The next phase: the move to Crete

As we have mentioned, some 50,000 troops were evacuated from Greece in late April 1941 as the situation there collapsed. We believe that the collapse in Greece has hastened by the nature of the staff work done by Group W, under the command of General Wilson. General Freyberg, commander of the New Zealand Division (later called the 2nd New Zealand Division) ended up as senior officer present in southern Greece as the Germans pushed deeper to the south. The troops consisted of the New Zealand Division, the 6th Australian Division and the 1st Armoured Brigade, or the remnants thereof. Most of the troops were removed by cruiser and destroyers (it seems), although some were removed by transport. The original plan was to have the transports embark the troops, in part from quays or using landing craft from the beaches. As the pace of the collapse quickened, the last troops were removed mostly by warship. Since cruisers could take larger numbers, they played a key role. From Greece, some were lucky enough to arrive in Egypt, but most were dumped at Suda Bay without anything but the clothes that they wore and with what small arms that they had carried out of Greece. Since Crete was the logical next German target, something had to be done. There were about 42,000 British and Commonwealth troops on the island of Crete. A British officer had been told that he was in charge of Crete, but General Wavell replaced him with General Freyberg, newly arrived from Greece with about 7,700 men from the New Zealand Division (two brigades). The third New Zealand brigade had ended up being sent to Egypt. The next part of the story will deal with preparations to defend Crete, the actual German attack, and the unfolding story of the battle for Crete. The fall of Crete ended up being messier than even that of Greece and left the Allied position in the Mediterranean Sea in an even more precarious state by the summer of 1941. The result was that General Wavell was sacked by Mr. Churchill and a new set of commanders was put in charge. Sadly, the results were little better.

The Greek Campaign: was it necessary?

A claim was made that Great Britain was obligated by treaty to defend Greece against a German attack. Certainly, Anthony Eden, Churchill's foreign minister took that obligation seriously. He apparently convinced the prime minister of the necessity to put troops into Greece. General Metaxas, the Greek dictator thought that the British expedition would be a strategic blunder, which it turned out to be. General Metaxas died suddenly, so he was not able to influence the decision. The Australian government and senior commanders were opposed to the operation. The decision to go into Greece had grave consequences. First, an approximately 50,000 man force was expended. They withdrew most of the men from Greece, many going to the island of Crete. Crete was soon invaded and there were further losses. The most damage was done to the navy. From April 1941 until late June, there were heavy losses in cruisers and destroyers. These losses came at a time when they were very damaging. This was at a point when Churchill wanted to run the Tiger Convoy to Egypt with tanks. There was an escalating need to keep Malta supplied, and convoys run through the Mediterranean were still more efficient than running then around the Cape of Good Hope. So yes, the campaign in Greece was a mistake. The mistake was compounded by putting General Wilson and his staff in charge, as neither was up to the task they were given. The operation could have been better executed if as requested, the Australians had been given control with General Blamey in charge.

More about HMAS Perth

As we have seen, the Captain of HMAS Perth was responsible for not approaching Kalamata when some 6,000 troops could have been embarked. He commanded a group consisting of two cruisers and six destroyers. This was in late April 1941. The Perth had only been in Australian hands since the summer of 1939. The Perth had been HMS Amphion, which as a modified Leander class cruiser with 8-6in guns. Almost immediately after being commissioned as an Australian ship, there was a mutiny of some sixty sailors. As these things go, a seemingly small issue blew up into a confrontation. New York police even gathered on the pier in preparation to intervene. In the even, the captain at the time, Harold Farncomb, was able to defuse the situation. The Perth was to go to Australia, but the start of the war delayed that trip until early 1940. The Perth was employed as a convoyer until late 1940 when she was dispatched to the Mediterranean to replace HMAS Sydney, a sister-ship. By April 1941, the Perth was commanded by Captain Bowyer-Smith. He showed unusual lack of initiative or perhaps even courage and did not go into Kalamata when there was the one opportunity to embark the troops and save them from German prisoner-of-war camps. Admiral Cunningham and Vice-Admiral Pridham-Wippel tried to salvage the situation, but the navy was only able to retrieve less than 1000 troops. This is based on widely available information about the Perth and the situation at Kalamata in late April 1941.

The navy still tried to get troops from Kalamata after 28-29 April 1941

The great Admiral Cunningham ordered Vice-Admiral Pridham-Wippell to pick up troops who might be on the coast south of Kalamata after the night of 28 to 29 April 1941. The destroyers succeeded in picking up over 900 men the next two nights, including 700 from the island of Milos. There was one Australian hospital left in Greece. The Germans took the hospital on 27 April, but let them continue to provide care. They ultimately started to take equipment and rations, however. On 7 May, the hospital was moved on German orders to Kokkinia. Through May, the Germans kept the hospital in operation and allowed men to join as well as new patients. The hospital continued to function and treated wounded from Crete through May. The operation began to wind down by the fall and the unit was ultimately moved to Germany in December. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

Australiians had recaptured the quay at Kalamata late on 28 April 1941

There were so few weapons left at Kalamata late on 28 April 1941, only 70 Australians attached the Germans on the quay and took two field guns and captured 100 men. At this point, the ships that were close by could have come in and loaded up with troops. The navy inexplicably did not follow up with their usual initiative and bravery. The ships close by were commanded by an Australian captain, and he chose to sail off at 28 knots rather than make the attempt to get more troops off the quay or beach at Kalamata. The destroyer Hero and three K class destroyers came in and took off wounded and 300 other troops. The assessment of the author of the Australian official history is that the ships could have taken off most of the troops who were left at Kalamata if they had stayed close while the small German force was captured. This is based on the account in the Australian Official History.

More about the loss of the SS Slamat on 27 April 1941

A new ship named HMS Diamond was commissioned 70 years to the day after the destroyer Diamond was sunk during the withdrawal from Greece on 27 April 1941. The day was solemn for the Dutch, because a Royal Rotterdam Lloyd ship, the SS Slamat was also sunk on that day. The Slamat was employed as a troop ship and had embarked men from the beach in Greece during Operation Demon. The Slamat was caught some 60 miles north of Crete by Ju-88 and possibly Me-110 aircraft and was bombed and sunk. The destroyers Diamond and Wryneck rescued at least 700 men from the Slamat, but were eventually bombed and sunk as well. The total loss was 983 men killed from the three ships and embarked troops. The captain of the Slamat, Tjalling Luidinga, was killed during the attack. This is based on information from a Royal Navy webpage.

The situation nears collapse in Greece on 28 to 29 April 1941

The plan for the night of 28 to 29 April 1941 was to send a cruiser and four destroyers to pick up the New Zealand brigade at Monemvasia. They also planned to send two cruisers and six destroyers to take off the troops at Kalamata. Thres sloops were sent to Kithera to take off about 800 men who had gotten their by caique and landing craft. The men on Kithera were in fact taken off by Sloop and were taken to Suda Bay in Crete. As we have seen, the operation at Monemvasia was successfully executed, taking off the brigade and General Freyberg. The operation at Kalamata was broken up by advancing German troops who overran the 4th Hussars defending the perimeter. the two cruisers and the destroyers were approaching Kalamata for the withdrawal. Some men could have been withdrawn from the beach, but the captain of the Perth had understood that it was not possible, and withdrew, we now know, prematurely. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The game was up at Kalamata on 28 April 1941

After the night of 27 to 28 April 1941 and with no ships arriving to embark troops, they had run out of time. The delay in withdrawal was fatal, because that gave the Germans time to penetrate the British and Commonwealth positions in deep south Greece. A German column drove into Kalamata during the next night, 28 to 29 April. There was a a mixed group of troops in Kalamata. They included some New Zealanders, including Sergeant Jack Hinton. The Germans had set up two 15cm guns and had howitzers and several armoured cars. Someone ordered the men on the beach to take cover, but Jack Hinton charged the German guns with other New Zealanders and killed or drove off the gun crews. They had retreated to nearby houses. Jack Hinton smashed into a house and they bayoneted the occupants. They did the same at a second house. By now, a large German force had arrived at Kalamata and Jack Hinton was wounded in the abdomen and taken prisoner. He received a Victoria Cross for his actions that day. With the threat of bombing of the troops on the beach, a British officer surrendered the troops to the Germans. This is based on the account at ww2today.com.

