General Morshead intervened in the planning process for the next move. He recognized that there was not enough time "before daylight". The attack was postponed and the brigade commander was ordered to ensure that the 2/23rd Battalion was in a better position. He wanted the battalion to be in touch "with the 2/13th on the right" and the "2/15th on the left". The 2/24th and 2/48th Battalions were sent back to their positions where they were to sit. 46th RTR was to withdraw the 8 running tanks that they had left.
The 2/13th Battalion was in a rather shaky situation when dawn occurred on 29 October. They had gaps and a open flank of some one thousand yards. The enemy had laid a minefield which actually afforded some protection to the 2/13th Battalion. Ahead of the battalion, there were several enemy posts. They were probably discomfited by the long open flank.
By 7am, the enemy artillery started to hit the battalion headquarters. They took casualties that left the battalion without a commander. A company commander took command on an interim basis. They asked for help in finding the second-in-command, a major. They found that the second-in-command had been wounded and "evacuated". A captain, the former battalion adjutant was promoted to major and put in command by General Morshead. The major was able to "get reinforcements from B-echelon" and his presence gave the men a boost in morale.
On 29 October, the enemy attacked the 2/15th and 2/17th Battalions. Using Trig 29 as cover, 14 enemy tanks fired on the Australians. They eventually realized that the enemy did not realize where the Australians were positioned. Several enemy vehicles drove into the Australian positions and were "destroyed or captured". This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.
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