My wife found about 30 copies of this sheet, and I thought it might be of interest to wargamers. You may need to scale the image to fit your needs. The AFV's on the page include:
22nd East African Brigade:
2nd Nigerian Regiment
1/6th King's African Rifles
5th King's African Rifles
1st South African Light Tank Company
HQ squadron 1st East African Armoured Car Regiment
1st South African Field Battery
7th South African Field Battery
Composite Section of 1st South African Medium Brigade
(1-60pdr and 1-6in Howitzer)
18th (Indian) Mountain Battery, RA
22nd (Indian) Mountain Battery, RA
54th East African Field Company
2 platoons, 1/3rd King's African Rifles (Machine Gun)
A Company (Tanganyika) Field Ambulance
22nd East African Brigade Group Company
23rd Nigerian Brigade:
1st Nigerian Regiment
3rd Nigerian Regiment
1/1st King's African Rifles
one squadron (less one troop) East African Armoured Car Regiment
7th South African Field Brigade
1st South African Medium Brigade (less composite section)
52nd Nigerian Light Battery
51st Nigerian Field Company
17th South African Field Park Company
one company 1/3rd King's African Rifles (machine gun) (less two platoons)
No.3 Squadron SAAF Hurricanes and Gladiators
No.11 Squadron SAAF Fairey Battles
No.12 Squadron SAAF Ju-86s
No.40 Army Cooperation Squadron SAAF Hartbeests
No.41 Army Cooperation Squadron SAAF Hartbeests
General Cunningham's plan, dating from April 1941, had been "to move on Jimma and the Lakes from Addis Ababa and at the same time advance northwards from Yavello and Neghelli". The orders from General Wavell to take the road from Asmara to Addis Ababa changed the plan. General Cunningham was reduced to part of the 11th African Division the 12th African Division. His new plan was for the two divisions to push forward and to join and then "drive the enemy from the Lakes region". This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.
Attacks on shipping to Tobruk were carried out by Ju-87's, often escorted by Me-109F's, which were superior to every British fighter in the Western Desert. The Official History says that at times, almost every British fighter in the theater was involved in the protection of shipping.
The Axis airforces carried on harassing raids against "targets in the desert". Suez and the canal were hit by Ju-88's based in Greece. These were carried out over July to October 1941, aanmd involved 34 attacks with 300 sorties. Few of these were successfully attacked. Five were lost, of which one was in August and four were in September. This is based on the account in the Official History.
German supply dumps in the forward areas were repeatedly hit by South African Marylands, flying under escort. Dumps near Gambut, between Tobruk and the border were singled out for more attention. The result was that German preparations for a renewed attack on Tobruk were delayed, so that the British were ready for offensive operations before Rommel.
Besides supply lines, the battle for air supremacy was waged by a bombing campaign against Axis airfields. Fields at Gambut and Gazala were particularly targeted. Gazala was the main fighter base.
British fighter aircraft were totally devoted to air defense of the main army bases and convoys to Tobruk, and to escorting reconnaissance and bomber aircraft. The alternate, more offensive strategy would have entailed patrols over Axis-held territory, looking for opposing aircraft to engage.
This is based on the account in the Official History.
In August and September 1941, Wellingtons flying from Egypt hit the Corinth Canal with the aim of blocking it. At the time, it had been thought that they had succeeded, but we now know that they had not been able to block the canal.
Both Derna and Bardia were bombed frequently. At night, they were hit by Wellingtons and Fairey Albacores and in the daytime, they were hit by Blenheims and Marylands. The Maryland was playing a greater bombing role at this date, while they had previously had been restricted to maritime reconnaissance. They were a diminishing resource, however, as production had been limited. As I have previously written, this lists Maryland production:
Customer Martin
Designation Model Customer Production Initial Delivery
XA-22 167 US Army 1 prototype 9/28/1939
167-A3 167-F1 France 115 aircraft 12/12/1939
167-A3 167-F2 France 100 aircraft 2/08/1940
167-A3 Armoured 167-B3 France 45 aircraft 6/18/1940
Maryland I 167-B3 British RAF 50 aircraft ?
Maryland I 167-B3 British RAF 35 aircraft 7/25/1940
Maryland II 167-B4 British RAF 150 aircraft 4/14/1941
This was apparently an early Maryland I, perhaps taking off.
