From 5 December 1941 with Rommel and events unfolding

The Italian High Command sent a staff officer to inform Rommel and General Bastico that supplies from 5 December 1941 to the end of the year would be very limited. The plan was to only send fuel, food, and medical supplies. Rommel only saw the officer, Lieutenant-Colonel Montezemolo a day later. Rommel, however, very likely had already been informed. Another major event was that Hitler was sending an "air fleet and defences" to the area to achieve air superiority and to protect shipping to North Africa. Rommel was thinking of a temporary withdrawal but with the prospect of a rebound in the new year.
Rommel then recalled the forces that had been sent to the frontier. They included the German Africa Corps and the Italian mechanized corps. The recall gave the 5th New Zealand Brigade a reprieve. The 90th Light Division was ordered back to the Ed Duda-Belhamed-Bir Salem area. The Italian Bologna Division was ordered to withdraw from the east during the night. Early on 5 December saw the two German armored divisions were in one case, three miles west of Ed Duda and the other was five miles west of El Adem.
By then, the German armor had been reduced to a total of fifty tanks. To take any action, they needed support from the Italian Ariete Division and Trieste Division. They were to move near Gubi and then attack British supply dumps. Rommel would have liked to move quickly, but the Italians were not able to respond very fast. Rommel lost patience and sent German divisions to El Gubi. In the process, they overran the 11th Indian Brigade. General Gott's usual operations allowed the 4th Amoured Brigade to leaguer 70 miles away, where they could rest undisturbed.
The XXX Corps attack on El Adem had to be postponed. The units in the vicinity of El Gubi were in a state of confusion. That applied to both German and British untis. They had been able to start to reorgamze the remnants of the 11th Indian Brigade, which was then withdrawn. The Germans followed them, moving towards the 2nd Guards Brigade. They were saved from being overrun when Rommel sent them a message ordering them to change over to a defensive posture. The British 4th Armoured Brigade was now close, northeast of El Gubi. They had set up a defensive position where they sat. They had an armored car screen out to provide warning. One thing that happened was that General Neumann-Silkow was fatally wounded. He had been the 15th Armored Division commander. The Germans and Italians were suffering under increased attack by British air and artillery.
Early on 7 December, General Ritchie had ordered XXX Corps to advance as soon as they could move. General Norrie should inform General Godwin-Austen of the plans. By now, General Gott was feeling cautious and told General Norrie that he thought that the Germans were firming up. General Norrie decided to sit still. Rommel was visiting the German Africa Corps headquarters early on 7 December. He told them that if they could not beat the British on the 7th, they would have to pull back to the Gazala area. Rommel did not make any plans to fight and instead, after dark, was going to pull back from the British and withdraw. Supply columns were actually withdrawn starting in the afternoon. As usual, at night on 7 to 8 December, the 4th Armoured Brigade set up a night leaguer southeast of El Gubi. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

Major developments from 4-5 December 1941 near Tobruk

A plan was proposed for the 2/13th Battalion to send a patrol to Outpost Plonk. If the enemy withdrew, they would set up an observation post. Outpost Bondi (also called Queen) was planned to be raided by another battalion. The 2/13th Battalion commander, now Major Colvin, had plans to use carrier platoons to strengthen the force  Before anything could actually happen, the brigade commander canceled the operations at 7:30pm.
The situation was changing. For example, the enemy forces that had been attacking Ed Duda had withdrawn and the enemy defenses near Ed Duda were abandoned. Reports came in that indicated that there was major movement of enemy forces from the east heading west. Tobruk sent out a group with anti-tank guns and machine guns to the Trigh Capuzzo. They fired on enemy columns driving west. There was a bottleneck between Ed Duda and the "next escarpment". Approaching columns were engaged and the situation got very tense, such that enemy attempting to pass through were "thrown into confusion."
23rd Brigade took command of all forces at Ed Duda. They were talking about assembling a battle group during the night to be ready to move west towards El Adem. As darkness approached, a Polish anti-tank gun group arrived. They reported that many outposts had been abandoned by the enemy. The local commanders responded by sending out patrols to occupy the empty outposts. Another disruption of plans occurred when XIII Corps canceled the advance to El Adem. The enemy withdrawal had caused the XXX Corps attack to be canceled.
From the German perspective, we learn that by morning on 4 December 1941, the Germans were going to push the east and destroy the British forces on the Egyptian frontier. They were also going to attack Ed Duda. Almost immediately, the attack on Ed Duda ran into trouble. There were four battle groups attacking Ed Duda. Mickl Group attacked from the west. Engineers from the 200th and 900th Engineer Battalions attacked from the south. The 8th Machine Gun Battalion attacked from the southeast. 90th Light Division infantry attacked from the east. The attacks were not made in concert and the only gains at all were those from the 8th Machine Gun Battalion. While the attacks on Ed Duda happened a British Jock Column raided and captured anti-tank guns and made prisoners.
Events of 5 December 1941 were remarkable. On the morning of 5 December, Rommel hoped to break the extension from Tobruk to Ed Duda and then push to Sidi Omar. By evening, Rommel had abandoned those operations. He concentrated German and Italian armored forces to be ready to fight XXX Corps. He abandonded all the ground from Tobruk east to the Egyptian frontier. There were also no German-Italian forces left on the east side of Tobruk. Rommel sent his armored forces to a position near El Gubi. The motivation for the changes is unclear, but the suggestion was that Rommel had read an intercepted message from General Ritchie to General Norrie. There are no German records that mention the message, but Rommel's changes were made shortly after the message was sent.
During the afternoon, Rommel ordered artillery and other unis from east of Tobruk to withdraw. Rommel had learned about the 2nd South African Division arriving at the Egyptian frontier. The 4th Indian Division was on the move on the Trigh el Abd. But the question remains "why did Rommel lift the seige of Tobruk? This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Austrsalian Official History.

3 to 4 December 1941 and beyond

The enemy made a heavy and damaging attack on Ed Duda while the 2/13th Battalion were transported back to the Tobruk perimeter. The attack started at first light on 4 December 1941. They attacked from the west, south, and southeast. The 4/Border were initiated at Ed Duda, trying to hold a position that they had never seen in daylight. The 1/Essex were the recipients of the attack from the west side. Defensive fire and a mobile carrier force were able to break up the attack. The carriers were manned by New Zealand soldiers. The enemy then attacked Bir Belhamed against the 18th New Zealand Battalion were also repelled. The attack from the southeast succeeded in crossing the bypass road. A counterattack by the Essex with the help of a company from the 4/Border recovered the lost ground and were able to penetrate a thousand yards into the enemy positions. The counterattack had help from the 4 RTR. The enemy, however had brought forward 88mm which knocked out 15 Matilda tanks, a devastating loss. Heavy machine gun fire kept anyone from escaping from the tanks and pinned down the 4/Border Battalion. The enemy had succeeded in taking the ground.
The Germans appeared to be push from Belhamed along the ridge to join the group attacking the Borders. The Germans were firing mortars at the 18th New Zealand Battalion. Two tanks had come up to attack the battalion, but one was mined and the other knocked out by a gun. The Germans were unable to make a damaging attack.
General Godwin-Austen issued an "order of the day" in response to the attacks by the Germans. He told the men that they were fighting the battle that would result in retaking Cyrenaica. He said that the battle would be won by those that kept with the fight the longest. They needed to continue to hold Ed Duda, if it was possible. They would be fighting with the help of XXX Corps in the battle about to be fought.
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When the 4/Border counterattacked, but were not able to deal with the enemy machine guns, a two battalion attack was planned. They hoped to recover the knocked out tanks. Because the 4/Border and the 18th New Zealand Battalion were cut off, communications were difficult. The 14th Brigade commander decided that the attack would not be needed and that patrols could do the job. By 8pm, the enemy was seen to be withdrawing. The men were able to start work to recover the knocked out tanks. By "first ligth" on 5 December, the enemy was gone and the enemy wounded were made prisoners. They had also captured the enemy 88mm guns that had been so effective against the infantry tanks.
5 December saw about two hours of heavy shelling against the Tobruk fortress. The 2/13th Battalion counted about 1500 to 1700 shells exploding. The 2/13th Battalion intelligence officer thought that this might be preparation for an attack against Bir el Azazi.
Late in the afternoon, the 1/Durham Light Infantry were ordered to move out at once. This seemed to involve an enemy withdrawal. They also thought that the battalion would be in a thrust to El Adem. Right after that, the 2/13th were ordered to attack Bir el Azazi. They had expected to have tanks halp them, but now there were none available.Artillery would fire on the eenemy positions and the guns that had fired on them that morning. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

Fighting at Bir el Gubi from 5 December 1941

General Norrie met with General Frank Messervy, the 4th Indian Division commander. General Messervy had only recently been intimately involved with fighting on the Egyptian frontier, so he was an expert on the topic. One of the 4th Indian Division brigades was now involved in the operations at Bir el Gubi. Once they had connected up, they drove to the 7th Armoured Division headquarters to talk with General Gott. Generals Norrie and Messervy were opposed to pulling back to the east. They were prepared to deal with any problems that they might encounter, because the benefits of keeping the infantry and artillery to the west were great. They had been ordered to send armor to the east, so they were ready to send the 4th Armoured Brigade to the Egyptian frontier area. They had decided to make another push to take Bir el Gubi at dawn on 5 December 1941.
During the early morning of 5 December 1941, General Ritchie had ordered that the enemy forces on the Egyptian frontier needed to be disposed of. The Australian historian had doubts that General Auchinleck had been aware of Ritchie's change of plan. By daylight on 5 December, the situation on the Eyptian frontier was in good shape. The commanders to the west pretty much ignored General Ritchie's latest change. The German armored force that had been a concern had already pulled back to the west.
By day on the 5th, General Auchinleck was feeling more confident and liked the use of Jock Columns to fight the enemy forces. Auchinleck thought that they had been an important factor in preventing the enemy from pushing more to the east. Being an old Indian Army soldier, he liked the 4th Indian Division leading the push against Bir el Gubi. The Italians, though, were able to beat back all the attacks against them. The British had indications that there was something happening at Hagfet en Nezha, "between El Adem and Bir el Gubi." General Norrie let General Gott know that he wanted the 4th Armoured Brigade to start driving toward El Adem in the morning. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

