FInal relief of the 9th Australian Division in October 1941

The relief of Australian units by British units was well-planned. Relief convoys used one minelayer and three destroyers. The final relief started on 12-13 October 1941. An arriving unit was generally given a day before the unit that was being replaced left Tobruk. That was to give the newly arrived men time for a transition. Also, that allowed for no reduction in strength defending the fortress of Tobruk.Convoys generally brought in one thousand men and removed slightly less than that number. Men of the 26th Brigade Group were the first to leave.
General Scobie became the new fortress commander, taking over from General Morshead. General  Scobie arrived at Tobruk on the night of 20-21 October. General Morshead introduced General Scobie at all the brigade headquarters. One of the first changes was that the division reserve was moved from the 26th Australian Brigade to the 23rd British Brigade. The next move was for the 23rd Brigade to replace the 20th Australian Brigade in the south of Tobruk. General Scobie formally took over as commander at 5pm on 22 October. General Morshead then bade farewell to units that were to stay, and then ate dinner with the naval staff. He then left Tobruk on HMS Endeavor. On the 22nd, more of the 20th Australian Brigade was removed from Tobruk. The 23rd British Brigade assumed the duty of protecting the Southern Sector on 23 October from the 20th Australian Brigade. The Australians moved into division reserve. A feature of the relief process is that the Australian units passed all their equipment to the arriving units. On the night of 24-25 October, the 14th British Brigade took command of the division reserve. Before night fell, an air attack by dive bombers hit the harbor.
During the relief process the enemy had fired artillery against the harbor. There was still no indication that the enemy realized that the relief was proceeding. One hazard that was not immediately recognized was that German submarines had arrived in the Mediterranean Sea from the Atlantic. The first ships sunk were "A-Lighters". The submarines were assigned to attack ships supplying Tobruk.
The British gunboat Gnat was able to hit the guns that fired on the harbor at Tobruk. The relief convoy cruiser escorts, the Ajax, Hobart, and Galatea were alsos able to fire at the guns. The Gnat was torpedoed on 21 October. The ship was not sunk, but was stopped. The destroyer Griffin was able to tow the Gnat to Alexandria. One final mishap was that the minelayer Latona was bombed and eventually sunk. That ended the Australian relief, because they had reached the end of the moonless period. The remaining Australians were stuck at Tobruk. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

The battle for the outposts at Tobruk, from 12 October 1941

Sunrise on 12 October 1941 showed some 19 German tanks and about six vehicles facing the 2/17th Battalion area. Perhaps most were near Plonk, which the Germans had reoccupied since it had been left vacant. The Australians could discern a line of sangars on both sides of Plonk. Workers could be seen during the day extending this new defensive line. The enemy had setup wire around Plonk by mid-morning on the 12th. Later in the afternoon showed that the enemy had laid more wire from Plonk out to the sangar line.
After these developments, the decision was made to provide tanks for Cooma for the night hours. They would drive through the perimeter at dusk and return there by dawn. During the day, troops of infantry tanks would be kept available to drive to Cooma, if needed. The 4th RTR initially provided these tanks, and then for two days, the 7th RTR provided the tanks.
In the evening, the Australians could see enemy tanks near Plonk and Cooma. Several tanks drove near the perimeter wire. The Australians sent out "tank hunting patrols", but they did not make contact with the enemy. The scheduled British tank presence set out at 1am. They did not see any enemy tanks, but they fired on the enemy working parties. The enemy had about twenty anti-tank guns set up and they fired at the British tanks. To the Australians within the Tobruk perimeter, there seemed to be a tank battle happening, but it was just the anti-tank gun fire and the tanks shooting. The Australians moved back into the Cooma outpost and went to work on strengthening the defensive positions.
After the last battle over Plonk, the enemy was content to work on extending their defenses. The Australians continued to occupy Cooma and the arrangements for tanks were continued while the Australians were still in the southern sector. Their remaining time was limited, because they were to be withdrawn while more units were carried in to replace them. The enemy now had some 100 guns available. The largest were the 210mm howitzers, one battery of 149/35 guns, and another battery thought to be 155mm. The enemy was thought to have 10 field batteries, 12 medium batteries. and the three heavy batteries. The enemy strength in the south was so dominating that the options for raiding at night were greatly reduced. In other sectors, the Australians were still strong enough to carry out aggressive patrolling. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

A night tank battle on 11-12 October 1941 near the Plonk outpost

The attack on the Plonk outpost was late to start, partly to the late arrival of the infantry tanks. The supporting artillery barrage was repeated for the real attack. The attack on Plonk was set to launch about 15 minutes after midnight on 12 October 1941. They could hear digging and voices at Plonk before the barrage started. Enemy artillery responded to the British artillery fire. This time, the Matilda tanks were moving up to attack Plonk. The Australian infantry patrol moved closer to Plonk as all this happened. A little before 1am, the infantry tanks commenced firing at enemy tanks that were visible. The range was very short, about 100 yards. There were the tank guns firing as well as the tank machine guns. The enemy was described as firing their tank guns wildly, and not well-aimed. The British tanks were able to move towards the objective. The German tanks retreated in front of them. The tank firing was across the infantry path and kept them from moving into Plonk.
They could see German tanks advancing from the west, but were driven back by the British tank gun fire. The Australian infantry patrol did not enter Plonk, as there was too much risk to the men from occupying Plonk.The Australians did fire their "Very light signal" to communicate that they had achieved their desired objective. That triggered the enemy to open artillery fire on Plonk, as the expected that the signal meant that Plonk had been occupied. By 1:25am, the enemy troops had pulled out of Plonk. Firing stopped after they left. After a brief respite, the enemy resumed firing at Plonk. An extraordinary barrage, the largest yet seen at Tobruk, descended on Plonk. While the firing continued, more enemy tanks drove towards Plonk, but the British tanks in Plonk fired at the enemy tanks, causing them to pull back.
The Australian patrol that had been sent to Plonk pulled back after sending one small group back with a wounded man. The patrol went looking for the machine gun that had fired on them earlier, but didn't find it. The patrol commander then sent the other men back, but he stayed until 2am, when he fired the Very light signal. After he gave the signal, the enemy started another artillery barrage on Plonk.
While Plonk wss receiving enemy artillery fire, the men working on creating an outpost at Cooma had been busy. The British tanks had driven on to Cooma from Plonk. They had fired on some enemy tanks that had gotten close, but they eventually drove back to the perimeter and reentered Tobruk.The 32nd Army Tank Brigade commander had ordered his tanks back to Cooma, but while the sky was getting lighter, the tanks had not reached the gap in the perimeter. The Australian 20th Brigade commander had suggested that the tanks return to the "forward assembly area". This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

More action near the 2/17th Battalion from 11th to 12th October 1941 at Tobruk

Early on 11 October 1941, Tobruk artillery fired on the outpost Plonk that had been occupied by enemy troops. The Australians could hear "yelling and screaming" after the artillery fire on Plonk. They heard tools tossed into trucks and then the trucks drove off. Again, at 6am, Tobruk artillery fired on Plonk. A patrol investigated Plonk after that and saw men walking about the area. They drew more artillery and machine gun fire. About this time, the enemy artillery fired on the 2/17th Battalion defenses, as was usually the case. Right before 8am, the Australians observed more men at Plonk and fired on them. The enemy responded with more artillery fire on the Australians. Between haze and dust, the Australians could no longer see Plonk.
Between 8:30am and 9am, increasing numbers of tanks were seen near the 2/17th Battalion. The battalion positions were machine-gunned. They were not used to having so much activity near them. They found that the enemy troops had moved back into the Tugun outpost. The Australians were concerned that the enemy might make a major attack on the 2/17th Battalion front. A practice attack near Carmusa by 2/15th Battalion soldiers and tanks from the 32nd Army Tank Brigade was cancelled due to the enemy activity. All of the 20th Brigade was kept at the ready, rather than proceeding with training. By 9:45am, they saw twelve enemy tanks "hull-down" near Plonk. Despite the activity, no attack was launched by the enemy.
By the next night, the 11-12 October 1941, General Morshead ordered the 20th Brigade to attack and retaked Plonk. They would no use Plonk but would create a new outpost to be called Cooma. The plan was to keep the enemy from advancing their line towards the Australians. The infantry directly involved would be from the 2/17th Battalion with support from the 4th RTR in the form of one squadron. The 2/17th Battalion would have one company of the 2/13th Battalion in reserve. The attack would have the 107th RHA firing a bombardment to soften up the enemy. If possible, the 1st RHA would fire smoke in the area of the enemy minefield.
Two platoons from the 2/17th Battalion made the attack. They expected to see tanks coming up in support, but the plan for the tanks was to move at 5 mph with a mile between tanks. That meant that they were not immediately available. At the time of the infantry attack, the tanks were just at the perimeter wire. The enemy artillery fire was so heavy, that two other Australian battalions, the 2/23rd and 2/24th were readied for use. The attacking platoons would then attack without the tanks. After some fits and starts, the new plan was to attack at 12:15am. The artillery would fire in support, again. The tanks that were still running would join in the attack. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

