The new organization in North Africa in the fall of 1941

Two new armies were formed in North Africa from September 1941. The 9th Army included the area north of Egypt. The 8th Army was formed facing west, towards Rommel and the Italian army in Libya. General Maitland Wilson commanded the 9th Army and General Alan Cunningham was brought in from East Africa to command the 8th Army. Palestine and Transjordan became one "Base and Line of Communication Area", while Egypt became a second "Base and Line of Communication Area". Churchill wanted General Wilson to command the 8th Army, but General Auchinleck thought that Wilson should take the northern army, covering the rear of the 8th Army against incursions from Russia, while General Cunningham's fast moving campaign, involving rapid movement impressed General Auchinleck that he had the right sort of attitude for the 8th Army. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

The situation in French Somaliland from mid-1941

What the British discovered in negotiations with the French governor of Somaliland was that he was prepared to let the British use the port of Jibuti, but he refused to let the Free French into the country, and refused to consider joining them. After the Japanese attacks in December 1941, several blockading ships were withdrawn from the coast of French Somaliland and the Vichy government in France "offered the use of Jibuti port and railway in return for the raising of the blockade and supplies of food to French Somaliland". The British government was not willing to relent, but by March, they ceased blockading, as the blockade no longer seemed appropriate. This is based onthe account in Vol.II of the Official History. This completes the summary of Vol.II, and we will start Vol.III, next.

French Somaliland in 1940-1941

The last topic in Vol.II of the Official History tells about the situation in French Somaliland. By November 1940, Generals de Gaulle, with General Legentilhomme, had suggested that General Legentilhomme take a small Free French Force to Jibuti, and stage a coup. They were convinced that there were many with Free French sympathies there. Churchill and the Commanders in Britain had approved the plan, but it was opposed by General Wavell as a diversion that would just be a distraction from the primary theater. French Somaliland was first under strict contraband control and then under a blockade to prevent supplies from reaching the Italians, and the people there were suffering from that measure. After March 1941, when a stricter blockade went into effect and a propaganda program. Neither seemed to have any effect on the situation. At this point, General Wavell, "after consulting Genral Catroux", suggested negotiating with the governor, M. Louis Noualihotas. By the summer of 1941, there seemed to be no progress. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

The Official History remarks on the East African campaign in 1940 and 1941

Volume II of the Official History has some remarks on the East African campaign in 1940 and 1941 that removed "Italian rule" from the region. What they say is that we would now see the campaign as being of minor importance, compared to the large battles in North Africa. Several key factors in the success were the increasing capabilities of African soldiers, the dominance of air power, and the Ethiopian guerrillas (the "Patriots"). The Official History also points out the diversity of the forces involved. They came from "Kenya, Uganda, Tanganyika, the Sudan, Ethiopia, the Gold Coast, France, India, South Africa, Northern Rhodesia and the United Kingdom". This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

The end at Gondar

The first troops to enter Gondar had been patrols from the Kenya Armoured Car Regiment. The first infantry were the guerillas of the Walla Banda. The 25th East African Brigade had achieved its objectives by noon on 27 November 1941. The Italians arrived to surrender at 3:4opm. The mechanized forces were sent to get General Nasi to surrender. He did, after an interval. The surrender order was dropped by Hartbeests on 28 November to Chilga and Gorgora. The fall of Gondar put 10,000 Italian and 12,000 native troops as prisoners. The British forces lost "32 killed, 182 wounded, and 6 missing". 15 British aircraft had been lost since 7 April, but the Italian's had their air power in the area wiped out in the process. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

The attack on 27 November 1941

The first attacks on 27 November 1941 started at 5:30am, when the 2/2nd King's African Rifles climbed the slope at Daflecha. The 1/6th King's African Rifles were sent against Lower Daflecha. When the 2/2nd's attack succeeded, the 1/6th was sent to exploit the breakthrough. They had taken Daflecha by 2pm. The 4/4th King's African Rifles attacked at 1:50pm, and they were successful. "The enemy fled into the arms of Nurk's Shoans up from the south". The night before, the 79th Foot had taken an outpost of Diridiba. They went for the Fanta posts at dawn. The guerillas had wiped out the Blackshirts by 8am. When they realized that there was nothing between them and Gondar, they moved into the town. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

The plan for attacking Gondar

The plan for attacking Gondar was for the 25th East African Brigade to assault the south while the 26th East African Brigade assaulted from the east. The guerilla bands would attack from between them. On the north side, the 1/Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders, "some divisional troops, and the 53rd East African Battery" would hold the Wolchefit road. The 26th East African Brigade would be supported by "the 22nd Mountain Battery, R.A. and 54th Nyasaland Field Battery". The 25th East African Brigade was supported by the "18th Mountain Battery, R.A., 51st Gold Coast Medium Battery, the Kenya Armoured Car Regiment, and the South African Light Armoured Detachement". This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

The brigades for the attack on Gondar

Vol.II of the Official History gives the composition of the two brigades that took part in the capture of Gondar in November 1941:

25th East African Brigade

2/3rd King's African Rifles
2/4th King's African Rifles
3/4th King's African Rifles
South African Light Armoured Detachment (3 light tanks, 3 Bren Carriers)
Kenya Armoured Car Regiment (less one squadron)
51st (Gold Coast) Medium Battery
18th (Indian) Mountain Battery, RA
9th South African Field Company
A Company 1/3rd King's African Rifles (Machine Gun)
6th (Uganda) Field Ambulance
25th East African Infantry Brigade Group Company
58th Reserve Motor Transport Company

26th East African Brigade

2/2nd King's African Rifles
4/4th King's African Rifles
1/6th King's African Rifles
22nd (Indian) Mountain Battery, RA
54th East African Field Company
one company of the 1/3rd King's African Rifles (Machine Gun)
7th (Northern Rhodesian) Field Ambulance
26th East African Infantry Brigade Group Company
Camforce (Ethiopian guerillas)
54th Nyasaland Field Battery "in support"

November 1941 in East Africa: taking Kulkaber

Columns were moving in the direction of Gondar in mid-November 1941. One was the 2nd Ethiopian Battalion, which was moving north west of Lake Tana. They were near Gorgora to the south-southwest of Gondar by 13 November. Another was the Sudan Column. They attacked Chilga to the southwest of Gondar on 20 November. They at least had "pinned down the garrison of four battalions". The next step was to take Kulkaber. The place was well defended behind strong defences. Brigadier James attacked on 21 November, after the place was hit hard byfrom the air with 44 sorties dropping 9 tons of bombs the previous day. The British lost 99 men and the guerillas 107 men. They took "1,648 Italian and 775 native troops."

A fresh attempt to break through at Kulkaber

General Fowkes decided that Kulkaber must be taken so that South Force could move forward to support the attack at Gondar that had been planned for 17 November 1941. He sent the 25th East African Brigade to move towards Kulkaber from the the north side, after the engineers had found a rough road that ran to Dancaz. The road proved to have almost ceased to exist, part way there, and it had to be rebuilt, setting back the attack on Kulkaber until 21 November. While all this was happening, Gondar was being hit by air. Gondar was hit by Hartbeests and Mohawks, which dropped almost 12,000 lbs. of bombs. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

A new plan for attacking Gondar in November 1941 (UPDATED)

General Fowkes became concerned that there was insufficient artillery support available for an assault on Gondar. He also questioned whether one brigade would be sufficient. The present artillery available was just 8-3.7in and 4-4.5in howitzers. Brigadier James , commander of the 25th East African Brigade wanted 25pdrs for the attack. A field battery was being sent from Kenya to Massawa, where it would receive 8-25pdrs. General Fowkes decided to use a second brigade, the 26th East African Brigade for the attack on Gondar. General Fowkes also decided to have South Force, with the 60pdr medium guns move forward to support the attack, because it was unclear of the 25pdr battery would arrive in time. South Force would concentrate and attack at Kulkaber, with guerilla ("Patriot") forces. South Force assembled on 11 November 1941 and attacked "two days later". This effort to bring forward the 60pdrs failed. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

South Force for the attack on Gondar

We have a detailed list of units that comprised South Force. South Force was commanded by Lt-Colonel Collins and consisted of the following units (from a note in Vol.II of the Official History):

B Squadron, Kenya Armoured Car Regiment
51st Gold Coast Medium Battery (4-60pdrs)
1/6th Kings African Rifles
D Company, 1/3rd Kings African Rifles (Machine Gun)
9th South African Field Company
1st and 2nd Battalions, East African Pioneers (less three companies)
25th South African Road Construction Company
HQ 1st (Tanganyika) Field Ambulance
Survey Section
58th Reserve Motor Transport Company
one flight, No.41 Army Cooperation Squadron, SAAF