During a four month period from mid-June to mid-October 1941, there were widespread air operations in the Middle Eastern theater. The Tripoli port was hit at night 72 times by a total of 357 Wellingtons (one aircraft per sortie). Daylight raids were made by Marylands and Blenheims. As the British were only able to use 500 lbs. bombs and smaller, the damage was not as extensive as it might have been.
Operations continued from Malta. They hit targets in Sicily and Southern Italy, concentrating on airfields and ports.
Benghazi was hit in 102 attacks by Wellingtons operating from Egypt. The squadrons involved were No.37, No.38, No.70, and No.148. Marylands from No.12 Squadron SAAF and No.24 Squadron SAAF, as well as No.39 Squadron RAF. Marylands and Blenheims also were used in night attacks on Benghazi, starting in August. By the end of this period, SAAF Marylands were used in daylight attacks. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.
Formed Squadrons Total Aircraft Newest Aircraft
Mid-June 1941 34-1/2 549 419
Mid-August 1941 49 722 550
Mid-October 1941 52 846 780
The Hurricane I was disappearing, but the number of
Hurricane II's available was driven by needs in Britain, which kept numbers down.
The Tomahawk (P-40C) was relatively new to the Middle East, but it was being phased out in favor of the Kittyhawk (P-40D and P-40E). Teething problems were expected with the new type.
Fighter Command versions of the Beaufighter were contingent on adequate supplies of ground-control radar for guiding interception. The tradeoff was that the Coastal Command version would require more aircrew from Britain.
Production of the Martin 167F Maryland was ending, but the replacement aircraft, the Baltimore (A-30) was delayed. The RAF was forced to send every Blenheim IV that was available, so that the Middle East would have medium bombers. Thre were very few of these left. As soon as they were available, Douglas Boston III aircraft would be sent.
The Wellington I heavy bomber did not do well in the heat, so the Wellington II was developed, but they were slow coming into production.
Bristol Beaufort torpedo bombers were in use in Britain, but had not reached the Middle East. They would need to be drawn from Britain for the Middle East. They are not listed in the appendix in Vol.II of the Official History, so they must not have reached the Middle East, yet.
General Auchinleck and Air Marshal Tedder had been called home to speak with the Defence Committee, after they were appointed. The Defence Committee had been anxious to mount some sort of offensive quickly so that the British could be perceived as taking pressure off the Russians, as we have previously discussed. Much of the rationale for the change in command was politically driven, as was the need for an offensive. General Auchinleck was able to successfully argue that the offensive should be delayed until November, when the chances of success were much better.
Everyone expected that by November the RAF could be reinforced with new aircraft, so that they would be in a better position to gain air supremacy over the battlefield. British forces generally had been very small, relative to the Italians and now that had been even more true since the arrival of the Germans. The record so far in the Mediterranean and Middle East had been that the RAF had been unable to meet the demands placed upon them to support and defend British ground and naval forces. The challenge was to correct that situation. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.
Rommel, at least, and probably it was German Army doctrine, routinely used combined-arms battlegroups in North Africa. In 1941, the British were organized along division and brigade lines, but even by the summer of 1941, there was a limited use of motorized infantry, artillery, and anti-tank guns. Including tanks would still have been a rarity.
General Auchinleck and Eric Dorman-Smith advocated the use of combined arms battlegroups, but what were actually created in mid-1942 were generally to small, so that it was not possible to easily concentrate them. Instead, you had these small groups off "swanning" in the desert, all doing what they wanted without central control. That understandably alienated mainstream British army opinion, which was generally conservative and opposed any radical ideas, and the people who advocated them. That was part of the reason that Percy Hobart was unemployed in the late 1930's and why Eric Dorman-Smith ended up that way. Claude Auchinleck had enough prestige that he continued to be employed, at least back in India.
Some 40 Axis merchant ships were lost to aircraft and submarines from June through October 1941. This was rapidly diminishing the available pool of transports, and would greatly affect the course of the campaign in North Africa. General Halder, at the OKW, continued to view the protection of the supply lines to Libya as an Italian affair and refused to consider moving more aircraft to the area.
Only by late August did the OKW concede that the campaign in Russia would continue into 1942. Before the end of September, German submarines were sent to the Mediterranean Sea and Hitler assigned Fliegerkorps X the task of protecting convoys to North Africa. These moves were driven by British successes in interdicting the supply lines. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.
