Scrambled cipher messages and misunderstandings and an attack on Ed Duda

The use of manual cipher systems that were laboriously applied seems to have created confusion in communication, not security. The communications in question were between General Godwin-Austen, the XIII Corps commander, and General Scobie, the Tobruk fortress commander. The plan seems to have been for the New Zealand Division to actually capture Ed Duda, but General Scobie had thought that his men would have to taken Ed Duda. General Freyberg and the New Zealand Division hoped to advance to Ed Duda during the night of 25-26 November 1941. They hoped that General Scobie's men would be able to move forward to Ed Duda sometime after daylight on 26 November.
General Godwin-Austen wanted Scobie to know that he did not need to take Ed Duda, as that was for the New Zealand Division to do. They did expected General Scobie and his men to make a diversionary attack that would divert attention from the New Zealand Division. General Scobie had a meeting prior to the planned diversion and ordered the Polish Brigade to make a feint in the west very early in the day. The enemy was not bothered by the feint. In fact, they attacked from the "twin pimples" area. The alternate plan then was to make the diversion in the sortie corridor and would be made against the eastern side.
In the evening at the Tobruk headquarters, they read that they New Zealand Division would attack Ed Duda at about 9pm. General Scobie's forces attacked the enemy outposts at Butch and Wolf. Men of the 2/Leicester and one squadron from the 7th RTR had a degree of success near the wrecked plane landmark. The operation near outpost Wolf did not do so well. The attack near Wolf involved the 2/Yorks and Lancs along with tanks from the 4th RTR. They took some 150 prisoners but the enemy counter-attacked and recaptured part of the area. At 7am the next morning, they attacked and took Wolf and some 150 prisoners. As many as 300 more enemy soldiers were able to escape across the escarpment. They could hear fighting some time after midnight, and they thought that they could hear 25pdrs firing.
The fortress troops got the codeword to attack Ed Duda by about 11am on 26 November. General Scobie seems to have decided to attack on his own. Communications were so bad, that the Tobruk forces had to intercept communications not directed at them in order to learn what was happening. They learned that a New Zealand brigade had taken Sidi Rezegh and was moving towards Ed Duda. Another message had wondered when the Tobruk sortie force would attack. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.