The situation worsens over 27 and 28 April 1941

At the Argos beaches and at Kalamata there were men gathered in anticipation of being picked up by destroyers. There were 2,000 at the Argos beaches and the numbers were growing with the arrival of stragglers. There were a large number, some 8,000 troops, at Kalamata. Many of these were not British or Commonwealth troops, but were Cypriot, Greek, Middle Eastern base troops. There were even 300 of the 4th Hussars. Over the night of 27th and 28th April, there were no ships. There was still one New Zealand brigade left in Greece at Monemvasia. They were armed, but without artillery. The plan was to embark the brigade on the night of 28-29 April on warships. The cruiser Ajax and four destroyers embarked the brigade that night and brought off the troops, including General Freyberg. They also hoped to send two cruisers to Kalamata as well. The deep penetration of the Germans into the Pelopoppenese greatly complicated the situation. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

More news from Greece in late April 1941

On the night of 27 and 28 April 1941, no troops were embarked from the beaches in the Peloponnese. At this point, the transports, cruisers and destroyers were already at Alexandria. Fortunately, General Freyberg was still present and in command. The 6th New Zealand Brigade wsa at Miloi and Tripolis. General Freyberg ordered the brigade commander to wait until nightfall and then move quickly to Monemaasia. The 26th Battalion moved early and then the rest traveled at night. The next day, they moved to the defensive position at Monemvasia. Multiple plans were moving forward. The troops were told to collect caiques, in case they were needed for transportation out of Greece. At Navplion and Tolos, there were more troops, about 2,000, many without food. More stragglers were arriving, as the men knew that those ports had been places where men had been taken aboard ships. There was the problem of German aircraft strafing and bombing during the day. A rearguard that included 200 men from the 3rd RTR was organized. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The Armoured Brigade on 27 April 1941

On 27 April 1941, there were the armoured brigade commander and about 800 men still holding out at Rafina. This was the remnants of an elite group of men. They were pure infantry at this point, because they had destroyed their guns, perhaps prematurely. The men that remained were from the Rangers, the anti-tank artillerymen, and the New Zealand Divisional Cavalry. Early on 27 April, German aircraft had flown over, but had not seen the men. Some of the anti-tank gunners took a caique in the harbour that might take 250 men. The rest were sent to Porto Rafti, where there was an embarkation planned for that night. Fortunately, at the last minute, the destroyer Havock approached Rafina from Porto Rafti and embarked the 800 men. By 4am on 28 April, the Havock had sailed for Crete. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The British army and navy in 1941

I don't understand the reasons, but in 1941, the British Royal Navy was an extremely proficient and professional service, while the British army had serious problems. There are many potential explanations. There was the friction between the regular British army and the British Indian Army. Many of the commanders in 1940 to 1941 were Indian army trained. There was also the obtuse influence of the mechanization clique in the British army. They thought that they were trying to modernize the army, but they didn't understand how tanks and armoured cars were best employed. The German army had a good understanding and doctrine and they beat everyone in their path up through the end of 1941, although Russia was proving to be too much for them. The Australian and New Zealander commanders and men were much better prepared for war than the British. On the other hand, the British forces in North Africa in 1940 to early 1941 were trained to a very good state and were well led. Their reward was to be dismantled by General Wavell.

I have never liked Bernard Law Montgomery, but I have come to appreciate what he accomplished. He took the British and Commonwealth forces in the Mediterranean theater and reformed them into a force that could win battles. He really did not have time to make the transformation prior to the Second Alamein, so they had a much harder time than a Montgomery army would have in 1943 or 1944.

The cruisers were workhorses

Eight cruisers with eight six-inch guns had been built in the early to mid-1930's. There were the five Leander class ships (Achilles, Ajax, Leander, Neptune, and Orion, and the three Amphion class ships, all sold to Australia as the Hobart, Perth, and Sydney. The Neptune was the only ship of the first group lost, but two of the three ships transferred to Australia were lost. The Hobart was the sole survivor. All of the ships had a designed speed of 32.5 knots. The Achilles and Ajax were best known for their part in the Battle of the River Plate in 1939.

As we saw, the Leander class cruiser Ajax evacuated some 2,500 troops from Porto Rafti on 27 April 1941. The cruisers had sufficient space to carry several thousand men, when necessary. Orion and Perth both embarked troops from Tolos on the night of 26-27 April. Earlier that night, the two cruisers and loaded men at Navplion. Great risks were taken, as the ships only sailed at 4am, which was dangerously close to dawn. Earlier, the Perth had helped bring Australian reinforcements to Greece.

Vice-Admiral Pridham Wippell had been a cruiser squadron commander in March 1941. His ships included the Orion, Ajax, and Perth, along with the larger cruiser Gloucester. His squadron fought in the Battle of Cape Matapan on 28 March 1941, not that long before the withdrawal (just about a month). Of the ships, three were lost in the war. The Neptune was lost in the Mediterranean Sea in late 1941. The Sydney was lost in the Indian Ocean fighting the German auxiliary cruiser Cormorant. The Perth was involved in the Southwest Pacific, fighting the Japanese, where she survived the Battle of the Java Sea, but was sunk at the Battle of the Sunda Strait.

A D-Day post

This is a deviation from our current thread, in honor of the men who invaded France on 6 June 1944. In 1997, I saw a History Channel documentary/dramatization of D-Day and the immediate days following. Lord Lovat was prominently featured in the movie. Simon Fraser, Lord Lovat, was a prominent commando leader in World War Two, at least up to the Normandy Invasion. There is a good picture of him with some of the men of the 4th Commando at Newhaven, after the Dieppe Raid in August 1942. The commandos were a rough looking lot, but then what would you expect? Lord Lovat, of course, has the hero and natural leader look. At Dieppe, Lord Lovat was an acting Lieutenant-Colonel. The 4th Commando was to stage two landings about six miles west of Dieppe to neutralize a coastal artillery battery. The 4th Commando included fifty American Rangers, men of approximately the same caliber as the British commandos. Foreshadowing the Rangers at Normandy, the 4th Commando scaled the cliffs and destroyed the battery of six 15cm guns. Their success was the only good thing that happened in the Dieppe Raid. This is based on Wikipedia information which we believe to be largely correct.

The night of 26 to 27 April 1941

The night of 26 to 27 April 1941 was very important. On that night, approximately 19,000 troops boarded ships for withdrawal. As we saw, two of the transports were sunk by air attack. They were the Slamat and the Costa Rica. In addition, two destroyers were sunk. Still, a large fraction of the British and Commonwealth troops left in Greece were withdrawn. Too many troops were left in Greece, though. Near Athens, on the beaches, were the 4th New Zealand Brigade Group and part of the 1st Armoured Brigade. There were about 2,500 men at Argos, on the beaches. The 6th New Zealand Brigade Group was at Tripolis. There were some more units at Monemvasia, and there were still 8,000 at Kalamata. The next morning, by about 11am, the 4th Brigade was bombed, and ammunition was hit and exploded, destroying guns and killing gunners and infantrymen. The local Greek inhabitants still took the time to offer water and well wishes to the New Zealanders, as they moved through to their positions.By 3pm in the afternoon, a column of German light tanks and supporting vehicles moved into Markopoulon. As they left the town, they were hit by gunfire. By late on the 27th, the brigade destroyed vehicles and guns and then moved to the beaches at Porto Rafti. There, they were embarked by the cruiser Ajax and the destroyers Kimberley and Kingston. About 3,840 men were picked up by the ships. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The Kalamata convoy

On 27 April 1941, the ships carrying troops from Kalamata were under orders for Alexandria, rather than being anchored at Suda Bay. The situation meant that the ships were attacked from the air while they were under way, instead of being at anchor in the bay. When the troops realized that the ships were under attack, they quickly moved to the upper deck. They carried weapons that were mounted and fired at the aircraft. The guns included Vickers machine guns, Bren guns, Hotchkiss machine guns, and anti-tank rifles. During the morning, there were multiple attacks, but there were no hits on the ships. In return, there were seven German aircraft shot down. In the afternoon, an aircraft caught the Costa Rica, a transport, by surprise, and dropped a bomb that disabled the machinery. The Costa Rics, a Dutch ship, started taking on water and slowly listed. Destroyers came alongside and took off the troops. Right before the ship sank, the Dutch crew and the remaining soldiers were able to jump to the destroyer Hero. The crew and troops on the transport Slamat were not so lucky. When the Slamat was bombed and sunk, almost the entire crew and passengers were lost. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

Some troops are embarked at Kalamata on 26 April 1941

The plan was for the troops to destroy their "kits" before going aboard ship. The evening of 26 April 1941, they proceeded to do that at Kalamata. By 10pm, the men could see several ships approaching. Two destroyers came alongside the quay and the troops boarded. Some Middle Eastern pioneers tried to rush the ship, but were turned back. By 2:45am on 27 April, the commanders heard that no more ships would be arriving that day. The plan was to send in more destroyers on the night of 27-28 April. Brigadiers Savige and Allen had boarded the last destroyer, thinking that all their men had been embarked, but, in fact, some were left behind. Still, an amazing 8,000 men had been embarked on the night of 26-27 April, the most up to that date. The ships loaded with troops had gone to Suda Bay, in the northwest corner of Crete. Vice-Admiral Pridham-Wippell was concerned about having so many troop-laden ships anchored in the bay, and sent a large force, escorted by cruisers, to Alexandria. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

At Kalamata on 26 to 27 April 1941

A considerable number of troops had gathered at Kalmata on the night of 26 to 27 April 1941. We don't know the exact numbers, but there were somewhere between 18,000 to 20,000 troops there. That number probably included doctors, nurses, and patients. The number included Allen Group, consisting of 16th and 17th Australian Brigades, along with some corps troops. There were also some Yugoslav Allied sympathizers in the group. There were a few of the 4th Hussara and a New Zealand reinforcement unit. Allen was thinking about the coming fight, and he advocated embarking fighting men first. Brigadier Parrington, in charge of the embarkation at Kalamata, divided the troops into four groups. The troops would move to a designated beach or quay and be embarked by a ship. The Australians wanted to leave Greece as disciplined units. There were forces at work that would make that very difficult to achieve. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

HMAS Stuart

The Australian destroyer HMAS Stuart that distinguished herself in the evacuation of troops from Greece at Tolos was actually built as a destroyer leader in the Great War. The Stuart was one of the destroyers transferred to Australia by the British to replace older ships. While we don't have a photograph from 1941 in the Mediterranean, we still can get a feel for what the ship looked like.

The Stuart was a larger ship than the V and W class destroyers also built in the Great War. She was better able to carry troops then the smaller ships. Her captain showed exceptional leadership in operating at Tolos under trying conditions and still managing to evacuate a significant number of soldiers from the beach. Sadly, the entire withdrawal from Greece was badly managed by the British staff, under the command of General Wilson, that it was only due to the initiative and energy shown by more junior officers and men that as many men were withdrawn as there were. The Royal Navy and RAN greatly distinguished themselves during April to June 1941 under very dangerous conditions.

