General Norrie's priority task for 30 November 1941: the South African brigade

The South African brigade was weighing heavily on General Norrie's mind. He wanted to help them make contact with the New Zealand Division without them being attacked by German tanks. The Australian historian thought that what General Norrie needed to do was to get the help of  Brigadier Gatehouse's composite armored brigade, not just freeing his schedule so that he could concentrate his thinking. Appatently, General Norrie personally accompanied the South African brigade on their trip to join the New Zealand Division.
30 November was one week after Rommel wanted to bring the German Africa Corps against the New Zealand Division. We see now that General Ritchie had ordered the 7th Armoured Division to harass the rear of the 15th Armored Division. General Gott told Brigadier Gatehouse to keep the corridor open from Tobruk to the New Zealand Division. They were also to protect the South Africans. XIII Corps told the New Zealand Division to move west as soon as the South African Brigade arrived.
Ed Duda was now left with a mixture of infantry units to continue to hold the place. There was the 1/Essex, the Australians, and the New Zealand companies. The 2/13th was left in command of the units. The Australians were surprised to find that German armor continued to drive around on the desert without anyone interfering. The only anti-tank capability they had were field artillery from the 1st RHA. They had no anti-tank guns at all. One response from the Australians was to request a large number of mines to build defenses. When the sun came up on 30 November, the Australians could see a busy German temporary encampment on the desert flat. They had everything from kitchens, to repair workshops, tanks, and men being marched around. The forward observer from the 1st RHA was anxious to all in artillery fire on the camp. The Germans replied with accurate artillery fire. The Australians could see some forty tanks to the west. A group of twelve drove close and were shelled. By 8am, they could see about 35 tanks, which eventually were bombed by the RAF. Two German tanks drove into an Australian position and asked the men to surrender, but they didn't fall for such as game. They could see the German tanks drive around as if to approach the New Zealand Division.
The British and Australians were able to nab some German vehicles from the bypass road. Brigadier Willison held a meeting at about mid-morning, where he proposed consolidating Ed Duda under the 2/13th Battalion and giving back the spare companies to their owners. Later in the day, men from the 1/Bedfordshire and Hertfordshire moved into the area. They were in a position just below the escarpment with a company on either side of the road.
The lack of resolute command of the forces near by left the men in precarious positions. They did not know what was British and what was enemy, because of the careless way that business was being conducted. You have to think that some of the problem was General Ritchie's lack of experience at the level of command he was at. Men near Ed Duda could hear firing from the general direction of Sidi Rezegh, but they could not actually see what was happening. No one bothered to tell them, either. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.