The run-up to the battle in November 1941 near Tobruk and the Egyptian frontier

In November 1941, the Axis supply situation for Rommel's army was getting worse. Despite this, Rommel was determined to mount an attack on Tobruk. Rommel felt that he could attack in three days. Intelligence kept him informed about the British increase in forces that was occurring. Rommel thought that if they could take Tobruk in three days, the British would not be able to counter-attack from Egypt.
The British planned to launch their offensive at almost the same date as when Rommel planned his attack. In early November, he had planned to attack on November 15, the same date that Crusader was scheduled to start. Rommel's Qusrtermaster-General sent a report to Rommel saying that they had enough supplies to attack Tobruk, but not to advance further east. British surface forces had destroyed a convoy on 9 November.
The German intelligence staff at headquarters reported the same as Rommel's intelligence staff that the British were not going to attack soon. The Italian commander, General Bastico, had intelligence information that the British were about to attack. This was the correct information. The Italians thought that the British would attack when Rommel's army was busy attacking Tobruk.
Rommel attended a meeting in Rome where he was authorized to mount the attack on Tobruk. Rommel won his point by engaging in a shouting match with his detractors, which may have been his usual style of operation. They set the date for Rommel's attack as 21 November. Coincidentally, the British attack was also postponed. The South African commander disliked the low priority given training. He insisted on more time to train his soldiers. General Brink asked for a postponement to 21 November, but the date was only changed to 18 November. That way, the British attack would start prior to Rommel's planned attack date.
Forces in Tobruk did not learn about the postponement from 15 November 10 18 November. They were to be ready to move out from Tobruk early on the day when the operation would commence. The plan, over-optimistic as it was, expected that British armor would defeat the German armor in the first day. 30 October was significant because Tobruk would come under 8th Army command on that date. Once the operation started, they would report to XXX  Corps. The corps would issue a code word to indicate that the sortie from Tobruk should start. At 6pm, the night before, XXX Corps would send a code word to the headquarters at Tobruk. "Tug" would indicate that they should not attack the next day. "Pop" would indicate that they should attack the next morning.
When the fortress troops were ordered to attack, some troops would "either fight or feint". The men in Tobruk had a practice held on 13 November. The infantry saw the tanks that would support them during the real attack. The fortress commander addressed the troops and told them that they would only attack when the British armor had beaten the German armor. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.