The commanders-in-chief decided to give Compass the priority on December 26th, 1940

After taking steps to strip the attack against the Italians in Libya of resources, the Commanders-in-Chief decided abruptly to give that front priority. The goal was to capture Tobruk, although Bardia was still waiting to be assaulted. The logistic situation became even more difficult, as supplies had to be accumulated for a continuation of the offensive. Marshal Graziani realized that the British were having difficulties, and his immediate reaction was to make a strong defence of both Bardia and Tobruk. Mussolini endorsed the idea, but Marshal Graziani immediately had doubts about the wisdom of such a plan. Meanwhile, General Bergonzoli ("Electric Whiskers") was able to bring the troops from the border region into Bardia to strengthen the defences. The raw 6th Australian Division would make the assault on what they supposed was a force of 20,000 men in Bardia. This is based on the account in Vol.I of the Official History.

The water shortage during Compass (December 1940)

A contingency plan for keeping Mersa Matruh supplied if the Italians had succeeded in cutting the supply line allowed the British to supply their troops being gathered for an assault on Bardia. The navy had organized a unit with the sole purpose of keeping Matruh supplied. Now, they were used to bring supplies to the troops in eastern Libya, near Bardia. Sollum would provide a useful port, but at first it was not yet in working order. The greatest problem was the water supply. Fort Capuzzo had storage tanks, but the water was contaminated with salt, so it was unusable. 12,000 gallons were shipped by road from Mersa Matruh. Part of the problem was the 4 gallon can, which would often leak. The navy used the gunboats Aphis and Ladybird, the water-carrier Myriel, and the monitor Terror to bring water forward in sufficient quantities.

By mid-December 1940, the focus had shifted to Bardia

The RAF flew 150 sorties against Bardia from December 14th to 19th. In conjunction, Wellingtons from Malta operated against Italian airfields in Libya. They destroyed some 44 aircraft. The 16th Infantry Brigade moved up to the southern side of Bardia while the 16th Australian Brigade moved to the southwest side. The 7th Armoured Division moved to block any relief efforts from Tobruk. Meanwhile, supply depots were set up. One line was along the coastal road while another followed the line of the escarpment. The transport received reinforcements from captured Italian trucks. Meanwhile, Sollum fell to the British on Decmeber 16th. This was convenient because it provided a small seaport close to the front.

The arrangements after December 11th, 1940

When Major-General Mackay and the 6th Australian Division arrived, they would have as additional forces the 16th Infantry Brigage and the 7th RTR, along with artillery. Their first task would be to capture Bardia. The orders for the 7th Armoured Division were to move between Tobruk and Bardia. On bright aspect of the previous week's action was that the RAF totally dominated the air against the Regia Aeronautica. The RAF used Gladiators for giving air cover in the field while the Hurricanes were used against Italian forces to the west of Bardia. The RAF and RAAF were quickly expending their supply of Gladiators. The bag for December 9th to 11th was impressive:

1. 38,300 Italian and Libyan prisoners
2. 237 guns
3. 73 tanks (L3/33, M11/39, and M13/40)
4. More than 1000 vehicles

This is based on the account in Vol.I of the Official History.

The results of December 11th and 12th, 1940

The British offensive had almost driven the Italians from Egypt by December 12th. The only Italian position still held was blocking Sollum and there was a force at Sidi Omar. The next step was to send mobile forces to block the road between Tobruk and Bardia. In the meantime, the offensive had progressed so well that General Wavell felt confident enough to follow his plan to withdraw the 4th Indian Division and send them to the Sudan, removing a large part of the attacking force. They would be replaced by the 6th Australian Division. They would have the opportunity to take Bardia, when they had arrived. The British 16th Infantry Brigade would stay and continue the offensive. At this point, Wavell was conducting the anti-Blitzkrieg: instead of reinforcing success, he stripped away what made the success possible. This is based on the account in Vol.I of the Official History.

December 11th, 1940 Operation Compass

On December 10th, the 7th Armoured Division, with cruiser tanks lent to Selby Force, operated with armoured cars, mobile artillery, and light tanks. They were at least crossing the coastal road. December 11th saw the 7th Armoured Brigade assaulting Buq Buq, and capturing a large number of Italian troops and artillery. The 4th Armoured Brigade was intended to be sent to Sofafi, but didn't receive the word in time, so that the Cirene Division was able to withdraw, umimpeded. The 7th Armoured Division Support Group found that the Cirene had withdrawn from Rabia and Sofafi during the night of 10-11 December. The day was still successful, as Selby Force and the 6th RTR fought the 1st Libyan Division, which had given their surrender at 1pm. By nightfall, the 4th Blackshirt Division had also surrendered. This is from the account in Vol.I of the Official History.