Problems at Tolos and Navpliion on 26-27 April 1941

The Australian destroyer Stuart had been sent to Tolos to take men off the beach, if possible. Starting late in the evening of 26 April 1941, a landing craft was approaching the beach to pick up men. A sandbar was a major impediment to taking off men. The landing craft would go in and men would wade out. The landing craft carried them out to the Stuart. When the Stuart could hold no more men, the ship took them to the cruiser Orion and then returned to Tolos. They asked for help from a cruiser, so the Perth was sent. By 4am on 27 April, they had took off 2,000 men, but 1,300 men were left on the beach.

At Navplion is where the transport Ulster Prince was bombed and burnt. The burned out Ulster Prince blocked the quay so that destroyers could not use it to pick up men. The seas were too rough for small boats, so they were fortunate to embark as many as 2,600 men. They were forced to leave 1,700 men still ashore. They were too late leaving Navplion so the Slomat was bombed and sunk by German aircraft. The two destroyers present tried to rescue men, but they were eventually sunk, as well. They went ahead and sent 700 men to Tolos, in hopes of taking them off the next night. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

Navplion on 26-27 April 1941

The fast transport Glenearn had been intended for use in embarking troops at Navplion. After the Glenearn was disabled, the plans had to be radically recast.

This picture shows Glenearn later in the war after she had her anti-aircraft armament greatly increased. After the Glenearn was disabled, Vice-Admiral Pridham-Wipple reacted decisively.

He took two precious cruisers in to embark soldiers. They were the British cruiser Orion and the Australian cruiser Perth.

Another of the warships, HMAS Stuart was sent to Tolos to take off as many men as possible. The cruisers, along with destroyers and transports worked to embark the men. At Navplion, one transport, the Uster Prince was bombed and burned. The ship was a total loss and obstructed the quay. Two of the destroyers which had taken risks to embark men were themselves bombed and sunk. They were the Wryneck and Diamond. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

HMS Ulster Prince-lost at Navplion

Plans are forced to change

The plan had been to embark troops at three ports on the night of 26-27 April 1941. These were to have been from the beaches at Athens and Argos, and from Kalamata. The artillery group were at Porto Rafti, while the remnants of the armoured brigade were at Rafina. At Porto Rafti, they only had one landing craft, and it needed to retrieve men left at Kea Island. Once Brigadier Miles realized the problem they faced, he sent part of his men to Rafina. The tragedy was when the Glengyle sailed in the night, there were still many men left on the beaches. While events played out, they learned that the whole 4th New Zealand Brigade would have to be embarked from the Marathon beaches on the night of 27-28 April. They had hoped to use the Glenearn at Navplion, but the ship had been bombed and damaged. Vice-Admiral Pridham-Wippell took big risks to get the men embarked at Navplion. He took the cruisers Orion and Perth to Navplion. There was another cruiser and four destroyers and two transports already there. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

Events in the north on 26 April 1941

A detachment of the 1st Armoured Brigade was with an artillery detachment at Rafina. They had orders to embark during the night of 26/27 April 1941. The armoured brigade detachment was at Tatoi. They had heard of Germans in Athens, although that was premature. In response, a small unit from the Rangers was sent out to block roads from Athens. The Rangers and the New Zealand Divisional Cavalry moved to Rafina, where they were joined by the detachment of Rangers from the rearguard.

The 4th New Zealand Brigade was at Ethrai, where they tried to remain inconspicuous. By 11am, they could see an German column approaching from Thebes. The Australian artillery succeeded in dispersing the advancing Germans. They were attacked by German aircraft at midday, and started to receive incoming artillery fire since they had revealed their positions. After they heard of the German paratroop attack at Corinth, they embarked on vehicles and headed for Porto Rafti. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The airborne attack at the Corinth canal

The Corinth canal area had come under increasingly intense air attacks from at least 25 April 1941. The airborne attack by paratroops and gliders had started early on 26 April. The paratroops quickly overcame the defending Australians, although the engineers were able to blow the bridge over the canal. Some nearby New Zealand troops were also captured, after being overcome. There had been troops left at Megara, but about 500 men were attacked by German paratroops, as they neared Corinth. The commanders were slow to learn of the attack at the Corinth canal. After they realized what had happened, they organized defenses to gain time for troops to withdraw. There were still troops to the northwest of Athens. The rest were to the south. General Wilson planned to withdraw and leave General Freyberg in command of the remaining troops. We already know that the troops at Kalamata came to a bad end as prisoners. They mostly were not fighting troops. The British had pulled out and left the Australians and New Zealanders to fend for themselves. If the troops still left were lost, the two countries would have to endure great losses in men and women. On 26 April, the 4th New Zealand Brigade was at Ethrai, trying to stay under cover. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The 19th Australian Brigade embarked

As the evacuation became increasingly disorganized and out of control, the 19th Australian Brigade was withdrawn from Megara. The men carried their small arms only. They were embarked on the transport Thurland Castle, the anti-aircraft cruiser Conventry, and five destroyers. Of an additional 2,000 on a nearby beach, only 1,500 were picked up. Many of those left were from Australian and British hospitals. Others were transported to Marathon, hoping to be embarked on another night. The Thurland Castle arrived at Crete, although the ship was attacked by dive-bombers en route. The stragglers tried to join Allen's battle group, as it was the largest force left in the south. Allen received orders to move to Kalamata. They arrived there on 26 April. Early on 26 April, waves of bombers attacked the Corinth bridge area and were knocking out the anti-aircraft guns. About 7:15am, German paratroops landed and captured the bridge. The engineers were able to fire the charges that had been planted and destroyed the bridge. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The outlook on the night of 25-26 April 1941 in Greece

During the night of 25-26 April 1941, General Wilson moved his headquarters from Athens to Miloi. He crossed the Corinth bridge shortly before dawn. At this point, all the troops except rearguards were south of the Corinth bridge. Two brigades had already been embarked, along with about 7,000 base troops. Those north of the Corinth bridge included the 4th New Zealand Brigade, a rearguard of 1st Armoured Brigade troops, along with a few other detachments. The Corinth bridge crossed the canal that had been cut through the isthmus that connected the mainland with the Peloponnese. The commanders were concerned that German paratroops might try and take Corinth, so there was a scratch force assembled in defence. There were a diverse group of carriers and some of the 4th Hussars. There were also some infantry and engineers. The engineers had alreay prepared to blow the Corinth bridge, when that became necessary. They hoped to embark the 19th Australian Brigade from Megara that night. During the changes and indecision in General Wilson's staff, they decided at the last minute that half the brigade should head for the Marathon beaches. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The New Zealand Division in late April 1941

The New Zealand Division was withdrawn from Greece in late April 1941. The division commander, the famous General Bernard Freyberg was instrumental in supervising the withdrawal of many of the troops from Greece. The division was split during the withdrawal. The 4th and 5th New Zealand Brigades were withdrawn to the island of Crete between 24 and 27 April 1941. The 6th Brigade was withdrawn to Egypt on 28 and 29 April. On 31 April, General Freyberg was appointed to command the force on Crete, dubbed "Creforce". About 1,850 New Zealanders were left behind and were taken prisoner by the Germans. Some of the personnel taken were sick and wounded, along with staff from the 1st NZ General Hospital. There were six New Zealand medical officers and 92 orderlies. The hospital had been ignored by General Wilson's staff during the withdrawal and were "put in the bag". Given the disorganization experienced in the last few days, as Wilson's staff were overwhelmed by the enormity of the situation, the capture of the hospital is not surprising. General Wilson and his staff were put in the position of having to perform above their level of experience. The Commonwealth officers and staff were much more experienced, even if from the Great War, and could have done a more creditable job.

Withdrawal plans changed: 25 April 1941

The force that General Wilson commanded in Greece was called "W Group", W presumably standing for Wilson. By 25 April 1941, the evacuation plan had changed. Now, they would try to hold off the German advance while embarking from more southern beaches. They had hoped to have all troops withdrawn by 27 April, but it was not to happen. New rear guards were mounted to buy time for more troops to withdraw. Brigadier Charring, commander of the 1st Armoured Brigade, was to try and hold eastern Attica, to protect the Athens beaches from the north. They were then to move to Rafina for embarkation on the night of 26-27 April. They also hoped to withdraw some 8,000 troops from Kalamata the same night. Now, they hoped to withdraw the New Zealand troops from far southern beaches on the nights of 28/29 and 29/30 April. General Freyberg was designated as the commander in the Peloponnese. The plan was now to withdraw the 19th Brigade from Megara on the night of 25/26 April. Wilson's staff then doubted that all the men could be embarked at Megara, so they were to send half to the beaches at Marathon. It seemed that the situation was starting to be more than Wilson's staff could handle. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

Things start to go wrong: the night of 24-25 April 1941

An unplanned 7,000-8,000 men had gathered at Navplion, where the plan had only envisioned 5,000 men. The transport Ulster Prince was wrecked at Navplion, late in the day. The ship ran aground when entering the harbour at the entrance. Despite that mishap, some 6,500 were embarked on ships. That night, nothing happened at Tolos. During the same time, at the Piraeus, there was a disaster. The yacht Hellas had embarked civilians and sick and wounded. The ship was bombed by German aircraft at about 7pm and the ship burned and capsized, killing the passengers. Somewhere between 500 and 742 were killed. At the same time, Allen's group headed towards Argos from Megara, hoping to be embsrked from there. As they were heading out, they were stopped and asked to provide a battalion as a guard against attack by German tanks. General Freyberg was still in Greece, and he heard of the plans and told them that Corinth had been bombed and the road was impassible. The original plan had been to have everyone embarked by the night of 26-27 April, but that had all been changed. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

Withdrawal from Kalamata on 26 April 1941

Tomorrow will be the 71st anniversary of the withdrawal of Australian troops from Kalamata in Greece. This picture shows Australian troops waiting for the embarkation at Kalamata. Some of the troops were from the 2/1st Field Regiment, which had fought well in the waning days of the Greek campaign. The withdrawal had started to go wrong about this time, as the next day, German troops had arrived in Athens. In a few days, by 30 April, some seven to eight thousand troops were captured in Kalamata by the Germans. By then, 43,311 troops had been evacuated, but the lack of coordinated command by the British had allowed the Germans to gain the upper hand and to overrun the defenders trying to hold them back to allow more to withdraw. The picture is from the Australian War Memorial. This is in part, based on the Official History and online sources.