1 to 5 December 1941 regarding plans and operations

General Norrie was able to return to his duties as XXX Corps commander, after having to command South African troops. He considered General Ritchie's proposal to attack El Adem. General Norrie was concerned that too few resources would be committed to such an operation (sort of like had happened at Sidi Rezegh). He received promises that there would be sufficient resources committed to such an attack. Given that assurance, General Norrie gave the 4th Armoured Brigade a day to rest and refit after a day near Tobruk. General Gott, the 7th Armoured Division commander, had a plan for threatening the German-Italian flank. General Norrie canceled that plan and had everyone preparing for a push to El Adem. Norrie's plan included taking control of Bir el Gubi and then to attack El Adem from the south.
An Italian force was at Bir el Gubi. There was a battalion of "Fascist Youth" and an Italian reconnaissance unit. The reconnaissance unit had light tanks, medium tanks, and light artillery pieces. Prior to an attack at Bir el Gubi, forces were moved into position. The 11th Indian Btigade traveled to Bir Duedar, just to the south of Bir el Gubi. Some columns formed by the 1st South African Brigade were operating in the area. The 11th Indian Brigade was driven 47 miles at night to be in position for an attack on the west and southwest side. They had no opportunity for scouting, so they achieved mixed results. The 2/5th Mahratta took a strong point. The 2/Camerons were beaten back by the Italian battalion. The 4th Armoured Brigade fought with the Italian reconnaissance unit. The British had 98 of their 126 total tanks in the fight. The tank battle was fougth about three miles north of Bir el Gubi. They claimed to have destroyed 11 M13/40 tanks. Armored cars from the King's Dragoon Guards and South African units hit Axis supply dumps north and west of Bir el Gubi, and also fired on vehicle columns.
Later in the evening, they attacked the Italian battalion again and were again beaten off. Just to throw everyone off-stride, General Ritchie asked General Norrie to send tanks to counter enemy tanks that were advancing on the Egyptian frontier area. General Norrie complained about having to follow Rommel's every move, but he was ordered to pull the British armor back towards the frontier, seemingly abandoning the planned attack on El Adem. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

Rommel's plan is executed from 3 December 1941

Rommel's two columns set out for the frontier area at dawn on 3 December 1941. They would face a reorganized British force there near the frontier. The 5th Indian Brigade and the 5th New Zealand Brigade were assigned to "masking" Bardia. The reorganization near Bardia happened on 1 and 2 December 1941. They had the 5th New Zealand Brigade in the north of Bardia and covering the coastal road.
Early on 3 December, a mixed column of New Zealand "cavalry and infantry saw the approaching German force commanded by Geissler. They notified the 5th New Zealand Brigade about the German force. About the same time, a column from the Central Indian Horse reported the approach of Knabe's force. Interestingly, Geissler's force attacked, being very confident, and were soundly defeated. A surviving company-sized remnant from the 15th Motor Cycle Battalion was gathered and were put into a blocking position. Knabe's group had a better outcome, but they were in a long-range duel with Goldforce and the 7th Support Group jock columns. Knabe was not confident enough that he could break off to help Geissler. That night, he was ordered to pull back to Gasr el Arid.
The New Zealand contribution to winning Operation Crusader needs to include their efforts to defeat Geissler's fighting force. We need to recognize the successes of the New Zealand Division and the Tobruk garrison between 18 November and 4 December. They inflicted losses on the 15th and 21st Armored Divisions and the 90th Light Division. The German Africa Corps staff reacted by sending the remaining part of the 15th Armored Division to Gasr el Arid early in the morning. They were to join Knabe's force and the Ariete Division. They still kept back part of the 21st Armored Division artillery, the 8th Machine Gun Battalion, and an engineer unit. They were intended for use in an attack on Ed Duda. The column sent to join Knabe arrived, despite being bombed. They pushed farther east and caused Goldforce to have to withdraw. There was some concern that the Germans might destroy the 5th New Zealand Brigade in the north. The Germans in fact planned to attack that afternoon.
General Auchinleck was now with General Ritchie at 8th Army Headquarters. They warned the 2nd South African Division about the German sin the north. The 2nd South African Division had arrived at Sidi Omar at 9am that morning. General Norrie was ordered to withdraw the 4th Armoured Btigade. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

Rommel's plan to send supplies to the troops on the border with Egypt showed the condition of the enemy forces. The columns sent to the east were small and did not contain any tanks. The tanks had to be grounded for maintenance. Monitoring the British communications indicated that they did not need to be concerned about a British tank attack. They thought that they might be free from tank attack until 3 December 1941. General Cruewell, the German Africa Corps commander, thought that they should send the entire force, minus tanks, rather than sending small detachments. Rommel disregarded General Cruewell's concerns and proceeded with the operation as he planned. The two forces heading to the east would include one traveling on the Via Balbia and the other on the Trigh Capuzzo. The northern group would include units from the 15th Armored Division. The force would be a battalion-sized all-arms group built around the 15th Motor Cycle Battalion. They had been recently engaged in capturing Belhamed. The southern group was drawn from the 21st Armored Division. The force was similar, except this group received three tanks. A regiment with extra troops was supposed to follow the two columns. The rest of the German Africa Corps was not involved since they were assigned to destroying the British forces at Ed Duda. The north and south columns assembled on 2 December and moved forward on 3 December. The force to attack Ed Duda was to have the army artillery assigned and would cooperate with the Italian XXI Corps.
British units on the Egyptian frontier were reorganized in early December  The 22nd New Zealand Battalion became the nucleus for a new 5th New Zealand Brigade. The purpose was to increase the fighting power available in the area to keep the enemy from sending supplies from the frontier to the units near Tobruk. This was a concern of General Ritchie, which was based on a misunderstanding of the situation. British forces "on the Bardia front" had reorganized on 1 and 2 December 1941. The 5th New Zealand Brigade would cover the northern part of the area. They had two battalions in a forward position and a third in reserve. The two forward battalions were deployed facing to the east. The New Zealand Cavalry was sent to patrol towards the west. A similar force in the south, named Goldforce, patrolled on the Trigh Capuzzo. Goldforce was a mixed unit of cavalry with men from the Central Indian Horse and the 31st Field Regiment. To the east of them was the 5th Indian Brigade. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

Action at the Appendix from 3 November 1941 and beyond

Not that long after the advance party from the Borders arrived at the 2/13th Battalion, an artillery battle was joined at the extremity of the "appendix" that stuck out from Tobruk to Ed Duda. The enemy fire was concentrated on outpost "Doc". This was on the right side of the appendix. The commander and staff of the 2/13th Battalion observed an enemy attack that resulted in "Dalby Square" being captured. The attackers consisted of three companies of motorized infantry. The majority of the 4/Border arrived at 1:45am at Ed Duda to relieve the 2/13th Battalion. Their transportation was on the vehicles that had brought the 4/Border. By 3am, the Australians were ready and eager to return to Tobruk, which seemed ironic.
The column drove through the night until they arrived at the Tobruk perimeter. The battalion would defend the perimeter from Post R37 to Post R59. They were deployed with three companies in line and the fourth in reserve. The 1/Durham Light Infantry were to ride the vehicles that had brought the 2/13th Battalion to Tobruk. They in fact did not leave, but they stayed in the "forward area", presumably in the perimeter defenses. There appears to have been a change in plan, which left too many men in close quarters. There was a limited amount of cover, so this exposed men to fire. The plan to send a force with tanks from Ed Duda to El Adem seems to have been a factor. The original thinking had been to send the 2/13th with the force sent to El Adem, but they decided to use the 1;Durham Light Infantry in their place. With the enemy operations near Ed Duda, the advance to El Adem was postponed.
Back on 30 November 1941, General Bastico visited Rommel at his headquarters. They talked about developments and agreed that they were now in a battle of attrition. With their supply line difficulties, they could do little more until shipments of tanks and "other vehicles" could be sent. Both Rommel and General Bastico had already been told that they would not see any tank and truck shipments in the foreseeable future. Rommel talked about his troops having suffered severely, which the Australian historian thought referred to the German and Italian soldiers on the Egyptian frontier. They were especially in need of supplies. General  Bastico was considering sending supplies to Bardia via submarines or aircraft. Early in the day on 1 December, Rommel had visited General Cruewell, the German Africa Corps commandr, and they discussed the desperate straights of the Solumn garrison. This was while Rommel was pummeling the New Zealand Division resulting in their withdrawal from the combat zone. Rommel wanted to make some sort of push to the east, egen if it was just an "advance guard".
Late on 1 December, Rommel sent out messages indicating his new plans. He planned to send out the advance guard, but would send two columns to the east. The German Africa Corps would form the northern column while the Italian Ariete Armored Division and the Trieste Mechanized Division would form the southern column. The southern column would also have the 33rd Reconnaissance unti to lead the way. Tht evening, Rommel and the reconnaissance unit drove to point 175. Rommel told General Cruewell that they needed to move as soon as the "Cauldron" had emptied. He also ordered them to "take food to Bardia". This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