Operations from 10 October 1941 at Outpost Plonk

General Morshead became involved with the defense of Outpost Plonk on 10 October 1941. He was not ready to allow territory to be ceded to the enemy without a fight. General Morshead ordered the 2/17th Battalion to defend Plonk. The brigade commander told the battalion that they should hold Plonk with two sections of infantry and with an anti-tank gun section. The guns would be supplied by the 20th Anti-Tank Company. The battalion commander was free to add to the defensive force as he saw fit.
The 2/17th Battalion commander decided to send out working parties to accompany the "standing patrol", They would build additional defense with wire and mines. They would also dig gun and weapon pits. A platoon was positioned about 300 yards south to provide cover. The standing patrol had "four light machine guns and two mortars". The men arrived at outpost Plonk at 7:50pm. The enemy started firing artillery at the general area. The firing lasted "more than half an hour". They took some casualties from the artillery fire. The working parties were pulled into the position. The artillery fire did not stop, so the working parties tried to work while under fire. The explosions raised dust which reduced visibility "to five yards". By about 9:20pm, they had lost communication with the battalion. The 2/17th commander heard that tanks had been seen moving. The trucks that carried the anti-tank guns had been disabled. The command of the working parties decided to attempt to recover the anti-tank guns. Tanks were reported to be circling Plonk. A reconnaissance patrol had seen 11 large tanks and five armored infantry carriers, presumably half-tracks. The infantry were recognized as being Italian.
The trucks with anti-tank guns were recovered. One gun was disabled but was eventually repaired. The standing patrol had been forced to leave Plonk to the enemy. When the 9th Australian Division headquarters learned of the situation, they had no further orders for the 2/17th Battalion. The battalion was taking heavy artillery fire by around 3am. From then until about 7am, the battalion received about 2,000 rounds of artillery shells.
The 2/Queens also also received heavy artillery fire. They had wanted to work on a new outpost, but they were taking too much artillery fire to work. The enemy had had active tanks near the old Tugun outpost. They had departed by 5:30am. Normally, the Australians were dominant at night in "no-man's land", but that was only the case in the west side of Tobruk. Men from the 2/43rd Battalion had decimated some Italian infantry near the "White Knoll". This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

The British and Australians respond to the enemy activity near Plonk and Bondi

The response to the enemy tank activity near the outposts of Plonk and Bondi was to send out sixteen infantry tanks and two light tanks to Plonk. This was at 9:45pm apparently on 7 October 1941 at Tobruk. They were to fight any enemy tanks that they encountered and defeat them. Men from the 2/17th Battalion and "an engineer party" were to remove anti-tank mines near the Plonk outpost. Other mines laid near the path that enemy tanks had taken were also removed. The minefield on the perimeter would have two gaps created. Anti-tank guns would be sited to protect the gaps. The gaps were for the British tanks to drive through on their return.
Two men set out from Plonk "to the enemy minefield to the south". They noticed that a forty yard gap had been created and tape laid to mark the gap. The Australian men removed the tape that they had found. They also fired on a working party they encountered. They were followed by ten enemy soldiers as they walked back to Plonk.
As it got dark, the men at Plonk could hear engine noises from the direction of Bondi. They called in artillery fire on the area around Bondi. That kept enemy tanks from entering the post. Communication failed with Bondi sometime after 9pm. By a little after 10pm, two men arrived who had escaped from Bondi. They heard the news that Plonk had been overrun by German tanks and infantry.
The Matilda infantry tanks drove slowly to Plonk to reduce the engine noise. As they approached, they heard that Bondi had fallen. They also heard that the enemy had fired on Plonk with artillery. After the tanks reached Plonk, they heard German tanks moving closer. The British tanks drove out towards the German tanks and started firing at 100 yards distance. That was fairly close range for a tank battle, and the infantry tank squadron commander was wounded when his tank was disabled. The fight lasted about 15 minutes. The German tanks drove off with the British in pursuit. The German tanks were faster than the Matildas, so the Matildas quickly fell behind. One Matilda had mechanical problems, so it drove into Plonk. That tank fought a battle with five German tanks and drove them off from Plonk. About this time, the men at Plonk were called back to the perimeter. Some time after midnight, a patrol came back to Plonk and found that the enemy had not taken possessiion, so they stayed in occupation of the post. During the rest of the night, they could hear enemy tank engines, but they did not attack Plonk.
The 2/17th Battalion policy was to hold outposts, but they would not attempt to hold the ground between the outposts and the perimeter. The commander decided that they would hold plonk and defend the area. They would have anti-tank guns as protection against tanks. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

Action in early October 1941 at Tobruk

During the night of 2 to 3 October 1941, the 16th Brigade was involved in fighting when a patrol from the 2/Queens had contact with an enemy patrol south of the Tobruk perimeter. The enemy soldiers threw grenades and the British fired at them. The enemy soldiers withdrew faster than the British chased them. In the evening, men from the 2/Leicester took machine gun fire from Italian positions some 600 yards away. The British fired back with artillery and mortars, stopping the machine gun fire. This action occurred on the west side of Tobruk.
Australians were in action on the night of 5 to 6 October in the south. A small patrol from the 2/17th Battalion moved out some 2,400 yards to a position near an enemy minefield. They observed two groups of men being led through the minefield. A third group was following behind. They alternated crawling and then walking fast. The Australian patrol lay low to escape being seen. Then they moved close to an Italian "working party". They opened fire on the Italians with great effect. Machine guns and "light automatic weapons" opened up on them. The Australians "scattered towards the north" and finally reached their listening post through a "pipe-line ditch".
The action at this point seemed to all be at night. During the next night, up until dawn, the 2/17th Battalion could see tanks on the move. They were near the pipeline and to the west of outpost Plonk. Plonk had three observation posts, one of which was occupied. Outpost Bondi was some 3,000 yards west of Plonk. Men from the 2/Queens were at Bondi. Tanks were seen further west from Plonk. The tanks approached to a mile from the perimeter. The Australian battalion commander guessed that the tanks were operating to defend working parties.
Men at Plonk reported five tanks moving towards them at 12:25am. They saw more tanks near the pipeline. The Australians employed tank-hunting patrols armed with "68" grenades. This time, they got some hits against one of the tanks. Due to the concern about tanks, the men at Plonk were withdrawn and not replaced. The 107th RHA opened up on the tanks near Biir el Azazi at dawn. In response, enemy artillery fired on the perimeter. Divebombers hit the positions occupied by the 104th and 107th RHA. They knocked out two guns and killed three gunners.
The Australian brigade commander ordered the 2/17th to move back into Plonk. Right before it got dark, sappers moved out to lay  mines on the route the tanks had taken. An infantry patrol moved towards Plonk, hoping to move back into the post. The patrol had to take cover when tanks were seen, but after they moved off, the men moved back into Plonk. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

The new situation after the British 16th Brigade arrived in September 1941

The newly arrived British 16th Brigade went in with an aggressive spirit and a positive attitude. They were going to take the Australian outposts and set them up as Observation Posts. They would then concentrate on "offensive patrolling". Despite that plan, the truth was that the outposts outside the wire ended up being taken by the enemy soldiers and setup as "defended localities". The plan was still to plan on dealing with enemy attacks. There was cause for concern, because the enemy outgunned the 104th RHA, which was supporting the 16th Brigade when they would take over from the Australian 20th Brigade. The 104th RHA had 24 guns, two of which were anti-aircraft guns. The anti-aircraft guns were only there in case of a tank attack, when they would be manned and available to fire on enemy tanks. They only had 16 25-pdr guns, 4-60pdr medium guns, and 2-Italian 149mm guns. The enemy was thought to have 52-field guns, 16-medium guns, and two heavy guns. Given that the enemy had much more artillery, the 104th RHA expected that the enemy could be expected to attack.
The 20th Brigade really did not understand the situation very well, because all they saw made the enemy seem to be at a considerable distance. Still, the 20th Brigade commander expected that any attack would be likely to come against the line south of the Bardia Road. The 20th Brigade didn't like the defenses, because the secondary line were small enough that when there were two battalions, one from the division reserve and one from the brigade reserve, the second line was "congested". The second line of defense was too far back from the perimeter, so that the brigade reserve battalion was remote from the perimeter. They wanted to build a new position that was closer to the perimeter.
The 16th Brigade arrived to replace the Australian 20th Brigade on 25, 26, and 27 September. The next day, 16th Brigade took responsibility for the defense of the area. Two British battalions were in the line and one was in reserve on the secondary line. During the first two days of October 1941, the Polish Carpathian Brigade replaced the Australian 26th Brigade in the west. The 26th Brigade then was made the division reserve brigade. They had spent 8 weeks in the high-pressure Salient.
The western sector had four battalions. When the Polish Carpathian Brigade arrived, the 2/43rd Battalion stayed in place. The Polish cavalry had been in the Wadi Schel, so they now were back with their parent unit. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

Who was right? Into the last days of the 9th Australian Division in Tobruk

In retrospect, we can now say that Churchill's complaints about the 9th Australian Division removal were overblown. There were no great effects by the removal. If the German air force had been attacking during the withdrawal, the situation could have been critical, but they were not. Operation Crusader was not materially affected by the Australian relief operation. The issues that caused the operation to be in jeopardy had nothing to do with the Australians. The issues were British problems, not Australian. Churchill was more concerned about the political impact of delaying the offensive in North Africa. The British at the time were unaware of the impending Japanese attack planned for December 1941. That was going to cause the most trouble for Churchill and the British forces.
Towards the end of the Australian participation in the defense of Tobruk, the Salient was the most dangerous area. From August to September 1941, the 2/24th Battalion worked to re-position the wire to help the 2/13th Field Company. They did the work on the left side of the Salient from "18 August to 1 September". They moved the wire on the right side of the Salient starting on 8 September and finishing on 25 September. When moving the wire, the presence of German anti-personnel mines took a toll.
We find that by September, there were some peculiar behaviors in place. For one thing, there was what the Australian historian called "live and let-live" to some extent by the Australian and Axis troops. Most of the time, German patrols were defensive in nature. They only rarely made attempts to penetrate the Australian positions. One exception occurred on 11 September, when a German patrol was spotted and ambushed. They killed three men and eventually captured a man who seemed to be lost. He was a member of what eventually was called the 90th Light Division. In September 1941, they were known as the Division Afrika zbV. The 9th Australian Division intelligence view on this was that the new division had been brought in to free up the armored division motorized infantry, so that they could go back to providing support to their divisions.
When the British 16th Brigade arrived in Tobruk, they had already served with the Australians in three previous campaigns. They had participated in the first campaign in the desert when they had defeated the Italians and captured Cyrenaica. They had also fought in Crete and finally in Syria. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