Air operations in East Africa from September 1941

Those few Ju-86s the SAAF had were sent to the force blockading French Somaliland in late September 1941. That left a very reduced force to operate against Gondar. In an attack on Gondar in October 1941, 7 Hartbeests, 4 Gladiators, and 1 Hurricane "dropped 7,810 lb. of bombs on the northern positions". A Gladiator had shot down a lone CR42 over the Gondar-Wolchefit road, later in October. At the end of October, No.3 Squadron SAAF had returned after rearming with Curtis Mohawks. Air operations intensified in anticipation of the assault on Gondar. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

After the surrender at Wolchefit

The British had planned to attack Gondar from Debra Tabor, but the continued heavy rains made that look less appealing. The 25th East African Brigade had been conducting probing operations towards Gondar, and the decision was made to take the all weather road from there towards Gondar. The British commander had intelligence that indicated that the Italians might surrender if threatened by sufficiently large regular force. The plan was for the 25th East African Brigade to attack on 9 November 1941. The 26th East African Brigade would follow up and "clear up the Italian positions further south". This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

The surrender of Wolchefit in September 1941

The 25th East African Brigade was sent to Massawa, Eritrea, arriving there by ship on 15 September 1941. They advanced to Wolchefit. General Platt conferred with his commanders on 20 September, and they decided to send a second brigade to Wolchefit. Before that could happen, the Italians at Wolchefit surrendered. 1,631 Italians and 1,450 Colonial troops surrendered. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

More about the East African Command in the fall of 1941

The East African Command had responsibility for operations in the following countries:

• Ethiopia
• Eritrea (the Official History says "for a short time only")
• Italian Somaliland
• British Somaliland
• Kenya
• Zanzibar
• Tanganyika
• Uganda
• Nyasaland
  
• Northern Rhodesia

The command headquarters was located in Nairobi, Kenya. The commander was assisted by a "Chief Political Officer", a diplomat.
This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History

The East Africa Command in the August and September 1941

The East Africa Command was to be directly under the War Office in Britain. The idea had been to relieve the theater commander in the Middle East from this responsibility. After the debacle in Greece and Crete, General Wavell had become increasingly balky at taking on new responsibilities. He was gone, succeeded by General Auchinleck, but the command remained. The command only formally came into existence on 15 September 1941. Lt-General Platt was appointed as the commander, but he was given a leave of absence. The acting commander became first Major-General Godwin-Austin. Shortly, Major-General Wetherall acted in his place. Lt-General Cunningham left East Africa on 29 August to become 8th Army commander, an unfortunate appointment. General Godwin-Austin left with him to become the 13th Corps commander. Lt-General Noel Beresford-Peirse was sent his place. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

Organizational changes in East Africa in July 1941 and later

General Platt commanded in "the Sudan and and the northern part of Eritrea". He did not actually have responsibility for Gondar, but he continued to direct operations in that area. To the south, General Cunningham's force was changing. He had lost the South Africans in July. The Chiefs of Staff in Britain directed that the 23rd Nigerian and 24th Gold Coast brigades be sent to Freetown, Sierra Leone. The Chiefs wanted protection against any Vichy French strikes against the important port. The 11th and 12th African Divisions were to have new brigades to replace those sent to Freetown and other assignments. There 22nd and 25th Brigades were assigned to the 12th Division. A new brigade, the 28th was formed, and the 28th and 21st Brigades would be given to the 11th Division. Because the experienced 26th Brigade was wanted for the planned attack on Gondar, the 28th was sent to "the border of French Somaliland". The 26th Brigade was added to the 12th Division. Two artillery regiments were sent to reinforce the 12th Division. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

Wolchefit in July to September 1941

Major Ringrose, commanding guerillas near Wolchefit, had wanted some regular troops to attack, expecting that the Italians would surrender to them. The 3/14th Punjab Regiment had traveled from Asmara to Wolchefit. Their attack was repulsed. The air force remained active. No.45 Squadron continued to supply the guerillas with "food and ammunition". The conducted five of these supply drops, presumably with Wellesleys. No.203 Group SAAF acquired responsibility for Wolchefit and Debarech, and conducted bombing attacks. Apparently both the RAF and SAAF conducted "almost daily attacks on these two positions". The Italians had 20mm Breda LAA guns, and they show down three South African planes that apparently attempted low-level attacks. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

I received my "desert tanker boots" tonight

I had almost given up hope, but my "desert tanker boots" finally arrived, tonight:

I bought my boots from the Armed Forces Merchandise Outlet.

More action near Gondar

Two battalions, the Composite Battalion from the Sudan Defence Force and the 3rd Ethiopian Battalion had attacked Chilga on 17 May 1941, but were repulsed. The place was strongly defended, so it was left alone until November. In the meantime, the air force continued to be active. No.47 Squadron still was flying Wellesleys, and with the Free French Flight, with Blenheims, hit "Gondar, Azozo airfield, Dabat, Chilga, Debarech and Woldchefit". They were apparently making low-level attacks. The air activity apparently helped to keep the Ethiopian guerillas inspired to keep fighting. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

Wolchefit Pass in April and May 1941

Wochefit Pass was a natural obstacle that was defended to a three mile depth by positions manned by about 3,000 Italian and 2,000 Colonial soldiers. They had some artillery, machine guns, and mortars. There was an escarpment as part of the feature, below which "the No.2 Motor Machine Gun-Group of the Sudan Defence Force" was located. There were also guerilla groups, led by British officers. The guerillas had some success. Dabat was taken in April and on 5 May, "the Italians evacuated Amba Giorgis". Attacks were attempted in May, but failed. An Italian counter-attack in June took Ras Ayalu. The lack of success caused the guerilla groups to leave the area for the time. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

More developments in late 1941 with guerillas

When the Italians at Debra Tabor surrendered, their 79th Colonial Battalion crossed over to the British side, and fought as the "79th Foot". Their commander was Captain McLean from the Royal Scots Greys. Another company, bandas, became the Wollow Banda. Their commander was Captain Pilkington of the Royal Horse Guards. They all came under Major Douglas's command and allowed him to surround Kulkabar and to interdict supplies to Gondar. There was still heavy rains, and they aloso ran out of money. More money was dropped from six No.47 Squadron Wellesleys. This allowed harassing operations to continue until November, when the rains ceased. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

Guerilla operations east of Lake Tana in April to July 1941

The goals for guerilla operations east of Lake Tana was to cut the road from Debra Tabor to Gondar and "clear the country of Italian posts". The British army officer with the guerillas from April to May was Major Simonds, who was with the Royal Wiltshire Yeomanry. His guerilla band besieged Debra Tabor, starting in April. More guerillas arrived, and for a short time, they were supported by troops from the Sudan Frontier Battalion. Major Douglas, from the Highlands Light Infantry, took over the leadership from Jamor Simonds in May. He tried to get the guerillas to stage attacks, but they would only harass the Italians. The air operations were more effective. No.47 Squadron made almost daily raids on Debra Tabor in June. That finally broke the Italian resistance, causing them to surrender on 6 July. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

General Platt's situation immediately after April 1941

Operations in Eritrea ended in April 1941. General Wavell had intervened and redirected General Platt to secure the road from Asmara to Dessie, as General Wavell wanted to smooth the way for the movement of South African troops north to Egypt. General Platt had to be content, for the moment, to just screen the Italians in Wolchefit. By the time that General Platt had forces available, the weather in the north of Ethiopia precluded major operations. Most of what was happening in northern Ethiopia was either air operations or raids by Ethiopian guerillas ("The Patriots"). There were also a certain number of British officers and senior enlisted men who had "gone native" and were operating with the guerillas. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History

More air power for Gondar in August 1941 and later

The Sudan command received additional air resources. As usual, in East Africa, there was an interesting collection of aircraft:

August 3, 1941

No.3 Fighter Squadron, SAAF            Hurricane, Gladiator, Mohawk
No.l5 Bomber Squadron, SAAF            Fairey Battle (2 aircraft)
No.16 Bomber Squadron, SAAF            Ju-86
No.41 Army Cooperation Squadron, SAAF  Hartbeest

No.15 Squadron ceased operation in two weeks
No.3 Squadron departed to re-equip with only Mohawks in late August
    to return at the end of October

Air operations were limited to close support for the army in the field. They were also to eliminate any remaining Italian aircraft that might still be found. They also bombed enemy positions in support of Ethiopian guerilla warfare ("The Patriots"). This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

The air force in support of General Platt in April 1941

General Platt's air force was commanded by Air Commodore Slattery. In April 1941, his force consisteded of the following units:

Squadron                                   Aircraft
No.47 Squadron, RAF                        Wellesley
No.237 Rhodesian Army Cooperation Squadron Hardy, Lysander, Gladiator
Free French Bomber Flight                  Blenheim IV

There were also some
some South African communication aircraft

This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

General Platt's activities

General Platt's force had advanced to Amba Alagi in May 1941. He had been totally occupied in those operations until then. Now, a small force had been made available:

2/6th King's African Rifles
Composite Battalion of the Sudan Defence Force
a Belgian unit from the Congo:
  a headquarters
  5th Infantry Regiment of two battalions
  a company of heavy mortars

These troops had operated in "The Blue Nile" region in March 1941. The Belgians and 2/6th KAR "had taken Gambela". They waited while General Cunningham advanced and greatly pressed the remaining Italians. General Platt sent the Belgians to the attack, and this caused the Italian commander to ask for a cease fire south of the Blue Nile. The Italians surrendered on 6 July. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

On the BBC "WW2 People's War", they have a contribution about the war in East Africa in 1941

The BBC has a completed project with outside contributions. One of those is about the war in East Africa from February 1941 until November 1941. It includes the campaign we are currently studying, in Ethiopia. On the visible page, this campaign has just a mention, although there is more, if you follow the links to their archive site, and look at the related stories. They seem to be more of the "oral history" sort of thing, transcribed for reading on the Internet.

