The wrong assumptions: the initial fight at El Alamein on 23-24 October 1942

The XXX Corps assessment was that Montgomery had been too optimistic in his estimate of what could be accomplished by the forces that he commanded. He had good men with extensive experience. The men had been trained to execute his plan and were well-prepared. Montgomery, himself, lacked the experience that his men had of fighting in the desert. He also lacked experience with fighting their enemy, the Germans and Italians. He had not realized the difficulty in clearing paths through minefields and the time that was required. That, in itself, was significant and may have accounted for the failure to accomplish what Montgomery had planned to do. The Australian historian suggests that Montgomery gave a hint that he also thought that it would take longer to execute the plan.

The "bridgehead" provided for the 8th Armoured Brigade did not extend past the enemy "anti-tank defence'. One possibility was to push the bridgehead farther in to enemy territory. Another possibility was to choose a new location for a bridgehead that was not so heavily defended. A third possibility was to attack the enemy infantry and force the enemy armored forces to attack the British forces.

The key British commanders were drawn to the Miteiriya Ridge area because they had advanced to the "Oxalic Line" and paths had been cleared through the minefields. General Freyberg had looked at the area in the morning of 24 October and was bothered by the 10th Armoured Division concern about advancing. Freyberg had not been able to speak with General Lumsden, so he contacted General Leese. Leese drove forward and met Freyberg. They looked over the area and then drove back to "Freyberg's headquarters". They called Montgomery with the "blower" (perhaps encrypted voice). Soon, General Lumsden arrived at Freyberg's headquarters. The historian thought that Lumsden didn't like the idea of driving through minefield paths and arriving at an enemy anti-tank gun line. Freyberg thouht that they should resume the attack on the night of 24-25 October and the corps commanders agreed. Montgomery ordered that the 10th Armoured Division should drive through the paths in the minefield into the open area past Miteiriya Ridge. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.