Considerations involving the Australian relief and Operation Crusader in October 1941

We have seen that the whole issue about relieving the 9th Australian Division and removing it from Tobruk were something initiated by General Blamey, the senior Australian officer in the Middle East. We have the sense that he was not totally candid about his reasons for the move, but rather he provided excuses for what he wanted that he felt would get results. He had found a way to overcome the British bad habits of extremely short-term thinking to meet the day's crisis. That approach had led to breaking units into small groups and dispersing them across great distances.
There was also Churchill's influence at work. Churchill always figured himself to be a great military expert, based on his early years and his experience in the Great War. The truth was that Churchill was a politician, and based his actions on political considerations. That often led to disasters, such as the Greek Campaign and the Crete debacle. Churchill was at his best as a political leader, with his ability to communicate and inspire people.
The Australian historian and author wondered if General Blamey would have been vindicated by the events of 1942, if the Japanese had not entered the war in dramatic fashion. That obviously is something about which we can only speculate.
We can also examine the arguments for keeping the Australians in Tobruk, rather than withdrawing them, and they still look like excuses for what Churchill wanted to do. He liked getting his way and having everyone agree with him. He ran into General Blamey, who was also a schemer, like Churcill, we suspect. In this case, General Blamey found a way to override Churchill, much to Mr. Churchill's distress.
Operation Crusader was eventually delayed to 18 November 1941, greatly angering Churchill, who wanted the attack on the enemy forces as early as possible. An interesting note is that Rommel planned to attack Tobruk on 20 November. Churchill's anxiousness for an early attack was based on the larger view of the war, not just issues surrounding the situation in North Africa.
The most important real issue was the demands made on the RAF. The Australian historian again notes that during the run up to the offensive, the RAF "was not in the even unduly extended". This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History and our general knowledge of the situation.

Churchill tries to bulldoze the Australian government in late September and October 1941

The British prime minister, Mr. Churchill, was determined to get the Australian government to agree not to withdraw their last two brigades from Tobruk during the moonless period in October 1941. Churchill's argument did not really have any firm basis in fact, but it was the principle of the thing that drove him to press the Australians. Churchill sent a telegram to the Australian prime minister, now  Mr. Fadden, telling him that General Auchinleck had wanted to resign over the Australian government's lack of confidence in him. Churchill told the prime minister that he was asking him to not withdraw the two brigades in the interest of comradeship with the British forces. The timing was bad, because Mr. Fadden's government had fallen and the Labour party was assembling a new government at the time that Churchill's telegram had arrived on 30 September 1941.
Mr. Curtin, the leader of the Labour Party was busy forming the new government. Mr. Fadden consulted with him and then answered Churchill's telegram with a refusal to stop the withdrawal. Mr. Fadden told Churchill that it was not the case that the Australian government lacked confidence in General Auchinleck. Churchill then notified Auchinleck of the Australian response.
Mr. Curtin, the new Australian prime minister, responded to yet another message from Churchill, saying that the previous government had considered all the issues when arriving at a decision, and the new government would make no changes. Churchill replied that he regretted the Australian decision, but he notified General Auchinleck to proceed with the relief of the remaining two brigades. Churchill was very unhappy that other issues caused the start of Operation Crusader to be postponed to 18 November 1941.
Churchill then sent a stern note to General Auchinleck complaining about the delay, when there had been some 4-1/2 months since any other major operation. Meanwhile, the Russians were thought to be getting battered severely by the Germans and the British were not doing anything to help, Churchill believed. The Australian governments felt obligated to follow the advice from their senior officer in the Middle East, General Blamey, rather than submit to pressure from Churchill that would have caused them to have to ignore General Blamey.This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

The British tried to keep from having to remove the rest of the Australians from Tobruk in September 1941

Upon the completion of Operation Supercharge, there were still two Australian brigades left in Tobruk. Churchill, in particular, wanted to not withdraw the brigades, at least not prior to Operation Crusader. The last two Australian brigades fully expected to be withdrawn during the next moonless periods. The British 16th Brigade had arrived and advance group from the 6th Division headquarters were in place in Tobruk. The British units were already being familiarized with the ground that they would defend. The British soldiers met the Australians and socialized with them.
Churchill and his military leadership planned to complain about the impact of the further withdrawal on Operation Crusader. Churchill was always optimistic about the possibilities for future operations. He could visualize announcing in Parliament that the new 8th Army had pushed through and relieved Tobruk and had destroyed the enemy armored forces on the way.That vision seemed much more important than the Australian government's insistence that the division that had been in Tobruk for about six months needed to be withdrawn.
The British thought that they could plead that establishing an ascendancy in the air over the Axis air forces would be compromised by having to provide air cover for the final Australian removal from  Tobruk. The unmentioned reason for the British low capability in the air was that they were still unwilling to send Spitfires to the Middle East. That left the RAF in North Africa with Hurricanes and Tomahawks, which were outclassed by Bf-109 fighters.
The truth was that despite having to provide air cover for the relief convoys removing Australians from Tobruk, They already were committed to provide air cover for the regular supply convoys. These were mainly carried in destroyers which had a limited capacity for cargo. To unload at the Tobruk harbor, some ships were moored to jetties while others were tied up to sunken ships and others were simply anchored while lighters moved the cargo ashore.
Air Marshal Tedder wrote a message to the Chief of the Air Staff. The gist of the message that if the enemy continued to refrain from attacks on shipping, the continued relief could proceed without having a great impact. If they did decide to attack the convoys, then the burden on the RAF would greatly increase due to the continued removal of the Australians from Tobruk. This is based on the account in Vol. III of the Australian Official History.

Operation Supercharge in September 1941

The British had expected that the enemy air forces would attack the relief convoys that were carried out as part of Operation Supercharge. The attacks either did not occur or were ineffective. The only air attack occurred on 19 September 1941 on a convoy of landing craft coming from Mersa Matruh with a cargo of tanks. At this point in the war, the landing craft were called "lighters".  Bombs were dropped by the attacking aircraft, but they fell into the sea about a half a mile from the landing craft. The only problems encountered during Operation Supercharge occurred when the small craft involved had some defect that prevented them from sailing to Tobruk. The day after the air attack, there were three schooners had sailed for Tobruk. None of them arrived at Tobruk due to various problems.
During Operation Supercharge, not quite six thousand men were transported out of Tobruk. This number included 544 wounded soldiers. Their replacements in the number of 6,300 men arrived at Tobruk. The operation interfered with supplies for Tobruk, so more than 1,000 tons less than had arrived during July and August 1941. This was partly due to the destroyers having to make room for soldiers and partly because the landing craft were carrying tanks rather than supplies. They also had restricted shipping to and from Tobruk to periods when the RAF could provide air cover.
Shipping traveling to Tobruk was stopped pending a conference to be held on 30 August to discuss supplies for Tobruk. Shipping continued to be suspended for a time following the conference.
The importance of restricting convoys to days when there was no moon was demonstrated on the night of 8 to 9 September when a convoy of destroyers ran in to Tobruk during time when there was moonlight. The destroyers were bombed while entering the Tobruk Harbor and when they departed. Two of the destroyers narrowly missed being hit by bombs. As soon as three days later, another convoy sailed when there was moonlight and it was bombed very early in the day.
Tobruk needed some 1,500 tons of supplies per day. That included about 20 tons a day of petrol. The supply that arrived averaged about 32 tons a day less than was needed. The situation was actually better than the figures would indicate, because "actual ration strength" was less than the nominal figure of 25,000 that was used for planning. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

Preparations to withdraw from Tobruk from 17 September 1941

Since preparations were to be secret, only rumors hinted at the entire 9th Australian Division would be removed from Tobruk as the 18th Brigade had been. There were necessary warnings to units that would be pulled out during the next moonless period. The units that received notice were the 2/1st Pioneer Battalion, the 24th Brigade except for the 2/43rd Battalion, the 2/12th Field Regiment, the 2/3rd Anti-Tank Regiment, along with several batteries from the 3rd RHA. The 2/7th Field Company was attached to the 24th Brigade, so they would leave as well. The British 16th Brigade would replace the Australian 24th Brigade. There was further shuffling of units to free up the units that would leave Tobruk.
The 2/12th Field Regiment had been very active during their time in Tobruk. They had fired off some 56,000 rounds and had lost 24 men killed and 24 wounded. A group of the 2/12th left Tobruk on the night of 18 September. The 2/12th would trade places with the 144th Field Regiment at Amiriya in Egypt. The 144th took over the odd collection of guns from the 2/12th Field Regiment and a disreputable set of gun tractors. In Egypt, the 2/12th Field Regiment received good 25pdrs and gun tractors left behind by the 144th Field Regiment.
The way things worked in the topsy-turvy world of the British military family, some men in Tobruk were stuck with Great War-vintage 18pdr guns, while other units away from the enemy were equipped with the latest gear. The men in Tobruk did not know of this situation so they had no problem using whatever guns they could get.
When the 2/1st Pioneer Battalion left Tobruk, that was their last association with the 9th Australian Division. They had been involved in heavy action since 1 May 1941, when they had built a line to defend against the German attack that penetrated the Tobruk perimeter. They would be replaced in the future by the 2nd/3rd Pioneers.
During the dark nights in September, 29 tanks were transported to Tobruk by A-lighters. The old 3rd Armoured Brigade headquarters was replaced by the 32nd Army Tank Brigade. The incoming tanks belonged to the 4th RTR. At their arrival, the tanks were still under the control of General Morshead, the fortress commander. He only had limited control, however, since General Morshead was required to request that the tanks be made available for attacks. The request was always granted, however.
Tbe relief operation was called "Operation Supercharge". The British Royal Navy excuted the withdrawal from 17 September until 27 September 1941. They used two fast minelayers of the Abdiel class and about 11 destroyers. Only any one night, one minelayer and three destroyers would enter and leave Tobruk's harbor. They stayed only two hours each night. Three cruisers of the 7th Cruiser Squadron provided cover for the withdrawal. They were concerned that Axis air power would be used against the evacuation, but that did not happen. This is based on account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

