Activity from 11:30am on 29 November 1941 in the Crusader battle

A large enemy force was seen approaching Sidi Rezegh at about 11:30am. This was to the west of the earlier planned operation. The British changed their minds about what they were seeing. Now, the enemy seemed to be intent on taking Ed Duda, or at least the escarpment just to the west. The New Zealand Division seemed to be the target of the enemy forces. They were about to surround the division.
The relatively inexperienced General Ritchie, the new 8th Army commander, figured that the German Africa Corps were intent on saving as much of their forces as they could, while the Australian historian suggested that the Germans were intent on defeating what we call the "British" forces, which included New Zealand, Australian, and Polish, as well as real British units.
The Australian historian thought that the British goal should have been to concentrate as great a force as possible to fight the largely German forces that were engaged. He criticized the army commander for not trying to build a concentrated defensive position. The New Zealand Division, at least, kept the priority of holding a corridor open between Tobruk and Ed Duda. They were intent on holding the two ridge lines, including the Ed Duda, Belhamed, and Zaafran, and the Sidi Rezegh ridge line. Part of the New Zealand Division motivation included the information that they were to be joined by the 1st South African Brigade on 30 November.
In the event, the South African brigade was not able to join the New Zealand Division, because the 7th Armoured Division was not able to protect and move the South Africans. The 7th Armoured Division was also not in a position to protect the New Zealand Division from attack. Despite the orders given by the army commander and the corps commanders, the armored division was unable to help the Tobruk force (70th Division) or the New Zealand Division.
The Germans were intent on executing a plan made by the German Africa Corps commander, General Cruewell starting on 29 November. He hoped to make the Tobruk forces that were south of the fortress have to pull back into the fortress perimeter. In this case, the results were not what were desired. General von Ravenstein, the 21st Armored Division commander, was captured by New Zealand Division forces "near Point 175". That caused 21st Armored Division operations to be disrupted for the rest of 29 November.
The German plans had changed by Rommel, who had arrived at the scene of the fighting and had taken charge. He now hoped to cut off the New Zealand Divisiion from communication with Tobruk. He was going to use the 15th Armored Division to take Ed Duda and then push to the east. He hoped that the 21st Armored Division would be able to push west and connect with the 15th Armored Division. They also relied on the Italian Ariete Division to captured the east side of Sidi Rezegh.
By this time, the 15th Armored Division had the bulk of the surviving German tanks. The 115th Infantry Regiment, a motorized unit, were "bogged down" close to Bir Salem. The 200th Infantry Regiment, also a motorized unit, attacked outpost Doc (formerly known as Dalby Square) instead of attacking Ed Duda. Ed Duda was attaced by a much smaller force than had been intended by the plan. The 15th Armored Division was assembling a force to attack Ed Duda at about 1pm. We have access to the communications from Captain Salt, from Chestnut Troop of the 1st RHA. Germans attacked the 1/Essex from the west, but where stopped. The 4th RTR was able to summon 8 infantry tanks. Some of the tanks were used by the 1st RHA, including Captain Salt. He was killed when his tank ws hit. The artillery lost two tanks, which disrupted the artillery support. That left the enemy approaching by 4:30pm. This is based onthe account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.