20 Blenheim bombers (probably Mk.IV)
12 Welligton heavy bombers
20 Swordfish torpedo bombers, FAA
10 Maryland reconnaissance aircraft
15 Hurricane I fighters
60 Hurricane II fighters
8 Beaufighter long range fighters
Blenheims: bomb attacks on shipping
Swordfish: torpedo attacks on ships and minelaying
Wellingtons: bombing ports and minelaying
The British campaign against Axis shipping in the fall of 1941 was being prosecuted by both submarines and aircraft. The submarines operated from Gibraltar, Malta, and Alexandria. They were primarily the small U Class boats at this stage. Aerial reconnaissance was photographing ships engaged in the North Africa supply effort to aid analysis.
The Italians ran convoys down through the Straits of Messina to Tripoli and Benghazi. Evasive routing was also employed, so that some ran to the east before they ran back to the Libyan ports. The convoys stayed well away from Malta.
Three British submarine flotillas were involved. They were the 8th Flotilla from Gibraltar, the 10th Flotilla from Malta, and the 1st Flotilla from Alexandria. The 8th flotilla included some Dutch submarines. On 18 September 1941, Upholder sank two Italian liners, the Neptunia and Oceania. Operations occurred with the expected losses: Union was sunk in July, and P32 and P33 were mined off Tripoli in August.
Two General Reconnaissance Squadrons RAF
One Greek General Reconnaissance Squadron
One Flying Boat Squadron (Sunderlands)
One Yugoslav Flying Boat Squadron
Two Long-Range Fighter Squadrons RAF
The decision was made on 28 August 1941 to send another convoy to Malta through the western Mediterranean Sea. The operation was called Halberd, and would include a heavy naval force: the battleships Nelson, Rodney, and Prince of wales and the aircraft carrier Ark Royal. There were 5 cruisers and 18 destroyers. The convoy would include 9 merchant ships. 22 Beaufighters and 5 Blenheim fighters were available for air cover. On 27 September, the Nelson was torpedoed by an Italian aircraft (perhaps an SM79 torpedo bomber). No.69 Squadron was providing maritime reconnaissance, and one of their Marylands sighted 2 Italian battleships and 8 destoyers to the ENE. They were about 70nm away. Another force was sighted 20 miles closer: 4 cruisers and 8 destroyers. When the British battleships steered for them, the Italians turned away.
When the concoy entered the Skerki Channel, Force H turned towards Gibraltar. Towards nightfall, small groups of torpedo bombers staged attacks. One hit the transport Imperial Star, which had to be sunk. The convoy reached Malta at about midday. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.
In September 1941, hthe merchant ship Empire Guillemot was sent with supplies for Malta. She had an odd cargo, as she carried "fodder for livestock". The passed through the Western Mediterranean by flying "false colours". At various times, she flew the flags of Spain, France, and Italy. She was seen by aircraft, but not disturbed. She arrived at Malta on 19 September.
Submarines were also used to carry supplies to Malta, although only small quantities could be sent this way. The minelaying submarines Cachelot and Rorqual had larger volumes, so they were especially suitable. The larger O-class ships, such as Osiris and Otus also were used. On 30 July 1941, the Chachelot was caught on the surface by an Italian torpedo boat and had to be eventually scuttled. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.
The cruiser minelayer Manxman carried out an operation to lay mines south of Livorno (Leghorn) on the night of 24/25 August 1941. For part of the trip, the Manxman wore a disguise as a French light cruiser. She left Gibraltar in disguise, but removed it at sunset on 24 August. The British were being meticulous about adhering to international law, which thought that carrying out hostile acts in disguise was unsporting. After laying mines, the Manxman escaped at 37 knots, and then reassumed her disguise. She was back in Scotland by 30 August.
Admiral Somervilled, commander of Force H, carried out a diversionary operation to draw any potential attention away from the Manxman. On 24 August, he had ten Swordfish from Ark Royal "set fire to some cork woods and bomb a factory near Tempio in Sardinia". The Italian fleet was drawn out, thinking that another Malta convoy was at sea. When Force H returned to Gibraltar, they figured that they had cause the convoy to turn back. This is based on teh account in Vol.II of the Official History.