Another sheet of wargame pieces

My wife found about 30 copies of this sheet, and I thought it might be of interest to wargamers. You may need to scale the image to fit your needs. The AFV's on the page include:

• French FCM 3b infantry tank
  
• Russian T-27 MG carrier
• British Crusader II cruiser tank
  
• German Pzkw II Ausf.G light tank
  
• German Pzkw I Ausf.A light tank
  
• German Pzkw III Ausf.G battle tank
  
• Russian T-26 light tank
  
• Russian BT-5 fast tank

Later in June 1941 in Ethiopia

General Cunningham had hoped to not move immediately into Jimma, to avoid the bother of having to care for Italian civilians. After the Italians had declared Jimma to be an "open city". General Cunningham ordered the 22nd East African Brigade to through Jimma and beyond to come up in support of the 23rd Nigerian Brigade. The 22nd took Jimma on 21 June, and taken 12,000 Italian and 3,000 Colonial troops prisoner. The 23rd Nigerian Brigade was advancing towards Ghimbi, and had reached the river Didessa. The brigade "had captured the last Italian rearguard east of the river". The 22nd East African Brigade took more prisoners at Dembi on 27 June. Finally, when an RAF "Hartbeest dropped 40 lb. of bombs on Belleta and the Italian force there surrendered on the spot". The Italians seem to have been in full collapse. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

The OOBs of the 22nd East African Brigade and the 23rd Nigerian Brigade

In two notes in Vol.II, the Official History supplies the OOBs of the two brigades. Some of the units were divided amongst the two brigades.

22nd East African Brigade:

2nd Nigerian Regiment
1/6th King's African Rifles
5th King's African Rifles
1st South African Light Tank Company
HQ squadron 1st East African Armoured Car Regiment
1st South African Field Battery
7th South African Field Battery
Composite Section of 1st South African Medium Brigade
  (1-60pdr and 1-6in Howitzer)
18th (Indian) Mountain Battery, RA
22nd (Indian) Mountain Battery, RA
54th East African Field Company
2 platoons, 1/3rd King's African Rifles (Machine Gun)
A Company (Tanganyika) Field Ambulance
22nd East African Brigade Group Company

23rd Nigerian Brigade:

1st Nigerian Regiment
3rd Nigerian Regiment
1/1st King's African Rifles
one squadron (less one troop) East African Armoured Car Regiment
7th South African Field Brigade
1st South African Medium Brigade (less composite section)
52nd Nigerian Light Battery
51st Nigerian Field Company
17th South African Field Park Company
one company 1/3rd King's African Rifles (machine gun) (less two platoons)

At attack at Sciola by the 23rd Nigerian Brigade

The British troops arrived at Sciola on 30 May 1941. They attempted to rush the bridge on the 31st and failed. The 23rd Nigerian Brigade perpared for an assault. The Italians destroyed the bridge and withdrew upstream. One artillery battery was left to defend the shore. The river had a strong current at that spot and the troops were unable to get across. A better crossing spot was found and elements of the 2nd Nigerian Regiment and 5th King's African Rifles were able to cross. The boats had been damaged, so they needed a day to repair and regroup. On 4 June, the rest of the 5th King's African Rifles were able to cross. They were able to defeat the guns on the shore. They took 1,100 prisoners, "nine guns and destroyed 9 more". This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

The next move in Ethiopia in late May 1941

The 23rd Nigerian Brigade had been engaged in protecting communications, but was reassigned to the advance on Jimma. They were given "most" of the 12th African Division's artillery for the mission. That freed the 1st Natal Mounted Rifles and the 1st Field Force Battalion to rejoin their units. The river Omo was a barrier to the brigade, as it had been to the Italians. The far side of the river seemed like a good defensive position. Because the British had built over 70 bridges in the campaign, they had little bridging equipment left. There was some at Berbera, so this would be brought forward. The plan was for the 22nd East African Brigade to cross at Sciola and "the 23rd Nigerian Brigade at Abalti". Ethiopian partisans were able to harras the Italians at will and the RAF dominated the skies. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

The 22nd East African Brigade in May 1941

The remaining Italian position in Ethiopia was at the point of collapse. The 22nd East Africa Brigade had fought an action at Colito on 21 May, where "Sergeant N. G. Leakey, attached 1/6th King's African Rifles, routed six Italian tanks single-handed." He died, but won a Victoria Cross award. Colito was taken and the advance continued. The 22nd East African Brigade took Soddu on 23 May, and with the town, "the commanders and staffs of the 25th and 101st Colonial Divisions". At this point, the Italian commander ordered the 21st and 24th Colonial Divisions to the "north of Lake Abaya", so that Italian nationals could be taken "west of the river Omo". In the end, the plan was unsuccessful and first the 21st Colonial Division was captured and then the 24th, which was not able to cross the Omo. In about six weeks, 18,396 prisoners were taken (by mid-June). This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

A change in plan in Ethiopia

Given the recognition that the current plan was unworkable, due to weather and roads, General Cunningham redirected the 11th African Division to Soddu. He also ordered the 12th African Division to take over on this line, so that the 11th African Division could be used on the road from Addis Ababa to Jimma. This was a road passable in all weather. General Godwin-Austin, who we know from his time in the desert, ordered his division, the 12 African, along the Neghelli road, as the Yavello road was too poor. General Cunningham decided to send the 11th African Division to both Jimma and Soddu, because the 12th African Division was slow to arrive. The 12th African Division was relegated to holding the rear. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

In Ethiopia in April and May 1941

The 22nd East African Brigade Gr0up had planned to head for Aselle, thinking that they would encounter Italian forces. Their Italian map was inaccurate and there were no Italians. After the road turned to mud, the brigade group turned to go to the west of Lake Zwai. They pushed through an Italian "position at Mount Fike". They stopped to give the 12th African Division time to move forward. The brigade group pushed off again on 9 May, going around Lake Shala. They reached Shashamanna on 14 May. Elements pushed a further 40 miles "towards Dalle". Dalle had been designated as the 12th African Division's objective, and it had already fallen. The division was no where close, though. The 24th Gold Coast Brigade had hit a defended position at Wadara, and was blocked. They were only able to attack on 4 May and finally defeated the position on 10 May. The brigade reached Wondo on 25 May, 100 miles further. The 21st East African Brigade had tried to advance up the Yavello road, but the road was so bad that this was not a faesible line of advance. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

General Cunningham's long supply lines

The supply lines for General Cunningham's divisions were long an tortuous. The supply hub for the 11th African Division was in Addis Adaba, and stretched 560 miles, using both roads and rail, to the port of Berbera. Supplies came by sea, presumably, from Aden. The 26th East African Brigade had to be positined to watch the frontier with French Somaliland, as the situation there was unstable. The 12th African Division had a supply line that was centered in Mogadishu and went through Dolo. As there was more rain, this became increasingly difficult. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

Air units in East Africa

All of the air units available to support General Cunningham were with the South African Air Force. The squadrons available were:

No.3 Squadron SAAF  Hurricanes and Gladiators
No.11 Squadron SAAF Fairey Battles
No.12 Squadron SAAF Ju-86s
No.40 Army Cooperation Squadron SAAF  Hartbeests
No.41 Army Cooperation Squadron SAAF  Hartbeests

This force was "commanded by Air Commodore W, Sowrey, R.A.F., with Brigadier H. Daniels, S.A.A.F., as his Senior Air Staff Officier". An army cooperation control group was reconstituted on 20 May for this compaign. This is based on Vol.II of the Official History.

