British bad faith with respect to the Greek Operation

We find that Blamey had been told that Menzies had been informed about the Greek operation and had agreed to it. Menzies, on the other hand, was told that Blamey had endorsed the operation when he had not in fact been given an opportunity to offer his opinion. When Mr. Menzies had inquired about a "reasonable chance of success", we found that was not considered and that the "Moral and political importance of supporting Greece". Which means that Anthony Eden's influence is what was driving the Greek operation. There was not a "reasonable chance of success" and it was not even a consideration. General Blamey told Mr. Menzies that he accepted the view that they needed to support Greece. General Blamey was unhappy with the plan that was being executed, because it was a "piecemeal" approach that reduced the chances of success. General Blamey though said that they would do well, we would guess that because the Australians and New Zealand troops were fine men and were well-led. He didn't exactly say that, but that was the implication.Part of the problem was that when Blamey met with General Wavell, he didn't present a strong-enough statement of his concerns.
The New Zealand government had concerns and wanted to know that "the full British forces could be made available. They also wanted to know that provision had been made to withdraw the forces that were being sent to Greece. The British government didn't want to risk sending a withdrawal message, because they did not want one to end up in the hands of the Greek Goverment. This is base on the account in "Greece Crete and Syria" by Gavin Long.