The battle of 29 November 1941 near Sidi Rezegh

After the transport convoy took off for Tobruk, after crossing over the Ed Duda pass, the German heavy artillery switched targets to the Australians of the 2/13th Battalion. The Australians were not dug in, but were sitting in exposed positions. Fortunately, Colonel Burrows was quick to recognize what they should do. He pointed out an area towards the east to Lieutenant Maughan. This was at the base of the escarpment on the far side of the pass. He had him point the men to defensive positions looking towards the south. The battalion headquarters would be located at the escarpment foot. They would be deployed with two companies forward and two behind them. This just happened to put the men in the right place for the Sidi Rezegh attack that was planned.
The enemy artillery soon found the battalion. Fortunately, there were some positions dug by previous inhabitants, and there were also deep tracks from the infantry tanks. The fact that many shells were duds didn'r hurt.
About 7:30am, Colonel Burrows rode in a light tank that was covering the route that was planned for the attack. They captured two wounded Italians while they were driving. Burrows initial impression was that they were in for trouble, because the ground was flat, had no cover, and the distance to the objective seemed rather great. The recent rain had turned the area into a bog. The only relief came when the attack was postponed for four hours. At a 10am meeting, the company commanders learned of the postponement, and that the 19th New Zealand Battalion would make the attack. The 2/13th Battalion would be in a support role, rather than being the attackers.
General Godwin-Austen, the XIII Corps commander had made the decisions. His new headquarters was at the El Gubbi airfield in the Tobruk fortress area. Brigadier Willison learned that General Godwin-Austen wanted to extend the corridor that stretched from outpost Grumpy north beyond Prince Town. He wanted to use the 2/13th Battalion for the task. For that reason, they were spared any direct involvement at Sidi Rezegh. They also learned that the 1st South African Brigade would move to the north to solidify the situation at Sidi Rezegh.
They soon noticed enemy vehicles and tanks moving towards the Sidi Rezegh area that would be attacked. They could see them approaching Ed Duda. To counter that movement, a squadron of Matilda tanks moved towards them. That was enough to cause the enemy force to pull back from where they had been headed. The Matilda tanks thought that the enemy pulling back might have been intended to draw them into a trap with guns, so they pulled back.
The enemy forces continued to move around at Sidi Rezegh. They seemed to be heading for the feature that the 2/13th Battalion had been going to attack. The picture now looked to be that the enemy force was driving towards the escarpment west of Ed Duda. The commanders thought that the enemy forces were going to concentrate on the New Zealand Division.
The new Eighth Army commander, General Ritchie, interpreted what the enemy intended as trying to drive the British forces back from the Axis lines of communication. The British needed to concentrate their tanks, guns, and infantry, along with bomber aircraft, into position to fight the enemy forces. Sadly, the British commanders did not react that way. General Ritchie had been a staff officer who was not as knowledgable about mechanized warfare as even General Scobie. The fault likes not so much in General Ritchie as in General Auchinleck's incompetence at judging people. Auchinleck was good as a field commander, but was a failure as a theater commander. Churchill constalby begged Auchinleck to take command of the Eighth Army. He was the best army commander around until Bernard Law Montgomery arrived in North Africa. We dislike Montgomery as a p0erson but respect him as an army commander, even with all his faults. This is based on Vol.III of the Australian Official History and our general knowledge of the topic.