The White Cairn on 13 and 14 September 1941 south and east of Tobruk

A patrol from the 2/28th Battalion was sent to attack the feature they called the White Cairn. This was south and east of Tobruk. The patrol was small, some 27 men including two engineers. They approached the White Cairn at about 11:30pm and attacked from two sides. There were three sections in the patrol. One section attacked on the right and another two sections attacked on the left.
The defenders of the White Cairn were all Italians. Prisoners taken  included an artillery officer from the Bologna Division. The officer carried interesting documents including his diary. A truck drove the officer back to the Australian division headquarters where he was questioned. The officer had been involved with operations involving Point 146, which was where the Jack Observation Post was located. That night, afte 1:30am, Jack outpost reported to 2/28th Battalion that they were being attacked. The battalion kept two carriers at the ready to drive out and rescue men from observation posts, so they were sent to Jack. Jack was manned by seven men commanded by a corporal. About 300 yards south of Jack were a 12 man patrol. The attackers were found to be Germans. They fired automatic weapons at the Germans, but the attackers were numerous and overran Jack, where the survivors surrendered. The commander of Jack, Corporal France was a prisoner and he was taken to see General Rommel "who congratulated him on his courage and his men's effective resistance".
The carriers arrived a Jack during the fighting. They retrieved most of the 12 man patrol and drove back to the divisional headquarters where they reported to Colonal Lloyd. Colonel Lloyd sent out a larger force with carriers to try and get to Jack. The commander of the force reported back that they enemy had occupied Jack and had the support of "three to five tanks". The information from the captured Italian officer was that Jack would be attacked by "German pioneers and engineers with "six German and three captured Matilda tanks". They heard that the enemy planned attacks against more of the outposts "on the next four nights".
Colonel Lloyd requested that the 104th RHA fire on Jack, so they fired five rounds at the post. The Australians would have liked to have had more artillery fire, but the rules about restricting firing to save ammunition kept them from firing more. Eventually higher authority in the form of the Tobruk fortress artillery commander allocated the 60 pounder guns and removed the restrictions so that they could be more effective. By the dawn on 14 September, the men in the sector that included the 2/28th Battalion were put on alert. They expected to be attacked, so six Matildas were moved forward in support. Later, they could hear tanks moviing, but there was no attack. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

Two Australian attacks on enemy positions near Tobruk on 13-14 September 1941

On the night of 13-14 September 1941 the 24th Brigade planned to execute two raids against the enemy soldiers to the south of Tobruk. One raid was to be made by men from the 2/32nd Battalion. The other was to be made by men from the 2/28th Battalion. The 2/32nd Battalion would be supported by a patrol from the 2/43rd Battalion, which would block any involvement by troops from Bir Ghersa, to the east of Dalby Square, the name they gave the enemy position they would attack. The Dalby Square was perhaps four and a half miles south from the Tobruk Perimeter. The 2/28th Battalion would send out a raiding party to the east of Bir Ghersa. The position they would attack was called the White Cairn.
The raid on Dalby Square was commanded by a Captain. He had previously raided the position twice, so he knew the area pretty well. They had found the position was very strong. In preparation, the attackers had rehearsed the attack.
The Dalby Square raiding party consisted of 60 men, with men from two platoons. They had mortars and crew, eight stretcher bearers, and seven engineers. They left post R69 at about 9pm on 13 September. They were able to arrive near Dalby Square without having been seen, so they had the element of surprise. They formed up for the attack with the engineers in the lead. They would need to blow holes in the wire. The raid commander accompanied the engineers. A platoon followed them with sections spaced out. Another platoon followed them in similar formation. The company headquarters followed them in the rear. They would be supported by a 2in mortar positioned on the north side.
As the raiding force for Dalby Square neared the position, they took some intermittent fire. At 75 yards, the enemy opened up on them with mortars and machine guns. The noise was so load, the first platoon commander couldn't tell if the engineers had succeed in blowing holes in the wire. When they reached the wire, they found that it was still intact. They stopped while the engineers fired bangalore torpedoes to break the wire. At that point, the first platoon charged into Dalby Square. The second platoon commander was hit, so a warrant officer took command and they followed thte first platoon into the position. Responsibilities were allocated by section. They attempted to do their tasks, but they only had limited success. About one-third of the raiding force were wounded. They were taking fire from some enemy posts, so the raiders collected their wounded and pulled out.The raiders had two men killed and five missing. They brought out two prisoners and thought that they had killed some twenty enemy soldiers. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

Defending Tobruk in September 1941

The situation with respect to enemy artillery firing on the Tobruk harbor remained unchanged after the artillery duel in early September 1941. The RAF and the army had been unable to silence the enemy guns that had been bombarding the harbor at Tobruk. The navy was somewhat more successful than the RAF and army forces. The original plan was for HMS Gnat, a gunboat, to fire on the enemy guns, but the Gnat had engine trouble, so HMS Aphis arrived on the night of 15-16 September and fired on the guns. The RAF and army also participated in the attack on the enemy guns. Guns from Tobruk fired on the enemy guns to show the RAF where to hit. The aircraft dropped flares to illuminate the target. The Aphis then hit them with its guns. They succeeded in stopping the enemy from firing on the harbor for eight days. That was meaningful, because that covered most of the time when there was no moon visible at night. That aided the process of relieving more of the Australian units.
When September 1941 started, Rommel had decided to attack Tobruk from the southeast. That was also the area that had seen the least development of defensive positions by the enemy forces. There was an open area in the vicinity of "the El Adem and Bardia Roads" that had a screen of five outposts manned by the battalions holding those segments of the Tobruk perimeter. The outposts had all been given amusing names. Outpost Plonk was located near Bir el Azazi. The outpost was created on 15 August by the 2/15th Battalion. Going clockwise ("from right to left") were Bob and Bash, eventually renamed as Bondi and Tugun a month later. The next outposts were called Jill and Jack. They had been renamed from outposts Jed and Normie. The 24th Brigade now held the east sector. Their outposts were "Bob and Bash" as we mentioned. They were occupied by men from the 2/43rd Battalion. Men from the 2/28th Battalion occupied outposts Jack and Jill. There were also two outputs, very small, on the side of the Wadi Zeitan towards the enemy. These were located north of the Bardia Road.
The area north of the Derna Road was the scene of active patrolling and small but violent actions between Australian patrols and enemy troops occupying positions. This was near where "the rock shelf was gashed by the cliff-walled Wadi Sehel". "Standing patrols" operated on the enemy's side on the other side of the gorge. This was dangerous business, because on 8 September, one patrol was "shot up" by artillery and small arms fire. The goal was to gather information about enemy defenses so that reports could be passed up the chain of command. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

Tobruk shelliing from September 1941 onwards

Conditions changed at Tobruk after the heavy air raid on 1 September 1941. The pressure from the air continued, but the main problem was shelling from artillery. The ammunition shortage continued, so that British manufactured guns were only allowed to fire ten rounds a day. The next major development saw the ammuntion depot with Italian ammunition was bombed and destroyed. That meant that Italian 75mm and 100mm guns fell under the same restrictions. During August, a great deal of ammunition arrived by sea. Most of the ammunition went to the front line units, so only 100 rounds were added to the ammunition reserve. At the end of August, there were 101,993 rounds at Tobruk.
Starting in September, the procedure for counter-battery fire changed. The guns would fire one-after-another, but timed with stopwatches so that all the rounds would hit the target simultaneously. The guns that fired on the Tobruk harbor were troublesome-enough that there were planned artillery attacks where the number of rounds restriction was ignored so that they could counteract the "harbor guns".
For example, a storeship that had been converted from a trawler, was to arrive in the Tobruk harbor at 4:30am. The ship was late, however, and arrived after dawn. The guns attacking the harbor were effective and slowed the unloading process. The 104th RHA had two troops return fire wqith 353 rounds. Enemy counter-battery fire was effective and hit one of the two troops, "killing one man and wounding two others." On 4 September, there was a meeting where the issue was discussed. The new plan was when the enemy was firing on the harbor, to ask the navy how much problem was caused. If the firing was very troublesome, they would do counter-battery firing and bring in other guns to hit the "enemy counter-battery guns".
On 6 September, the enemy fired on the port and hit a jetty used for destroyers. They also hit the 104th RHA troop that they had hit previously and on a troop of 60-pounder guns from the 2/12th Regiment. The new plan went into effect and some 350 25pdr rounds and 77 60-pounder rounds. Afterwards, they observed an ambulance leaving the enemy position. The Tobruk guns had not taken any casualties, showing the effectiveness of the new plan. On 7 September, both sides had another go at the artillery battle. The RAF hit the enemy gun positions. When one gun still fired on the harbor, The 25pdrs and 60pdrs responded with counter-battery fire. The enemy gun and the 60pdrs fired at each other. The 60pdrs fired the last rounds, so they won the impromptu duel. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

