The attack on Ed Duda on 21 November 1941

The original time to start the operation to take Ed Duda was set a 1pm. The time had to be postponed to 2:30pm because of the 32nd Army Tank Brigade. Some of the brigade's tanks had become involved in a fight against a counter-attack and "mopping up" operations. Brigadier Willison, the brigade commander, then came back with a comment that he needed to have his attack be at the same time as a move by the South African brigade. Then, there was a surprise announcement by XXXth Corps right before 4pm that they would not be able to support the Ed Duda attack because of a tank "battle 16 miles to the south-east". General Scobie responded to that news by cancelling the Ed Duda operation.
The battle had gone well on 21 November 1941. The Tobruk force had driven through about three miles of the surrounding positions. The way now seemed open for the Tobruk forces to punch through the enemy positions to the "open desert". They had taken some five hundred German prisoners and 527 Italians. That had been achieved at high cost. The Black Watch, alone, had about 200 dead.
22 November started with a message from XXXth Corps saying that their force at Sidi Rezegh was under heavy attack. They asked for the attack on Ed Duda right away to draw off some of the attackers. They hoped for enemy tanks on the Trigh Capuzzo to be "shot up". The 70th Division plan only expected to attack Ed Duda when the enemy armor had been "reduced". The failure of the attack on Ed Duda could put Tobruk at risk.
General  Scobie came back with the reply that they would attack Ed Duda if that is what XXXth Corps wanted. He asked XXXth Corps for instructions. By afternoon, they told him not to attack and that their situation had improved.
The plan for Operation Crusader had the prerequisite for the Ed Duda that the enemy tank forces be defeated. In fact, the 7th Armoured Division seemed likely to be defeated. They expected to be finished off the next day ("executed").
When the 8th Army crossed the Egyptian-Libyan frontier at the beginning of the operation, the same storms that had flooded wadis in Tobruk had flooded airfields in the area. That kept German aircraft on the ground so that they did not observe the movements of the British units. The attacking British units had taken their "first objectives" without much resistance. The large operation had achieved total surprise, thanks to the weather. The British had hoped to cause the enemy to respond, but they enemy was unaware of what was happening. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.