Action on 2 December 1941 and beyond near Tobruk

General Godwin-Austen told General Ritchie that his forces were confident of their ability to hold the extension from Tobruk to Ed Duda. He would relieve the most tired troops with groups of Poles. He also reported that they were gradually advancing towards El Adem. He did say that 70th Division was not in a position to provide a brigade group for the proposed advance along "the northern edge of the escarpment". 70th Division was totally committed to other responsibilities. The "4 Border" would take over Ed Duda from the 2/13th Battalion, which would then move to the southern perimeter. They would relieve the 1/Durham Light Infantry, which would then move to the reserve on the northern side of the corridor.
General Scobie had a plan to send to groups to attack El Adem in coordination with XXX Corps. One group would move along the escarpment from Ed Duda to El Adem. The group would have two infantry battalions, one tank squadron, one field regiment, one anti-tank battery, and a machine gun company. The other group would leave the Tobruk perimeter and attack the previous outpost "Plonk". They would then move beyond to a feature that they called "the walled village." This group would have the 2/13th Battalion, using one of their companies and a squadron of infantry tanks. These objectives were along the boundary between two Italian infantry divisions, the Trento and Bologna divisions. These were covering the main route, the Tobruk-El Adem Road.
The division perimeter responsbilities at Tobruk were reassigned. The Polish brigade now had the perimeter from posts R34 and R35 to the sea. The 16th Brigade would cover the rest of the perimeter. That freed the 23rd Brigade to move to Ed Duda. The 14th Brigade, with four battalions and  the 1st RHA would hold the rest of the corridor.
The morning on 3 December 1941 was "abnormally quiet". By later in the morning, the enemy became more active. They sent some tanks on a reconnaissance near Belhamed. The appearance of British infantry tanks from the 32nd Army Tank Brigade seemed to scare them away. The Australians from the 2/13th Battalion were become encouraged that their side might be on the verge of winning. They could see, for the first time, that the British actually had air superiority. Actually, the enemy was still strong in the air. The previous day saw the 5th South African Brigade under heavy dive bomber attack. The last evening saw Ed Duda overflown by two Me-109 fighters doing reconnaissance.
Right after midday on 3 December, the 2/13th Battalion got word through the 1/Essex, that they needed to send an advance group to the 1st Durban Light Infantry. They were given notice that they needed to be ready to move at 4am the next morning. The Australians apparently did not respond to the news. They were awakened at 4am by a group from the "Borders". Their advanced group didn't leave until 5:30am. They only arrived at the Durham Light Infantry headquarters at 7pm. They were on the left side of the El Adem Road portion of the perimeter. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

Holding on from 1 December 1941 and later near Tobruk and points west

< p>General Ritchie had been ready to withdraw from Ed Duda, but the men on the spot were offended by the idea. They were holding on and were increasing their defenses. Once General Godwin-Austen heard about Colonel Nichols of the 1/Essex, he concurred that they should hold on to their ground. Other commanders in 70th Division offered suggestions for operations to improve their position. Early on 2 December 1941, then, the position of Colonel Nichols and his battalion affected the situation, because by withdrawing, they would have allowed Rommel to concentrate his units on the Egyptian Frontier.
The fall of Belhamed to the enemy exposed the 2/13th Battalion to heavier shelling. The enemy presumable had new observation posts that could see the battalion. The mortar platoon arrived and then a New Zealand field artillery troop. They offered a target for strafing, presumably meaning by aircraft. 1pm saw Colonel Burrows visit the 1/Bedfordshire and Hertfordshire at Bir Belhamed. He also talked with the 18th New Zealand Battalion. When enemy movement was seen, they expected an enemy attack, but that did not happen. A move that seemed to indicate a pending attack to break the connecting corridor from Ed Duda ended when they were shelled. A little later, a 210mm shell landed and exploded, but did not fragment. Colonel Burrows was seriously wounded, however. Major Colvin was not incapacitated and he took charge of the battalion. Major Colvin adjusted the defenses in light of potential threats. He also called forward Captain Gillan to take over the headquarters company. The headquarters now included some specialist troops who were without equipment.
Right after dark at Ed Duda, some companies changed responsibilities. To the east, there was fighting where German infantry hit the 1/Bedfordshire and Hertfordshire battalion. The New Zealand battalion also fought off an enemy group. The enemy had broken into one company at Bir Belhamed. Some British troops were broken into small pockets. Once that there was daylight, they captured some Germans. About 9am, some German assault engineers and anti-tank gunners attacked. Between the British and New Zealand battalions, they were able to throw back the attacking troops. Some men captured were from the 90th Light Division, from a new battalion, tentatively named after the commander, the Kolbeck Battalion. These men were some who had been liberated from a New Zealand prisoner of war camp.
The units in the corridor from Tobruk to Ed Duda were understandbly nervous about their situation during 2 December. In fact, the German situation was difficult. They had infantry which had been severely beaten. Many tanks were broken down and were in need of repair. The enemy had no other forces to follow up on the real successes that they had experienced. At this point, Rommel needed some time to recover from the heavy fighting that they had experienced.
On 1 December 1941, General Godwin-Austen had requested that a senior officer able to make decisions be sent to XIII Corps headquarters. General Ritchie arrived on 2 December. General Godwin-Austen had been disappointed that the 7th Armoured Division had not attacked the enemy tanks. General Godwin-Austen did not believe that his forces were in a position to attack towards El Adem without the enemy tank forces having been attacked. This is based onthe account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

General Auchinleck gets involved from 30 November 1941

General Auchinleck gave Churchill his impression of the current situation on 30 November 1941. He portrayed the situation in more glowing terms than the reality justified. That was more because he had not been closely involved with events and had to rely on input from others and his impressions. The British were hampered by their poor communications systems and methods of operation. General Ritchie, for example, visited XXX Corps headquarters, expecting to see General Norrie, who was elsewhere. The Australian historian mentions that the most important decisions about the conduct of the battle were made by Ritchie's subordinate, without consulting him. Then again, they had asked him if they should abandon the area created by the Tobruk garrison breakout, and he did not reply until twelve hours later.
The Australian historian thought that General Ritchie must have spent most of 30 November at XXX Corps headquarters. They had a current situation map that he found to be very informative. He was able to develop the outline of a plan for operations in the future. Ritchie could see on the map the enemy armored formations, "surrounded by anti-tank guns".  General Ritchie thought that they should try to entice the enemy armor to move out into open ground, where the British could harass them, "never leave it alone". General Ritchie thought that they should send a 4th Indian Division brigade against El Adem, and send armored cars to raid supposed enemy supply lines from  Tmimi and Acroma. He thought that there must be a supply line from Bardia to enemy units west of Bardia. In reality, Rommel was trying to get more supplies into Bardia, not move them out.
General Ritchie returned to 8th Army Headquarters from XXX Corps. The first thing he did was to tell General Godwin-Austen to continue to hold the area between Tobruk and Ed Duda with the force that they had, as there was nothing available to help. General Auchinleck then arrived at 8th Army Headquarters. He stayed there and was involved with operations for the next ten days. They also endorsed using 7th Support Group units and equipment in Jock Columns. XXX Corps would take command of the 1st South African Brigade, the 22nd Guards Brigade, and eventually, the 4th Indian Division. That would happen after they were replaced by the 2nd South African Division on the Egyptian frontier.
In a meeting at 11am on 1 December at Brigadier Willison's headquarters, decisions were made about pressing topics. They would reorganize so that the 2/13th Battalion had its own companies. The Australians would hold positions from Ed Duda to the bypass road. This was on the escarpment. The 1st RHA mortars and carriers would be pulled out. They would be replaced by New Zealand equivelents.
The enemy mounted three attacks against outposts. One was on Jill and two were against Jack (since renamed Happy). About midday, the 1/Essex were warned to be ready to withdraw "from Ed Duda after dark if Belhamed fell to the enemy". Colonel Nichols was disturbed at the idea that they should withdraw. The enemy had just made some half-hearted attacks that the 1/Essex could handle.  There was no need to withdraw. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

The Cauldron and British and enemy issues on 1 December 1941

The Australian historian was critical of Brigadier Gatehouse and his timidity in the fight on 1 December 1941. Certainly, if Gatehouse's armored brigade had attacked, they would have taken losses. The historian thought that constantly yielding the battlefield to the Germans was not a way to win a battle. The German armored divisions were free to concentrate against the British infantry, particularly the New Zealand Division. We also notice that the Germans were hard-pressed to pull together a force to fight the battle at the Cauldron. The 90th Light Division was reduced to organizing a battalion from soldiers freed from a New Zealand prisoner of war camp. They were not able to fight at this point in the battle. The 115th Motorized Infantry Regiment was attempting to regroup after being beaten in battle at Sidi Rezegh. The 21st Armored Division was also in poor shape. They were said to be taking a very pessimistic view and were "sending alarming reports". The German Africa Corps did have the advantage of a strong medium and heavy artillery force. Besides the artillery, the main German strength were the 8th Armored Regiment with some forty tanks, "the 2nd Machine Gun Battalion, and the 15th Motorcycle Battalion." Before the British armored brigade had joined the battle, this force had fought a hard fight with a New Zealand battalion and the 6th Field Regiment. While the Germans had perhaps 24 Pzkw III and Pzkw IV tanks, Gatehouse's brigade had 115 tanks. But the British tanks had pulled back, leaving the Germans to continue to batter the New Zealand Division.
The Germans planned an attack at 4:30pm on the New Zealand artillery, which had planned to withdraw at 5:30pm. To help the artillery were five Matildas from the 44th RTR and a few Valentines from the 8th RTR. This was a close-fought battle with artillery firing at point-blank range. Some guns were abandoned at the withdrawal. The Germans were very tired so they rested when the British and New Zealanders withdrew. They were admonished by General Cruewell for stopping, because he wanted them to move on Zaafran. He ordered them to take Zaafran at "daybreak".
At 6:45pm, the remnants of the New Zealand Division formed up into a traveling order and then drove east and south their was back to Egypt to rest and rebuild. On the way, they had traveled to Bir Gibni by 3:30am on 2 December 1941. The 1st South African Brigade was in position at Taieb el Esem. The 4th Armoured Brigade was in a night leaguer, as they wre wont to do. This night, they were at Bir Berraneb. This was a far as 24 miles from Ed Duda. The attempted relief of Tobruk had failed.
Rommel had not succeeded in restoring the situation to what it had been prior to the start of Operation Crusader. The Tobruk force, mainly 70th Division, was still at Ed Duda. British forces on the Egyptian frontier were attacking the German and Italian positions at Salum, Bardia, and the "Omars" (such as Sidi Omar). There was also a strong British force on the Trigh el Abd that was a potential threat. The outcome would depend as much on British moves as on anything Rommel would decide to do. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

