The next Australian attack on Ruin Ridge on 26 to 27 July 1942

General Morshead wrote an instruction on 24 July 1942 to the 9th Australian Division. He seems to have been embarrassed by the last attempt to attack Ruin Ridge. The Australians had been at their peak efficiency while they were garrisoning Tobruk in 1941. His instruction addressed reconnaissance by officers, for one thing that they should not be so obvious about their reconnaissance to keep the enemy from being warned. He also told officers that they needed to inform their troops quickly about what they had learned. Another point was that tanks could not sit in support for an extended period, as they would expect to have too many losses. Tanks would, after a period on the objective, "rally" to a position behind the infantry. The purpose of tanks in support was to destroy machine-guns. The infantry's purpose was "to destroy anti-tank guns and artillery", the enemies of tanks.

For the second attempt on Ruin Ridge, the 2/28th Battalion had spent planning and reconnaissance time. The battalion stepped out at exactly midnight of 26 to 27 July. The moon was bright and they attacked with two companies in the front, with a width of some 800 yards. They were trying to move at 100 yards in two minutes. The 2/28th Battalion had a new commander, Lt-Col. McCarter. He told the officers to expect fire from the sides as they moved forward. He suggested that the men "fire from the hip" without changing direction or stopping.

After traveling some 800 yards from the start, the right front and rear companies took officer casualties, including company commanders. They were taking fire from machine-guns, mortars and field guns. There were vehicles in company carrying supporting weapons, but they took anti-tank gun fire and then ran onto a minefield. Five vehicles were knocked out and some were burning.

At least this time, the front companies had reached Ruin Ridge by 1:10am. On the left side, the rear company charged with bayonets and cleared the objective. The 2/28th Battalion commander had moved his headquarters forward to a point some 900 yards from the "ruin" (to the northwest). They were having communication problems because they could not get good wire laid through the minefield while they were receiving fire. To make matters worse, the battalion radio had been destroyed. ON the site, the men tried to dig in, but the ground was too hard to do much. They had three wounded company commanders, another factor. On Ruin Ridge, they were receiving heavy enemy fire. They had been unable to hit the enemy guns that fired across the minefield. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.