The 12 October 1941 raid and issues with aritillery operations

The raid on the Germans started early on 12 October 1941. Visibility had dropped dramatically due to a heavy mist. The raid had started at the first light of the day. Even though visibility was low, there was much noise created by the Australian gun tractors. They crossed an area covered by discarded tin containers. By the time the mist had cleared off, they found that the German tanks and guns were gone. Presumably, they had heard the sound of the vehicles crossing the area where the tins were scattered and left their position. There were still five German armored cars at the site, One of the cars was taken as well as four German soldiers. The ammunition and fuel storage were destroyed.
The RAF had provided air cover for the raid with 12 Hurricane fighters. They were outclassed by the German Messerschmitt fighters which shot down half of the Hurricanes. While the raiders left the battlefield, another fight occurred between Tomahawk fighters and more Messerschmitts. One German fighter strafed Colonel Eastick's vehicle. Colonel Eastick and an American observer observed a parachuting Tomahawk pilot "shot out of his harness". They retrieved the pilot's body and buried him with a Christian burial service.
Colonel Eastick, the 2/7th Field Regiment commander, his staff, and observers drove to the headquarters of the Little Brother column. They were to see an operation designed by Colonel Eastick. A target would be hit by his field guns working with Fleet Air Arm bombers. The field guns belonged to E and F troops of the 2/7th Field Regiment. They were going to strike "Point 207".  The operation would commence at "half an hour after midnight". The bombers were planned to be over the target area at this time. The field guns would  "delineate the target by predicted searching fire". The Fleet Air Arm bombers would drop their bombs, incendiary devices, and flares for a period of about 15 minutes. The guns would wait for some 15 minutes and then they would hit the target with a heavy bombardment. The operation went well, because it was planned well and there were no mishaps. The Australian gunners had some concerns that they might be hit by counter-battery fire made poossible by shooting from the same location twice. The enemy might well have located the guns by the flashes, but this did not happen. The results were observed and fires and explosions were seen, indicating that the operation had succeeded.
The 2/7th Field Regiment turned over their duties to the 1st Field Regiment. By 16 October, the regiment started their long drive to Palestine. When the regiment "reached the Wadi Nastrun", they were informed that the plan had changed and that they should drive to Cairo, to "the Royal Artillery Base Depot". At this point, they did not realize the benefits that would accrue from being at the depot, where they could complete their equipment and get valuable training. This is based on the account in Vol.III of theAustralian Official History.

Late September to early October 1941in the border area between Libya and Egypt

Brother column was located at the North Point position. The 2/7th Field Regiment arrived there before the guards did. The regiment commander, Colonel Eastick, was assigned temporarily as the Brother column commander on 26 September 1941. His temporary assigment lasted until 1 October. They split the 2/7th Regiment into parts again. 14th Battery was assigned to Brother column while 13th Battery was assigned to Sister. One battery from the 2/8th Field Regiment was attached to the 102nd Anti-Tank Regiment, Royal Artillery. The field artillery battery was employed during this period as anti-tank guns.
Even more splitting occurred. One troop from each 2/7th Field Regiment battery were attached to Little Brother and Little Sister. These columns provided the Australian gunners with the best possible desert training. During daylight, the columns were dispersed but with some order. At night, they collapsed down into a small area with a tight perimeter. Another troop was assigned as artillery support to a roving cruiser tank column. This assignment also provided excellent desert training to the Australian gunners.
The 2/7th and 2/8th Field Regiments were told that they would be withdrawn to Palestine to join the 1st Australian Corps, robbing the two regiments of chances to see action. They also were informed about the new organization where each regiment would have three batteries instead of two. The 2/7th Field Regiment would have the 13th, 14th, and 57th Batteries. The 2/8th Field Regiment would have the 15th, 16th, and 58th Batteries.
On 10 October 1941, the 2/8th Field Regiment south east "in desert formation" towards "Hill 69 in Palestine". This was the first time the complete regiment had moved together. They took 8 days to reach their hill in Palestine.
The 2/7th Field Regiment got a temporary reprieve so that they could participate in an offensive operation against Germans. One troop was attached to Little Brother colomn starting on 6 October. During the night of 7 to 8 October, they were asked to fire on a German night leaguer south of Point 207. They at least got rounds that fell near the target area.
Another troop attached to the cruiser tank column participated in a raid that crossed the frontier wire to the south of Sidi Omar. The column that they were in was a mix of armored cars, tanks, and field artillery. The purpose was to take "prisoners, tanks, armoured cars and guns". The guns were from a 105mm battery. The Australian gunners would be asked to "silence" the guns, if they fired. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

Changes from 19 September 1941 near the border area between Libya and Egypt

Fait Hope and Char columns had resumed operations near Halfaya Pass after the end of the operations caused by the German reconnaissance in force in September 1941. The resumption of "business as usual" did not last long. The Australian field regiment commander learned that the Scots Guards would be replaced by a brigade of the 4th Indian Division. The Scots Guards would move to the desert above the escarpment. They would take the three Australian batteries with them when they left the coast. Fait column got new orders that included not running on hearing the code word Bicycle. Instead, they would "stand and fight" near the line of the minefield.
The border area received an important visitor on 19 September. General Freyberg came visiting to see the area where the New Zealand Division might be located. That did not prevent the "sniping gun" from firing and drawing Axis return fire. They were successful in causing the enemy to fire many rounds for a few Australian shots.
The Australian 2/7th Field Regiment was replaced on 22 September. The three columns, Fait, Hope, and Char were dissolved. The Australian battery commander heard the news that the 2/8th Field Regiment would arrive in the area. Major Ralph was told that he would be rejoining his regiment in the "Playground" area.
The 2/7th Field Regiment ended up being positioned at Sofafi by 28 September. More Australian artillery was still scattered about. There was a troop at North Point. Two more troops were in the Playground. The remaining units of the 2/8th Field Regiment were near Sidi Barrani, but were moving towards the front area. By 27 September, the 15th Battery was assigned to the 7th Armoured Division. The orders for the 2/8th Regiment were to support the British to the "last man and the last round". The 16th Battery eventually earned a special commendation from the commander of the 4th Indian Division artillery, as being far beyond what anyone had expected.
What now seemed to be expected was that a small group would be expected to sacrifice themselves while defending before any help could reach them. This applied to North Point, the Playground, and the Kennel fortifications. They looked strong on paper but were only weakly held. While the holding forces were called the 3rd Coldstream Guards, the 9th Rifle Brigade, and the 7th Armoured Brigade, the actual forces involved were split into small columns. They were units such as "Little Brother" and "Little Sister". They were placed some 15 to 25 miles in front of the main column. South African armored cars were operating even further forward. The main Brother and Sister columns did not amount to much with the many detachments positioned around the area. The main strength at North Point and Playground were "two infantry companies, two troops of field guns in a normal role, two troops of anti-tank guns, and one or two troops of field guns in an anti-tank role.In addition, there were some engineers, anti-aircraft gun crews, and some infantry providing some defensivc strength for the headquarters units. The troops involved were good enough for what was needed. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

Pulling back from the Sunday morning go-round on the coast from 14 to 15 September 1941

The British-Australian columns had blunted the German probe on 14 September. The Germans eventually were withdrawing rapidly to the west. Two columns, Fait (Faith) and Hope got their code words that were to send them back to Sidi Barrani. They headed east at about midnight. Char (Charity) column sat until 4am when they had finally gotten the code word that would send them back to Sidi Barrani. As we mentioned, there were rear-guard detachments left to provide a block to prevent any Germans from approaching the columns while they were retreating to the east. One key point also was protected by a detachement. The Buq Buq water hole had two detachments defending the site. A Troop from the 2/7th Field Regiment had supplied field guns for these two groups. More guns were on the Sofafi track located near Somulus. Another group went south from Sidi Barrani towards Alam el Hammam. They expected to see German tanks heading north and would have engaged them.
At Sidi Barrani, Faith and Hope columns were in place "at first light". Char column was much later arriving, as they had only gotten the code word at 4am. They were in place at Sidi Barrani by 8am.
A false report arrived at Buq Buq at 10:45am on 15 September saying that a German column of tanks was driving north. towards them. The "water point" was blown with some 600 pounds of dynamite. The group had Buq Buq then drove at high speed for Sidi Barrani. There was still one group commanded by Captain Mackay near the coast.
By 2pm on 15 September, the "coast was clear" and the three columns, Fait, Hope, and Char were sent back out to their original spots. The Buq Buq group had just arrived back and was integrated into the columns. The guns that had been at Siwa oasis were back and rejoined their regiment. They had moved back into the "High" spot and the sniping gun had returned to their previous pattern of trying to draw enemy fire with a few shots.
The Germans had claimed only one or two tanks "totally destroyed", but the 2/7th Field Regiment had seen burned out tanks and dead "tankers". The German active tank strength had dropped from 110 before the operation to about 42 after the end of the Midsummer Night's Dream. The most interesting find by the Germans was a British truck with "codes and documents". The truck did not have any information about Operation Crusader, since nothing existed as of yet. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

14 September 1941 on the coast road east of Halfaya Pass

The action on the coast road, during the German operation that commenced on 14 September 1941 commenced a first light. The Australian gunners who were in position had not been given the highly classified intelligence about what to expect. The information had been collected, we believe, through decrypting German communications. A German patrol hit the Scots Guards and caused some casualties. The commander of the 2/7th Field Regiment went to visit his 13th Battery. The first Germans took mortar fire from Point 20 and were also fired upon by Australian carriers. The forward observer called in fire on German troops who were dismounting from their trucks. Enemy shelling came down on the coast road and on the gun set up for sniping on the enemy. The enemy kept firing during the day. The sniping gun went 5 for 225, so they had fired five rounds and heard the enemy fire 225 rounds.
The enemy tried to move forward, but was kept back by artillery fire. When Colonel Eastick had arrived at his battery, he found that communications (by wire) had been lost with forward troops. He ordered that the lines be restored. A lieutenant and a gunner went out to make the repairs. They were able to keep the lines working all day, and got a congratulations from the Scots Guards.
Major Ralph, commander of Char column, saw reports that showed that there were enemy tanks in contact on the desert flank. The units on the high side of the escarpment were set to withdraw to Sidi Barrani. Major Ralph, an Australian officer, ordered the third troop of his battery forward from Sidi Barrani. The troop was to deploy on the holding line to provide a backstop. As Major Ralph read reports about what was happening, he ordered his forward section to pull back to a position that allowed them to cover the minefield.
After receiving the codeword "Bicycle" after 6:30pm, they were to withdraw from the coast at 7:30pm. They were getting more concerned as there were German infantry moving forward towards them. Fortunately, the Australian gunners and the Scots Guards were able to withdraw as night fell. The gunners fired a barrage as the forward section came through, and then loaded up their guns and followed them along the road. Columns Faith, Hope, and Charityqujckly moved out, leaving the Germans behind.
At the first stopping point, they got the word to fall back to Sidi Barrani. By this time, the Germans had turned around and headed back to the west. Columns Faith, Hope, and Charity received orders to follow the rest in their withdrawal to Sidi Barrani. They moved out at about midnight. Char had setup at Samalus and Point 52. They only got the word to move out at about 4am. As the columns moved east, they had left rearguards behind them. The rearguards were given anti-tank guns, field guns, and some Scots Guards. Fait and Hope (the four character abbreviations) reached Sidi Barrani at first light. Char column arrived at about 8am, as they got the word to withdraw on Sidi Barrani much later. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

Mid-Summer's Night Dream

"east and south-west".of Bir el Khireigat. After that, they would then hit the 7th Armoured Division which lay to the east. This was not to be a prolonged operation and the 21st Armored Division would return to their position within 24 hours.