The battle near Sidi Rezegh and Ed Duda playes out on 1 December 1941

The Australian historian remarks that Brigadier Gatehouse did not feel that he had to "charge" the enemy when encountered. Rather, he could use his judgement about how to conduct the action to protect his tanks and personnel from unnecessary loss. Gatehouses brigade drove down from the escarpment near the Sidi Rezegh airfield. There may have been times when they might have engaged the enemy under risky circumstances. By this time, the New Zealand Division had been driven from Belhamed and Sidi Rezegh. The 1st South African Brigade had made a strong attack on Point 175, but had failed to penetrate the enemy shield. The 21st Armored Brigade had blocked the attack. North of the British armored brigade, the remains of the 6th New Zealand Brigade manned a defensive position. Their 25th Battalion was still at the blockhouse in the Sidi Rezegh area. They had two groups of infantry tanks to their north. The 8th RTR had five tanks left. Even further north were seven infantry tanks of the 44th RTR. They were there to shield anti-tank guns and field artillery, located in a wadi. They still had about 40 25pdr Field Guns left. They represented the main fighting force that survived from the New Zealand Division. There were a handful of other units or groups left, in addition.
Rommel had pulled in most of the German Africa Corps. They were closing in on the New Zealand Division and the other units. Rommel called the situation "the Cauldron". New the 6th New Zealand Brigade and Brigadier Gatehouse's armored brigade were the German 8th Armored Regiment and the 200th Motorized Infantry Regiment. They lay north of the Trigh Capuzzo. On the south side were the "Mickl artillery group" and the 115th Motorized Infantry Regiment. The German force outgunned the New Zealand Division artillery. The 90th Light Division was also on the north side of the Cauldron. The Italian Ariete Armored Division was east of the Cauldron. The 21st Armored Division was sitting on the Trigh Capuzzo.
Brigadier Gatehouse was very uncomfortable with the situation he found himself in. Gatehouse was aware of the strong enemy artillery force that was present. He also believed that they were too late to keep the New Zealand Division from having to withdraw.He knew about the enemy heavy artillery that was nearby. Given the disparity in tank strengths, Brigadier Gatehouse was not ready to attack the enemy tanks. The 6th New Zealand Brigade commander had decided that they needed to withdraw to Zaafran. Brigadier Gatehouse had been in communication with General Gott about the situation. His brigade was caught in a fight with Italian tanks "in front" and some German tanks on the right. The New Zealand transport had disappeared, so Gatehouse considered that his responsibility to them had ended.
Tanks from the 15th Armored Division had expected that Gatehouse's brigade would attack. By early afternoon, the British armored Brigade had driven off towards the south so that they could resupply. The situation had left the 6th New Zealand Brigade wondering what had happened. They were thankful for the presence of the brigade, but were surprised when the brigade suddenly disappeared. They had also expected that the British tanks would have had more of an effect on the course of the battle. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

The critical point in the Crusader battle, 1 December 1941

When General Scobie found that the New Zealand troops from Belhamed were withdrawing towards the Tobruk sortie force, he had them diverted and employed in the "forward posts". The enemy had staged an attack from the east against the "corridor". This attack was driven back. They apparently had killed fifty of the enemy and had taken another fifty as prisoners.
The one New Zealand battalion at Belhamed, the 18th, had been facing Ed Duda. They had been able to hold their ground, but eventually started to pull back to the west. Major Loder-Symonds had finally been able to get two mobile artillery observation posts in place. He had been able to call in artillery fire to support the New Zealand withdrawal. B/O Battery were able to drive back a group of German tanks that had been trying to cut off the New Zealand battalion. Major Loder-Symonds was able to speak to the New Zealand Battalion commander, who seemed to be very able. The major told the New Zealand commander that the artillery would stay and provide anti-tank protection, if his men could take positions "just in front of the guns". He also showed the New Zealand commander the enemy minefield that they could use as part of their defenses. The New Zealand battalion moved onto the ridge "west of Belhamed". Very soon, a column of vehicles approached with the remnants of the New Zealand Division artillery. This included one troop from the 6th New Zealand Field Regiment. Major Loder-Symonds was able to incorporate them "alongside B Battery". That gave them a line of eight guns that could fire as a unit. There was some concern that B Battery could be forced to withdraw, so "Rocket Troop" was sent to a position at Belhamed where they would be in a position to provide support. Rocket Troop was shelled and took some casualties, but where able to hold on "until after dark".

The 2/13th Battalion was still in place on the ridge by Belhamed and Ed Duda. They were able to observe the German attack on Belhamed with tanks. The also observed the 18th New Zealand Battalion pull back. By 10am, they heard about a German group. Later, they could see what might have been Germans "beyond the bypass road". The 2/13th Battalion heard at 10:30am that Belhamed had fallen to the enemy. A conference was planned for 11am at Brigadier Willison's headquarters.
They were now at the critical point in the Crusader battle. They had almost been defeated on Totensonntag, but 70th Division,, the New Zealand Division, and the army tank brigades had kept the British forces from being defeated. On 1 December, the New Zealand Division had taken important losses. The German armored divisions had been ordered to attack and to defeat them.
In the German Africa Corps, the custom was to move in to attack while the sky was still dark. They planned an attack on Belhamed at 6:30am. Brigadier Gatehouse had been ordered to check out the situation at dawn, which would have been later than the planned German moves. The time was 9am when the composite armored brigade approached over the "northern Sidi Rezegh escarpment. Brigadier Gatehouse had been given orders that would have been bad to have executed as given. He was to attack and be relentless, fighting to the last tank, if necessary. Gatehouse had the 5th RTR commander contact the New Zealand Division and plan hoow to  attack the enemy tanks. Brigadier Gatehouse did not feel required to  make reckless charges against the enemy. His responsibility was to make the best use of his resources in tanks and men and not throw them away. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

Events on 30 November 1941 to 1 December 1941 near Sidi Rezegh

The situation late on 30 November 1941 saw the 1st South African Brigade sitting on the escarpment where General Norrie had led them. The 6th New Zealand Brigade was all but destroyed. The Italian Ariete Armored Division was on the Trigh Capuzzo, with the 21st Armored Division behind them. The South Africans sent out a strike group towards Point 175, but they were stopped by units from the 21st Armored Division, including the 3rd Recennaissance Unit. The Australians were sitting on the ridge, with two New Zealand companies to their east, near the place where the bypass road crossed the ridge.
Eighth Army senior officers were busy during the night.. They had different amounts of information about the situation, and their personalities shaped how they responded. General Freyberg was prepared to ask his men to sacrifice themselves, as needed, for the good of the division. General Freyberg believed that his division was still obligated to hold the ground they defended. For one thing, the corridor to Tobruk depended on them. The commander of the 6th New Zealand Brigade had proposed withdrawing, but that was unacceptable to General Freyberg. General Freyberg's view was that the 1st South African Brigade and the British armor would need to participate in the battle to hold the ground they occupied. General Freyberg sent his chief artillery offcier to Tobruk to talk with General Godwin-Austen about Freyberg's view of what was needed. General Freyberg also sent two officers to talk with the South African brigade comander. "He beileved that the South Africans had been placed under his command." They were to tell him that Sidi Rezegh had been captured by the enemy. The New Zealand Division needs Sidi Rezegh recaptured prior to dawn on 1 December. The South Africans were ordered to retake Sidi Rezegh immeditately.
The New Zealand artillery commander, Brigadier Miles only reached XIII Corps headquarters after midnight. The officers sent to the South African brigade arrived at 1:40am. The South Africans were quite close to General Norrie, so when they received the message relayed from General Freyberg, the South African commander went to talk with General Norrie. They decided that capturing Point 175 was not possible prior to dawn. The attack could restart at dawin, at best.
General Godwin-Austen sent out encoded wireless message to the major unit commanders. The 7th Armoured Division needed to concentrate and focus on defeating the German armored units. If the South Africans could take Point 175 and Sidi Rezegh, then they should try to establish themselves in controll of those positions. If that failed, then the New Zealand Division needed to move "behind Ed Duda". They would also need to hold onto Belhamed. Anything else can be given up, if all elsle failed. They might have ordered the New Zealand Division to withdraw immediately, but there was not realy time for that to be a realistic possibility.
Geenral Scobie was paying xlose attention to events and plans. He was aware ofo the rishs of having 70th Division soldiers from Tobruk outside of the fortress defenses when the situaion was in doubt.  Infantry tank runners were not more than twenty by now. He was intent on holding onto Ed Duda and Belhamed. General Gott told Brigadier Gatehouse that he needed to attack the enemy tanks. They were very close to morning and the enemy forces were clearly on the move, intent on causing them trouble.
The 32nd Army Tank Brigade dealt with an enemy group between outposts Butch and Tiger. at dawn, there was heavy mist. While there still was mist, they started to receive incoming artillery fire at Belhamed. The New Zealand Division units near Belhamed were being attacked. They had support by the 1st RHA, but some British tanks were knocked out by mines and anti-tank gun fire. The New Zealanders "were without tank support and being overrun."  This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

On the brink of disaster at Sidi Rezegh and the general area on 30 November 1941

Late on 30 November 1941, the men at Ed Duda could tell that there was fighting at Sidi Rezegh, but they could not see what was actually happening. The men at Ed Duda were concerned that the situation was about to take a major turn for the worst. A planned change of companies was canceled. They were so concerned about the situation and their prospects for survival that they spent the night digging emplacements and laying mines. Up until the end of the day on 30 November, the XIII Corps headquarters and the men in Tobruk had no idea of what was happening at Sidi Rezegh.
The one British cruiser tank brigade, the composite 4th/22nd Brigade, wasted time playing games with the Italians of the Ariete armored division. They also may have seen and fired at some German Africa Corps men and tanks, but took no serious action. General Gott, the 7th Armoured Division commander, had wanted the brigade to be engaged with keeping the corridor open from the outside to the New Zealand Division, near Point 175. In fact, the Germans were positioning themselves to attack the New Zealand Division and remove them from the battlefield. There wax Italian artillery positioned near Point 175 that was firing on the New Zealanders.
The XXX Corps commander, General Norrie, took personal of the 1st South African Brigade. They reached the escarpment at about 4pm, near Trigh Capuzzo. They did not try anything, but were preparing to attack the dressing station at Point 175.
The 15th Armored Division was intent on capturing Sidi Rezegh and surrounding the New Zealand Division so that they were out of touch with Tobruk and the Egyptian Frontier. They made mistakes, however, as one was for the division to head off to El Adem. They were eventually stopped at Bir Salem. The men at Ed Duda could see the 15th Armored Division move to the north, near Bir Bu Creimisa.
Bir Bu Creimus had become the headquarters of the German Africa Corps. Later in the afternoon, Rommel ordered the attack on the New Zealand Division. The little Mickl Group, a battle group of five tanks, was to hit Sidi Rezegh. The Italians of the Ariete Division were to hit the east side. The 90th Light Division would hit Belhamed to the south. General Cruewell had suggested that the 15h Armored Division should move to the "saddle" between Ed Duda and Belhamed. They would end up moving along the foot of the ridge where the 2/13th Battalion was located. The Australians planned to patrol to the "bypass road.
From 4pm to 5pm, the German and Italian tanks moved in on the New Zealand Division. The 4th/22nd Brigade had done nothing useful to interfere with the enemy tank movements. The 15th Armored Division commander, General Neumann-Silkow led his division to join the attack on Sidi Rezegh, rather than waste his time at the "saddle"The 6th New Zealand Brigade, located near the Sidi Rezegh mosque was in trouble. Two New Zealand battalions were overrun and a third was pressed hard by the Ariete Division. The brigade commander wanted to salvage what he could from the wreckage. He wanted to move in behind the "Tobruk sortie force". With the 6th New Zealand Brigade all but destroyed, that left the New Zealand Division artillery unprotected at Belhamed, and nearby. From the east, you now had the 21st Armored Division closing in and blocking the Trigh Capuzzo. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

