After Churchill sent a message to Anthony Eden suggesting that it would be a mistake to go into Greece, Anthony Eden replied that "In the existing situation we are all agreed that the course advocated should be followed and help given to Greece. We devoutly trust that difficulties will arise with regard to the dispatch of dominion forces as arranged." General Wavell was very aware that the troop convoys at sea were a commitment that would be difficult to withdraw.
Anthony Eden was the one person who had insisted that they were obligated to go into Greece to try and stop the expected German attack. In retrospect, we have no confidence in Anthony Eden's judgment. He was the architect of the disastrous response to the Suez Crisis, although the British, French, and Israeli plan was torpedoed by Eisenhower. We don't know his reasoning, but he comes across as anti-colonialist and possibly anti-Israeli. Eisenhower seems to have been a liberal globalist, although I have no proof.
On 7 March 1941, Wavell was informed by the Chiefs of Staff that the Cabinet had decided to proceed with the Greek Operation. "The Cabinet accepts full responsibility", which seems meaningless. They would send messages to Australia and New Zealand accordingly. The Australian prime minster, Mr. Menzies informed Mr. Fadden "about the changed and disturbing situation" in Greece. Anthony Eden and General Dill, the CIGS, had just returned from visiting Turkey. It says something about the Greek operation that it was described as an "adventure" that had a "reasonable prospect of success", which seems to not be true. The Australians at least understood the truth. This is based on the account in "Greece Crete and Syria" by Gavin Long.
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