, 2017

Assessments of the fights on 22 April 1941 at Tobruk

The first assessment of the fights on 22 April 1941 came by the German radio on 23 April. The announcement said: "Yesterday morning, the British force besieged in Tobruk made a desperate attack, which was repulsed with terrific loss of men and material, while our own force is still incomplete." The Germans, Italians, British, and Australians all took in the report and reacted. Rommel and his ADC had visited the area where the fighting had occurred to see what they could find out about what had happened. When they arrived, everything was quiet, but then they realized that there was no Italian infantry to be found. There were only a few Italian artillery batteries without infantry support. They came to a rise that they climbed and then descended. At the bottom were a large number of discarded Italian Bersaglieri helmets. They realized that a complete Italian battalion had been captured by the Australians during the night.

Rommel then collected a scratch force from available troops to reoccupy the area that had lost the battalion. Rommel also sent a warning to the Italians that officers who showed cowardice in battle would be immediately executed.

Rommel started to think about what he would have done in the Australians and British situation. His concern was that British might practice some infiltration tactics and do a blitzkrieg attack on his rear, dislocating the forward forces. Part of the 15th Armored Division had now arrived near Tobruk. They were ordered to occupy a blocking position on the coast road about 18 miles west of Tobruk. They should also have a battle group near Acroma. The Italian battalion that had been lost must have been the Fabris Battalion. Rommel ordered a battalion from the Trento Division to move forward to the abandoned position. The Trento battalion had been planned to move to the Egyptian frontier. The Trento Division was to advance to the Salum area and attack. Colonel Herff, who had replaced Colonel Knabe, would command the attack at Salum. Rommel hoped to achieve enough success that some German units could be brought back to Tobruk for an attack. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

Tuesday, February 07, 2017

More raids on 22 April 1941 from Tobruk

While the company-sized raid from the 2/48th Battalion achieved success, another raid by a company from the 2/23rd Battalion was carried out. They were protected on the right by two troops from the 18th Cavalry, a survivor of the 3rd Indian Motor Brigade. The Indian cavalry group was commanded by Captain Barlow, who had been involved with the breakout from Mechili.

The Australians from the 2/23rd Battalion moved forward along a wadi. Enemy troops at the end of the wadi opened fire with machine guns that forced the Australians into a side wadi. They took heavy shelling and mortar fire in the side wadi. In a quick decision, the captain commanding the raid decided to attack across open ground. The enemy troops proved to be Italian. They opened fire but the attack by the Australians with bayonets and grenades broke into the Italian positions. The Italians surrendered in the face of the attack. With open ground covered by heavy gunfire, the Australians returned with about 40 Italian prisoners.

The 2/23rd raid was divided into two parts. We just saw the right hand portion of the raid. The left-hand group was moving south of the Derna road. They ran into a mixed battery of anti-tank and anti-aircraft guns. Beyond them were two batteries of artillery. Again, they were fighting Italian soldiers. The Italians had fired on Australians on an open slope. A flanking move with carriers got them within grenade range. After throwing grenades, they charged with bayonets. The Italians reacted by surrendering in the face of grenades and bayonets.

The left-hand group had a hard fight and took heavy casualties. 24 men, including Lieutenant Hutchinson, did not return from the raid. 22 men returned wounded. They had done good execution. They had hit an Italian company which lost 90 of its 100 men. The two columns from the 2/23rd Battalion had captured 87 men, some anti-aircraft guns, machine guns, and mortars. The 18th Cavalry conducted a reconnaissance mission and drove seven miles west without seeing any Germans or Italians.

Another raid, by the 20th Brigade, failed. They were a mixed force of tanks, infantry, and artillery. They started while it was still dark. When the sky got light, they found themselves under heavy artillery fire. They were forced to withdraw, losing one light tank to an anti-tank gun. Fortunately, they were will-supported by British artillery fire and were able to withdraw. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

Wednesday, February 01, 2017

Events on 20 to 22 April 1941 in the Mediterranean Theater

When Winston Churchill heard about the tank situation in North Africa, he decided to take a high-stakes gamble. He would send tanks to Alexandria, Egypt, through the Mediterranean Sea. He hoped that most of the tanks would arrive. The Navy had been very cautious about sending high-value convoys through the Mediterranean Sea, particularly with the increased German air threat. That threat was very real, as the losses later in April and May would show. In this case, the gamble succeeded, although with loss.

General Wavell was in Greece, as the resistance was collapsing. He ordered the troop withdrawal from Greece to get as many of the troops away as they could. The losses from the Greek campaign were predictable and could have been avoided by not going in to begin with. Anthony Eden had strongly urged that the British intervene in Greece, despite the certainty of failure. General Wavell had done his part to get the Australians to agree to the participate. The senior Australians realized the odds, but did their part when called upon.

At the same time, Rommel read the message from the German High Command about taking Tobruk. Rommel wanted to have the complete 15th Armored Division before making the attempt. The high-level commanders urged him to use more Italian forces, instead. Rommel felt that his most immediate need was more air support to protect the supply line to Libya. British attacks on the convoys were causing losses that were very damaging.

General Morshead was planning new attacks against the forces attacking Tobruk. The main attack would be by the 2/48th battalion, hoping to take "Carrier Hill" and capturing the nearby enemy force. Two adjacent battalions would also stage attacks. Preparations were made on 21 April for the attack by the 2/48th Battalion. The attack would be mounted by just one company, five carriers, three infantry tanks, and four anti-tank guns from the 3rd RHA. They had a forward artillery observer from the 51st Field Regiment. There was no artillery barrage planned, because they did not want to warn the force being attacked. The company from the 2/48th Battalion stepped off at 6:40am on 22 April 1941. They had air cover and a low-flying Westland Lysander to make noise to drown out the carrier and tank noise.

The Australian infantry caught the Italian infantry totally by surprise. The carriers fired on the enemy gun crews while the attack took place. The Italians initially fought in place. In the face of a bayonet charge, most of the Italians surrendered, although some continued to fight. One carrier was knocked out by an anti-tank round. They captured 368 Italian soldiers, including 16 officers. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

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