Moving towards the Second Battle of El Alamein in October 1942

One point not yet discussed is the situation in regards to air power. In raw numbers, the British had more than five hundred aircraft in North Africa while the Germans and Italians had about 350. The enemy did have the ability to shift aircraft from Italy and to use aircraft from Crete in North Africa. The raw numbers don't take into account the superiority of German Messerschmitt Bf-109F and G fighters.

Right before the battle began, the Desert Air Force (as it was known) was organized into fighter groups and bomber wings. No. 211 Group had 17 fighter squadrons on hand. No. 212 Group had 8 fighter squadrons. There was No. 3 South African Air Force Wing equipped with three day bomber squadrons. There was No. 232 Wing that had two day bomber squadrons. There were also Americans in the field with the No. 12 Medium Bombardment Group with three bomber squadrons. There was also the No.285 Wing with three reconnaissance squadrons and two flights. There were more squadrons than these, including "night-bombers and long-range fighters".

There was the usual problem in that Churchill was impatient for action, while Montgomery liked to have a nice, tidy plan and operation. Alan Brooke was quoted as saying that Churchill was always a potential source of trouble. Like Hitler, he had an inflated sense of his abilities as a military commander. Churchill was waiting for Alexander and Montgomery's plan to be executed, but Churchill was very aware of the perilous situation with Malta.

They had originally thought that they would be able to attack in September, but with experience of the Battle of Alam el Halfa, they had to rethink their plan. They wanted to attack the enemy during the night, but with the benefit of bright moonlight. They also needed time for training. The full moon in October was on October 24. Alexander chose 23 October as the date for the attack. Montgomery helped Alexander draft the message to be sent to the Prime Minister. Montgomery wrote four points on a piece of paper. They were: "1) Rommel's attack had delayed their preparations. 2) The condition of the moon restricted potential attack dates in September and October. 3) If the attack happened in September, the army would not be sufficiently trained or equipped. 4) An attack in September would be likely to fail while an attack in October would ensure a complete victory". Another factor, we have not mentioned, was the planned Allied invasion of French North Africa on 8 November. Alexander and Montgomery expected a British victory over Rommel would have a favorable impact on the French and Francisco Franco, the Spanish dictator. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.