Early on 11 October 1941, Tobruk artillery fired on the outpost Plonk that had been occupied by enemy troops. The Australians could hear "yelling and screaming" after the artillery fire on Plonk. They heard tools tossed into trucks and then the trucks drove off. Again, at 6am, Tobruk artillery fired on Plonk. A patrol investigated Plonk after that and saw men walking about the area. They drew more artillery and machine gun fire. About this time, the enemy artillery fired on the 2/17th Battalion defenses, as was usually the case. Right before 8am, the Australians observed more men at Plonk and fired on them. The enemy responded with more artillery fire on the Australians. Between haze and dust, the Australians could no longer see Plonk.
Between 8:30am and 9am, increasing numbers of tanks were seen near the 2/17th Battalion. The battalion positions were machine-gunned. They were not used to having so much activity near them. They found that the enemy troops had moved back into the Tugun outpost. The Australians were concerned that the enemy might make a major attack on the 2/17th Battalion front. A practice attack near Carmusa by 2/15th Battalion soldiers and tanks from the 32nd Army Tank Brigade was cancelled due to the enemy activity. All of the 20th Brigade was kept at the ready, rather than proceeding with training. By 9:45am, they saw twelve enemy tanks "hull-down" near Plonk. Despite the activity, no attack was launched by the enemy.
By the next night, the 11-12 October 1941, General Morshead ordered the 20th Brigade to attack and retaked Plonk. They would no use Plonk but would create a new outpost to be called Cooma. The plan was to keep the enemy from advancing their line towards the Australians. The infantry directly involved would be from the 2/17th Battalion with support from the 4th RTR in the form of one squadron. The 2/17th Battalion would have one company of the 2/13th Battalion in reserve. The attack would have the 107th RHA firing a bombardment to soften up the enemy. If possible, the 1st RHA would fire smoke in the area of the enemy minefield.
Two platoons from the 2/17th Battalion made the attack. They expected to see tanks coming up in support, but the plan for the tanks was to move at 5 mph with a mile between tanks. That meant that they were not immediately available. At the time of the infantry attack, the tanks were just at the perimeter wire. The enemy artillery fire was so heavy, that two other Australian battalions, the 2/23rd and 2/24th were readied for use. The attacking platoons would then attack without the tanks. After some fits and starts, the new plan was to attack at 12:15am. The artillery would fire in support, again. The tanks that were still running would join in the attack. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.
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