What should have happened prior to the attack along the road by the 9th Australian Division would have been to protect against gunfire from the small hills between the coastal road and the sea. They really needed to take all the land between the road and sea, as well as the land south of the rail line. That was needed but was not included in the plan.
There was a meeting "later in the morning" with Lumsden, Freyberg, and Morshead. Freyberg eventually learned from Montgomery that the New Zealand Division was expected to "take over" the northern sector from the Australians and to move forward along the coast.
During the night of 27 to 28 October, the 20th Brigade was supposed to relieve the 26th Brigade. The enemy made life difficult by attacking both the 2/24th and 2/48th Battalions. Even worse, the 2/Camerons was late to arrive so that the relief of the 2/13th Battalion was delayed. The 2/13th Battalion was supposed to walk across the front on foot. Transport had to be diverted to drive them to "complete the relief by dawn". The transport had been waiting to remove the 2/24th Battalion. Sitting on Trig 29, the 2/17th Battalion had faced a strong attack during the morning and early afternoon, but had succeeded in holding the ground.
The 20th Brigade had but two battalions. These launched an attack "at 10pm on 28 October". The 2/13th Battalion The 2/24th Battalion was on the left. The 2/13th Battalion was very weak. Their companies only had 35 men "of all ranks". The battalion had been through "five sleepless nights", so they were very tired. Over that time, they had two days where they had attacked. On the next two nights, they had faced enemy attacks. The fifth night had seen the battalion "on the move". They arrived at a location where the enemy could look down on the them and they had to endure almost "constant shelling". This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.
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