General Norrie's priority task for 30 November 1941: the South African brigade

The South African brigade was weighing heavily on General Norrie's mind. He wanted to help them make contact with the New Zealand Division without them being attacked by German tanks. The Australian historian thought that what General Norrie needed to do was to get the help of  Brigadier Gatehouse's composite armored brigade, not just freeing his schedule so that he could concentrate his thinking. Appatently, General Norrie personally accompanied the South African brigade on their trip to join the New Zealand Division.
30 November was one week after Rommel wanted to bring the German Africa Corps against the New Zealand Division. We see now that General Ritchie had ordered the 7th Armoured Division to harass the rear of the 15th Armored Division. General Gott told Brigadier Gatehouse to keep the corridor open from Tobruk to the New Zealand Division. They were also to protect the South Africans. XIII Corps told the New Zealand Division to move west as soon as the South African Brigade arrived.
Ed Duda was now left with a mixture of infantry units to continue to hold the place. There was the 1/Essex, the Australians, and the New Zealand companies. The 2/13th was left in command of the units. The Australians were surprised to find that German armor continued to drive around on the desert without anyone interfering. The only anti-tank capability they had were field artillery from the 1st RHA. They had no anti-tank guns at all. One response from the Australians was to request a large number of mines to build defenses. When the sun came up on 30 November, the Australians could see a busy German temporary encampment on the desert flat. They had everything from kitchens, to repair workshops, tanks, and men being marched around. The forward observer from the 1st RHA was anxious to all in artillery fire on the camp. The Germans replied with accurate artillery fire. The Australians could see some forty tanks to the west. A group of twelve drove close and were shelled. By 8am, they could see about 35 tanks, which eventually were bombed by the RAF. Two German tanks drove into an Australian position and asked the men to surrender, but they didn't fall for such as game. They could see the German tanks drive around as if to approach the New Zealand Division.
The British and Australians were able to nab some German vehicles from the bypass road. Brigadier Willison held a meeting at about mid-morning, where he proposed consolidating Ed Duda under the 2/13th Battalion and giving back the spare companies to their owners. Later in the day, men from the 1/Bedfordshire and Hertfordshire moved into the area. They were in a position just below the escarpment with a company on either side of the road.
The lack of resolute command of the forces near by left the men in precarious positions. They did not know what was British and what was enemy, because of the careless way that business was being conducted. You have to think that some of the problem was General Ritchie's lack of experience at the level of command he was at. Men near Ed Duda could hear firing from the general direction of Sidi Rezegh, but they could not actually see what was happening. No one bothered to tell them, either. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

Events on 30 November 1941 near Ed Duda and Sidi Rezegh

A portion of the 2/13th Battalion (Australians) were still on "the ridge to the east". They were reinforced by two companies from the 19th New Zealand Battalion, and operated under the Australian command. The New Zealanders were in place alongside the Australians, another "ANZAC" formation.
Commanders from both sides had some fundamental misunderstandings about the current situation. What little ground had been taken by mainly German forces under Rommel's command had been recaptured by two squadrons of Matildas and two infantry companies. Rommel had already fought and defeated the armor and infantry of XXX Corps. Rommel expected that the British knew how badly they had been beaten and that the New Zealand Division would pull into Tobruk for protection. General Ritchie, 8th Army Commander, however was unaware of the real situation. He thought that the German armored forces had been so battered that they would attempt to flee to the west. Rommel also expected the main British armored force to join the battle. Because of that impression, Rommel decided to attack the New Zealand Division where they were sitting, south of Tobruk.
General Ritchie wanted the 7th Armoured Division to attack the Germans that night, but instead, they went into a protective night leaguer some distance away. They were reorganized so that they had one composite brigade composed from the remnants of the division. Rommel, on 30 November, wanted to surround the New Zealand Division, although he neglected to consider Ed Duda in his plan. Rommel was focused, instead, on retaking Sidi Rezegh. One change that Rommel made was appointing General Boettcher, the heavy artillery commander, to take command of the 21st Armored Division.
General Ritchie's orders to the 7th Armoured Division were to "harass with petty attacks" against the 15th Armored Division. He revised his orders later to be to both harass and destroy the enemy as the opportunity prsented itself. The goal being to protect the 1st South African Brigade. The South African's had their orders modified to take them towards Ed Duda, south of the airfield at Sidi Rezegh. General Norrie got involved and ordered the South Africans to move to Sciafsciuf way east of Point 175 before they got up on the escarpment. They would then be attacking Point 175 from the east.
XIII Corps plans for 30 November were similar to his previous plans. General Godwin-Austen ordered 70th Division to take some action to divert Rommel's attention from the New Zealand Division. At the same time, General Godwin-Austen asked the New Zealand Division to help 70th Division. Once the situation at Ed Duda seemed to have been stabilized, General Godwin-Austen was thnking again of a forward move to El Adem. When the New Zealand Division had connnected with the South Africans, and they were confident in their ability to hold their present position, they should push forward to the El Adem-Bir el Gubi road.
General Norrie and XXX Corps were concerned with helping the South African Brigade join with the New Zealand Division. They had hoped to have completed that movement prior to 30 November, but the enemy armored forces returning from the Egyptian frontier had mde that impossible, as the South African brigade was not in a position to deal with armored forces. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

A surprise attack that worked at Ed Duda

The situation was rather ironic. The 7th Armoured Division, designed to be able to successfully fight the German Africa Corps lay in a leaguer at night, while the 32nd Army Tank Brigade, which had been tested repeatedly during the Crusader battle, was being asked again to fight the German Africa Corps, this time at Ed Duda.
The tank battle at Ed Duda lasted about three hours while the infantry was engaged for about fifteen minutes. Eight Matilda tanks drove up to the escarpment at Ed Duda. They came from the lower ground below. The German tanks stood out against a backlit view. There were tracers from machine gun fire and shots were fired from German 50mm guns and British 2pdr tank guns. There were also German 20mm tank guns fired from light tanks that added to the fireworks. Many shots ricocheted from the Matilda tank hulls. There were many more German tanks, perhaps three-to-one in numbers versus the British infantry tanks. The observing British infantry could see Matildas withdrawing and then returning to fight. The Germans seemed to be winning, but the German tanks withdrew, leaving the British tanks in possession of Ed Duda.
The Australian infantry were going to wait to attack, but ended up being sent forward at 1:30am. The German tanks were thought to have withdrawn before this time. What had actually happened was that by the British attacking without artillery support, they achieved complete surprise. Colonel Burrows, though, ordered his men to call out "Australians coming" as they attacked. The British tanks were also making as much noise as possible, revving their engines as they moved. They were also firing on the move, just to create more confusion. Sadly, the British tanks mistakenly fired on the Australian infantry. The Germans thought that they were facing British infantry, as they called "Englander kommen".
An account written after the battle gave better information about the situation. The Australian infantry attacked with two companies from B Company on the left and C Company on the right. The men from C Company had to recognize who was in front of them. They were apparently German infantry. Once they got close, the shouted and charged with bayonets fixed. The enemy morale collapsed  Their infantry either dropped to the ground or else held their hands up in surrender. They could hear Germans running ahead of them, calling "Englander kommen". The Austtslisnd stopped after they comvered five hundred yards. The Australians took small groups of Germans prisoner.
They could hear German motor transport moving in the distance. They were not close enough to capture any except for a motor cycle that was stopped by Thompson sub-machine gun fire. They captured the rider.
The Australian infantry leaders were very experienced at patroling and fighitng at night. The company commanders maintained control of their units. They only encountered German resistance twoards the edges. The Australians were so accomplished at this sort of activity that they stayed on top. When one group of Germans opened fire, an Australian sergeant led a charge and that stopped the enemy fighting. They encountered two Australian stretcher-bearers who were German prisoners and freed them. They almost had bayoneted them by mistake. On the other side, an Australian firing a hand-held Bren gun forced the surrender of 25 German infantry. The attackers took 167 enemy prisoners. The Australians had two  men killed and five wounded. The men needed to be able to dig in before morning, but there was no equipment. They were fortunate enough that there was not an immediate counter-attack. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