General Cunningham's plans

General Cunningham's plan, dating from April 1941, had been "to move on Jimma and the Lakes from Addis Ababa and at the same time advance northwards from Yavello and Neghelli". The orders from General Wavell to take the road from Asmara to Addis Ababa changed the plan. General Cunningham was reduced to part of the 11th African Division the 12th African Division. His new plan was for the two divisions to push forward and to join and then "drive the enemy from the Lakes region". This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

The situation at Galla-Sidamo

Under Italian rule, Ethiopia was divided into five provinces. Galla-Sidamo was in south-western Ethiopia. General Gazzera was located at Jimma. The province was 500 miles long and 300 miles wide. Jimma was connected to the capital at Addas Ababa by one of three roads into the province. There is a string of lakes that stretch over 140 miles, starting from the northernmost, which is about 60 miles from Adda Ababa. "South African engineers were building a new all-weather road" from Marsabit in Kenya. The other roads could only be used in fair weather, and were poor. The Italian forces in three locations, and consisted of four understrength divisions supported by the remaining 30 light and medium tanks. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

The situation in East Africa, starting in the spring of 1941

After the main Italian army, commanded by the Duke d'Aosta had surrendered in East Africa, the British commanders had wanted to strip down the remaining forces to the minimum. It was only due to General Cunningham's successes that he had won permission to continue offensive operations. One factor that greatly helped was that the Italian air force in East Africa had "collapsed". The SAAF and RAF in the Sudan were able to "play a decisive part". Air power proved to be a "decisive factor" at Gondar, later in the summer and fall. General Cunningham's first operations were in Galla-Sidamo from April to October 1941. Some of General Platt's force was made available to General Cunningham from the Sudan. The second phase ran from October to November and included the attack against Gondar. French Somaliland also was an ongoing concern, although that mainly was a political problem. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

The remaining Italian forces in East Africa in May 1941

The Official History now switches context to "the final campaign in East Africa". We have previously summarized the victories in East Africa, as convered in Volume I of the Official History. Somewhat less than 25% of the Italian forces in East Africa remained, after the Duke of Aosta had surrendered on 19 May 1941. The remaining Italians were located in Galla-Sidamo and in Gondar. There was also a "garrison at Assab on the Red Sea". General Nasi's army in Gondar consisted of "about 41,000 men and 70 guns". General Gazzera had more guns (200) and somewhat fewer soldiers (38,000) in Galla-Sidamo. His force was swelled by refugees from fallen areas, such as Somalia. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

The roles of the German and Italian air forces in the Mediterranean Theater

The German and Italian air forces were essentially two separate commands. While they obviously had joint interests and often cooperated, there was no unified command. The Official History suggests that if they had a unified command, that they might have been able to hurt the British quite badly, if they had made a determined effort to attack shipping in the Suez and the ports. Rommel's priority was immediate pressure on the supply line to Tobruk, so while that pressed the British Inshore Squadron to the limit, they did not succeed in starving Tobruk to the point of surrender. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

Dilution of Axis air power in the fall of 1941

The German air unit in the Mediterranean was Fliegerkorps X. They had a force of He-111 and Ju-88 bombers. Both had a considerable range. They might well have caused a great deal of damage if they had been concentrated on bombing Malta, the Suez, or even the British supply lines. Instead, they were occupied in tasks for which they were ill-suited and misused. The primary one was escorting convoys. I suppose the idea was to bomb any British surface attackers. The Official History offers the opinion that Fliegerkorps X was inadequate for the demands being made up on it. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

The Italian air power

The Official History says that the Italian air force, at their entry to the war, consisted of 313 aircraft "in Libya and the Aegean" and "325 in East Africa". In the period we are presently considering, June to October 1941, the Italian air force had "73 bombers and 137 fighters" in Libya and "37 bombers and 46 fighters in the Aegean". The air force in East Africa was non-existant by this time. The Italian air force was commanded from Italy, so that the Libyan army commander had less control over operations than he would have liked. There was a liaison between the German and Italian air forces, but this was in Rome. The Official History points out that the German High Command still considered the North African war an Italian operation. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

The German air force in the Middle East and Mediterranean in 1941

In January 1941, Fliegerkorps X had been sent to Sicily to operate against Malta and shipping in the Mediterranean Sea. They were the specialist unit for martime operations, and had taken part in the Norway campaign, later in 1940. Fliegerkorps X was only peripherally involved with Greece and Crete. They were mostly the province of Fliegerkorps VIII and XI, from the Balkans. After the capture of Crete, Fliegerkorps X was left. They had between 400 and 450 aircraft. Their serviceable aircraft often was as low as 250 at any point in time. The point was made that Fliegerkorps X and Rommel's army were just detachments and were not intended to absorb a lot of resources that were needed elsewhere. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

Comparative losses in the air in the Middle East from mid-June to mid-October

The British intelligence estimates in 1941 were that they had destroyed 142 German aircraft and 253 Italian aircraft between the middle of June 1941 until the middle of October. The real German records show that their total losses, from all causes, were just 81 aircraft. There are not comparable records for the Italians, but existing records for the middle of June to the middle of September show that they lost 89 aircraft, plus others "destroyed on the ground from July onwards". The British losses for the same period "were 198 destroyed in battle and 48 on the ground". This is based on the account in the Official History.

More on the Axis air effort in the fall of 1941

Attacks on shipping to Tobruk were carried out by Ju-87's, often escorted by Me-109F's, which were superior to every British fighter in the Western Desert. The Official History says that at times, almost every British fighter in the theater was involved in the protection of shipping.

The Axis airforces carried on harassing raids against "targets in the desert". Suez and the canal were hit by Ju-88's based in Greece. These were carried out over July to October 1941, aanmd involved 34 attacks with 300 sorties. Few of these were successfully attacked. Five were lost, of which one was in August and four were in September. This is based on the account in the Official History.

The Axis air campaign

Much of the German air campaign was devoted to bombing Tobruk and the ships carrying supplies. The Germans used their divebombers to attack shipping. They also hit the harbour with divebombers, as well as level bombers. Night bombers based in Greece conducted unaimed bombing of the general area at night. The Germans also laid mines in the harbour, to do everything they could to weaken Tobruk for an anticipated attack. Apparently, the British anti-aircraft artillery were very effective. Fighter cover was less of a factor, due to the range from bases. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

More on air operations in the Middle Eastern Theater in the fall of 1941

German supply dumps in the forward areas were repeatedly hit by South African Marylands, flying under escort. Dumps near Gambut, between Tobruk and the border were singled out for more attention. The result was that German preparations for a renewed attack on Tobruk were delayed, so that the British were ready for offensive operations before Rommel.

Besides supply lines, the battle for air supremacy was waged by a bombing campaign against Axis airfields. Fields at Gambut and Gazala were particularly targeted. Gazala was the main fighter base.

British fighter aircraft were totally devoted to air defense of the main army bases and convoys to Tobruk, and to escorting reconnaissance and bomber aircraft. The alternate, more offensive strategy would have entailed patrols over Axis-held territory, looking for opposing aircraft to engage.
This is based on the account in the Official History.

More on the RAF bombing offensive in the fall of 1941 and the Martin Maryland

In August and September 1941, Wellingtons flying from Egypt hit the Corinth Canal with the aim of blocking it. At the time, it had been thought that they had succeeded, but we now know that they had not been able to block the canal.

Both Derna and Bardia were bombed frequently. At night, they were hit by Wellingtons and Fairey Albacores and in the daytime, they were hit by Blenheims and Marylands. The Maryland was playing a greater bombing role at this date, while they had previously had been restricted to maritime reconnaissance. They were a diminishing resource, however, as production had been limited. As I have previously written, this lists Maryland production:

Customer        Martin
Designation     Model  Customer    Production    Initial Delivery
XA-22           167    US Army       1 prototype  9/28/1939
167-A3          167-F1 France      115 aircraft  12/12/1939
167-A3          167-F2 France      100 aircraft   2/08/1940
167-A3 Armoured 167-B3 France       45 aircraft   6/18/1940
Maryland I      167-B3 British RAF  50 aircraft   ?
Maryland I      167-B3 British RAF  35 aircraft   7/25/1940
Maryland II     167-B4 British RAF 150 aircraft   4/14/1941

The successor aircraft was to be the Martin 187 Baltimore. Volume deliveries to the Middle East only happened in the Spring of 1942. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History and from the Glenn L. Martin Maryland Aviation Museum site.

This was apparently an early Maryland I, perhaps taking off.

These are some Maryland pages:

1. Warbirds: The Martin Maryland
2. RAF Museum: Maryland photo
3. Wikipedia: A-22 Maryland
4. The Glenn L Martin Maryland Aviation Museum: Martin Model 167
   

Middle East air operations June-October 1941

During a four month period from mid-June to mid-October 1941, there were widespread air operations in the Middle Eastern theater. The Tripoli port was hit at night 72 times by a total of 357 Wellingtons (one aircraft per sortie). Daylight raids were made by Marylands and Blenheims. As the British were only able to use 500 lbs. bombs and smaller, the damage was not as extensive as it might have been.

Operations continued from Malta. They hit targets in Sicily and Southern Italy, concentrating on airfields and ports.

