Planning for the battle in October 1942

There were plans for two attacks on Rommel's supply lines planned prior to the battle. One raid was made at Tobruk while another was made at Benghazi. They failed to damage anything useful. That left the planning to begin for the battle. A major piece was the creation of a supply system to provide what was needed by the army. They wanted not only to create the supply system, but to hide it from the enemy. They also planned to take steps to disrupt the enemy operations. After Auchinleck's operations that had been part of the First Battle of El Alamein, the enemy had constructed defensive positions along the north-south line. Now, like the later static defense of the Atlantic Wall. The defensive positions had considerable depth. They were apparently stronger in the north, near the 9th Australian Division, than they were in the south. The defensive works in the north were about six thousand yards wide. There were minefields, and gaps in the minefields designed so that advancing tanks would be exposed to anti-tank gun fire from the side. There was "an anti-tank gun line" that \ actually included dug in tanks. The guns were concealed so as to be difficult to see. Rommel called his positions "devil's gardens" and thought that they would be effective in stopping a British advance. Rommel's supervisor, Field Marshal Kesselring, was somewhat skeptical about their efficiency. It was true that anti-tank guns, firing at lone range, would make tank operations much more difficult. For a while, they had been able to function as mobile cavalry and could be more effective, but that was to change.

In the end, Montgomery had made two plans for the battle. The first was distributed on 15 September. The second was distributed on 6 October. The second built on the framework of the first plan. Due to the enemy's defensive line, the initial attack would have to be made by infantry. They would set up the force so that the enemy would have to attack the British armor sitting on ground that they had chosen. The British army would not start with an armor attack on enemy armored forces. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.