The ships Calcutta and Glengyle at the Porto Rafti embarkation

The two ships that embarked troops from Porto Rafti in Greece were the cruiser Calcutta and the fast transport Glengyle. The Calcutta was near the end of her service life, while the Glengyle was a relatively new ship.

The British cruiser Calcutta was a World War I veteran that had been converted into an anti-aircraft cruiser in 1939. The Calcutta was one of the C-class cruisers that had been built with a "trawler bow" to improve sea keeping during North Sea operations. Prior to embarking troops from the beach at Porto Rafti, the Calcutta had been assigned convoying duties to provide some protection against air attack at a time when there was inadequate fighter strength in the Mediterranean Sea. The Calcutta became a victim of the increasing German air presence in the Mediterranean Sea and was sunk on 1 June 1941 by Ju-88 dive bombers at the end of the battle for the island of Crete. The picture is at least of one of the converted cruisers of the same class (Cairo, Carlisle, Calcutta).

The Glengyle was one of a group of four fast cargo ships (18 knots) that quickly became favorites of Winston Churchill. The Glengyle was fitted to be able to carry early British landing craft and had been involved in a raid on Bardia a few days before the embarkation of Australian and New Zealand troops from Porto Rafti in Greece.

Preparing to leave Greece

The plan for leaving Greece involved three large embarkations of "British" troops. The majority of the troops were actually from either Australia or New Zealand. The first group to leave were the 5th New Zealand Brigade Group, with other units. They were picked up from Porto Rafti. Major Sheppard, in charge of a team of Australian officers, directed the embarkation. Major Sheppard was the 6th Australian Division's legal officer. The troops were loaded by 2am, with about 5,000 men on the amphibious transport Glengyle and 700 men on the old cruiser Calcutta. The other evacuations ran into problems. The cause was partly because the groups of men were not in a large, organized unit. The Australians supervised the Tolos Bay embarkation while a British staff supervised at Navplion. Another issue at Navplion was that there were many more men than had been expected. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

A successful defence at Thermopylae

The April-May 1641 timeframe saw determined infantry backed by artillery able to defeat German tank tanks. One of these was at Tobruk on 11 April 1941. Another was the defence of Thermopylae. The third was again at Tobruk on 1 May. The Germans considered that 12 of the tanks knocked out at Thermopylae were total losses. Many more were disabled but were repaired. The Germans were already masters at recovering and repairing knocked out tanks. The British had yet to learn the skill. German records show the attack against the New Zealanders was made by 18 tanks, including four Pzkw IV's armed with short 75mm guns. The tanks were crewed by 70 men, of whom 7 were killed and 22 wounded. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History."

Withdrawal from Skamnos and Brallos-24 April 1941

On 24 April 1941, the Australian battalions defending such places as Skamnos, Brallos, and Gravia were being hard pressed by the Germans and Brigadier Vasey, 19th Brigade commander, realized that they would have to withdraw. The 2/2nd Field Regiment preserved their guns, rather than destroy them, and had tried to save some rounds before they moved south. They left the battle at about 8:30pm on the 24th, heading down the road. The engineer company made a road for the guns to use in their withdrawal and then destroyed it after they passed. Fortunately, the pressure had eased, somewhat, on the rearguard. There remained one more rearguard at Erithrai, the King's 2/5th Battalion. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

The Greek reception for the troops in Athens

When the troops arrived in Athens, the had the marks of a twelve hour battle and a 160 mile trip through the night. On 25 April 1941, a long column of trucks and carriers, filled with troops from Brigadier Barrowclough's 6th New Zealand Brigade. The people greeted them and threw them flowers. Men and girls climbed up on the running boards to shake their hands. The quote, which is representative of what the men heard, is "Come back--you must come back again--Good luck--Good luck".

Back in the hills, on the left, the 19th Australian Brigade had been under German attack. The guns had been attacked from the air on April 23rd. The guns were moved at night further to the rear, but left the previous emplacements looking as if they were still occupied. Sure enough, on 24 April, 65 Stukas hit the positions that they had vacated. The men could see German tanks on the move, wheeling to hit the New Zealanders. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official history.

The last battle and withdrawal on 24-25 April 1941 in Greece

Brigadier Miles, a New Zealander and regular army officer, commanded the artillery defending the troops near Thermopylae. Firing up the road succeeded in stopping any tank attacks for the moment. There was a danger of being flanked, however. General Freyberg was on the spot commanding the troops. When it seemed that the ammunition trucks would not be available, he had Brigadier Miles carry troops on the artillery vehicles. The remainder would have to march. The battle continued, but by 9:15pm, the trucks had arrived to carry the troops. The artillery pieces were destroyed at that point. By midnight, the column was headed south and would pass through Athens. Brigadier Miles had been sent ahead, but General Wilson's staff had just left when he arrived. He had to find a route through Athens without any help. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The Molos bottleneck defense

Three battalions were positioned to defend the Molos bottleneck. The 24th Battalion was positioned on the right. The left was defended by the 25th Battalion, with the 26th Battalion being held in reserve. The three battalions were well-supported by artillery. The most obvious place for a tank attack would be across the dried marshes. These were covered by field guns. The road would be easy to cover. The artillery included one medium regiment, four field regiments, two anti-tank regiments, and a light AA battery. The battle started in the afternoon on 24 April 1941. Some German tanks started across the marsh. They were quickly knocked out by field guns and for now, no more tanks attempted the crossing. At 3pm, the main attack up the road began with tanks and infantry. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

The situation in Greece deteriorates from 24 April 1941

The lack of experience of General Wilson's staff continued to play a factor. They were going to send commanders from Greece before their units, as an example of what they were doing wrong. Fortunately, the Australians were able to improvise, as they were forced to do, so that the situation didn't immediately descend into chaos and disaster. Brigadier Allen was essentially functioning as divisional commander for seven battalions of infantry. Fortunately, the able Brigadier Savige was also present, along with a small core of Australian staff officers. They were able to rely upon a cadre of Lt-Colonels to help organize the withdrawal to the beaches and especially the defensive arrangements to keep the German from overrunning the withdrawing troops. By 24 April 1941, the Greek army had surrendered and King George were flown to Crete in a flying boat. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

24 April 1941

On 24 April 1941, General Wilson's staff tried to order General Freyberg to withdraw. You have to think that the staff, and possibly General Wilson, were living in some fantasy world. For one thing, it would have made sense to leave the ANZAC Corps in command of operations and let them control the withdrawal to the beaches. Instead, they sent General Blamey off to Egypt where he was out of the picture. General Freyberg let the staff know that he was involved in a battle with German tanks and he intended to stay and command the New Zealand Division. After that, General Freyberg was free to control the New Zealand Division operations. On 24 April,, the plan was to embark as follows:

Date       Athens             Megara     Navplion       Tolos        Kalamata
4/24-4/25  5th NZ Br.                    Corps troops
                                         RAF personnel
4/25-4/26  19th Brigade
           Part 1st Ar.Br.

4/26-4/27  6th NZ Br.         4th NZ Br. Base details   Base details 16th Br.
           Part 1st Ar.Br.               3rd RTR                     17th Br.
                                         4th Hussars                 4000 Base

This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History. We can see that General Wilson and his staff were not really up to the task that they had to perform, as it this stage they were making greater mistakes.

General Blamey was appointed deputy Commander in Chief in the Middle East when he arrived from Greece. The Official History rehashes the situation in early 1941 when General Blamey thought that he should command in Greece, since the force was largely Australian. This was relevant due to the fact that Blamey had been suggested as commander of what became the Eight Army, but was still called the Western Desert force. The Australian Prime Minister had consulted with the CIGS, General Dill, who concurred that General Blamey should become Wavell's deputy. That put General Blamey over General Wilson in the new setup. After shutting down ANZAC Corps, General Wilson had assumed direct control of the withdrawal from Greece. Only on 24 April 1941 did Generals Freyberg and Mackey hear that their troops would embark that night. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

Planning for withdrawal from Greece from 23 April 1941

Members of General Blamey's staff arrived in Athens early on 23 April 1941. They searched for a contact with General Wilson's staff to make arrangements for the withdrawal from Greece. The Australians were to provide beach parties at three beaches. Arrangements were made to establish communications with the units involved. During the night of 23/24 April, the 16th and 17th Brigades were able to move to Megara in preparation for the move to the beaches. After issuing orders for the withdrawal in the evening on 23 April, the ANZAC corps was dissolved. General Blamey reported to General Wilson informed them that withdrawal from beaches near Athens could not be done and that the plans had changed. General Blamey was to be flown to Alexandria to meet with Admiral Cunningham on the 24th. General Blamey returned to Mandra before his withdrawal and informed the officers of the changed situation. From the Australian staff, they could not understand why ANZAC corps had been disbanded, because they could have provided more control over the withdrawal. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

April 22 to 24 1941 in Greece

German air attacks on 22 and 23 April 1941 forced the remaining Hurricanes to withdraw to the island of Crete. The attacks on 22 April in the Athens area caused the Hurricanes to fly to Argos. More attacks on 23 April caught 13 Hurricanes on the ground and destroyed them. It was after this incident that Air Vice-Marshal d'Albiac ordered the withdrawal to Crete. It was about this time that Lt-Colonel King, the 2/5 Battalion commander, was ordered by General Mackay to take a column of all arms through the night to Levadia to provide cover for the ongoing demolitions. The men drove all night with their lights on, knowing that the German aircraft were not likely to be operating at night. At this point, the King of Greece announced that he would move to Crete with his government to continue the fight against the German attackers. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

From 23 April to 25 April 1941

They heard that the Germans were now on Euboea on 23 April 1941. They sent reconnaissance aircraft to verify the story, but they did not see anyone. There were concerns about the 1/Rangers guarding the crossing at Khalkis. They needed to hold the crossing until the 6th Brigade could be south of there by the evening of the 25th. The 6th Brigade would leave a rearguard at Tatoi until they saw the Rangers withdraw through there.