Benghazi was hit in 102 attacks by Wellingtons operating from Egypt. The squadrons involved were No.37, No.38, No.70, and No.148. Marylands from No.12 Squadron SAAF and No.24 Squadron SAAF, as well as No.39 Squadron RAF. Marylands and Blenheims also were used in night attacks on Benghazi, starting in August. By the end of this period, SAAF Marylands were used in daylight attacks. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

Air support for the Army from July 1941

As previously noted, the No.253 Army Cooperation Wing had been formed for the expressed purpose of providing air support for the Army. The wing was now part of the Western Desert Air Force. Joint army RAF exercises were conducted, starting in July 1941. One step that was defined by September was to provide an Air Support Control Headquarters (ASC). These units were provided to corps headquarters and to armoured divisions. Each brigade had a "tentacle" that could communicate with wireless telegraphy to the ASC. They functioned as forward air controllers, as we would call them. The ASC units only came into existence by 8 October, when the first two were formed. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

Air Vice-Marshal Dawson

Air Vice-Marshal Dawson was sent to the Middle East from the Ministry of Aircraft Production. He role was as Chief Maintenance and Supply Officer was to oversee the assembly of new aircraft, including any modifications, the maintenance of aircraft, their storage, and supplying associated equipment and parts. He arrived in June 1941. There had been four maintenance units in the Middle East, three focused on repairs and one on ordnance. No.103 at Aboukir was heavily bombed and was moved. No.102 had fallen into disuse and had practically ceased to exist. More was moved to the Massara caves, and it was expanded to deal with storage and repair, becoming the No.111 Maintenance Unit. When Aboukir was under attack, it was partially moved to Heliopolis. The became a new repair unit. The British Overseas Aircraft Corporation largely supplied the staff. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

More Churchill intervention in later 1941

Political concerns continued to drive the Prime Minister's agenda on the Middle East. He relented and was going to allow 25,000 more air personnel to be transported to the Middle East, but in fact, only 15,000 were sent by the end of 1941. Everyone but Churchill also wanted more "reinforcements and drafts" to build up existing units that had been depleted, but Churchill wanted to send out new divisions, instead, to have more British divisions in the field, so that all the fighting was not being done by "the Dominions". Even that did not happen. Churchill had asked President Roosevelt for shipping for two "regular British divisions", but in the event, there was only shipping available for one, and that to be sent from Halifax, and that division, the 18th, ended up being sent to the Far East, not the Middle East. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

Churchill was unhappy with RAF staffing plans for the Middle East

Convoy capacity from Great Britain to the Middle East never was great enough for the demand. By the summer of 1941, the Chiefs of Staff had wanted to send 35,000 men to the Middle East to build up the RAF there, to correct the shortages and shortcomings. Churchill was resistant, because he wanted to send army troops instead. In stead of 35,000 men, he wanted that number to be reduced to 20,000. The 35,000 men was intended to aid the buildup to 62-1/2 squadrons, including 17 new fighter squadrons. Churchill was also unhappy with the total planned number of 85,000 men, which he considered to be excessive. Even without the 17 new fighter squadrons, the need was to build to about 74,000 men. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

Factors limiting the RAF in the Middle East

The RAF's numeric strength in the Middle East grew rapidly from June to October 1941. This is a summary of the numbers:

                  Formed Squadrons  Total Aircraft  Newest Aircraft 
Mid-June    1941    34-1/2            549             419
Mid-August  1941    49                722             550
Mid-October 1941    52                846             780

Air Marshal Tedder was concerned that the air strength would expand beyond the capacity of air fields, maintenance, and trained air crew. The air crew training was a major issue. On paper, there were three operational training units in the Middle East, but none were functional in June. The operational training units would be expanded to four and built up to an efficient state, but progress was slow. By "late Autumn", one was "fully staffed". One other was half-ready, while another had untrained staff, and the fourth had not been formed, yet. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

The RAF in the Middle East was suffering from gaps in production between aircraft versions

In the summer and fall of 1941, there were production transitions taking place among aircraft models and there were gaps between the phaseout of older models and the new models coming into production. These are some examples:

The Hurricane I was disappearing, but the number of
Hurricane II's available was driven by needs in Britain, which kept numbers down.

The Tomahawk (P-40C) was relatively new to the Middle East, but it was being phased out in favor of the Kittyhawk (P-40D and P-40E). Teething problems were expected with the new type.

Fighter Command versions of the Beaufighter were contingent on adequate supplies of ground-control radar for guiding interception. The tradeoff was that the Coastal Command version would require more aircrew from Britain.

Production of the Martin 167F Maryland was ending, but the replacement aircraft, the Baltimore (A-30) was delayed. The RAF was forced to send every Blenheim IV that was available, so that the Middle East would have medium bombers. Thre were very few of these left. As soon as they were available, Douglas Boston III aircraft would be sent.

The Wellington I heavy bomber did not do well in the heat, so the Wellington II was developed, but they were slow coming into production.

Bristol Beaufort torpedo bombers were in use in Britain, but had not reached the Middle East. They would need to be drawn from Britain for the Middle East. They are not listed in the appendix in Vol.II of the Official History, so they must not have reached the Middle East, yet.

This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

Guidance for the Middle East commanders from Churchill in September 1941

General Auchinleck had proposed that specialist air units be assigned to protect and cooperate with the Army in the Middle East. Churchill disagreed and sent a letter outlining the policy that he wanted implemented. One step was that Churchill had ordered 250 Bofors 4omm light AA guns sent for the Army, so that they did not need to be so dependent on the RAF for air defence. Also, rather than dispersing aircraft to provide cover over a wide area, aircraft should be concentrated to achieve air superiority over the critical points. Aircraft should also be used to attack enemy rear installations. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

Decisions about the British attack in North Africa in late 1941

General Auchinleck and Air Marshal Tedder had been called home to speak with the Defence Committee, after they were appointed. The Defence Committee had been anxious to mount some sort of offensive quickly so that the British could be perceived as taking pressure off the Russians, as we have previously discussed. Much of the rationale for the change in command was politically driven, as was the need for an offensive. General Auchinleck was able to successfully argue that the offensive should be delayed until November, when the chances of success were much better.

Everyone expected that by November the RAF could be reinforced with new aircraft, so that they would be in a better position to gain air supremacy over the battlefield. British forces generally had been very small, relative to the Italians and now that had been even more true since the arrival of the Germans. The record so far in the Mediterranean and Middle East had been that the RAF had been unable to meet the demands placed upon them to support and defend British ground and naval forces. The challenge was to correct that situation. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

Combined arms battlegroups in North Africa

Rommel, at least, and probably it was German Army doctrine, routinely used combined-arms battlegroups in North Africa. In 1941, the British were organized along division and brigade lines, but even by the summer of 1941, there was a limited use of motorized infantry, artillery, and anti-tank guns. Including tanks would still have been a rarity.

General Auchinleck and Eric Dorman-Smith advocated the use of combined arms battlegroups, but what were actually created in mid-1942 were generally to small, so that it was not possible to easily concentrate them. Instead, you had these small groups off "swanning" in the desert, all doing what they wanted without central control. That understandably alienated mainstream British army opinion, which was generally conservative and opposed any radical ideas, and the people who advocated them. That was part of the reason that Percy Hobart was unemployed in the late 1930's and why Eric Dorman-Smith ended up that way. Claude Auchinleck had enough prestige that he continued to be employed, at least back in India.

The British were disappointed with their interdiction efforts

Despite their successes, the British were concerned that the Axis was still able to get too many supplies through to their forces in Libya. A series of steps were taken to improve the performance of their forces:

• 3 Wellingtons with long range radar were sent to Malta
• 11 Albacores were fitted with auxiliary fuel tanks to extend their range
• Force K was formed to operate from Malta with the cruisers Aurora and Penelope and destroyers Lance and Lively

This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

The Axis supply situation was very bad by November 1941

Some 40 Axis merchant ships were lost to aircraft and submarines from June through October 1941. This was rapidly diminishing the available pool of transports, and would greatly affect the course of the campaign in North Africa. General Halder, at the OKW, continued to view the protection of the supply lines to Libya as an Italian affair and refused to consider moving more aircraft to the area.

Only by late August did the OKW concede that the campaign in Russia would continue into 1942. Before the end of September, German submarines were sent to the Mediterranean Sea and Hitler assigned Fliegerkorps X the task of protecting convoys to North Africa. These moves were driven by British successes in interdicting the supply lines. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

Airpower on Malta in August and September 1941

A considerable air power had been built up on Malta by August and September 1941. The inventory had grown to this force:

20 Blenheim bombers (probably Mk.IV)
12 Welligton heavy bombers
20 Swordfish torpedo bombers, FAA
10 Maryland reconnaissance aircraft
15 Hurricane I fighters
60 Hurricane II fighters
 8 Beaufighter long range fighters

They were employed on different tasks:

Blenheims: bomb attacks on shipping
Swordfish: torpedo attacks on ships and minelaying
Wellingtons: bombing ports and minelaying

The Blenheims were primarily engaged in low-level attacks on ships with bombs. They would come in at mast-height. Occasionally, Wellingtons would be used to bomb ships at sea, although this was less common. They were primarily used to bomb Tripoli. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

The British campaign against Axis shipping in the Mediterreanean Sea in the fall of 1941

The British campaign against Axis shipping in the fall of 1941 was being prosecuted by both submarines and aircraft. The submarines operated from Gibraltar, Malta, and Alexandria. They were primarily the small U Class boats at this stage. Aerial reconnaissance was photographing ships engaged in the North Africa supply effort to aid analysis.