British Armour on December 9th and 10th, 1940

The Matildas of the 7th RTR were a critical piece of the assault on Nibeiwa. Sadly, on leaving Nibeiwa, after the victory, 6 Matildas ran into a minefield and were lost. There 6 Matildas to assault Tummar East. While the 4/6th Rajputana Rifles were held up by Italian tanks , the Matildas got into the camp. Meanwhile, the 4th Armoured Brigade was providing cover for the 4th Indian Division. The 11th Hussars spread out to the west, as a screen. The 7th Hussars, with light tanks (perhaps Lt.Mk.VIBs) moved across the road between Sidi Barrani and Bug Buq. The 7th Armoured Division Support Group covered the south, while the 7th Armoured Brigade was kept in reserve, awaiting developments. On December 10th, 10 Matildas from the 7th RTR supported the 16th Infantry Brigade's advance on the road network to the west. They blocked the exits from Sidi Barrani from the south and west. General Beresford-Peirse ordered to them to attack Sidi Barrani before dark. He sent armoured support from the 7th RTR and the 2nd RTR to operate to the west (the left flank?). This is based on the account in Vol.I of the Official History.

After the fall of Camp Nibeiwa

After Nibeiwa and Tummars were overrun, but before Brigadier Selby was told about the outcome, he sent forces to attempt to block the escape route from Maktila. Sadly, they were too late, and the British forces eventually learned that the 1st Libyan Division had escaped in the darkness. By late afternoon, General O'Connor was wondering what had happened, and as he had received no word, he drove to the Tummar West Camp to meet General Beirsford-Peirse. They would send the 5th Indian Brigade against Tummar East. The 16th (British) Infantry Brigade was sent to the west to block the coastal road that led to Sidi Barrani. The 7th RTR and two field artillery regiments were also sent in motion. This is based on the account in Vol.I of the Official History.

The Official History has some good photos from December 1940

The Official History, Vol.I, between pages 280 and 281, has some good photos from December 1940. One is "A burnt-out British tank which had become bogged in a salt marsh near Buq Buq in December 1940". The tank is probably a Lt.Mk.VIB, although it could be a Lt.Mk.VIA. The next photo is an aerial view of Sollum, showing the harbour and rising escarpment in the background. Another shows a truck, perhaps a gun tractor, towing an Inf.Mk.II Matilda up the road towards Halfaya Pass. There is also a picture of the river gunboat Aphis in Sollum harbour, where she had landed water for the army. Another photo shows burnt out and sunken ships ain the harbour at Bardia, where the Aphis had provided gunfire support on December 17th, 1940. Another photo shows Italian L3/33 light tanks abandoned on the hill above the harbour at Bardia. In another photo, you can see black smoke rising from the harbour at Tobruk. In the last photo of this series, you see the burning and sunken armoured cruiser San Giorgio, a survivor from the pre-dreadnought era.

The assault on Camp Nibeiwa

At 7:15am on December 9th, 1940, the assault on Camp Nibeiwa commenced. There was a 72-gun barrage from the 4th Indian Division artillery while 2 squadrons from the 7th RTR rolled towards the northwest corner of the camp. These were Inf.Mk.II Matildas. They were supported by 31st Battery, Royal Artillery. On the flanks were Bren carrier from the 2nd Battalion The Queen's Own Cameron Highlanders and 1/6thRajputana Rifles. The 20 Italian medium tanks and a few light tanks were quickly taken. The camp was quickly divided the camp into quarters and artillery was used, firing point-blank, to silence holdouts. The 5th Indian Brigade and 25th Field Artillery Regiment (without the 31st Battery) attacked the Tummar West camp to the west of Nibeiwa.

A small tidbit about the attack on Bardia in January 1941

The 6th Australian Division was eager to attack Bardia. Their sole fear was that the Italians would escape before they could attack. For the attack, General Mackay was given "120 of the 154 available guns". The 7th RTR was also there for the assault. They had managed to get 23 tanks running. Their main problem was lack of spare parts. They were equipped with Inf.Mk.II Matilda tanks. The 1st Northumberland Fusiliers, a machine gun battalion was also available for the assault. The only available unit not to take part was the 16th Infantry Brigade, a British unit.

Another look at the initial operations in Compass

Vol.I of the Official History also has information about initial operations in Compass. Selby Force, commanded by Brigadier Selby, had a strength of about 1,800 men. This was apparently all that could be provided with transport. These were drawn from the garrison at Mersa Matruh. They were to be a blocking force between Tummar and Maktila. The monitor Terror and the gunboat Aphis bombarded Maktila. Another gunboat, the Ladybird, fired on Sidi Barrani. The camp at Nibeiwa was scouted by the 2nd Rifle Brigade, which was looking for the best approach. They found that the best spot was where a road entered the camp on the northwest corner. The Fourth Indian Division, commanded by Major-General Beirsford-Peirse, had moved into position about 15 miles from Nibeiwa. On the night of December 8, 1940, one brigade (11th Indian) moved forward with the 7th RTR to a position near Nibeiwa. The 7th Armoured Division was far to the southwest, ready to block any rescue effort.

The experiment with mixed squadrons in October and November 1940

The British experimented with mixed squadrons in an attempt to provide useful short range reconnaissance and ground support to the offensive. No.208 squadron was equipped with 8 Lysanders and 4 Hurricanes. No.3 RAAF squadron was equipped with 8 Gladiators and 4 Gauntlets. There was also one flight of No.6 squadron equipped with just 4 Lysanders. The lesson had been learned in France that Lysanders needed fighter escort to be effective. The idea was to integrate fighters and reconnaissance (or Army cooperation) aircraft into squadrons. It was also an opportunity to train fighter pilots in the art of reconnaissance. This is based on the account in Vol.I of the Official History.

