Events in early 1941 regarding Greece

General Wavell communicated with Churchill about Churchill's scheme to send troops to Greece. Wavell was concerned about how little force they could send and the possibility that they could not arrive in time to do anything useful. General Wavell was also concerned that the Greeks would not fight if attacked by the Germans. Wavell thought that they might be able to help the Greeks "
hold a line on the Aliakmon River". There was also a concern about the air force shrinking as they were taking greater losses than they were receiving replacements. They had not been receiving any "fighting formations since the fall of France in 1940. The only possibility was the possibility of the 50th Division arriving from Britain. In February 1941, the CIGS was still General Dill. He had not yet been switched to being in the United States as a diplomat. On 7 March, General Wavell received a message saying that the cabinet had decided that the Greek operation should proceed and that the Cabinet had taken "full responsibility for the results. What seems to have been a lie, was that Churchill had said that the Greek campaign was not being conducted because of Anthony Eden making commitments in Athens, but because the CIGS General Dill, Wavell, and others had thought that there was a "fighting chance" that the operation could succeed. The Australian prime minister, Mr. Menzies was told that General Blamey and the New Zealand commander, General Freyberg were said to have agreed. Why all this was a lie was that neither General Blamey or General Freyberg were asked for an opinion. This is based on the account in "Greece Crete and Syria" by Gavin Long.