Meanwhile, at Thermopylae, the British medium guns dueled with the German artillery. The troops were gradually withdrawing towards the beaches where they would withdraw. Some of the troops headed for the beaches at Marathon. An effort was made to post rearguards along the way that would move back in stages. There was some concern that the Germans might take the Delphi Pass, and cut off the line of retreat. The general state is reflected by the condition of the 4th Husssars, reduced to 12 light tanks, 6 carriers, and one armoured car by 23 April. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

Defending Thermopylae

Once the order had been given to withdraw from Greece, the 6th New Zealand Brigade was left to defend Thermopylae Pass. Altogether, they had men from five battalions: the 25th on the heights above the road and river, the 24th holding the road at Ayia Trias, and the 26th behind them on the road to Molos. The brigade had strong artillery support in the form of one medium, four field, and two anti-tank regiments. Carriers from the 5th Brigade were patrolling to the north during the night. The other two brigades moved at night on 22 April 1941. The 5th Brigade had destroyed its heavy gear before withdrawing to Ayia Konstantinos. The 4th Brigade pulled back to Erithrai. As this was happening, the Australians were being pressed by the Germans. 21 and 22 April saw heavy German air attacks on the defenders at Thermopylae. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The Australian guns finally silenced: 22 April 1941

The two Australian guns on the side of the mountain, in an exposed position, had dueled with the German artillery for eight hours. The guns were 25 pounders. One gun finally had a recuperator oil leak and had to stop firing. The officer in charge, a young lieutenant, noticed that there were German infantrymen unloading from trucks that were too close to fire upon. The gun was sited in a pit, so they lifted the trail onto the back edge. That allowed them to fire on the infantry with reduced charges. They could have easily flipped the gun with full charges. That fire brought down medium artillery fire that disabled the remaining gun. The artillery duel had lasted eight hours by the time, at 4pm, when the gun was disabled. The men exposed on the hillside were finally hit by German fire and there were men killed and wounded. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The gunners on 21-22 April 1941

At the Brallos pass on 21 April 1941, Brigadier Herring, the 6th Australian Division artillery commander was on the scene and directing the placement of field guns. They also had an Italian Breda 20mm AA gun with the field guns to provide cover. By 6pm, they could see the first Germans leaving Lamia, heading south towards the guns. At 10,900 yards, the guns opened fire and hit the leading vehicle. The rest of the Germans turned around and drove back into Lamia. From the heights, the gunners could see a large number of vehicles descending and driving into Lamia in the dark. Early on 22 April, four large German guns, probably medium guns, opened fire on the Australians from beyond the range that they could reach. More German vehicles headed south on the road, and were fired upon by the field guns. As the field guns fired, the medium guns returned fire,, becoming increasingly accurate. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

After Wavell's visit

General Wavell's visit where he ordered a withdrawal from Greece greatly shook up the command. The commanders had been thinking in terms of a last ditch defence and then surrender. Wavell told them that the men should not surrender, but if they were cut off, they should try and reach the islands, where they would be rescued later. Embarkations would take place at designated beaches. They would try and bring out guns, if possible. If they had to be abandoned, they would be stripped of breach blocks and sights. The men would travel light, with no packs. They would be taken off the beaches on three nights: 24/25, 25/26, and 26/27 April. They would be taken off in lighters, early landing craft, as we would call them now. As the preliminary moves took place, the artillery fire between British and Germans along the whole front became much more intense. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The Decision to Withdraw from Greece

General Mackay has said later that he expected to stand in position for another two weeks and then be beaten by greater force. That is what he was apparently thinking late on 20 April 1941. Brigadier Vasey, commanding the 19th Brigade, thought the same thing at the time. Out of the blue, General Wavell arrived at the headquarters and ordered the force to withdraw from Greece, contrary to what everyone expected. What had happened was the surrender by General Tsolakoglou. That changed the picture completely, at least from General Wavell's perspective. Wavell was ready to take sympathetic Greeks with them, if they wanted to leave before the German occupation. General Wilson's plan for withdrawal was only issued on 23 April. He had already given verbal instructions, however, to Generals Blamey and Freyberg. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The situation deteriorates: 21 April 1941

The positions that the British and Commonwealth troops were occupying on 21 April 1941 were becoming increasingly untenable. There was concern about German airborne troops landing behind the British lines on the plain of Thebes, news had been received of the Greek Army of Epirus surrender, and it looked like the Germans would be able to flank the position on the left. The British lacked a sufficient force to block the roads from German attack, as the Australians were decimated in part. The Leibstandarte Adolph Hitler Division was was to the west at Yannina, and posed a threat to the British position. The main delay to the German advance was crated roads. The Germans had strong forces, but the state of the roads were keeping them from pressing the British as hard as might be expected. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

Thermopylae from 19 to 22 April 1941

British troops waited at Thermopylae for the expected German attack. The army commander's headquarters was now at Thebes. ANZAC Corps headquarters would be at Levadia. General Freyberg was to have his headquarters near Longos. General Mackay was ordered to move his headquarters to a position near Ayla Marina. He was unhappy with such a move, as the forward troops defending Brallos would be 20 miles distant. 16th Brigade, now reduced to two "weak battalions" would hold the west side. At sunset on 21 April 1941, the 2/7th Battalion was about four miles forward of Brallos. The 2/6th Battalion was to the west. The 2/5th Battalion returned and was in reserve. The new positions were very weak and really needed divisions, not brigades. Although the New Zealand Division was still relatively intact, the 6th Australian Division had three battalions that greatly reduced in strength. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

A messy withdrawal: 20 April 1941

Allen's force straggled back towards the bulk of the division. The rearguard had finally pulled back after 5pm on 20 April 1941. Colonel Lamb had reached the division headquarters and realized that he had not seen Brigadier Allen since the morning. Men from the 2/2 and 2/3 battalions were straggling back towards the rear in small groups. By later in the day, there were seven officers and 297 men from the 2/2 Battalion near General Blamey's headquarters. Many of the men from the 2/3 Battalion were on trucks that were still on the road. By later on 20 April there were as many as 500 men from the 2/3 Battalion assembled. Some New Zealanders and more men from the 2/2 and 2/3 battalions arrived after having to abandon their vehicles and march towards the division headquarters. We find that Brigadier Allen had driven down a dead-end road, found some sixty men, assigned an officer to command them, and then instructed them to keep marching south. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

20 April 1941, more from the rearguard

In the afternoon of 20 April 1941, the rearguard at the Lamia Pass was being tested by the Germans. There was a rainstorm that enabled the Germans to bring mortars forward and they started firing on the Australians. As the Germans advanced across ground at the foot of the pass, they received accurate fire. Major Guinn decided that they would withdraw when they started to receive artillery fire. He gave the order to withdraw when the Germans opened fire with four light guns. One British tank was hit and had to be left behind. There were two cruiser tanks holding the road while the Australian infantry started to withdraw. One gun covered the engineers while they set off charges to damage the road. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

20 April 1941 the second rearguard

Late on 19 April 1941, the decision had been made to withdraw Brigadier Lee's brigade. Some troubling aspects were that there was a New Zealand brigade that no one knew where it was, not even the brigade commander. Another issue was that Some mistakes were made in the process of doing demolitions. Several anti-tank guns were lost as a result. They saw a vehicle arrive and start repairing demolitions and opened fire on them, not realizing that they were "British" (meaning British, Australian, or New Zealand).

A second rearguard was designated, this time a small detachment. Major Guinn was to command the rearguard and hold the road until the last Australian and New Zealand troops had gone past Lamia. This was on 20 April, and the men became aware of advancing German forces. The rearguard was well-concealed, so they surprised a team of German motorcyclists who were approaching. A small contingent of British tanks were concealed, ready to engage any approaching German tanks. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

General Mackay on 19 April 1941

General Mackay wanted to see what Brigadier Lee's force was enduring, so he spent time with the rearguard at Domokos from about 7:30am until 4pm on 19 April 1941. General Mackay understood what Rommel also understood: the importance of leading from the front lines. On 18 April, Brigadier Lee had four infantry battalions, engineers, and additional troops. At that point, he thought that there was little danger of being pressed by the Germans until after the Australian and New Zealand divisions had passed through Lamia. Because of that, he had sent one brigade of two battalions back to Thermopylae. General Mackay had approved the move early on 19 April. That was when the men discovered a train of valuable fuel and explosives two miles away. The Victorian railway men were determined to take the train to Athens. However, they were bombed by German aircraft and caused and explosion that destroyed the train. Miraculously, the Australian railwaymen survived. This is based on the account in Vol.II of hte Australian Official History.

