The critical point in the Crusader battle, 1 December 1941

When General Scobie found that the New Zealand troops from Belhamed were withdrawing towards the Tobruk sortie force, he had them diverted and employed in the "forward posts". The enemy had staged an attack from the east against the "corridor". This attack was driven back. They apparently had killed fifty of the enemy and had taken another fifty as prisoners.
The one New Zealand battalion at Belhamed, the 18th, had been facing Ed Duda. They had been able to hold their ground, but eventually started to pull back to the west. Major Loder-Symonds had finally been able to get two mobile artillery observation posts in place. He had been able to call in artillery fire to support the New Zealand withdrawal. B/O Battery were able to drive back a group of German tanks that had been trying to cut off the New Zealand battalion. Major Loder-Symonds was able to speak to the New Zealand Battalion commander, who seemed to be very able. The major told the New Zealand commander that the artillery would stay and provide anti-tank protection, if his men could take positions "just in front of the guns". He also showed the New Zealand commander the enemy minefield that they could use as part of their defenses. The New Zealand battalion moved onto the ridge "west of Belhamed". Very soon, a column of vehicles approached with the remnants of the New Zealand Division artillery. This included one troop from the 6th New Zealand Field Regiment. Major Loder-Symonds was able to incorporate them "alongside B Battery". That gave them a line of eight guns that could fire as a unit. There was some concern that B Battery could be forced to withdraw, so "Rocket Troop" was sent to a position at Belhamed where they would be in a position to provide support. Rocket Troop was shelled and took some casualties, but where able to hold on "until after dark".

The 2/13th Battalion was still in place on the ridge by Belhamed and Ed Duda. They were able to observe the German attack on Belhamed with tanks. The also observed the 18th New Zealand Battalion pull back. By 10am, they heard about a German group. Later, they could see what might have been Germans "beyond the bypass road". The 2/13th Battalion heard at 10:30am that Belhamed had fallen to the enemy. A conference was planned for 11am at Brigadier Willison's headquarters.
They were now at the critical point in the Crusader battle. They had almost been defeated on Totensonntag, but 70th Division,, the New Zealand Division, and the army tank brigades had kept the British forces from being defeated. On 1 December, the New Zealand Division had taken important losses. The German armored divisions had been ordered to attack and to defeat them.
In the German Africa Corps, the custom was to move in to attack while the sky was still dark. They planned an attack on Belhamed at 6:30am. Brigadier Gatehouse had been ordered to check out the situation at dawn, which would have been later than the planned German moves. The time was 9am when the composite armored brigade approached over the "northern Sidi Rezegh escarpment. Brigadier Gatehouse had been given orders that would have been bad to have executed as given. He was to attack and be relentless, fighting to the last tank, if necessary. Gatehouse had the 5th RTR commander contact the New Zealand Division and plan hoow to  attack the enemy tanks. Brigadier Gatehouse did not feel required to  make reckless charges against the enemy. His responsibility was to make the best use of his resources in tanks and men and not throw them away. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.