Mid-October 1940: decisions about air strength in the Middle East

By mid-October, the Chiefs of Staff decided that with the focus on the eastern Mediterranean and Middle East, that air strength must be augmented, and quickly. Existing squadrons would be rearmed with newer aircraft and squadron strength would be increased from 12 to 16 aircraft. The Sunderland squadrons would have their strength increased to six aircraft. They would send 48 Blenheim IVs and 24 Hurricanes every month. They would fly out 23 Wellingtons to replace Bristol Bombay bomber-transports. They would send 227 Mohawk fighters to the Middle East as well as 149 Martin Maryland aircraft, instead of the planned 75. The Marylands did not start to arrive in Africa until December 12th, so that setback plans. The RAF also found, when Mohawks started to arrive that they were unsuitable for combat, due to their low performance. They were diverted to India and South Africa for training, instead. In December, RAF losses were mounting, at least partly due to the Italian explosive bullets. Even when aircraft were not lost, they could be put out of action for a while because of damage from the explosive bullets. Despite the RAF situation, General Wavell decided to mount the Compass operation anyway. This is based on the account in Vol.I of the Official History.

Even in 1940, the Germans were preparing to intervene in North Africa

During the summer of 1940, the Italians kept begging for German equipment, but the German preferance was to send their own troops, instead. The initial plans were for two armoured divisions and one motorized division. The Germans were focused on the Suez Canal, and thought it unlikely that the Italians would be able to capture it. The General staff dispatched General von Thoma to Libya to survey the situation. The 3rd Panzer Division was to make preparations to be sent to North Africa. General von Thoma submitted an unfavorable report, and the 3rd Panzer ceased their preparations.

The air component of Operation Compass

Operation Compass, the attack on Italian forces, had a strong air contingent, given the remoteness of the region. They had 48 fighters and 116 bombers. They included two Hurricane squadrons and one Gladiator squadron. Of the bombers, there were three Blenheim squadrons, three Wellington, and one Bombay squadron. Air Commodore Collishaw commanded the force from his headquarters at Maaten Baggush. This is based on the account in Vol.I of the Official History.

Reinforcements, temporarily, for the 11th Hussars

In October, the RAF No.2 Armoured Car Company arrived from Palestine to reinforce the 11th Hussars. They almost certainly were also equipped with Rolls Royce armoured cars. Very likely, they were the 1924 pattern. The served alongside the 11th Hussars from October 1940 through February 1941.

Air reinforcements for Malta in early October 1940

The decision was made to bring Malta's air strength up to one full squadron of Hurricanes and 12 Martin Maryland maritime reconnaissance aircraft. The chiefs of staff wanted to start bombing Benghazi, but there were not adequate resources available. Blenheims from Egypt were out of range. The No.216 Bomber Transport squadron was needed as transports, so they could only be diverted to bombing by impacting their transport duties. In the first two weeks of October, the Hurricanes in Malta were able to stay active. This is based on the account in Vol.I of the Official History.

Air power to be sent to Greece: late 1940

The British commanders planned about what air units could be sent to aid Greece. This started about November 4, 1940, when instructions arrived. The commanders found that what could be sent would be limited by the availability of suitable airfields. The main problem was the lack of all-weather airfields. The terrain was very unsuitable, as well, for constructing new airfields. To protect what airfields there were, General Wavell was to send AA artillery. That would initially be one heavy and one light AA batteries. After that, three Blenheim squadrons would be sent. One of these was actually a mixed squadron of bombers and Gladiators. One additional fighter squadron equipped with Gladiators would be sent. As the Hurricane inventory reached the critical point, a second fighter squadron would then be sent. Egypt would be stripped to the bare minimum, if not below that level. Given the hindsight we have about how forelorn an operation this would be, the risks that were taken seem reckless, in the extreme. This is based on the account in Vol.I of the Official History.

June 11, 1940 and beyond

The British put out a covering force to be ready for the commencement of hostilities with Italy. The 11th Hussars, equipped with Morris AC9 and Rolls Royce Model 1924 Mk.I armoured cars, were spread out across the desert as much as 40 miles from the coast on June 11th. That night, they crossed the border and took surprised Italian outposts that weren't aware that war had been declared. The 7th Hussars and 1st/KRRC moved up to the border, and on June 14th, took Fort Capuzzo. Fort Maddalena fell to the 11th Hussars. On the 16th, a squadron of the 7th Hussars and J Battery, RHA, routed a column of 17 Italian light tanks, guns, and infantry and captured all the tanks.

As early as June 11th, the Italians commenced bombing Malta. Malta had never received the planned AA artillery outfit. Instead of 112 heavy and 60 light AA guns, they only had 34 heavy and 8 light. They did have the famous three Gladiators named Faith, Hope, and Charity.