13 battalions
112 heavy AA guns
118 light AA guns
104 pieces of artillery (light, field, and medium)
aircraft:
15 Hurricane I
60 Hurricane II
cruiser Edinburgh
cruiser Hermione
cruiser Arethusa
8 destroyers
battleship Nelson
battlecruiser Renown
cruiser Edinburgh
cruiser Manchester
cruiser Arethusa
aircraft carrier Ark Royal
some destroyers
8 submarines
Vol.II of the Official History of the War in the Mediterranean and Middle East paints a picture that the Germans and Italians so benefitted from the delay in the British attack until November 1941, that the British should have attacked sooner. That ignores the fact that the British army in North Africa was not ready for any offensive. They would have just repeated Battleaxe, where they squandered what strength they had without result. They focus on the benefit to the Axis forces and ignore the realities of the British situation in this discussion. To be fair, they had already examined the British situation and had convinced me that even November 1941 was too soon to attack.
So, we should go ahead and list the Axis reinforcements that arrived between August and November 1941:
Part of the Afrika Division, later renamed as the 90th Light Division
Italian artillery units
Trieste (motorized) Division
Sabratha Division, reformed after being almost totally destroyed
100 M13/40 tanks for the Ariete Division
some light tanks of little value
15th Panzer and 21st Panzer Division were built up
to 250 tanks from 180, almost all by repairs
The British had to face that reality that infantry tanks such as the Inf.Mk.II Matilda were unsuitable for tank-to-tank combat, and so they were finally withdrawn from the armoured divisions. Instead, they would be used to equip the "Army Tank Brigades", for use in the infantry support role for which they were intended. The Matilda had actually shown itself quite capable in the Battleaxe operation, but they had radio problems and limited range, so that alone necessitated that they could not be used in mobile operations. Their superior armour had shown itself to be useful against the Germans, however.
Since the British were not able to supply enough cruiser tanks (increasingly, Crusaders), they had to use the American Stuarts in their place during the summer and fall of 1941. The Stuarts were extremely mobile, but they suffered from lack of desert equipment and had an odd, rather small gun in the 37mm. They were thus burdened with a gun that was non-standard and required special ammunition that was only in limited supply. Still, they played an important part in the Crusader battle in late 1941. They were replaced, though, in the cruiser role, as soon as adequate numbers of Crusaders and the American Grants were available. This is based, in part, on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.
The British Chiefs of Staff were not surprised at the German attack on Russia on 22 June 1941. The British had been weakened and were not a threat, but were strong enough at home that an invasion was impractical. The British were aware that there was a large scale movement of German forces to the East. The reduction in German air activity in the Mediterranean theater and over Britain was also indicative of the shift in forces elsewhere.
Rumours accurately forecast that the Rumanians would attack Russia with the Germans. By late May, the German armies facing East had grown to at least 100 divisions. The British expected the Germans to go through some exercise where they would demand concessions from the Soviets that they could not accept, and then use that as a pretext to invade. The reality was the Germans skipped what used to be the accepted forms and just attacked without warning on 22 June. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.
We might make a few comparisons between Generals Wavell and Auchinleck. Some obvious things to examine are appointments and their strengths and weaknesses.
Based on results, General Wavell seems to have done well with his appointments. He was in his position for about two years. Auchinleck held his position for only about a year. General Auchinleck did not do well with his appointments, and I have wondered at the difference. One example was Alan Cunningham, who had done well in East Africa, and had conducted a fast-moving campaign that routed the Italians. The problem was that General Cunningham was near exhaustion at the end of the campaign. General Auchinleck was more impressed by Cunningham's campaign, and seems not to have been able to assess the man.
Wavell's primary strength seems to have been his planning ability. His ability to judge men was another strength. His weaknesses were his verbal inarticulateness and his seeming inability to recognize which orders from Britain were reasonable and which were not. He accepted the end to the offensive in Libya without protest and the adventure in Greece. Both turned out badly. He objected to Iraq and Syria, both of which turned out well.