The Italians ran convoys down through the Straits of Messina to Tripoli and Benghazi. Evasive routing was also employed, so that some ran to the east before they ran back to the Libyan ports. The convoys stayed well away from Malta.

Three British submarine flotillas were involved. They were the 8th Flotilla from Gibraltar, the 10th Flotilla from Malta, and the 1st Flotilla from Alexandria. The 8th flotilla included some Dutch submarines. On 18 September 1941, Upholder sank two Italian liners, the Neptunia and Oceania. Operations occurred with the expected losses: Union was sunk in July, and P32 and P33 were mined off Tripoli in August.

This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

RAF organization change in the Mediterranean area

At Admiral Cunningham's request, No. 201 Group RAF was reformed as No.201 Naval Cooperation Group RAF. Air Commodore Slater's primary responsibility was to cooperate with the fleet. This change happened on 20 October 1941. The squadrons involved initially were:

Two General Reconnaissance Squadrons RAF
One Greek General Reconnaissance Squadron
One Flying Boat Squadron (Sunderlands)
One Yugoslav Flying Boat Squadron
Two Long-Range Fighter Squadrons  RAF

As of 21 October 1941, Admiral Cunningham had the increased responsibility for the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden, as far east as Aden. The command had to contend with FW-200 Condors and He-111's flying from Crete, which had successfully bombed the Georgic on 24 July 1941, near Suez. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

More about Halberd

The Mediterranean Fleet went to sea in support of Operation Halberd. Admiral Cunningham had hoped to draw the German airforce to the battlefleet, away from the convoy. No one noticed that they were even at sea, so they broke radio silence. The Italians had reacted by sending as much of their fleet to sea as they had fuel. They were already suffering from a scarcity of fuel oil for their ships. The Italian-centric view had thought that this might be an attempt to get revenge for the attack on Gibraltar, and they had hoped to send all five of their battleships to sea, but in the event, they only sent the two Littorio class ships out, because of the fuel limitations previously mentioned. After Cape Matapan, the Italian fleet was operating under restrictions, and in the even, they did not close to within sight of Force H. The Regia Aeronautica showed skill and courace in attacking the British force, and the navy was disappointed in having done so little. The SM79 torpedo bombers continued to be a factor while Italy was in the war on the Axis side. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official history.

At the close of Halberd

The opportunity was taken during Operation Halberd to run three empty merchant ships west, from Malta, to Gibraltar. They encountered aircraft and an Italian MTB, but arrived safely. Force X steamed along the coast of Tunisia and then turned to join Force H for the voyage back to Gibraltar. The torpedoed Nelson had preceded the two groups that arrived on 30 September and 1 October 1941. The ships were attacked by Italian submarines along the way, but took no hits. They did sink one Italian submarine, the Adua. The nine British submarines that provided cover had no success, either. Utmost had fired torpedoes at three Italian cruisers near Naples, but was lucky to escape, as she was almost rammed by a destroyer. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

The Halberd convoy in September 1941

The decision was made on 28 August 1941 to send another convoy to Malta through the western Mediterranean Sea. The operation was called Halberd, and would include a heavy naval force: the battleships Nelson, Rodney, and Prince of wales and the aircraft carrier Ark Royal. There were 5 cruisers and 18 destroyers. The convoy would include 9 merchant ships. 22 Beaufighters and 5 Blenheim fighters were available for air cover. On 27 September, the Nelson was torpedoed by an Italian aircraft (perhaps an SM79 torpedo bomber). No.69 Squadron was providing maritime reconnaissance, and one of their Marylands sighted 2 Italian battleships and 8 destoyers to the ENE. They were about 70nm away. Another force was sighted 20 miles closer: 4 cruisers and 8 destroyers. When the British battleships steered for them, the Italians turned away.

When the concoy entered the Skerki Channel, Force H turned towards Gibraltar. Towards nightfall, small groups of torpedo bombers staged attacks. One hit the transport Imperial Star, which had to be sunk. The convoy reached Malta at about midday. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

More Malta supply runs in 1941

In September 1941, hthe merchant ship Empire Guillemot was sent with supplies for Malta. She had an odd cargo, as she carried "fodder for livestock". The passed through the Western Mediterranean by flying "false colours". At various times, she flew the flags of Spain, France, and Italy. She was seen by aircraft, but not disturbed. She arrived at Malta on 19 September.

Submarines were also used to carry supplies to Malta, although only small quantities could be sent this way. The minelaying submarines Cachelot and Rorqual had larger volumes, so they were especially suitable. The larger O-class ships, such as Osiris and Otus also were used. On 30 July 1941, the Chachelot was caught on the surface by an Italian torpedo boat and had to be eventually scuttled. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

Minelaying in the Mediterranean Sea in August 1941

The cruiser minelayer Manxman carried out an operation to lay mines south of Livorno (Leghorn) on the night of 24/25 August 1941. For part of the trip, the Manxman wore a disguise as a French light cruiser. She left Gibraltar in disguise, but removed it at sunset on 24 August. The British were being meticulous about adhering to international law, which thought that carrying out hostile acts in disguise was unsporting. After laying mines, the Manxman escaped at 37 knots, and then reassumed her disguise. She was back in Scotland by 30 August.

Admiral Somervilled, commander of Force H, carried out a diversionary operation to draw any potential attention away from the Manxman. On 24 August, he had ten Swordfish from Ark Royal "set fire to some cork woods and bomb a factory near Tempio in Sardinia". The Italian fleet was drawn out, thinking that another Malta convoy was at sea. When Force H returned to Gibraltar, they figured that they had cause the convoy to turn back. This is based on teh account in Vol.II of the Official History.

An attack on Gibraltar

After failing in their attack on Malta, the Tenth Light Flotilla turned its attention back to Gibraltar. They had tried three previous attacks: September and October 1940, and May 1941. They planned a new attack, this time with human torpedoes. They launched the attack on 20 September 1941. The naval tanker Denbydale was attacked in the naval harbour by one human torpedo. The tanker was "seriously damaged" "but remained afloat". "Two other merchant ships were attacked in the commercial anchorage". They succeeded in sinking one and caused the other to need to be beached to stay afloat. All the human torpedo crew members, two per torpedo, escaped to Spain and were eventually returned to Italy. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

The Italian attack on the Grand Harbour at Malta.

In both WWI and WWII, the Italians excelled at individual acts of heroism, such as the frog men at Alexandria, or in this case, explosive boats in an attack on the Grand Harbour at Malta. The attack occurred in the dark in the early morning of 26 July 1941. The attack was carried out by men of the Tenth Light Flotilla, a sort of Italian special forces unit. British fighter cover had prevented a reconnaissance before the attack, so the Italians lacked knowledge of ship positions. A "human torpedo", such as was later used at Alexandria, was to attack the torpedo net at the boat entrance to the harbour. In the event, the attack failed, as the British saw the ship that carried the attackers and were forewarned. Instead of breaking the net barrier, a bridge was brought down into the boat entrance, and this effectively blocked the way. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

Malta in August 1941, after being reinforced

The primary goal of the Substance and Style convoys was to increase the strength on the island. The Official History says that there were now 22,000 in the garrison. This is a summary:

13 battalions
112 heavy AA guns
118 light AA guns
104 pieces of artillery (light, field, and medium)

aircraft:

15 Hurricane I
60 Hurricane II

In August, a night fighter was formed with 12 Hurricane IIs, and this seems to have reduced the frequency of night raids. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

Operation Style in August 1941

The next convoy, in August 1941, was named Style (the previous had been Substance, so they were having some fun with names). Force X, for this operation, had Hermione, Arethusa, the minelayer Manxman, and two destroyers. They actually sailed from Gibraltar on 31 July and arrived at Malta on 2 August. They carried 1,750 "officers and men and 130 tons of stores". The only incident of note was that on 2 August "at first light", the cruiser Hermione caught the Italian submarine Tembion by surprise and rammed and sank her. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

Substance was a hard fought convoy

As we showed, the escort for Operation Substance was substantial. Force H, Force X, and the battleship Nelson, from the Home Fleet were involved. The operation was costly to the Navy. The cruiser Manchester was torpedoed on 23 July 1941 as was the destroyer Fearless. "The Fearless had to be sunk". The Manchester was sent to Gibraltar with a destroyer as escort. Force X was also involved, and this included:

cruiser Edinburgh
cruiser Hermione
cruiser Arethusa
8 destroyers

In fruther attacks, the destroyer Firedrake was damaged and had to be towed to Gibraltar by another destroyer. The transport Sydney Star was torpedoed by an Italian MTB at night, but was able to proceed towards Malta, after her troops and part of her crew were removed. She actually arrived on 24 July, before the convoy. The rest arrived safely. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

Malta needed more forces

After the German capture of Crete with airborne forces, the British became increasingly concerned that the Germans might attempt the same sort of attack on Malta. The decision was made, perhaps in July 1941, that more troops and artillery needed to be shipped to Malta. With the Germans more active in the eastern Mediterranean Sea, the convoy would be sent from west to east. The force to be sent to Malta would include "two battalions of infantry, one heavy and one light anti-aircraft regiment, thirty field guns and then men to man them, and a number of Royal Air Force pilots and technicians". The operation ran from July 21 to 24, 1941, and was called Operation Substance. A considerable naval force was involved:

battleship Nelson
battlecruiser Renown
cruiser Edinburgh
cruiser Manchester
cruiser Arethusa
aircraft carrier Ark Royal
some destroyers
8 submarines

This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History. I also consulted this web page about convoys.