Other units would hit the coast sector on Sunday. Despite the usual practice of not having a gun set up to fiire on the beach on Sunday, the day of the attack, there was a gun. Three more guns were set up a short distance behind. The evening before Rommel's attack, the three guns back had been registered.
The main thrust of Rommel's operation was south of the escarpment. Units on the west were told to expect an operation by Axis troops. Rommel was going to have problems, because the British were ready with air power to hit his masses of moving vehicles. Later in the North African campaign, a common practice of dispersal was implemented. But Rommel was oblivious to the issue, surprisingly enough.
When Rommel's operation started on Sunday morning, there were three columns from the 21st Armored Division sweeping on arcs that hoped to catch British battle groups. The British were prepared and fell back to the minefield avoided the three columns. The South African armored cars stayed at a distance and provided a screen for the withdrawing battle groups. When the Germans had moved up to the dummy supply dump, they found "empty desert". The British positions at North Point and the Playground were abandoned. The Germans passed through the British minefield and drove to Sofafi when they ran out of fuel. The Germans went into hedgehog formations when they were hit by the British air attack. They took fire and bombs. At thst point, the Germans pulled back and headed for the rear. Rommel was present and driving in his captured British command car. He had a flat tire, which they struggled to fix.
The Australian gunners on the coast were not privy to prior knowledge about the impending attack. They were all set for a normal day where they would shoot harassing fire. The Australians could hear noise from the direction of Halfaya pass. A British column commander did not explain what was happening. They were finally Early in the morning, the Scots Guards were attacked by a German patrol and took casualties. The patrol was hit by mortar fire and by a carrier patrol. The Australian gunners were supporting the Scots Guards. This based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official history.

Developments near the Egyptian border from July to August 1941

A common failing in the Western Desert in 1941 was that training was given short shrift at a time when training was greatly needed. The South African division became the latest victim of this problem when the division was put to work digging defenses, when they needed to be training for their expected combat role. The Middle East Command was the chief culprit in neglecting training to make time for the latest priority. This problem had been a problem prior to Operation Crusader and continued to be a problem following the battle. This problem was not solved until much later when General Montgomery arrived on the scene after August 1942. The Australian historian does acknowledge that the El Alamein position built would be useful a year later.
During August until early September, the 22nd Guards Brigade was holding the coastal area near Halfaya Pass. They were organized into three columns. The names Faith, Hope, and Charity were shortened to the first four letters: Fait, Hope, and Char. There were other units nearby. The 7th Support Group was located at North Point. The 4th Indian Division headquarters was located at Sofafi. The 7th Armoured Division occupied what was called the "Playground". The 4th South African Armoured Car Regiment provided screening and reconnaissance forward of the minefield.
In late July 1941, the Austrakuab field regiments were moved forward. One troop from the 2/7th Field Regiment was sent to Siwa Oasis. Siwa had become the headquarters of the Long Range Desert Group. A battery from the 2/8th Field Regiment was assigned to Char column. The battery commander, Major Johnston, became the column commander. During the night of 30-31 August, another battery relieved the previous battery, but Major Johnston remained behind as column commander.
Major Argent had spent five months in the frontier area. He and his anti-tank battery were pulled into Mersa Matruh and placed under Brigadier Ramsey's orders. Most of the 2/7th Field Regiment moved on 2 September to the coast sector. They were replaced at Mersa Matruh by a South African field regiment. The regiment's commander, Colonel Eastick became the Coast Sector artillery commander. There were three Australian field artillery batteries, three anti-tank gun batteries, and one light anti-aircraft battery, presumably equipped with 40mm Bofors guns. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

Developments at Mersa Matruh in 1941

In September 1941, Mersa Matruh was occupied by considerable force. The 1st South African Division manned the perimeter and were supported by a machine-gun battalion. The machine gunners happened to be Australians. They had some artillery: "three field artillery regiments and two anti-tank batteries". The artillery commander was from the 9th Australian Division, a brigadier. In the usual ironic situation, the 9th Australian Division was sent to Cyrenaica to train, as the conventional wisdom at that date was that this was a back-water location where nothing much could be expected to happen. The conventional wisdom did not acknowledge the presence of General Rommel, who upended everyone's calculations, even the Germans and Italians. Tje 9th Australian Division, since they did not expect any action, had left their artillery at their base. While this frustrated the gunners, this saved them from being caught up in the chaos in Cyrenaica when Rommel first attacked, and besides, the gunners were lacking equipment. The 9th Australian Division was forced to depend on British artillery located in Cyrenaica.
The changing situation soon left the Australian gunners providing the second and third lines of defense for Egypt. After that happened, the British were sufficiently motivated to find vehicles and guns to equip the Australians. They were given old guns, such as 18pdrs and 4.5in howitzers. The Australians received their equipment near Alexandria. They got a taste of the desert environment before being sent to Mersa Matruh. Two regiments arrived at Mersa Matruh, but the 2/12th Field Regiment was sent to Tobruk.
Two British field regiments were covering the coastal area. They initially moved up guns in the dark so that they could reach the Halfaya area. They figured out a better plan, which was to to move one gun up on the sand dunes and shoot at whatever movement that they could observe. This usually drew a disproportionate amount of return fire. They reported results as if it were a cricket score. For example: "195 for 10" meant that they had fired ten rounds and caused the enemy to fire 195 rounds. An Australian officer was permitted to command the operation for 23 July 1941. His gun fired 28 rounds at a "working party", vehicles traversing Halfaya Pass, and probably destroyed a staff car.
When the Australian gunners had arrived at Mersa Matruh, they realized that they needed to improve and expand the artillery positions. One important point that they realized was that the defensive perimeter needed to be expanded to enclose the high ground that dominated the site and harbor. They did not want to provide the enemy with access to the position which overlooked the site. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

Further developments in August to September 1941 in North Africa

The German army command had tried to restrict Rommel's activities, because they were concerned about the supply line to North Africa. They had sent General Gause to be their man between the Army and Rommel. Instead, General Gause became Rommel's chief of staff and they got along well. Hitler was at work, much as was Churchill, because he was concerned about the losses sustained at sea. His first move was to divert the X Air Corps to change its mission to one of providing air protection for the convoys to North Africa. Their mission had been to attack Egypt.
All this was in accord with Rommel's plan of having an Army Group Africa, with himself as commander. Rommel was happy. He informed his wife that he and General Gause, his Chief of Staff, got along well, and Rommel was very pleased that was the case.
The situation was similar for both the British and Axis forces. They both had pulled their armored forces back from contact at the border between Libya and Egypt. The Germans kept their two armored reconnaissance units in a screen. The units both were based on mobile forces equipped with the German six-wheeled armored cars with 20mm gun armament. The British front was about six miles east of Halfaya pass. They were above the escarpment and were covered by a mine field. They had constructed fortifications, although the terrain did not favor having a strong defensive line.
The opposing forces had a gap that was not occupied, except by occasional marauding mobile forces. The British groups eventually became known as "Jock Columns" while the Germans were using ad hoc battle groups. They both were used for reconnaissance and to provide a means for engaging the enemy. The Australian historian gives some credit to Churchill for being impatient with a situation where his men were "shadow boxing" and never could "land a punch". This was the only spot where the British were in contact with German forces and could potentially fight actions.
We find that the British orders were to stake out spots in the desert to let the enemy know that if they went past them, there would be a battle. The truth was that the British were told that if the enemy came with a substantial force, that they were not to fight, but to withdraw towards Sidi Barrani. That gave the British commanders on the spot a mindset to be ready to flee, so as not to be trapped. They were not thinking about fighting, but about running away. East of Sidi Barrani was Mersa Matruh with a port and railhead. The place had defense built along similar lines to those at Tobruk. "New Zealand railway construction engineers" had extended the rail line further to the west. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

The situation at Tobruk from mid-September 1941

Once the decision had been made to relieve the 9th Australian Division at Tobruk, there was some repercussions. General Auchinleck considered that since the Australian Government seemed to have lost confidence in him, he should resign his command. That did not happen, but it was a reasonable conclusion. Part of what happened were the machinations by General Blamey to get his way, no matter the cost. The better results were the addition of an additional infantry tank battalion, 4-4.5in guns, and twelve more 25pdr guns.
General Morshead returned to Tobruk on 17 September 1941. He was informed on his arrival that while he was gone, the Germans had attacked one of the observation posts that lay outside the perimeter wire. They had used five tanks on 14 September. At the same time, they made a reconnaissance into Egypt with a force that included tanks. Rommel had called the operation "Summer Night's Dream". We have heard this translated as "Midsummer's Night Dream", which seems more like what Rommel would have called it. The Australian historian thought that since this was mid-September, midsummer was not appropriate. The historian's suggestion was that this operation gave Rommel a false sense of what the British were doing and what they were thinking.
For the coming battle between Axis and British forces, the Germans incorporated responses to lessons learned from Operation Battleaxe. They extended their defenses for some 25 miles south of the Halfaya Pass area. They had battalion-sized units to hold each fort that was built. Given the success of using 88mm anti-aircraft guns against British tanks, they included the use of those guns with armored forces for the next battle, The Germans also started using radios follow the message traffic in their own units and also started using front-line signals intelligence to intercept and process British communications.
The Germans also worked at pulling their battle-group ad hoc organization back into formal division organization. They had two complete armored divisions, the 5th Light Division and the 15th Armored Division. They also had new infantry to use. They had the 361st Africa Regiment, along with two other infantry regiments. The 361st Africa Regiment included former French Foreign Legion troops.
With the Italian Trieste Mechanized Division, they had the complete Italian Mobile Corps. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official history.