On 20 April 1941, the last 15 Hurricanes in Greece took off and intercepted a German attacking force consisting of 100 divebombers and fighters. The British had 22 certain kills and 8 more probables. The British losses were five Hurricanes. During the night, General Wavell visited General Blamey's ANZAC Corps headquarters and ordered him to withdraw as soon as possible. The troops needed to reach the embarkation beaches on 24 April to be evacuated that night. The ANZAC Corps were mostly on the road with rearguard detachments protecting the retreat. The column on the road from Larisa to Lamia was attacked from the air in the morning. The senior officers were involved in the retreat and made sure that the men saw them along the roads. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

19 April 1941

The commanders in London had decided to withdraw the force in Greece. The Greek government actually agreed that would be the best thing to do. The only dissenters were the commander in Greece. General Wavell had arrived in Athens on 19 April 1941 to meet with General Wilson and other commanders. General Wilson was overoptimistic in thinking that the troops could hold the Thermopylae line for an extended period. They met with the Greek king and General Papagos, and General Papagos suggested that the Greek army was in dire straights. They had a message from Churchill that he did not want the force to withdraw without Greek concurrence. Independently, the rogue Greek army commander met with the Germans to surrender. The die was cast and the British would have done best by heading for a withdrawal. This is based on Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The retreat on 18 April 1941

A retreating column of vehicles stretched some seventy miles during the day on 18 April 1941. This was happening on a day when the Germans dominated the air and were frequently present dropping bombs. The surprising thing was that the German bombing was not very effective. There were a few successes, such as the exploding ammunition truck that destroyed a bridge. The Generals Freyberg and Mackay were present, setting an example for the troops, ignoring the German air attacks. Both men had been inspiring leaders in the Great War and were demonstrating those same qualities in the second war. The results of 18 April lifted the mens' spirits and gave them a new resolve to continue the withdrawal from Greece in the face of German air superiority, which for their sakes, was largely and inexplicably ineffective. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The 21st New Zealand Battalion at the Pinios Gorge

There is a good article about the 21st New Zealand Battalion in Greece in the Sunday Star Times newspaper (online). 21 Battalion had arrived in Greece in late March 1941. They arrived under German air attack that had set a nearby ammunition ship afire. The New Zealanders had put the fire out and saved the ship and themselves. From there, they were sent forward to Platamon. They were attacked by two German armoured divisions on 15 April 1941. The Germans attacked and broke the New Zealand line on 16 April, causing them to retreat after a desperate battle that lasted for some 36 hours. From there, they pulled back to the Pinios Gorge, where they defended the western end of the gorge. They were supported first by the 2/2 Australian Battalion and subsequently, by the 2/3 Battalion. They had destroyed the railroad bridge and blocked the tunnel. The New Zealanders had four anti-tank guns (2pdr) and two mortars that were inoperable by the time of the action at the Pinios Gorge. The Germans attacked starting at 5pm on 17 April and then by the morning of 18 April mounted a larger attack. They had gotten tanks across the river, by fording almost turret high water. The 21st Battalion was supported by Australian artillery, and together they stopped the initial attack. The Germans, with tanks, finally broke A company at about 4:30pm on 18 April. They were forced to retreat at that point. The commander, Colonel Macky, was treated shabbily, as he was relieved of his command and sent home after the fight. General Freyberg tried to apologize, much later, but Macky would not see him.

18 April 1941 involving Larisa

The British commanders spent the day of 18 April 1941 in a state of anxiety. They feared that one or both of the rearguards might be pushed past Larisa before the retreating columns could safely pass. The other concern was that German bombers might inflict heavy casualties on the forces on the roads. At 9:30am, a truck laden with explosives was hit by a bomb and exploded. The explosion blew a large crater in the road. Brigadier Steele, himself, the ANZAC Corps Chief Engineer was on the spot to personally supervise the repairs. A knocked out bulldozer made matters worse. They not only had to repair the crater but to create a detour. At 2pm, Brigadier Rowell had gone to see Mackay and Freiberg to see if they might postpone the withdrawal. The situation was so tenuous that it was not possible, but by then, the columns were able to continue on the detour and traffic moved forward. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

More on German movements 18/19 April 1941

A German mountain company cut the road between Allen's force and Larisa. They were fighting Australians who were attempting to move down the road to Larisa. The Australians were in trucks and carriers, without supporting arms. Late in the evening on 18 April 1941, the Germans captured a convoy of trucks and knocked out a carrier. Units of the 2nd Panzer Division joined the company and moved into Larisa on the morning of 19 April. At the same time, there was a battle at the Pinios Gorge while several armoured groups moved on Larisa. On the morning of 18 April, there was a large convoy of trucks moving south from Larisa. These seem to have been mainly Australians. The sky was clear and they fully expected to be bombed from the air. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

German movements from the 16th to 17th April 1941

When the attack on Servia failed, Stumme's corps was sent west towards Grevena while Boehme's corps moved around the east side of Mount Olympus. They left a weak force facing Servia. Stumme's corps consisted of the 5th and 9th Panzer Division, the Leibstandarte Adolph Hitler, at this stage of the war, a regiment-sized unit, and the73rd Division. Boehme's corps apparently consisted of the 5th and 6th Mountain Divisions, the 2nd Panzer Division, and the 72nd Division. The 2nd Panzer Division divided into two battle groups. One went towards the Olympus Pass while the other attacked the 21st New Zealand Battalion at Platamon. The group advancing on the Pinios Gorge was augmented to include 150 tanks and more infantry and artillery. They reached the Pinios Gorge on 17 April, early in the day. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

Savige's force on 18 April 1941

Brigadier Savige had put Lt-Colonel King in charge of a rear-guard located about five miles east of Kalabaka King commanded a small combined arms force, equipped with tanks, artillery, machine guns, and infantry. This was an Australian force. The 2/11th Battalion were moving towards Zarkos at dawn and arrived at 10am. By 11am, the engineers were blowing up sections of the road. Part of Savige's men crossed the Pinios by bridge, but the bridge was bombed. The bombs detonated the prepared explosives and destroyed the bridge. Vehicles were forced to detour a long ways to Tirnavos to cross the river. One bridge had not been prepared for demolition and still stood. An elite demolition party, led by Warrent-Officer went back and blew the bridge. By midnight, they had crossed the river and rejoined the rear guard. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The rearguard withdraws while under attack

As the sun set on 18 April 1941, the 24th New Zealand Battalion was withdrawing as a German attack was mounted on the road to the Menexes Pass. The German force had tanks in the lead until they ran onto mines in the road. They were followed by motorized infantry. The infantry dismounted and attacked, but they were held up long enough for the 24th Battalion to withdraw. The Australian field guns withdrew by troops and left only some New Zealand artillery. They slipped away at about 11:30pm. They had arrived at Larisa by 3am. The 26th New Zealand Battalion had traveled to Larisa by rail, but the other two battalions traveled by road to Volos. All this occurred as Brigadier Savige's force had an adventure on 18 April. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The 6th New Zealand Brigade on the defence: 18 April 1941

By late morning on 18 April 1941, a German attack was underway against the positions held by the 6th New Zealand Brigade, south of Elasson. A combination of medium and field artillery was able to inflict damage on the advancing German tanks. At this time, the 6th Brigade was not attacked by air, except by one Stuka. The medium guns eventually had to withdraw after they fired off all of their remaining ammunition. Fortunately, the Australian field artillery was well-supplied with ammunition. This was due to the work of the 5th New Zealand Regiment's drivers who moved the entire ammunition dump from Ayios Dimitrios to the 6th Brigade's positions. The 2/3rd Australian regiment fired some 6,500 rounds at the Germans on 18 April. There was an abundance of targets with the artillery observers spotting the large groups of targets. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

6th New Zealand Brigade on 18 April 1941

The 6th New Zealand Brigade was deployed as a blocking force south of Elasson. They were across two roads that led to Larisa. The 25th Battalion was on the west side and the 24th Battalion was on the east. The 26th Battalion was in reserve. The brigade had heavy artillery support:

2/3rd Field Regiment   20-25pdrs
one troop 64th Medium Regiment
two groups of the 5th NZ [Field] Regiment   8-25pdrs (in the anti-tank role)
one battery of the 5th NZ [Field] Regiment in reserve at Domenikon  12-25pdr
7-2pdr anti-tank guns dug in and 4 mobile with the 25th Battalion

The 24th Battalion was in mountainous terrain with no artillery. They had performed demolitions and laid mines to aid the defence. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The rearguard units on 18 Apil 1941

There were three rearguard units that would have to withdraw through the Larisa bottleneck. The three were positioned on roads leading south. April 18 saw the New Zealand Divisional Cavalry, with anti-tank guns sitting on the junction of roads from Servia and Katerini. The illustrious Colonell Kippenberger, with a small contingent, were all that remained of the 4th New Zealand Brigade rearguard. One cavalry squadron had 2pdr guns on portees with their guns pointed up the roads. The men guarding the road from Katerini were surprised to see German tanks and motorcyclists coming down the road. They had assumed that demolitions would have delayed their advance. As they were being attacked repeatedly, the men finally withdrew behind the 6th New Zealand Brigade. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

Two battalions cut off

By 5:45pm on 18 April 1941, Brigadier Allen could tell that the 21st New Zealand Battalion and the 2/2 Australian Battalion were cut off by advancing Germans. Brigadier Allen had collected a large number of carriers from the various units in his brigade. He was extremely low in infantry strength, however. They had endured bombing and strafing through the day. There were five German tanks advancing up the road. They were met by 25pdr fire and two tanks were knocked out. They lost one gun and had to pull back. The men were forced to pull back to their trucks for a withdrawal. The withdrawal was covered by New Zealand armoured cars. The column ran into a German ambush and took casualties along the way. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