The period from July to October 1941, in the Mediterranean, consisted of a fight for control of the sea and the flow of supplies and equipment

Very quickly, after Italy entered the war, the British established an ascendancy over them at sea. Before the arrival of German airpower, the British were able to operate pretty much where they wanted. After the arrival of Fliegerkorps X in January 1941, as we have seen, that situation changed. After May, the waters between Cyrenaica and Crete became almost impassible to the British. The decision was made, though, that the supply and defense of Malta was critical, and must be pursued, regardless of cost. The losses off Crete now greatly affected operations. The scarcity of destroyers meant that the battleships Queen Elizabeth and Valiant were confined to Alexandria. The Warspite and Formidable were sent to America for repair. Other damaged ships were sent to "Durban, Bombay, or the United Kingdom". This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

The Official History tries to spin that General Auchinleck should have attacked sooner

Vol.II of the Official History of the War in the Mediterranean and Middle East paints a picture that the Germans and Italians so benefitted from the delay in the British attack until November 1941, that the British should have attacked sooner. That ignores the fact that the British army in North Africa was not ready for any offensive. They would have just repeated Battleaxe, where they squandered what strength they had without result. They focus on the benefit to the Axis forces and ignore the realities of the British situation in this discussion. To be fair, they had already examined the British situation and had convinced me that even November 1941 was too soon to attack.

So, we should go ahead and list the Axis reinforcements that arrived between August and November 1941:

Part of the Afrika Division, later renamed as the 90th Light Division
Italian artillery units
Trieste (motorized) Division
Sabratha Division, reformed after being almost totally destroyed
100 M13/40 tanks for the Ariete Division
some light tanks of little value
15th Panzer and 21st Panzer Division were built up
  to 250 tanks from 180, almost all by repairs

New plans had to be made, as Russia was stronger than thought

By 28 August 1941, the Germans realized that they were likely not to achieve their objects before winter, and they needed to make longer term plans about the course of the campaign in Russia. They faced the reality that the British would be in contact with Russia through Iran. In the Middle East, the British seemed to be too weak to launch an attack, but if Rommel were able to take Tobruk, that might help the Axis supply situation. The British goal would obviously be to expel Axis forces from North Africa, and that would allow the Americans free access to French North Africa and West Africa. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

The German attack on Russia started so well, that they started planning their next moves

The German attack on Russia, launched on 22 June 1941, was succeeding so well in the initial phase, that planning commenced for the nexts moves following the collapse of Russia. The Russian campaign was planned to be over by the fall of 1941. At that point, the Germans would be free to concentrate pressure on the British position in the Middle East. With a successful result in Russia, Germany would be in a better position to apply pressure on Turkey. They would press Spain to remove the British from Gibraltar. They would be able to attack Egypt from Libya, through Bulgaria and Turkey, and possibly, through Iran. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

Command changes on the Axis side in the summer of 1941

The German high command (OKH) had wanted to setup General Gause as a new level in the command structure, with his responsibilities as a liason to the Italian commander in North Africa, and for ensuring that supplies flowed smoothly. In fact, neither the Italians nor Rommel liked this arrangement. The Italians actually preferred either an Italian general or else Rommel in the role of an Army commander. Rommel was acceptable, as he had gained the support of the Italian people with his successes in Libya. To further strengthen their hand, the Italians replaced General Garibaldi with Generatl Bastico. The OKH relented and made the new headquarters Panzer Gruppe Afrika, with General Gause as chief of staff and Rommel as the commander. Rommel would command Italian as well as German troops in his new role. General Bastico would also have an Italian mobile corps with General Gambara as commander. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

The German situation from May 1941 in North Africa was quite different

For the Axis powers, especially for the Germans, the situation was reversed from the British situation. The German High Command was very conservative and did not want to risk an advance until they had built up their strength considerably. Rommel was an opportunist, and was always looking for a chance to attack the British positions. Then, you had the inter-ally politics, where the Germans wanted to see the Italians use their navy more in support of North Africa and the Italians wanted to see the Germans bring in air power and attack the Suez Canal through Turkey. It seemed that the most suitable Axis units for an attack were the 5th Light Division, the 8th Panzer Division, and the Italian Ariete armoured division. They also decided to send more medium and heavy artillery for use against Tobruk. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

Churchill was not to get his early offensive

General Auchinleck was in a position to argue to Churchill that an offensive could not be mounted with any chance of success until late 1941. Battleaxe was a convenient example pointing to the consequences of a quick offensive with untrained troops. The fact was that there would not be a complete, fully trained armoured division in North Africa. Even by mid-October there would only be one division and one army tank brigade. After the commanders in Britain understood the situation (Auchinleck had argued persuasively), they decided to send out the 22nd Armoured Brigade, from the 1st Armoured Division in Britain. They had hoped that the 22nd Armoured Brigade could arrive in mid-September, but it convoy only arrived on 4 October 1941. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

The British tank situation in the summer and fall of 1941

The British had to face that reality that infantry tanks such as the Inf.Mk.II Matilda were unsuitable for tank-to-tank combat, and so they were finally withdrawn from the armoured divisions. Instead, they would be used to equip the "Army Tank Brigades", for use in the infantry support role for which they were intended. The Matilda had actually shown itself quite capable in the Battleaxe operation, but they had radio problems and limited range, so that alone necessitated that they could not be used in mobile operations. Their superior armour had shown itself to be useful against the Germans, however.

Since the British were not able to supply enough cruiser tanks (increasingly, Crusaders), they had to use the American Stuarts in their place during the summer and fall of 1941. The Stuarts were extremely mobile, but they suffered from lack of desert equipment and had an odd, rather small gun in the 37mm. They were thus burdened with a gun that was non-standard and required special ammunition that was only in limited supply. Still, they played an important part in the Crusader battle in late 1941. They were replaced, though, in the cruiser role, as soon as adequate numbers of Crusaders and the American Grants were available. This is based, in part, on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

As soon as General Auchinleck arrived, Churchill was pressing for a new offensive

General Auchinleck had been in India, prior to taking over from General Wavell as the theater commander for the Army. Churchill was already asking him if a new offensive could be mounted, partly to take advantage of the German preoccupation with Russia. Political considerations were largely behind the desire for an offensive. In Britain, they did not want to do nothing, so if Russia defeated Germany that they could claim to have done so without British help. They were also concerned that if Russia were defeated, that Britain could have been said to have done nothing to help. When Auchinleck seemed unresponsive, he and Air Marshal Tedder were called to Britain to discuss the situation. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

Iran ("Persia") becomes a problem

Even in 1939, there had been about 3,000 Germans in Iran. More entered after May 1941, after the Iraqi coup. British operations, in conjunction with the Russians, began on 25 August 1941. The plan was "to occupy the oilfields at Ahwaz" "and at Khanikin". Khanikin was just to the northeast of Baghdad. Lt-General Quinan, the commander in Iraq, commanded the operation. Following the usual forms, they had given the Iranian government an ultimatum on 17 August. The 8th Indian Division took the southern oilfields. The northern operation was undertaken by the 10th Indian Division and the 2nd Indian Armoured Brigade and the 9th Armoured Brigade. These were actually motorized, as only the 2nd Indian Armoured Brigade had one regiment of British light tanks. The RAF had 7 squadrons available to support the operation. The Iranian government collapsed by 28 August, and the Shah was succeeded by his son. "British and Russian forces entered Teheran" on 17 September. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

The threat to the British position in the Middle East from Barbarrosa

The German attack on Russia, on 22 June 1941, greatly changed the strategic picture in the Middle East. The concern was that the Germans could be in a position to threaten the oil fields in Iran (Churchill insisted on calling it Persia), particularly. If Russia was quickly overcome, then the Germans might head to the south through Turkey or Iran. Depending when they reached the Caucasus, they might really pose a threat to the entire British position in the eastern Mediterranean and Middle East. The British were heavily dependent on their oil fields in Iraq and Iran and the refinery at Abadan. Basra, in the south of Iraq was also an important port. By 1 September 1941, the suggestion had been made to India that they might increase the planned force for Basra to 10 divisions with 30 squadrons of aircraft. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

After the German attack on Russia on 22 June 1941

The British Chiefs of Staff were not surprised at the German attack on Russia on 22 June 1941. The British had been weakened and were not a threat, but were strong enough at home that an invasion was impractical. The British were aware that there was a large scale movement of German forces to the East. The reduction in German air activity in the Mediterranean theater and over Britain was also indicative of the shift in forces elsewhere.

