Auchinleck takes command in the Middle East

When General Auchinleck took over as the theater commander in the Middle East, Winston Churchill hoped to bulldoze him into doing what Churchill wanted. General Dill, the CIGS, advised Auchinleck to resist doing anything before adequate preparations had been made. He considered that when General Wavell launched Operation Battleaxe, that he had acted prematurely due to pressure from Churchill. General Dill told Auchinleck to act as he thought best, and to resist the Prime Minister's push to act before he was ready. In particular, he said that he should be explicit about the risks he was prepared to run, and those risks that were too great to chance, to demand the resources that he needed, and if they are not provided, to state clearly what could be done and not be done.
General Auchinleck told Churchill that attacking before the necessary resources were available was something that was not "a justifiable operation of war". He negotiated the date for the attack in the Middle East to 1 November 1941. He treated that as the real target date that he was trying to meet. When the preparations were not complete in time, he asked for a delayed start, even though that would upset Churchill.
We find rather amusing that President Roosevelt told Churchill to reduce his commitment to the Middle East, because the Americans thought that the area could not be adequately defended. In fact, they threatened to withhold shipments of war materials and equipment if Churchill ignored their concerns. Churchill's reply to Roosevelt caused Roosevelt to lose his temper. The two leaders met following this exchange on a battleship in "the Bay of Newfoundland". The disagreement was resolved and the Americans proceeded to sent tanks, vehicles and aircraft to the Middle East in large numbers. Those shipments continued through 1942, which was a much more challenging year than 1941, if that was possible.
Before Churchill left to meet Roosevelt, they had decided to send a second armored division to the Middle East. The division would not arrive in time for the start of the upcoming attack. The convoys were immediately dispatched with men and equipment for the division. American Stuart tanks would arrive in time for the start of the operation. Robert Crisp's book, Brazen Chariots, is a good story about how the Stuarts were used in the next offensive in the desert.
Auchinleck had not yet appointed the army commander. He was not familiar with any of the men who were available. All he could do is essentially look at their resumes. On paper, Lieutenant-General Alan Cunningham, who had just completed a successful campaign in East Africa seemed to be a good choice. The East African campaign had been a fast moving war of mobility. What Auchinleck did not know is that Cunningham was exhausted after the East African campaign and was not ready to take on new responsibilities in the Western Desert that involved mechanized warfare. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the British Official History.