Fighting at Ed Duda from 1pm on 29 November 1941

While the first attempt by the Germans to take Ed Duda failed, they came back. The 1/Essex and anti-tank guns had held. At that point, the tanks available to the 4th RTR were ordered to climb to the top of Ed Duda. There were about 8 tanks, of which some, as we have said, were used as observations points by the 1st RHA. At first, the Germans held back, and the dug in positions of the 1/Essex. Their machine guns and anti-tank guns were disabled. The German patrols were able to lift the protective mines. The time was about 4:30pm when the enemey approached from the west. As the time got later, the enemy had teh sun behind them. The British Matilda tanks came up and then started withdrawing by twos. The heavier German tanks approached, while the lighter German tanks, Pzkw II's drove up to the side, to a flanking position. They opened up with machine guns on the British. Now, there were as many as twenty German tanks lined up across the position held by the British infantry. The Matilda tanks were still close by and were in a hull-down position. Darkness fell, but the British tanks were far enough back to be out of the range of German tanks.
Colonel Burrows, the 2/13th Battalion commander, was summoned to a tank that was talking with Brigadier Willison at the 32nd Army Tank Brigade headquarters. Colonel Burrows told them that he was not prepared to attack tanks without having tanks in support. The British agreed that was the best decision. They wanted the 2/13th Battalion to launch a counter-attack at Ed Duda with two companies. They would provide a third company to protect 1st RHA guns near Belhamed. The rest of the battalion would just try to hold their present positions.
Colonel Burrows headquarters was located up on the escarpment. They were about one thousand yards to the northeast of thet pass at Ed Duda. They planned to use companies C and D for the counter-attack at Ed Duda. The situation was such that D company probably would not be ready in time, since they had been farther away. Colonel Burrows made an adjustment so that company B would attack with company C, instead of company D.The two companies gathered at the north side of the escarpment at the bottom. Some 25pdr guns were firing over the men as they gathered. Except for that, the night was quiet. The 25pdrs stopped firing, but a German shell landed in the middle of a platoon and caused immediate casualties to everyone present.
The other men were forced to march past the platoon that he been decimated. They walked around the corner to a starting point for an attack towards the southwest.  Ed Duda had "pimples", so the men were on both sides of the pimples. Looking through binoculars, they could see German tanks about five hundred yards away. Colonel Burrows declined to attack with the tanks in front of them. He needed tank support so that they could fight on an equal footing. Colonel Burrows took time to visit Brigadier Willison's headquarters to discuss the situation. They would either get tank support or they would not attack. The new plan was to get the Australian infantry and the British tanks in close with the enemy, and recognize that they would not be able to have artillery support, due to the close contact. Battery A/E of the 1st RHA had already left for outpost Tiger as the sky got dark. They had also ordered B/O Battery to head back in the belief that the road was not blocked. In fact, though, the 4th RTR had three tanks blocking the road, just forward of the 2/13th Battalion positions. To the east, the 44th RTR had another road block using tanks.
The 7th Armoured Division tanksk were sitting in the desert, not very far away, but were not involved in the criitical fight. Instead, Brigadier Willison and his brigade had been carrying the load, fighting German tanks over the last nine days. And here they were ready to fight the main German armored force, the German Africa Corps. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

Activity from 11:30am on 29 November 1941 in the Crusader battle

A large enemy force was seen approaching Sidi Rezegh at about 11:30am. This was to the west of the earlier planned operation. The British changed their minds about what they were seeing. Now, the enemy seemed to be intent on taking Ed Duda, or at least the escarpment just to the west. The New Zealand Division seemed to be the target of the enemy forces. They were about to surround the division.
The relatively inexperienced General Ritchie, the new 8th Army commander, figured that the German Africa Corps were intent on saving as much of their forces as they could, while the Australian historian suggested that the Germans were intent on defeating what we call the "British" forces, which included New Zealand, Australian, and Polish, as well as real British units.
The Australian historian thought that the British goal should have been to concentrate as great a force as possible to fight the largely German forces that were engaged. He criticized the army commander for not trying to build a concentrated defensive position. The New Zealand Division, at least, kept the priority of holding a corridor open between Tobruk and Ed Duda. They were intent on holding the two ridge lines, including the Ed Duda, Belhamed, and Zaafran, and the Sidi Rezegh ridge line. Part of the New Zealand Division motivation included the information that they were to be joined by the 1st South African Brigade on 30 November.
In the event, the South African brigade was not able to join the New Zealand Division, because the 7th Armoured Division was not able to protect and move the South Africans. The 7th Armoured Division was also not in a position to protect the New Zealand Division from attack. Despite the orders given by the army commander and the corps commanders, the armored division was unable to help the Tobruk force (70th Division) or the New Zealand Division.
The Germans were intent on executing a plan made by the German Africa Corps commander, General Cruewell starting on 29 November. He hoped to make the Tobruk forces that were south of the fortress have to pull back into the fortress perimeter. In this case, the results were not what were desired. General von Ravenstein, the 21st Armored Division commander, was captured by New Zealand Division forces "near Point 175". That caused 21st Armored Division operations to be disrupted for the rest of 29 November.
The German plans had changed by Rommel, who had arrived at the scene of the fighting and had taken charge. He now hoped to cut off the New Zealand Divisiion from communication with Tobruk. He was going to use the 15th Armored Division to take Ed Duda and then push to the east. He hoped that the 21st Armored Division would be able to push west and connect with the 15th Armored Division. They also relied on the Italian Ariete Division to captured the east side of Sidi Rezegh.
By this time, the 15th Armored Division had the bulk of the surviving German tanks. The 115th Infantry Regiment, a motorized unit, were "bogged down" close to Bir Salem. The 200th Infantry Regiment, also a motorized unit, attacked outpost Doc (formerly known as Dalby Square) instead of attacking Ed Duda. Ed Duda was attaced by a much smaller force than had been intended by the plan. The 15th Armored Division was assembling a force to attack Ed Duda at about 1pm. We have access to the communications from Captain Salt, from Chestnut Troop of the 1st RHA. Germans attacked the 1/Essex from the west, but where stopped. The 4th RTR was able to summon 8 infantry tanks. Some of the tanks were used by the 1st RHA, including Captain Salt. He was killed when his tank ws hit. The artillery lost two tanks, which disrupted the artillery support. That left the enemy approaching by 4:30pm. This is based onthe account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

The battle of 29 November 1941 near Sidi Rezegh

After the transport convoy took off for Tobruk, after crossing over the Ed Duda pass, the German heavy artillery switched targets to the Australians of the 2/13th Battalion. The Australians were not dug in, but were sitting in exposed positions. Fortunately, Colonel Burrows was quick to recognize what they should do. He pointed out an area towards the east to Lieutenant Maughan. This was at the base of the escarpment on the far side of the pass. He had him point the men to defensive positions looking towards the south. The battalion headquarters would be located at the escarpment foot. They would be deployed with two companies forward and two behind them. This just happened to put the men in the right place for the Sidi Rezegh attack that was planned.
The enemy artillery soon found the battalion. Fortunately, there were some positions dug by previous inhabitants, and there were also deep tracks from the infantry tanks. The fact that many shells were duds didn'r hurt.
About 7:30am, Colonel Burrows rode in a light tank that was covering the route that was planned for the attack. They captured two wounded Italians while they were driving. Burrows initial impression was that they were in for trouble, because the ground was flat, had no cover, and the distance to the objective seemed rather great. The recent rain had turned the area into a bog. The only relief came when the attack was postponed for four hours. At a 10am meeting, the company commanders learned of the postponement, and that the 19th New Zealand Battalion would make the attack. The 2/13th Battalion would be in a support role, rather than being the attackers.
General Godwin-Austen, the XIII Corps commander had made the decisions. His new headquarters was at the El Gubbi airfield in the Tobruk fortress area. Brigadier Willison learned that General Godwin-Austen wanted to extend the corridor that stretched from outpost Grumpy north beyond Prince Town. He wanted to use the 2/13th Battalion for the task. For that reason, they were spared any direct involvement at Sidi Rezegh. They also learned that the 1st South African Brigade would move to the north to solidify the situation at Sidi Rezegh.
They soon noticed enemy vehicles and tanks moving towards the Sidi Rezegh area that would be attacked. They could see them approaching Ed Duda. To counter that movement, a squadron of Matilda tanks moved towards them. That was enough to cause the enemy force to pull back from where they had been headed. The Matilda tanks thought that the enemy pulling back might have been intended to draw them into a trap with guns, so they pulled back.
The enemy forces continued to move around at Sidi Rezegh. They seemed to be heading for the feature that the 2/13th Battalion had been going to attack. The picture now looked to be that the enemy force was driving towards the escarpment west of Ed Duda. The commanders thought that the enemy forces were going to concentrate on the New Zealand Division.
The new Eighth Army commander, General Ritchie, interpreted what the enemy intended as trying to drive the British forces back from the Axis lines of communication. The British needed to concentrate their tanks, guns, and infantry, along with bomber aircraft, into position to fight the enemy forces. Sadly, the British commanders did not react that way. General Ritchie had been a staff officer who was not as knowledgable about mechanized warfare as even General Scobie. The fault likes not so much in General Ritchie as in General Auchinleck's incompetence at judging people. Auchinleck was good as a field commander, but was a failure as a theater commander. Churchill constalby begged Auchinleck to take command of the Eighth Army. He was the best army commander around until Bernard Law Montgomery arrived in North Africa. We dislike Montgomery as a p0erson but respect him as an army commander, even with all his faults. This is based on Vol.III of the Australian Official History and our general knowledge of the topic.