Rumours accurately forecast that the Rumanians would attack Russia with the Germans. By late May, the German armies facing East had grown to at least 100 divisions. The British expected the Germans to go through some exercise where they would demand concessions from the Soviets that they could not accept, and then use that as a pretext to invade. The reality was the Germans skipped what used to be the accepted forms and just attacked without warning on 22 June. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

More thoughts about generals

I was interested to see that General Alan Cunningham, who brilliantly commanded a fast-moving and far-ranging campaign against the Italians in East Africa, was an artilleryman. For me, that helps to explain why he was so out of his element as 8th Army commander. The Wikipedia entry for him was above average, as were those for Generals Wavell and Auchinleck. Auchinleck and Cunningham both lived to a great age. Some of what is in Wikipedia is mediocre and best, but the biographies of the generals are quite good.

More thoughts on Generals Wavell and Auchinleck

We might make a few comparisons between Generals Wavell and Auchinleck. Some obvious things to examine are appointments and their strengths and weaknesses.

Based on results, General Wavell seems to have done well with his appointments. He was in his position for about two years. Auchinleck held his position for only about a year. General Auchinleck did not do well with his appointments, and I have wondered at the difference. One example was Alan Cunningham, who had done well in East Africa, and had conducted a fast-moving campaign that routed the Italians. The problem was that General Cunningham was near exhaustion at the end of the campaign. General Auchinleck was more impressed by Cunningham's campaign, and seems not to have been able to assess the man.

Wavell's primary strength seems to have been his planning ability. His ability to judge men was another strength. His weaknesses were his verbal inarticulateness and his seeming inability to recognize which orders from Britain were reasonable and which were not. He accepted the end to the offensive in Libya without protest and the adventure in Greece. Both turned out badly. He objected to Iraq and Syria, both of which turned out well.

I have wondered if General Auchinleck was more of an idea man. One factor that I had not considered was the Auchinleck was an Indian army man, and lacked much exposure to the regular British army. He did not do well with his appointments, but he proved himself a brilliant field commander, something that was not consistent with his position as theater commander. Auchinleck saved the Crusader battle, in late 1941, and turned it from a defeat into a victory. He then turned the 8th Army over to General Ritchie, who was not up to the job. Auchinleck had to step in and restore the situation, finally halting Rommel at the First Battle of El Alamein. He and his chief of staff, Eric Dorman-Smith, were removed by Churchill, as Churchill had finally lost confidence, and politically, needed to make a change.

The root of Wavell's problem

The Official History says that the real problem with relations between Churchill and General Wavell was the General's lack of verbal skills. Churchill was the consummate speaker, and he apparently expected his commanders to be able to speak well. Churchill first met General Wavell in August 1940, and it was only the favorable opinions of General Dill and Anthony Eden that kept him from removing Wavell, after the meeting. Of course, General Wavell could tell that Churchill had taken a dislike for him, and that was enough to erode his attitude, over time. With the constant telegrams from Churchill and orders to take actions which further eroded British security in the theater, General Wavell went from being a good soldier, following orders, to the point he reached in May and June, where he was resistent to direction from Britain. Because of Churchill's priorities, they had a setback in the Western Desert, which jeopardized the whole British position in the Middle East, they had been forced to pursue the disastrous campaign in Greece and the further losses at Crete. By the time Iraq and Syria had been ordered, Wavell had become useless, really, because his attitude had broken. It turned out that Iraq and Syria went well, and the next obvious step was to remove Wavell from his command.

The root of Wavell's problem

The Official History says that the real problem with relations between Churchill and General Wavell was the General's lack of verbal skills. Churchill was the consummate speaker, and he apparently expected his commanders to be able to speak well. Churchill first met General Wavell in August 1940, and it was only the favorable opinions of General Dill and Anthony Eden that kept him from removing Wavell, after the meeting. Of course, General Wavell could tell that Churchill had taken a dislike for him, and that was enough to erode his attitude, over time. With the constant telegrams from Churchill and orders to take actions which further eroded British security in the theater, General Wavell went from being a good soldier, following orders, to the point he reached in May and June, where he was resistent to direction from Britain. Because of Churchill's priorities, they had a setback in the Western Desert, which jeopardized the whole British position in the Middle East, they had been forced to pursue the disastrous campaign in Greece and the further losses at Crete. By the time Iraq and Syria had been ordered, Wavell had become useless, really, because his attitude had broken. It turned out that Iraq and Syria went well, and the next obvious step was to remove Wavell from his command.

Churchill makes personnel moves, starting in May 1941

In many ways, the manic way in which the Prime Minister and his staff in Britain managed the war was bound to cause friction. The first casualty of the impatience for results, when impossible and unreasonable demands were being made from Britain was Air Chief Marshal Longmore. He was relieved by his deputy, Arthur Tedder, on 1 June 1941. General Wavell's attitude was beyond repair, so he was another of Churchill's targets. Wavell was very much the establishment soldier, and was one of those responsible for striking down innovators, such as Percy Hobart and Eric Dorman-Smith. Another component of the clean sweep in the command structure was when General Sir Claude Auchinleck was appointed as the new theater commander, starting 5 July 1941. The third of the air-land-and-sea commanders, Andrew Cunningham, survived as Mediterranean Fleet commander until 1942. He had such prestige that he continued in high commands through the war, by 1943 becoming First Sea Lord. This is based, in part, on the account in Vol.II of the Official History, with my commentary.

Lend Lease

The enactment of the Lend-Lease Act on 11 March 1941 by the United States was a major event that greatly helped the British. They also allocated equipment for Greece, although this was too late to be any use there. The Americans had allocated 30 Grumman F4F fighters, 50 field guns, and ammunition for Greece. They were shipped in early April, but this equipment, along with some alloted to Yugoslavia, didn't arrive at their intended destination, due to the German invasion that started 6 April. Production in the United States was very small, in some types of equipment. They produced only 16 tanks in March 1941. The Grant tank prototype had been produced in April and in May, the M3 Stuart light tank went into mass production. One outcome after Lend Lease was that large-scale shipments of American equipment were started in May 1941. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

The British aviation situation greatly improved by the summer of 1941

The British air strength in the Middle East had grown to 300 aircraft by May 1941. They expected to reach 520 in the middle of July. The situation in Takoradi had greatly improved. They were able to erect 161 aircraft in May, a huge improvement over the 100-or-so that they had been able to erect. The goal was that there needed to be 300 aircraft a month added, to just replace losses and worn-out or obsolescent aircraft. The actual figures in mid-1941 were:

Month    Aircraft arrivals

May      206
June     352
July     265

In addition, in July, 16 aircraft arrived from South Africa and 76 from the United States.
This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

British aircraft in use in May 1941

The Official History discusses the aircraft in use in May 1941 and their strengths and weaknesses:

1. Hurricane I: equal to the contemporary Italian aircraft and the Me-110, but inferior to the Me-109 above 16,000ft
2. Hurricane II: not available yet. Some were equipped with cannon for low-level attack
3. Blenheim IF: still used for low-level attack on airfields and vehicles
4. Blenheim IV: outclassed and could only operate with escorts
5. Martin Maryland: maritime reconnaissance only, as its speed and armament limited its ability to operate where there were enemy fighters. Its bomb capacity was too limited and its loaded range was too short
   
6. Sunderland flying boat: good for maritime reconnaissance, but not of defended ports
7. Westland Lysander: obsolescent, and not able to operate with out escorts
8. Wellington: only able to operate as a night bomber
9. Curtis Tomahawk: new and unproven, although it was hoped that it would prove useful for both the fighter and low level attack roles

Takoradi, in early 1941

Most aircraft destined for the Middle East were sent by the route to Takoradi, in west Africa (now Ghana). Almost all fighters and light bombers were sent to Takoradi, where they were assembled and then flown on to Egypt. That was not without difficulties. In February 1941, there were 150 aircraft at Takoradi that were not yet erected or were not flyable for some reason. Many were new Curtis Tomahawks, most of which had arrived without their equipment. By March, there were 180 in that state. Part of the issue is that with the staff they had, they were hardly able to process 100 aircraft in a month. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

The next phase in North Africa

Following the end of fighting in Syria, the next major development was the massive reinforcements sent to North Africa. After the Italian surrender in East Africa, the 4th and 5th Indian Divisions and the 1st Sourth African Division were sent to Egypt. From the UK arrived the HQ 50th Division, the New Zealand Division, and the 7th Australian Division. From Australian came the 9th Australian Division. The liners Queen Mary and Queen Elizabeth brought troops from Australia to the Red Sea. Since the Italian defeat in East Africa, they were able to north to Suez. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.