Things get dicey on 18 April 1941

The New Zealand 21st Battalion withdrew at about 11am on 18 April 1941. They left the Australian 2/2 Battalion to fend for themselves. They lost contact with General Macky during this period. The 2/2 Battalion had several hours where they were not hard-pressed by the Germans. By 3pm, the battalion was attacked on the ground and by air. They were being overrun by German tanks. There was a concurrent infantry attack on a different part of the defensive front. A mortar team of the 2/2 Battalion fired some 350 rounds on the advancing Germans. The unit was also able to mount heavy Bren gun fire which slowed the advance. The tanks, however, continued to move up the road. Two companies of the 2/2 were able to withdraw and reached their trucks, which transported them to the brigade headquarters. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

18 April 1941 in the Pinios Gorge

The units defending the Pinios Gorge on 18 April 1941 included the 21st Battalion, the 2/2 Battalion, and the 2/3rd Battalion. Early on 18 April, German troops could be seen advancing towards the defenders. It was apparent that the Germans were working their way around the left, trying to outflank the defenders. A platoon of carriers was sent out to intercept the Germans. The carriers came under heavy fire and were forced to withdraw. There was a great deal of mist in the morning that reduced visibility. A tank attack developed in front of the 21st Battalion. There were 2pdr anti-tank guns defending, but they were overrun by advancing tanks. By 11am, troops from the 21st Battalion (New Zealanders) had started to withdraw. The Australians were still able to hold on for the present. By 3pm, a bigger attack was mounted. The attack included about 35 aircraft that commenced bombing. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The fateful conference in Athens on 17 April 1941

General Papagos had suggested that the British force exit Greece. General Wilson exchanged cables with Winston Churchill who stated that they should not stay in Greece against the wishes of the Greek government. General Wilson attended a meeting in Athens on 17 April 1941 where Mr. Koryzis told the King that he felt like he had failed the country. He then commited suicide. Churchill ordered on 18 April that they must both withdraw from Greece and keep on fighting in Libya. The battle in Libya had priority over the Greek operation, however. The island of Crete seemed to be a close location to which they could go after leaving Greece. The troops in the field were unaware of the events of 17 and 18 April, and they were fully occupied with resisting a German advance. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The rearguard at Domokos

Brigadier Lee's rearguard was gathered at Domokos on 17 April 1941. Two battalions arrived from the north: the 2/4th and 2/8th. the 2/8th still had 533 men, but with fewer weapons than they should have had. At least the men of the 2/1st Field Regiment arrived by train from Larisa. They had come back to Domokos to be with their guns. The 2/6th Battalion had arrived by train on 16 April. The British troops had been able to move under cover of rain and mist. Four of the seven brigades were at Domokos or Thermopylae. The others would be harder to safely move. Greek resistance seemed ready to cease by 18 April. The general consensus was that the Greeks liked the Germans and would like to work with them. By then, the Macedonian armies had dispersed. The remaining Epirus army was in dire straits. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

Brigadier Savige

Brigadier Savige's force, an augmented infantry brigade was left unsupported on the left flank. He had been directly under ANZAC Corps command, but by 18 April 1941, he was switched back under his division. He had thought that the best plan would be to sit where they were until the night of 18/19 April. Early on 18 April, Captain Grieve brought back orders from General Mackay to withdraw that night. The orders from Mackay had apparently been written without knowing that the armoured brigade had already withdrawn. Brigadier Savige informed Captaina Grieve that they would start withdrawing. He had already ordered his artillery to withdraw. He hoped to be near Larisa by 5pm. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

On 17 April 1941, the 5th New Zealand Brigade had been loaded onto trucks to move to Almiros. Their assigned road was so bad that General Mackay had them move on the Australian division's road. The withdrawal also commenced from the Servia Pass. Lt-Col. Howard Kippenberger commanded the rearguard. The artillery withdrew first and then the infantry. The demolitions effectively held up the German advance. Savige Force, to the left, was left to hold for too long. They would only get to start the withdrawal in the night of 17/18 April. They had the dubious protection of the 1st Armoured Brigade. By the afternoon of 17 April, there was no armoured brigade to provide cover. The road behind them was packed with vehicles, so any withdrawal would be difficult. Brigadier Savige only expected to be able to start a withdrawal on the night of 18/19 April. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The Pinios Gorge-17 April 1941

The battalions were prepared to defend against a German attack at the Pinios Gorge. The tracks ran along the north side of the gorge and the road was on the south side. The defenders included two Australian battalions and a New Zealand battalion. They had stretched out to prevent the Germans from going around the flank. The Official History notes, though, that if the New Zealanders were not able to hold, that the position could become untenable. The three battalions were included in Allen Force and were equipped with some anti-tank guns. By late on 17 April 1941, the men could see the first Germans on the ridge. The Germans were mountain troops and got into position where they were able to fire downwards on the New Zealanders. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The Victorian railwaymen

It was the 2/7th Battalion of the 17th Australian Brigade whose Greek train crew abandoned them. They had been heavily attacked near Larisa by German aircraft, and the Greek crew had more than they could handle. Fortunately, the 2/7th had some Victorian railwaymen in the battalion. The leader, Corporal Jock Taylor, along with Corporal Melville and Private Naismith stepped up to solve the situation. They fired up a train as a decoy, and then about 5oo yards away, they assembled a train to carry the battalion to relative safety. They were able to carry the 2/7th Battalion to Domokos. All this seems to have occurred during the night of 16 April 1941. The 17th was uneventful, as the British were executing a withdrawal plan that included demolishing roads and bridges behind them. The brigade was able to prepare defensive positions on 17 April so as to be ready for the expected German attack. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The withdrawal on 17 April 1941

The roads leading south were packed with vehicles, bumper-to-bumper. Men lay sleeping in the floor. There were a very few Greek vehicles. You were more likely to see donkeys with men riding or Greek cavalrymen on their horses. Early on 17 April 1941, there was rain, but it cleared later in the day and there were more German aircraft in the sky. The roads all ran through Larisa which was wrecked from a combination of earthquake and bombing. Not only were the roads clogged, but the railroads were having difficulties. The Greek railroad crews were abandoning trains due to fear of German aircraft. Australian railwaymen came forward and got a train assembled and moving with men from the 17th Australian Brigade. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

By 16 April 1941, the Greeks were ready to surrender

The Greek generals had been asking the Prime Minister to give up the fight. By 16 April 1941, the Bishop of Yannina made the same request of Mr. Koryzis. By 15 April, General Wavell had warned General Wilson that they should prepare to retreat further. At this point, the only place to go was to board the ships and leave Greece. The British and Commonwealth troops were in Thessaly on 17 April, where it was rainy and the skies were filled with marauding German aircraft. There were often conflicts on the roads between the supply vehicles carried supplies forward and the troop-carrying vehicles trying to withdraw. Since 14 April, the Germans had been firing in the trucks with machine guns from aircraft. The men had become extremely nervous and at the first sign of aircraft, they would jump off the vehicles to the roadside. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The Armoured Brigade

General Wilson's staff had ordered the 1st Armoured Brigade to withdraw over a mountain road that no one knew anything about. The road turned out to be so rough, that most of the brigades remaining tanks broke tracks and had to be abandoned. They could easily have allowed the brigade to travel on the main road, but chose not to let them do so. The brigade had originally been planned to cover Brigadier Savige's withdrawal, but he was just left with a small contingent while the remnants of the brigade tried to withdraw over the mountain road. Sadly, this was symptomatic of how General Wilson's command functioned. The entire campaign was ill-considered and driven by politics to begin with. The British should never have gone into Greece, but Anthony Eden, Churchill's foreign minister, decided that they needed to aid Greece and try and pull Yugoslavia to the British cause. The entire enterprise was a disaster and nearly cost the British North Africa. This is some commentary in addition to information from Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The NZ protective force

General Freyberg was concerned about the security of his forces while they were withdrawing from the Servia and Olympus passes. As a precaution, he established a force under the command of Lt-Col. Duff to cover the withdrawing units from the two passes. Colonel Duff's force included anti-tank guns, machine guns, and carriers. That measure was put in place, but an attempt to use the armoured brigade to cover Brigadier Savige's withdrawal misfired due to General Wilson already having issued orders to the brigade. He had ordered the brigade to withdraw over rough mountain roads. That had the effective of causing most of the available tanks to break down in route due to track failures. That was a constant danger with the early British cruiser and light tanks used by the 1st Armoured Brigade. That was what Robert Crisp mentioned in his book, Brazen Chariots, about the abortive and failed Greek campaign. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The 4th NZ Brigade on 16 April 1941

The 16th of April 1941 saw a determined New Zealand fight on the left where the Maori's repelled a German attack, with the help of artillery. When the sky cleared, they could see a German column stretching far off into the distance. New Zealand artillery fire called in by the observer that broke the attack. The was the 4th NZ Brigade with the 23rd Battalion on the right in a heavy mist. By late afternoon, they were being pressed hard, but reinforcements helped them block the attack. German mountain troops had threatened to overrun the Maori's, but in the end, they held. As darkness fell, they were to withdraw south along the road, although they were late in starting. The other two battalions of the brigade were able to stage a more orderly withdrawal according to plan. In the mountainous terrain, they had to abandon their nine 2pdr anti-tank guns. They tipped these over and they fell into a ravine. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official history.