I have wondered if General Auchinleck was more of an idea man. One factor that I had not considered was the Auchinleck was an Indian army man, and lacked much exposure to the regular British army. He did not do well with his appointments, but he proved himself a brilliant field commander, something that was not consistent with his position as theater commander. Auchinleck saved the Crusader battle, in late 1941, and turned it from a defeat into a victory. He then turned the 8th Army over to General Ritchie, who was not up to the job. Auchinleck had to step in and restore the situation, finally halting Rommel at the First Battle of El Alamein. He and his chief of staff, Eric Dorman-Smith, were removed by Churchill, as Churchill had finally lost confidence, and politically, needed to make a change.
Month Aircraft arrivals
May 206
June 352
July 265
On 9 June, the Australians were involved in heavy fighting at the Litani River in southern Lebanon. Further intense action occurred between 11-27 June at Merdjayoun, Lebanon, where Australian and British troops attacked and counter-attacked Vichy forces. On 21 June, the Syrian capital of Damascus fell to a combined Indian, British, Australian and Free French force. Fighting, however, continued in Lebanon as the Allies struggled to take the important coastal centre of Damour. With the fall of Damour on 9 July 1941, the Vichy commander, General Dentz, asked for an armistice which was signed at Acre on 13 July 1941. Altogether about 18,000 Australian troops took part in the Syrian campaign.
Martin Customer Number Time
Model Designation Produced Period Customer
Number
167 XA-22 1 1939 USAAC
167-F1 167-A3 115 1939 France
167-F2 167-A3 100 1940 France
167-F3 167-A3 95 1940 France
167-B3 Maryland Mk.I 35 1940 Great Britain
167-B4 Maryland Mk.II 150 1941 Great Britain
The third buy from the left is John Hill, who reportedly now works as an intelligence analyst in the DC area.
The real value of the 88 was in the way the Germans used it - and this started in the Civil War in Spain ! Von Thoma had only PzKw 1 tanks against Russian T26’s so he used the "Shield and Sword" tactic. This involved retreating and drawing the Russian tanks onto a Pakfront ( linked anti- tank guns in prepared positions.) After the guns had done their work the tanks attacked the fleeing enemy tanks or the unsupported infantry.
British tank armament policy in the late 1930's and WWII reflected the changing perception of how tanks would fight. The mistaken ideas of the all-tank school, such as Percy Hobart, thought that tanks would be used to fight tanks, so British gun-armed tanks were originally armed with the 2pdr gun, a high-velocity, low-shot weight (as the name implies) piece. Before that, British tanks were primarily armed with the medium velocity 47mm 3pdr. A few tanks (support tanks) were armed with a low-velocity 75mm gun for firing HE rounds. In parallel with the 2pdr gun, there continued to be a small number of support tanks armed with a gun for firing HE rounds. This was not considered to be the primary role of tanks, tanks were to fight other tanks, so they needed an "anti-tank gun". The British bureaucratic mind decided that numbers were more important than quality, so development of the much better 57mm 6pdr gun was deferred so that large numbers of the smaller gun could be producted.
Only after fighting Rommel, who taught them a radically new way to fight, where tanks attacked infantry and emplaced anti-tank guns were used to fight tanks, that the British started to rethink their policy. They also were greatly impressed by the 88mm AA/anti-tank gun, and the power of the larger guns. The organizational infighting in the British army kept the 95mm AA gun from being adapted for anti-tank use during the timeframe when it would have been most useful.
Besides seeing the utility of the 75mm gun on the Pzkw IV, at first a low-velocity gun, when the first American medium tanks arrived, armed with the medium velocity 75mm gun, there was a great impetus to arm British tanks with guns that were suitable for firing at both infantry and tanks. As the 57mm gun started to appear, some were bored out to 75mm, so that they were capable of firing HE. The larger 76.2mm guns that were fairly high velocity only appeared late in the war. There was the 17pdr gun, at first mounted in modified Shermans as the Firefly, and the less bulky "77mm" gun, really a 76.2mm gun, mounted in the Comet cruiser tank. Better guns, such as the potent "20pdr" only appeared post-war.
The 5th Indian Brigade attacked at Kissoue, early on 15 June 1941. The defense was not alert, and after repelling two counter-attacks, the 4th Indian Brigade was able to consolidate its position in possession of Kissoue with a night attack. The 1st Royal Fusiliers, the third battalion of the 5th Indian Brigade, was having a difficult time at Kuneitra. They were attacked by a strong force, and there were no resources to send to aid them. Almost to a man, they were taken prisoner. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.
