The "breakout attack" on 25 October 1942 at El Alamein

In the area occupied by the Highland Division, the men could hear the sound of tanks approaching from the rear. They were expecting the 7/Rifle Brigade, but they had not arrived yet. They could see that they were getting close to dawn. The 2nd Armoured Brigade was driving forward towards the Oxalic Line. There was an enemy position so strong that it had not been taken yet. This was to the right of the 7/Black Watch. Next to the Highland Division, near Miteiriya Ridge, was where the heaviest action had been occurring. Typically, sorry to say, they had not allowed enough time for sappers to clear a path of mines. An artillery barrage was fired at 10pm, in readiness for three armored brigades to move forward. The enemy forces were waiting in readiness to counter-attack. The center armored brigade, the 8th, had problems. Their mine reconnaissance group had been captured and there was an 88mm gun set at the exit from the cleared path. They had to give up on that path. They were going to send two regiments up the Boat track, but that went badly. You had General Gatehouse on the Boat track. He had seen the problems encountered and was concerned that at daylight, the enemy anti-tank guns would make quick work of his remaining tanks. there was an exchange between Montgomery, Lumsden, the corp commander, and Gatehouse. There was a conference called at 3:30am.

Of the four armored brigades, three had not had any great problems. Montgomery wanted the operation to proceed. He wanted to see some 400 tanks. There was the issue that not all tracks were usable, due to difficulties in clearing mines. Montgomery told Lumsden that he would not accept any lack of enthusiasm and would replace whoever had qualms about proceeding. Montgomery talked with Gatehouse and angered him. The tanks had moved forward. Their commanders were dressed rather colorfully. The tanks were in position near the leading infantry units.

At about 6am, the 7/Rifle Brigade reached the back of the 2/13th Battalion. They found themselves under fire, as the minefield spacing left insufficient room to position their vehicles. The incoming fire did great damage to the 7/Rifle Brigade. It seems that part of the Rifle Brigade vehicles had driven to Point 29, not to Trig 33. The enemy had moved up to the 2/17th Battalion, but were engaged by British artillery fire and stopped. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.