The night of 28 to 29 November 1941 near Ed Duda, Sidi Rezegh, and Tobruk

The convoy to transport the 2/13th Battalion had arrived. They then moved on carrying the Australians through the perimeter defenses. This was somewhat emotional affair for the Australians who had been trapped in Tobruk since early in 1941. They stopped at the Tiger outpost (which had been renamed as Sneezy). The 32nd Army Tank Brigade had a command center located at Tiger. The Australians learned at Tiger that they were to be involved with an attack by Brigadier Willison's armored brigade in the morning. They were supposed to attack Sidi Rezegh along with the armored brigade and a New Zealand battalion. They would receive formal orders about the operation when the 2/13th Battalion arrived at Ed Duda. The plan was mentioned in the 70th Division operations report. Apparently, the goal was to occupy a position on a spur at Sidi Rezegh that lies to the east. They would be operating with the 32nd Army Tank Brigade as well as the New Zealand Battalion.
The convoy grew in size while sitting at Tiger. They now had a supply column carrying supplies for the New Zealand Division and an augmented escort force. They did not need to wait long before they drove off to Ed Duda, which was relatively nearby. They had reached Ed Duda not long after midnight. The men climbed down off their trucks and were shown to their assigned spots on the eastern slopes of Ed Duda. This was a cold November night. The air was so cold that many men were not able to sleep. The passage from Tobruk to Ed Duda was very visible. You could see long lines of vehicles that were part of British and New Zealand convoys. They had driven in from the outposts in the desert and had turned onto the bypass road and then headed for the Tobruk corridor.
Colonel Burrows, of the 2/13th Battalion, was summoned to a meeting at Brigadier Willison's headquarters. The topic was to plan the details of the attack on Sidi Rezegh. They quickly realized that the 19th New Zealand Battalion commander and at least hald of the battalion were not there for the meeting and would not participate in the attack. The revised plan was that the Australians would attack and then take the ground that they would occupy. Colonel Burrows pointed out that he would need time to look over the situation in daylight before trying to attack. The guns from the 1st RHA would also need to be moved up to where they could be fired to support the 2/13th Battalion. That all meant that the attack needed to be postponed until 11am. The orders noted that the enemy forces were on the southwest slope down from Sidi Rezegh. The 2/13th Battalion would be under the operational command of the 4th RTR, which would provide tank support. The New Zealand forces would take over the rest of Sidi Rezegh. They desired that the Australian battalion would take the highest ground, designated by three grid squares. The men who had guided the Australians to their night positions at Ed Duda warned them to watch for gunfire early in the day. The veteran Australians didn't take the warning seriously, but this was different from what they were used to seeing. The German heavy artillery ws involved.
A New Zealand truck convoy stopped at the Ed Duda pass, right before dawn. The trucks were following good dispersal tactics, and they started to move again. German heavy guns opened fire on them. The bursting shells caused a high column of dense, black smoke. The trucks were now moving at high speed towards Tobruk. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

The battle on the afternoon of 28 November 1941

At outpost Freddie, some of the tanks that attacked got on top of Freddie. They drove around the outpost and took some 300 prisoners. They turned out to be mostly German soldiers. In the process, though, about five tanks were lost, mostly mined. The forward artillery observer was killed during the attack. The negative results were enough to cancel the proposed exploitation. As the time got closer to night, the infantry that were involved were withdrawn. The fact that the Tobruk force was able to attack the enemy forces was a sign that the situation could improve over time. The troops that were attacked in this case were from the 90th Light Division, and were units that had not taken losses prior to this battle.
General Scobie was getting increasingly concerned about his men at Ed Duda. The one cruiser squadron from the 1st RTR had now been used at outpost Freddie and had felt the effects. The one squadron of Matilda infantry tanks of the 4th RTR that remained had been sent to Belhamed. The diversions had left the 1/Essex with little support. Pretty late in the afternoon saw enemy troop movements on the escarpment. Right before 6pm, General Scobie received a message from the New Zealand Division about the enemy movements. General Scobie ordered the 16th Brigade to transport the Australians of the 2/13th Battalion to Ed Duda. He directed the battalion commander to report to Scobie for instructions. The purpose of the move was to strengthen Ed Duda.
Colonel Burrows, of the 2/13th Battalion was driving towards Post R69 when Brigadier Willison stopped him and told him that General Scobie was in route to speak with him. General Scobie was there to meet Colonel Burrows about 15 minutes later. General Scobie was riding in the back of a truck. He showed Colonel Burrows a map of the Ed Duda position. He pointed out that the area between Ed Duda, Sidi Rezegh, and Belhamed had the advantage of sitting on the enemy's retreat path. It also was a good spot to join forces with British units from the Egyptian Frontier. With the corps headquarters moving into Tobruk, it became increasingly important to keep the corridor to Ed Duda unobstructed. To stir things up further, there was a false report that the enemy had taken Sidi Rezegh during the afternoon. There would be a New Zealand move to recapture Sidi Rezegh the next day. Still, the main concern was to continue to hold Ed Duda.
When Colonel Burrows meeting with General Scobie had ended, General Scobie emphasized that they must continue to hold Ed Duda (at all costs).
The Australians had all sorts of emotions when the time came to drive out of Tobruk. There were armored cars leading the column and on the sides. They drove until they reached the Tiger outpost. The outpost had since been renamed as Sneezy. They stopped at that point. Tiger was a sort of headquarters or communications center for the 32nd Army Tank Brigade. This si based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

The battle continues near Tobruk on 28 November 1941

28 November 1941 saw the New Zealand Division conducting attacks to clean up pockets of enemy troops. There had been two groups of German troops located along the Trigh Capuzzo that were troublesome. The group that stretched between Sidi Rezegh and Belhamed faced a squadron of tanks from the 44th RTR and troops from the 18th New Zealand Battalion. Two platoons attacked and took the defensive position near the tomb. The infantry were from the 26th New Zealand Battalion.
There was another enemy force looking down on the airfield and plateau from the second escarpment. This was the Artillery Command 104, commanded by Major-General Boettcher. They had reestablished themselves after the forward movement by the New Zealand Division. While the other attacks were happening, enemy troops attacked 24th New Zealand Battalion from the escarpment. The enemy was able to push the battalion back from their previous position. A counter-attack by tanks from the 8th RTR were unsuccessful in pushing the enemy back.
The German armored divisions had supply problems and were scattered. The British armor were not causing the German tanks any problems early in the day on 28 November. The 7th Armoured Division main accomplishment was to escort the 1st South African Brigade so that they joined the New Zealand Division. They wasted some strength while exchanging fire with the German 15th Armored Division. They accidentally helped the New Zealand Division by drawing the 15th Armored Division further south. During the afternoon, the Germans overran the New Zealand Division "main dressing station". They allowed them to continue to function, however. Towards dark, the German leading forces fought the New Zealand Division headquarters. By night, the German 21st Armored Division was close to the New Zealand Division headquarters as well as XIII Corps. Part of XXX Corps headquarters were also present. The two corps commanders decided during the night to move into Tobruk. Somewhat to the south were the 7th Armoured Division leaguer. The 1st South African Brigade was also close by.
By the end of 28 November 1941, the enemy seemed not ready yet to collapse. The situation had delayed any possible move to push through to the Bardia Road. The push to the Bardia Road was to commence with capturing outposts Freddie and Walter. Freddie alone proved to be a tough place to attack. Two companies of the 2/Queen's and 7th RTR D Squadron. The infantry was bothered by enemy fire. A tank force was sent from Ed Duda to help. hey consisted of some light tanks and nine cruiser tanks, all from the 1st RTR. They did take twenty prisoners and roced 11 enemy tanks back. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.>/p?

27-28 November 1941 near Tobruk

The men in command decided late on 27 November 1941 that the 1st South African Brigade was going to be given to the New Zealand Division. They found that they could make that decision, but actually making that work was to be more difficult. Not being able to have a third brigade created problems, as well, since the South Africans were slow to join.
From the perspective of the Tobruk force, they began to hope that they could cause the enemy forces to withdraw. The proposed move to move forward along the Bardia Road was thought to be likely to succeed. Progress was delayed by rain, and misinterpreted news about enemy tank operations near Ed Duda also caused the progress forward to be pushed out into the future. By dawn, the situation at Ed Duda seemed less threatening. The enemy had pulled out of the positions on the west side of Ed Duda. The 19th New Zealand Battalion furnished two companies to move forward to create an outpost south of the Trigh Capuzzo, located on the escarpment to the south. This was also on the west side of Sidi Rezegh. They were to determine if nearby troops were friends or enemies. They were ordered back before they could do that.
From the perspective of the 1st RHA, they thought that the enemy must have troops at Belhamed, despite the claim that there were New Zealand troops in possession of the place. In the morning light, the troops there were seen to be enemy. They were on the northwest side of the Belhamed. The enemy would have a great view of the planned move forward by the 2/Queens through the enemy forces on the east side of the Bardia Road.
XIII Corps notified the Tobruk Fortress commander that they needed to take an area designated by map position. This included the Belhamed pocket of enemy troops. This was east of the corridor that the Tobruk sortie force had created. They needed to take the place at 2pm and hold the position starting from that time. This may have just to have been needed to help the 4th New Zealand Brigade protect their northern side. The New Zealand Division would be preoccupied with clearing enemy troop pockets from the south.
The 19th New Zealand Battalion, minus the troops involved elsewhere, were designated for the operation along with a 4th RTR squadron. They started late, but when they approached enemy troops with tanks, they surrendered. Those that surrendered were a mixed force of German and Italian troops. Typically bad practice in this case allowed the force that General Scobie had sent to do the task had been appropriated by the New Zealand Division. The culprit in this case was the XIII Corps headquarters. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

Continued action in the Crusader Battle on 27 and 28 November 1941

One problem created by Rommel sending the German Africa Corps to the Egyptian Frontier for three days is that he provided time for the 7th Armoured Division to regroup and recover. General Gott, the 7th Armoured Division commander heard the report from the King's Dragoon Guards armored cars that a column was headed for Gasr el Arid. General Gott ordered the 22nd Armoured Brigade to attack the front of the column and told the 4th Armoured Brigade with Stuart tanks to attack the flank.
The 22nd Armoured Brigade made contact with the German 15th Armored Division close to Bir el Chleta at about 1:30pm. They were both about the same strength in tanks. The 22nd Armoured Brigade was short of artillery, though, as they only had one 25pdr battery and one 2pdr anti-tank gun battery. The Support Group artillery had been scattered among a large number of Jock columns, so that few gun were available when they were needed.
After a while the 4th Armoured Brigade made contact. They were better equipped with tanks at this point. The British armored brigades had kept the Germans from taking a position on the escarpment, overlooking the Trigh Capuzzo. The British threw their advantage away at dark, when they pulled to leaguer away from the important ground. The Germans responded after dark by taking  the important pass that went up the escarpment.
In the dark, at the 2/13th Battalion, the land to Gambut was studied by the light of a lamp. At Gambut, Rommel and the Africa Corps Commander were meeting. Rommel apparently wanted to attack either to the west or southwest. The Division zbV Africa was renamed to the 90th Light Division, they name that they made famous over time. The 90th Light Division would participate in Rommel's proposed attack.
At this point in the Crusader Battle, the British continued to "do the wrong thing". General Blamey had repeated criticised the British practice of breaking up divisions and scattering their units across the desert. The New Zealand Division was a victim of this practice in the Cruader Battle. General Freyberg wanted his 5th New Zealand Brigade returned to his control. The British, instead,wanted him to use the 1st South African Brigade.
During the night of 27-28 November 1941 the decision was mzde by the British command to send the 1st South African Brigade to the New Zealand Division. The New Zealand DIvision at this point in time was short of strength to clear out the groups of enemy troops that were still present. They also needed to better prepare defensive positions on the most important of its territory. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

