On the brink of disaster at Sidi Rezegh and the general area on 30 November 1941

Late on 30 November 1941, the men at Ed Duda could tell that there was fighting at Sidi Rezegh, but they could not see what was actually happening. The men at Ed Duda were concerned that the situation was about to take a major turn for the worst. A planned change of companies was canceled. They were so concerned about the situation and their prospects for survival that they spent the night digging emplacements and laying mines. Up until the end of the day on 30 November, the XIII Corps headquarters and the men in Tobruk had no idea of what was happening at Sidi Rezegh.
The one British cruiser tank brigade, the composite 4th/22nd Brigade, wasted time playing games with the Italians of the Ariete armored division. They also may have seen and fired at some German Africa Corps men and tanks, but took no serious action. General Gott, the 7th Armoured Division commander, had wanted the brigade to be engaged with keeping the corridor open from the outside to the New Zealand Division, near Point 175. In fact, the Germans were positioning themselves to attack the New Zealand Division and remove them from the battlefield. There wax Italian artillery positioned near Point 175 that was firing on the New Zealanders.
The XXX Corps commander, General Norrie, took personal of the 1st South African Brigade. They reached the escarpment at about 4pm, near Trigh Capuzzo. They did not try anything, but were preparing to attack the dressing station at Point 175.
The 15th Armored Division was intent on capturing Sidi Rezegh and surrounding the New Zealand Division so that they were out of touch with Tobruk and the Egyptian Frontier. They made mistakes, however, as one was for the division to head off to El Adem. They were eventually stopped at Bir Salem. The men at Ed Duda could see the 15th Armored Division move to the north, near Bir Bu Creimisa.
Bir Bu Creimus had become the headquarters of the German Africa Corps. Later in the afternoon, Rommel ordered the attack on the New Zealand Division. The little Mickl Group, a battle group of five tanks, was to hit Sidi Rezegh. The Italians of the Ariete Division were to hit the east side. The 90th Light Division would hit Belhamed to the south. General Cruewell had suggested that the 15h Armored Division should move to the "saddle" between Ed Duda and Belhamed. They would end up moving along the foot of the ridge where the 2/13th Battalion was located. The Australians planned to patrol to the "bypass road.
From 4pm to 5pm, the German and Italian tanks moved in on the New Zealand Division. The 4th/22nd Brigade had done nothing useful to interfere with the enemy tank movements. The 15th Armored Division commander, General Neumann-Silkow led his division to join the attack on Sidi Rezegh, rather than waste his time at the "saddle"The 6th New Zealand Brigade, located near the Sidi Rezegh mosque was in trouble. Two New Zealand battalions were overrun and a third was pressed hard by the Ariete Division. The brigade commander wanted to salvage what he could from the wreckage. He wanted to move in behind the "Tobruk sortie force". With the 6th New Zealand Brigade all but destroyed, that left the New Zealand Division artillery unprotected at Belhamed, and nearby. From the east, you now had the 21st Armored Division closing in and blocking the Trigh Capuzzo. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.