Coming to a decision about the 9th Australian Division in September 1941

General Auchinleck disagreed about the supposed degradation of the 9th Australian Division due to their being at Tobruk for so long a time. He agreed that they were tired. Auchinleck suggested that they increase the fighting strength in Tobruk to compensate for that situation. He considered replacing one brigade of Australians with a brigade of the British 6th Division. He preferred keeping the entire 9th Australian Division at Tobruk.He had hoped to add Indian troops to the 6th Division, but that seemed less likely now the way that the situation was progressing.
General Blamey had access to Auchinleck's message and sent his government a long rebuttal, including issues raised outside of the message. As to the concerns about the navy, General Blamey said that given that there was enemy naval interference with the sea transport, that should not be a concern. The need for air cover for the relief was an issue, but he had agreed to postpone the relief from August to September, since the RAF had said that they could more easily provide air protection then than they could have in August. Also, the RAF air strength in North Africa had been incresaed, so they were better able to provide air cover for the relief operations.
The British Prime Minister pushed the Australian Prime Minister to get him to agree, but Mr. Fadden would not change his position that the 9th Australian Division must be withdrawn from Tobruk. The Australian government really desired to bring their divisions together into a single corps. The Australian government was also concerned about Auchinleck's comments about a planned sortee from Tobruk by the Australians. The conclusion was that the Australian concerns about the 9th Australian Division in Tobruk were more important to them than any of the British concerns.
Churchill gave in an instructed that plans go forward to relieve the Australians in Tobruk. He was concerned about the response in Australia by a British refusal to relieve the 9th Australian Division. There were other issues, such as the appearance to the Australians of the British division on Cyprus being relieved by an Indian division at the same time that the British government opposed relieving the 9th Australian Division in Tobruk. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

The Australians and Tobruk in September 1941

We have to think that General Blamey had his own agenda, that is to stop the scattering of Australian units across the Mediterranean and North Africa, and bring them together as a single force. From the perspective of time, we feel like the objection he raised about the condition of the troops in Tobruk was just an excuse to try and convince the British so he could get his way. In the face of the Australian obstinant request for the relief of the 9th Australian Division from Tobruk, Churchill's next move was to ask General Auchinleck to provide him with the facts about the situation. The problem with that is that Auchinleck was reduced to asking the Australians for information, which is going to be biased towards what they want.
Auchinleck ordered General Morshead to meet him in Cairo for conferences to gather the relevant facts. Morshead was brought out of Tobruk on the destroyer Kipling, which endured five air attacks and took some damage in the process. That was a foretaste of what could be expected during any relief of the 9th Australian Division in Tobruk. General Moshead stopped by to meet with General Blamey prior to meeting with General Auchinleck. There were three conferences  to atatend on 10 September. Generals Morshead and Blamey attended together. The first meeting was with Auchinleck and General Alan Cunningham, the newly appointed army commander. We imagine that they discussed Operation Crusader. Following that, they met with the Air, Naval, and Army commanders-in-chief. They discussed the relief of the 9th Australian Division. After that, they met with staff officers, one being Neil Ritchie and the other being the deputy quartermaster general.
General Morshead was questioned in the meeting with the commanders-in-chief about the condition of the men in Tobruk. He admitted that the men were still in good health, but were seen as tiring, and becoming weaker. Morshead made the point that both the British and Australians in Tobruk were in a similar situation. In fact, Morshead said that he would be unhappy if the British in Tobruk were left behind when the Australians were removed.
Auchinleck's rejoinder was that to stage at relief now would create difficulties for the army's readiness for Operation Crusader. Auchinleck proposed sending an infantry tank battalion to Tobruk to increase the defensive strength of the fortress. He also told General Morshead that he could not relieve the British troops in Tobruk, only the Australians. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Officiail History.

Government instabilty in Australia as an influence on events in North Africa in 1941

Robert Menzies was the Australian prime minister from 26 April 1939 until 28 August 1941. He was a Liberal, but he was part of a coalition government during this period. He was succeed by Arthur Fadden for a short time. In early September 1941, General Blamey sent a message to Mr. Fadden regarding Tobruk and the 9th Australian Division. He said that Churchill told General Auchinleck that if he would not relieve the 9th Australian Division, he would fix the deal with the Australians. General Blamey was opposed to such a deal and expressed concern that if the division stayed in Tobruk, they would continue to decline and might not be able to resist a future attack. He also mentioned that with the 18th Brigade being withdrawn, the rest of the troops would be disappointed if they were not also withdrawn. General Blamey wanted the Australian government to strongly resist the British attempt to keep the 9th Australian Division in Tobruk. General Blamey knew that the British would keep the Australians in Tobruk indefinitely, if they could get away with such a thing.
Mr. Fadden sent a message to Winston Churchill requesting that the British respect the desires of the Australian government and withdraw the 9th Australian Division. If the British refused and Tobruk were eventually overrun and the division was lost, the effects in Australia would be great. When he wrote in The Grand Alliance, Churchill made out like this was the first he had heard of the request, which was false. What was true was in early September 1941, there were not any solid plans for Operation Crusader in place. Churchill confidently told Auchinleck that he could bluff the Australians into going along with Churchill's desires to keep the Australians in Tobruk.
General Blamey was unconvinced by Churchill's arguments. He wrote the minister for the Army in Australia about the problems he was having assembling the Australian formations into a single grouping. The British would say that they would agree, but then would take steps to resist doing what General Blamey wanted. For the Syrian campaign, he had brought together units to form an ad hoc brigade. He was assured that he would get the men back to return to their normal divisions. After the end of the Syrian campaign, that did not happen. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

Conflict between the British and the Australians over relieving the 9th Australian Division at Tobruk

In late August, the Australians learned that there was considerable British resistance to moving the 9th Australian Division out of Tobruk. The first inkling was that the navy wanted to reduce the number of convoys in and out of Tobruk. They also wanted to only run ships on moonless nights and not on nights when there was moon. Then we find that there was resistance to sending the British 6th Division to Tobruk because they had recently been in an area where malaria was prevalent. They also did not want to send another division to that area because of the malaria. After seeming to agree to withdrawing the 9th Australian Division from Tobruk, now they had a defense in depth by having a long list of objections. General Blamey was not going to agree to this sort of arrangement, because it would circumvent the plan to consolidate all the Australian divisions into one fighting force. We find, on examination, that the real opposition to withdrawing the 9th Australian Division from Tobruk was Winston Churchill. Churchill considered withdrawing the 9th Australian Division from Tobruk as a "needless relief".
When General Auchinleck returned to Egypt, he was preoccupied with the coming offensive, now named "Crusader". He did not want to deal with anything but preparations for the operation. The Australians were able to withdraw the 18th Brigade from Tobruk, but now found that the British were dug in and resistant to any move to withdraw the 9th Australian Division from Tobruk. The naval and air commanders in Egypt both opposed the withdrawal of the Australians.
The RAF hoped to achieve air superiority over the battlefield for Operation Crusader, but there were many factors which seemed to make that very difficult if not impossible. The British hoped to have 544 aircraft for the operation. The might have some 650 aircraft, of which 300 would be German. The Germans had a superior fighter type to anything that the British could employ. If the war in Russia went well, the Germans might be able to pull more aircraft into the fighting in North Africa. Convoys to Tobruk would require enough aircraft to provide a sufficient protection.
Carrying out the relief of the 9th Australian Division from Tobruk would divert needed resources for Operation Crusader. The British were desperate to find a way to not have to carry out the withdrawal of the division from Tobruk. General Auchinleck also believed that the Australians could defend Tobruk better than any relieving division. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

Late August to September 1941 in North Africa

General Auchinleck appointed Alan Cunningham to be his army commander in North Africa without really knowing anything about him, except his recent history. Cunningham has just finished a successful campaign in East Africa against the Italians. Cunningham had been summoned to Cairo to be briefed on his new command. He left on 29 August for Cairo. Auchinleck would give Cunningham instructions to make two plans for the coming operation. One would cut across the desert to Benghazi while the second would be for an attack along the coast towards Tobruk. From what we know, the second plan was the one that was actually implemented.
The Australian 18th Brigade was successfully moved out of Tobruk by 30 August 1941. This was according to General Blamey's plan which had been approved. He notified his government of the successful movement and asked them to keep the new secret. That same day, the chiefs of staff met in Cairo to discuss supplying Tobruk in the future. The supplies were mainly carried by two destroyers each night. The goal was to built up the supply reserves for the fortress. Other ships were also involved. They used "A-Lighters" to carry supplies from Mersa Matruh to Tobruk. Other small ships also ran from the main base at Alexandria and Tobruk or from Mersa Matruh to Tobruk. There was a constant risk of air attack, along with mines, and large caliber gunfire on the harbor. When units were moved in and out of Tobruk, that tied up the available destroyers, as they could not be used simultaneously for both troop carrying and transporting supplies.
The planned large movement of Australian and Polish units in August meant that more ships were required. Some nights, there were three destroyers or, even on some occasions, four destroyers. The fast minelaying cruisers Latona and Abdiel were also used on the run to and from Tobruk. They used the additional ships to move troops while the normal ships were used to carry supplies. To provide protection from air attack, there were more fighter aircraft and some cruisers with their anti-aircraft guns. Two ships were damaged during these operations. The Australian destroyer Nizam had a near miss by a bomb that caused damage while the cruiser Phoebe was torpedoed, probably by an Italian torpedo bomber. These aircraft were twin-engined and were some of the best Italian attack aircraft.
The air protection provided relieved the pressure on the smaller ships, and reduced the losses. Three small ships were lost in operations to resupply Tobruk. This was considered an improvement over the previous months. The ships lost were a trawler and a whaler. A tank lighter or landing craft was sunk by a mine in Tobruk harbor. A minesweeper, also in the same small shipi  category, was damaged near Mersa Matruh. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