The Crusader Battle turns on 27 November 1941

27 November 1941 saw enemy forces turn from the Egyptian frontier and return to the Tobruk area. The big operation by British forces had dwindled over three days. The action was reduced to what three infantry brigades and three tank battalions could achieve. Even though the British strength was fading, they brought enough pressure on the enemy to cause Rommel to change the focus back to the Tobruk area from the frontier.
The Africa Corps commander, General Cruewell, wanted to turn the armored divisions back to Tobruk to counter the pressure from the British forces. Rommel was reluctant to make the move, because he hoped to obtain some cheap successes on the Egyptian frontier. The German armored forces typically started the day about two hours before dawn. Early in the day, the 8th Armored Regiment crushed the headquarters of the 5th New Zealand Brigade, which was located at Sidi Azeiz. After that, most of the 15th Armored Division drove along the Trigh Capuzzo. If they were not opposed, they would first overrun the XXX Corps Headquarters followed by the XIII Corps Headquarters, and then the New Zealand Division, and finally, the 1st Army Tank Brigade.
At the same time, the 21st Armored Division left Bardia and drove along the coast road. They hit the 22nd New Zealand Battalion, which was holding Menastir. They succeeded in holding up the armored division. The division changed to a different route on the following day so as to make some progress. The 23rd New Zealand Division successfully blocked an attack at Capuzzo by the German 33rd Engineer Battalion with some other detachments under Rommel's close control. The Germans penetrated the New Zealand position, but where finally blocked. After dark, the Germans backed off from the attack and drove west to rejoin their division.
Both the British and the Germans made extensive use of signals intelligence from their enemy. The British were able to warn the New Zealand and the Tobruk force that the enemy armored divisions were driving back to the Tobruk area. The Eighth Army had dismissed the enemy forces on the frontier simply as roaming columns of motor vehicles and tanks that were not accomplishing much. The British command also portrayed the enemy moves toward Tobruk more as a move to escape rather than a threatening attack at a critical point. Earlier, the move towards the Sidi Rezegh area had also been misinterpreted as a retreat while they were chased by the British armor.

While the Germans had been on the Egyptian frontier not accomplishing much, the 7th Armoured Division was able to recover strength from a number of different sources. They were successful in recovering damaged tanks which were repaired. Other tanks were sent from workshops. There were also new tanks recently received. The 22nd Armoured Brigade was rebuilt up to 40 cruiser tanks from almost nothing. The 4th Armoured Brigade was back up to 77 Stuart tanks. The 7th Armoured Brigade was pulled back so as to be rebuilt. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

Trying to get some clarity on 27 November 1941

General Godwin-Austen's message very early on 27 November 1941 had the problem that it sounded like the XIII Corps should cut loose and move into a general chase of the enemy forces. By midday, General Godwin-Austen had visited the New Zealand Division and could observe the state of the New Zealand Division and could see the battered division for himself. There was also the news of approaching German armored divisions headed towards the area of his corps from the Egyptian frontier. General Godwin-Austen cautioned General Scobie that the best that the New Zealand Division could do was to hold the ground that they had taken. The Tobruk force was given responsibility for holding open the corridor from Tobruk to Ed Duda, Sidi Rezegh, and Belhamed.
The Australians of the 2/13th Battalion were described as being "in the last ditch at Pilastrano". This reminded me of William III having coined the "last ditch" phrase, where he said that they would find his dead body in the "last ditch" of the defenses. They had been about to be ordered to handle more prisoners, but that was canceled and they were ordered to meet with Brigadier Martin, General Scobie's deputy commander. They received word that they were to be ready to move out in an hour. They would leave the fortress and move out to Gambut, following the Bardia Road. There were assorted rumors of mass Italian surrender.
When the time was almost 5pm, Colonel Burrows was called to meet General Scobie. He heard that the Tobruk fortress had been told to be prepared for a German attack, coming from Bardia. The 2/13th Battalion had become Tobruk's last reserve force. They needed to be ready to stage a counter-attack against German forces. They would be a blocking force on the Bardia Road. If the German attack did not happen, they would be in position to join a push to the east by the 32nd Army Tank Brigade and the 2/Queens battalion south of the Bardia Road and the 1/King's Own on the north side. This move was planned to commence at 7am, if the German attack had not materialized.
As Colonel Burrows was leaving the meeting with General Scobie, he was informed that his battalion had been sent to a position across the Bardia Road, near King's Cross. Colonel Burrows reached his battalion in time to direct they dispositions. Conditions then radically changed and they were "miserable" because they had to endure 24 hours of rain. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

General Scobie has a bad impression of the New Zealand Division on 27 November 1941

During the 70th Division occupation of Ed Duda and the attempt at cooperation with the New Zealand Division, General Scobie was very irritated with the New Zealand Division and General Freyberg. General Scobie had ordered two of his senior staff officers to drive to Ed Duda. He had expected that the New Zealand Division would have created a controlled corridor from the rest of the division to Ed Duda. That had not happened and that indicated to General Scobie a sloppiness on the part of the New Zealanders.
Early during 27 November 1941, XIII Corps gave orders to the Tobruk Fortress, the New Zealand Division and to armored units. As soon as the situation had stabilized, they were to advance to the line of Tobruk, El Adem, and the Bir el Gubi track. Those orders went to the Tobruk headquarters, the New Zealand Division, and the 22nd Armoured Brigade. The orders were that the New Zealand Division would continue west on the escarpment. The Tobruk sortie force would continue along in parallel on the north side. The Tobruk sortie force was asked to accomplish a great deal. They were to send "columns", approximating to the German battle groups, to the west to clear away the enemy from between Tobruk and Gambut. They were to occupy all the "landing grounds" in the area.
General Scobie responded that his troops holding Ed Duda needed to be relieved. That needed to happen so that they could provide enough strength for the clearing operation. General Freyberg sent a message that angered General Scobie. General Scobie replied that there were no New Zealand Division troops at Ed Duda on "square 424409." General Freyberg had said that his troops firmly held Ed Duda, when that was clearly not the case. He also had no idea where the Tobruk troops were located and he hoped that they would tell him.
At this point, General Scobie asked point blank if the New Zealand Division held :"Sidi Rezegh and the hill to the north". He also asked if his troops and tanks were under General Scobie's command. That at least got a reply from General Freyberg that the 44th RTR was needed to return to the New Zealand Division, but the 19th Battalion was available to help defend Ed Duda.
The Australian historian gives both the New Zealand Division and the Tobruk sortie force having lack of information about each other that caused severe miscommunication. The Tobruk sortie force was stretched across forty miles with out considering the clearing mission. General Scobie was also not aware of the condition of the New Zealand units and how close they were to the breaking point. He described them as "near exhaustion".
While General Scobie did not want to risk weakening the Tobruk defenses, he also thought that the enemy were close to "cracking" and that that they might see the enemy go into a general retreat back to the frontier between Cyrenaica and Tripolitania. After General Godwin-Austen visited the New Zealand forces at lunchtime. He got a sobering view of just how shakey they were and that there was still the threat of approaching German armored divisions. General Godwin-Austen informed General Scobie that they New Zealand Division was only capable of holding their territory and that the Tobruk sortie force would have to lear a corridor to the New Zealand DIvision. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

The New Zealand plan for the fighting at SIdi Rezegh and Belhamed

The New Zealand plan for the battles at Sidi Rezegh, Belhamed, and Ed Duda were over-optimisitic. General Freyberg had expected to attack Belhamed and at Sidi Rezegh during the night of 25-26 November 1941. After Sidi Rezegh was captured, the 6th New Zealand Brigade would move forward and take Ed Duda. The two Zealand Brigades would move along each side of the Trigh Capuzzo. In the event, the New Zealanders were not ready to go at 9pm.
The 4th New Zealand Brigade easily took Belhamed, as they had not realized how little strength was holding the place. The Australian historian mentioned that the New Zealand division had not done any serious planning, and that contributed to the delays. The 6th New Zealand Brigade had trouble. The enemy was in the process of relieving some of the forces at Sidi Rezegh while they were reorganizing the defenses. That meant that the 6th Brigade was confused by what they were seeing. They had two sets of two battalions involved. The 21st and 26th New Zealand Battalions would move down the escarpment to the Trigh Capuzzo and then move to Ed Duda. The other two battalions, the 24th and 25th would move into a position and form a box defense above the escarpment.
One immediate issue was that there enemy units sitting in the way on the route to Ed Duda. There was not time prior to dawn to clear the way, so the move to Ed Duda was cancelled. At dawn on 26 November, the New Zealand units at Sidi Rezegh were disorganized and were under fire by the enemy. With trouble, the New Zealand units at Sidi Rezegh were able to hold onto their positions.
Once General Freyberg learned that the Tobruk sortie force had taken Ed Duda, he ordered the 4th Brigade to move to Ed Duda to join forces with the Tobruk force that was there. The 6th New Zealand Brigade was left to strengthen their hold on Sidi Rezegh. An ad hoc group of tanks from the 44th RTR were ordered to Ed Duda, to set off at 9:30pm. At 9:45pm, the 19h Infantry Battalion and six more tanks followed. They arrived at Ed Duda without any real opposition.
The night at Sidi Rezegh had been filled with desperate fighting, including charges with fixed bayonets. Two German strong points remained. One was at Sidi Rezegh and the other was between Behamed and Sidi Rezegh.General Scobie was dismayed to find that the New Zealanders did not control the area between Ed Duda, Sidi Rezegh, and Belhamed. We can only think that the New Zealand Division was still affected by the losses in the Battles for Greece and Crete. They were still not the old New Zealand Division that existed at the start of the Greek Campaign. Another possibility is that General Freyberg was overrated. His poor performance at Crete almost makes us think that could be the case. He may have had Churchill's complete confidence, but that does not mean much, sadly. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.