The situation was close to being changed for the better on 21 November 1941 near Tobruk

Early on 21 November 1941, General Norrie had proposed to General Cunningham that this might be a good opportunity to use XIII Corps against enemy positions near the Egyptian frontier. General Norrie had a mistaken impression about the previous day's situation, which was overly optimistic. General Cunningham knew about the German armored divisions move to the west, so this suggestion made sense to him. Cunningham told General Godwin-Austen that he could go into action, which is what he wanted to do anyway. General Godwin-Austen thought that his corps would be better utilized fighting rather than sitting, not in action. The proposed operation ultimately had the benefit of distracting Rommel at a critical point when he was within reach of winning. This eventually led to the tide of event turning in the British favor.
Not that long after the Support Group had taken a position on the ridge, just south from Belhamed, they were attacked on the eastern end by the German 21st Armored Division. The 7th Armoured Brigade and the 7th Support Group fought the two German armored divisions. During the battle, Brigadier "Jock" Campbell was able keep from being destroyed, although they were pretty badly beaten by superior force. The Australian historian says that the British lost 15 to compared to the Germans. By night time, the 7th Armoured Brigade was reduced to 28 tanks still in operation. The other two British armored brigades had not joined the battle, as they had not been able to keep up with the Germans.
General Cunningham was at his command post that was far from the scene of the battle. Communication was slow, and those reports that he did see, were often inaccurate. He attempted to influence the course of the battle, but because his understanding was based on a mistaken impression of earlier information. He thought that the German armored forces were retreating and the sortie from Tobruk was about to approach Ed Duda. He thought that the force at Sidi Rezegh was not trying to move to Ed Duda to link up with the Tobruk sortie. Cunningham's appreciation was that a short move at night to Ed Duda would join the two groups. Generals Norrie and Gott were more focused on the events at Sidi Rezegh and to them, they thought that it was more important to clear German infantry that were on the escarpment to the southwest. The 5th South African Brigade was moved close to do the clearing.
The enemy commanders had some disagreements as to the best moves to make. They eventually decided to send the 21st Armored Division to Belhamed to join the 155th and 361st Regiments. They would be in position to block any move from Sidi Rezegh to meet the Tobruk sortie. They sent the 15th Armored Division into the desert some "7 miles south of Gambut". They thought that the division would be in position to hit the British flank. They were in difficult ground, which left them in a spot that would prove to be dangerous to the British. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.