Auchinleck takes command in the Middle East

When General Auchinleck took over as the theater commander in the Middle East, Winston Churchill hoped to bulldoze him into doing what Churchill wanted. General Dill, the CIGS, advised Auchinleck to resist doing anything before adequate preparations had been made. He considered that when General Wavell launched Operation Battleaxe, that he had acted prematurely due to pressure from Churchill. General Dill told Auchinleck to act as he thought best, and to resist the Prime Minister's push to act before he was ready. In particular, he said that he should be explicit about the risks he was prepared to run, and those risks that were too great to chance, to demand the resources that he needed, and if they are not provided, to state clearly what could be done and not be done.
General Auchinleck told Churchill that attacking before the necessary resources were available was something that was not "a justifiable operation of war". He negotiated the date for the attack in the Middle East to 1 November 1941. He treated that as the real target date that he was trying to meet. When the preparations were not complete in time, he asked for a delayed start, even though that would upset Churchill.
We find rather amusing that President Roosevelt told Churchill to reduce his commitment to the Middle East, because the Americans thought that the area could not be adequately defended. In fact, they threatened to withhold shipments of war materials and equipment if Churchill ignored their concerns. Churchill's reply to Roosevelt caused Roosevelt to lose his temper. The two leaders met following this exchange on a battleship in "the Bay of Newfoundland". The disagreement was resolved and the Americans proceeded to sent tanks, vehicles and aircraft to the Middle East in large numbers. Those shipments continued through 1942, which was a much more challenging year than 1941, if that was possible.
Before Churchill left to meet Roosevelt, they had decided to send a second armored division to the Middle East. The division would not arrive in time for the start of the upcoming attack. The convoys were immediately dispatched with men and equipment for the division. American Stuart tanks would arrive in time for the start of the operation. Robert Crisp's book, Brazen Chariots, is a good story about how the Stuarts were used in the next offensive in the desert.
Auchinleck had not yet appointed the army commander. He was not familiar with any of the men who were available. All he could do is essentially look at their resumes. On paper, Lieutenant-General Alan Cunningham, who had just completed a successful campaign in East Africa seemed to be a good choice. The East African campaign had been a fast moving war of mobility. What Auchinleck did not know is that Cunningham was exhausted after the East African campaign and was not ready to take on new responsibilities in the Western Desert that involved mechanized warfare. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the British Official History.

The Polish Carpathian Brigade arrives at Tobruk in late August 1941

When the Polish Carpathian Brigade was formed in April 1940 in Syria, the Polish government in exile was based in Paris. The brigade gradually grew from Polish soldiers who had escaped internment or captivity and traveled to Syria. After France fell to the Germans and the Vichy government was formed under Marshal Petain, the brigade marched out of Syria and into Palestine. This was in June 1940. Polish soldiers continued to make their way to Palestine to join the brigade. This process continued until Greece was captured by the Germans in April 1941. There ceased to be an easy route out of Eastern Europe to Palestine at that point.
Many of the men who joined the Carpathian Brigade had been officers in the Polish army. A special unit had been formed of some Polish officers in addition to the normal brigade organization. Other officers served in the brigade as non-commissioned officers or as ordinary soldiers. The Carpathian Brigade had the advantage of time to train before they were sent into action at Tobruk. The brigade was actually organized as a brigade group. The brigade group included a cavalry regiment. The brigade commander, Major-General Kopanski, arrived at Tobruk during the night of 25 to 26 August 1941. The general and his staff had lunch with General Morshead and then had a conference. They found that the plan was for them to move into the southern sector and take over from the 20th Brigade (Australian).
The first Polish unit to see action was the field regiment. They were sent to the western sector to relieve the 51st Field Regiment, which was to leave Tobruk. The Polish anti-tank regiment replaced the 24th Anti-Tank Company and the 9th Battery of the 2/3rd Anti-Tank Regiment. Apparently, only the men left and the guns remained in place for the Polish to use. The Polish cavalry regiment replaced the 18th Indian Cavalry Regiment.
The Polish infantry were sent to integrate with the 20th (Australian) Brigade for a week. The Polish would have preferred to be positioned in opposition to Germans, rather than Italian soldiers, but they accepted their assignment. When they listened to news of the Russian front, the Polish disliked both the Germans and Russians, so they were happy to hear of both sets of casualties.
The 20th Brigade was removed during September 3-4 1941. After the 20th Brigade was relieved, that meant that a Tobruk sector was now held by a non-Australian unit. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

More activities in August 1941 at Tobruk

Developments in the southern sector of Tobruk continued through August 1941. The 2/13th Battalion was on the right of the sector. The 2/17th Battalion was positioned on the left. During this period, both battalions were involved with deep patrolling. The Australians were aware that the enemy were continuing to build their defensive positions. That was particularly true near the roadblock at the El Adem Road. They were busy adding mines to close the gaps in their minefields. At the same time, the Australians were busy creating new gaps in the minefields. On 4 August, a patrol from the 2/17th managed to lift 184 mines and brought them in for their own use.
The 2/13th Battalion had been in their positions from 15 July to 18 August 1941. Their position was conducive to deep patrolling at least in part due to the greater distance of the enemy positions. That allowed them to exit their own positions and move out without being observed. They were still close enough to the enemy positions to be able to reach them and return during the night. One early patrol went out and brought back intelligence of the enemy minefield that they had found. Lt. Martin was a regular leader of patrols and he eventually was in a position to be able to penetrate the enemy lines and move around behind them. They also noticed gun flashes and several patrols out at the same time were able to get bearings on the gun flashes that could be used by the counter-battery group. These were guns that were shelling the harbor area.
On the night of 17-18 August a large group of infantry and engineers ventured out to attack the guns. Lt. Martin commanded the assault group, but they only found empty gun emplacements, although they had been recently used.
By mid-August 1941, improved air support was provided to Tobruk. They aircraft were still prohibited from using the Tobruk air field, but reconnaissance aircraft were occasionally allowed to operate there. On 3 August and 16 August, the RAF carried out air attacks on the German guns located along the coast, east of Tobruk. The RAF also improved their ability to obtain useful photographic reconnaissance of enemy positions near Tobruk. Tobruk was eventually provided a skilled photo interpreter.
When the commander of the 1st RHA received photographs of enemy positions in the south, west of the El Adem Road, he realized that they confirmed the findings of aggressive infantry patrols. He wrote Brigadier Thompson, the fortress artillery commander, and mentioned that the reconnaissance by deep infantry patrols were confirmed by the photographs. He said that they needed to recognize the importance of the deep patrols. Since air reconnaissance had been so lacking, the deep patrols had been very successfully in obtaining the needed information that had been absent. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

The Tobruk harbor, shelling and air raids

Tobruk harbor was shelled starting on 22 August 1941 and lasted for two days. The first rounds were fired by a battery of German 105mm guns. They fired at long range (about 20,000 yards). More rounds were fired by some 155mm guns similar to what the Australians had previously called "Bardia Bill". They fired from east of the fortress. The British artillery replied with their very efficient counter-battery fire. That stopped the incoming fire on the harbor and fortress until 27 August. On that day, the harbor received about 60 rounds, that in the face of heavy counter-battery fire. In the afternoon on the 27th, the harbor was hit by an air attack. The attackers were some forty bombers and three fighters. They hit not only the harbor but the heavy anti-aircraft gun sites. One casualty of the attack was the whaler Skudd 3 which was sunk. The attacking aircraft had three planes shot down, six more heavily damaged, and many more with some damage.
Late August 1941 and into September included many more air attacks. The attacks were increasingly focused on hitting the anti-aircraft gun sites. The Ju-87 dive bombers (known as Stukas). The attack on 27 August included 35 Stukas. During August 1941, the air defenses at Tobruk fired on about 600 aircraft. 1 September saw a very heavy raid directed at the air defenses. The attackers had some 140 aircraft and the attack lasted about 15 minutes. Two heavy anti-aircraft guns were bombed by 30 Stukas. Level bombers attacked a third gun and dropped about fifty bombs on the site. Field guns were also attacked by another fifteen Stukas. Base areas were attacked by more high-level bombers. The forward defenses on the perimeter were also bombed by high-level bombers. Some of the bombs even hit German or Italian positions. The infantry fired (probably ineffectively) large amounts of small arms and machine gun rounds. Many of the heavy anti-aircraft guns were 3.7in guns, the most modern British heavy anti-aircraft gun. Those guns fired 1,006 rounds in the raid on 1 September. There were a few 102mm guns which fired 111 rounds. The light guns also saw action. The 40mm Bofors guns fired about 1,200 rounds. The 20mm Oerlikon guns fired some 3,000 rounds during the attack. Casualties included one gunner killed and six wounded. Five of the heavy guns were out of action for about four hours after the attack. They believed that they had shot down as many as four enemy aircraft, although they only saw one actually crash. An indication that the defensive fire was pretty effective was that the enemy did not use any more Stukas against Tobruk for the rest of September 1941. This description is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.