The dispositions late on 16 April 1941

On the left, the 5th Panzer Division, with a detachment from the 9th Panzer Division were pushing down towards the Aliakmon River and then south towards the Pinios. The 1st Armoured Brigade was withdrawing ahead of them, and was not south of the Aliakmon River. To their right, the main body of the 9th Panzer Division was attacking the 4th New Zealand Brigade at Servia. Near the coast, to their right, the 2nd Panzer Division was attacking the 5th New Zealand Brigade. Further south, right on the coast, the 6th Mountain Division, with a portion of the 2nd Panzer Division, was attacking the 21st Battalion near Rapsani. The NZ Division HQ and the ANZAC Corps HQ were still at Elasson,. Far to the southwest, Savige Force was still holding Kalabaka. The 6th Australian Division HQ was far to the southeast, at Larisa. This was to be a difficult period in the face of attack by armoured forces and experienced mountain troops. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

Elaborate plans were made to withdraw to Thermopylae

Generals Mackay and Freyberg were to closely coordinate the withdrawal from the north to Thermopylae. At the beginning, the 5th NZ Brigade was on the north slope of Mount Olympus. This was some twenty miles from where "Allen Force" was to move toT the south bank of the Pinios. The 4th NZ Brigade was to leave the Servia Pass the same night (17/18 April 1941) that the 5th NZ Brigade was to leave Olympus. The 6th NZ Brfgade was to leave Elasson in the night of 18/19 April. Savige and Allen, and the 1st Armoured Brigade all had to be moved south in the process of withdrawing. One concern was that some of the trails might provide a route to German mountain troops to outflank them. As early as the night of 15/16 April, the New Zealanders broke up a German attack and destroyed two tanks and 14 other vehicles. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

17 April 1941: a scratch brigade is formed

Brigadier Allen was put in charge of a scratch brigade formed of two of his battalions (the 2/2nd and 2/3rd) and the 21st New Zealand Battalion. They were to move to the Pinios Gorge in an attempt to block the advancing Germans. He had a mixed force of infantry, along with most of a field artillery regiment, some anti-tank guns, and carriers. He was to defend Larisa from the east. Allen's 2/1st Battalion was put under the command of the division commander at Olympus. The plan was still to withdraw to Thermopylae, the site of the famous battle in antiquity. General Mackay would have responsibility for protecting the flanks of Freyberg's NZ division. The commanders could only hope that the Germans could be delayed long enough for their withdrawal plans to be executed. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The situation turns increasingly desperate

Anthony Eden had a lot to answer for over the Greek debacle. Serious military men, such as General Blamey, could see before the commitment was made that going into Greece with a threat of an impending German intervention would be a serious mistake. At least Anthony Eden was a politician. Winston Churchill had aspirations to military expertise, so he had no excuse for being a part to what would be an obvious opportunity for a military disaster.

Anthony Eden had portrayed the British operation to be in ghttp://www.blogger.com/img/blank.gifreater force than was available in order to gain thehttp://www.blogger.com/img/blank.gifir acquiescence. The Greeks, on the other hand, were in a much worse condition than was understood. Not only were their troops poorly equipped, but their leadership was suspect. In particular, General Tsolakoglou was not only incompetent, he proved to be a traitor, as well. He abandoned his troops in the Western Macedonia Army, and then signed an armistice with the Germans when given the opportunity. The situation became so intense, than when confronted with a possible British withdrawal, the Greek prime minister committed suicide on 18 April 1941.

Sources:
Diggers and Greeks

We cannot leave Greece in the lurch

A critical situation from 16 April 1941 in Greece

The ANZAC corps had expected to be able to hold the Olympus passes against the German advance, but by 16 April 1941, they realized that the Germans were a threat to the right flank. Lt-Colonel Macky, commander of the 21st NZ Battalion reported an attack being pressed by 150 German tanks at the Platamon tunnel. On the 15th, they had fought off an attack by motorcycle troops. Late in the day on 15 April, a German armoured regiment had moved into position. The Germans actually had assembled an all-arms force and planned to attack the New Zealanders in the morning on 16 April. By 9am, Col. Macky ordered a withdrawal. General Blamey had sent his artillery commander, Brigadier Clowes, forward to the 21st NZ Battalion with authority to order whatever he thought necessary. When they had retreated to the gorge mouth, they had to cross by ferry. They had brought across a large flock of sheep and two shepherdesses before sinking the ferry. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

The British are treated to a view of the worst of the Greek army

By late on 15 April 1941, the Greek general Tsolakoglou's army was disintegrating. The remnants were reduced to two divisions near Grevena. The other units had disintegrated and the men from the units were scattered along the roads in Brigadier Savige's force. Tsolakoglou had owed his appointment to his family connections, and he was both incompetent and had the aura of corruption. During the period of 13 to 15 April, the German staff had believed that the three ANZAC divisions and the 2nd Armoured Division units were in retreat. That was not actually true at the beginning of the period. During 15 and 16 April, the British forces were greatly outnumbered and were going to be outflanked unless some move was made. They were still holding, though. During 16 and 17 April, the situation was rapidly deteriorating. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

Savige Force and the 1st Armoured Brigade

On 14 April 1941, General Wilson ordered the 1st Armoured Brigade to move to Kalabaka and to join Savige Force. There was concern that the Germans might be close by, but a 4th Hussars patrol found that the Germans were on the other side of the Aliakmon River at this point. On 15 April, General Wilson informed Brigadier Savige that some 3000 Greek troops would be arriving in his area. All they did was to clutter the roads and make life more difficult for the Australians and 1st Armoured Brigade. The British liaison officer, Lt-Colonel Barter informed Brigadier Savige that the Greek commander was politically well-connected and they just couldn't move his troops out of the area. Brigadier Savige bitterly remembered the events that followed. By this time, the Greeks were living in a fantasy world where they considered that they were stubbornly resisting, not disintegrating, which was the reality. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The 19th Brigade's withdrawal went poorly

Again, there was difficulty in communicating with all the companies in the 19th Australian Brigade to inform them of the order to withdraw on 14 April 1941. They had assumed that they would be able to take their Bren carriers with them. They found to their dismay that the bridge could not hold them and the one raft they had was unequal to the task and overturned. They were forced to destroy the carriers as best as they could. One company became separated, but they were reduced to sixty men, so they were able to transport them across the river using a small boat. While all this was happening, the Germans were pressing the Greeks defending the mountain passes to the north. The armoured brigade was caught in the mess. They attempted to withdraw along congested roads. In the process, the 3rd RTR had seven tanks break down. This was Robert Crisp's unit and he was present. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The Germans press forward against the 19th New Zealand Battalion

The Germans continued to press forward late on 14 April 1941. During the night of 14/15 April, Major Sampson, commander of the 19th NZ Battalion, realized that his unit was almost surrounded by the advancing Germans. In the dark, he had his men pull back, further up the slope. He had two platoons stage an attack that drove back some Germans that had advanced near to Prosilion. Early on 15 April, General Blamey ordered General Mackay to pull the 19th Australian Brigade across the Aliakmon. The day was already late, with little light left. Communications were poor and there was no bridge across the river. The engineers made an amazing achievement, in that in a few hours they had built a wooden bridge over the Aliakmon, so that the 19th Brigade could cross at 9pm. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History,

The Servia Pass from 14 April 1941

The 4th New Zealand Brigade had been holding the Servia Pass. From 14 April 1941, they came under increasing air attack from German divebombers. The brigade was positioned high above the river, looking down steep mountain slopes and then down an escarpment. During the afternoon, the men could see the advancing German troops headed their direction. The Ju-87's were equipped with the noisemaker that was intended to shake the morale of their victims. They proved to be disquieting to the New Zealanders who were having their first taste of this sort of attack. As the sun set on 14 April, the German artillery started firing ranging rounds towards the New Zealanders. By early on 15 April is when they noticed the Germans pretending to be retreating Greek troops and who were trying to infiltrate the New Zealand lines. That was when they had opened up with machine gun fire and had decimated the Germans. They killed, wounded, or captured some 400 men in the process. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The situation deteriorates further in Greece

As events progressed on 14, 15, and 16 April 1941, the Germans were pressing forward. The mountainous terrain had made even communication difficult. One battalion of the 16th Australian Brigade found on 16 April 1941, that they should have withdrawn the night before. No one had been able to find them earlier, so that was not possible. By 14 April, General Wilson had ordered a withdrawal from the Aliakmon line. The Germans were using infiltration tactics to penetrate the New Zealand and Australian lines. They pretended to be retreating Greek troops to gain entrance to the positions. The New Zealanders recognized what was happening and opened fire with machine guns, doing dreadful execution on the Germans. They then rounded up many prisoners, some of them being Austrians. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

New Zealanders in action

The situation on the night of 13-15 April 1941 was that the New Zealand troops on the left could hear the Germans advancing towards them. The next day saw the Germans moving past the demolitions and probing the New Zealand positions. The Germans only started replying to artillery in the late afternoon on 15 April. The 16th Australian Brigade, which was to position themselves between two New Zealand brigades only crossed the Aliakmon on the night of 13 April. The Australian battalions became separated and were faced with mountainous terrain. On the morning of 15 April, the troops of the 2/3rd Battalion that they had been cut off by German troops during the night. They eventually all got themselves into what they believed were their intended positions. When the decision was made to withdraw to Thermopylae, the commanders wondered how they could let the 16th Australian Brigade know. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The Greek army 13 and 14 April 1941

On 13 April 1941, the Greeks were hold several passes and were staging an orderly withdrawal. At noon on 14 April, the 20th Division was pushed out of the Klisoura Pass. The remnants of the 20th Division were ordered south to the Grevena road. Other Greek divisions were able able to stage an orderly withdrawal into other positions to the south. By 14 April, German units had reached the Aliakmon line where the ANZAC Corps was deployed. Demolitions were started, but the troops in Greece lacked the equipment necessary for adequate demolition in mountainous terrain. The New Zealand brigades had seen German units approaching by late afternoon on 14 April. During the night, the New Zealanders could see the Germans bringing troops forward for use in the morning. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.