The 1st Free French Brigade Group

The 1st Free French Brigade Group were the defenders of Bir Hacheim. The brigade consisted of the following units:

2e bataillon Légion étrangère
3e bataillon Légion étrangère
2e bataillon de marche de l'Oubanghi
1er bataillon d'infanterie de marine (coloniale)
1er bataillon du Pacifique
1er regiment d'artillerie
1er bataillon de fusiliers marins (AA)
an anti-tank company, engineers, signal, medical,
signal, and administrative troops

They had 26 field guns, 62 anti-tank guns, and 44 mortars

This is from Footnote 1 on page 237 of the British Official History.

Back to Bir Hacheim

While the Cauldron battle was being fought, the 90th Light Division and Italian Trieste division had been trying take Bir Hacheim in the south. They had good air support, although the support was very grudgingly given. Rommel had decided that Bir Hacheim needed to be taken by 8 June 1942 so that they could return to the task of attacking the Gazala line from the rear. To bolster the attack, Rommel sent the 15th Panzer Division south to join the battle. British columns operated outside the Bir Hacheim perimeter. They were formed from the 7th Motor Brigade, the 29th Indian Infantry Brigade, and the Free French. By 8 June, the air attacks had increased in intensity. 58 bombers escorted by 54 fighters were used in the attacks. The Free French needed help, but the army was not able to immediately help. Instead, the RAF mounted 478 sorties on 8 June against the Axis forces attacking Bir Hacheim. On 9 June, the British air effort was greatly diminshed. General Ritchie decided early on 10 June that the French needed to withdraw from Bir Hacheim,as they could not be sustained in that position. Rommel personally led a DAK attack that broke into Bir Hacheim from the north. The 7th Motor Brigade arrived with a large motor convoy and embarked 2700 men from the original 3600 and took them away successfully. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

Defeat in the Cauldron

The British attempt to destroy the Axis forces in the Cauldron was a failure. The Axis forces admired the "courage and self-sacrifice" of the British soldiers, but that was not enough to overcome the command problems that existed. Rommel seems to have been successful in allowing the British to attack and be defeated. The best of the British tactics, artillery concentration and infantry attacking at night, were not enough. Once the battle was underway, the British had lost control of the action while Rommel personally commanded the battle as it progressed. But the battle for the Cauldron was over and the focus would shift to Bir Hacheim. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

The Hurricane IID arrives in the desert

About this time, 6 June 1942, the first Hurricane IID aircraft arrived in the Desert. No.6 Squadron had nine when the squadron started operations. Their 40mm cannon seemed too large for the Hurricane. Because of the weight of the guns, the Hurricanes were stripped to reduce weight. With the guns, with 15 rounds each, they were still very overweight. Still, they could destroy Axis tanks with hits to the thin upper armour.

"The Cauldron" lost on 6 June 1942

For some reason, the RAF was not able to effectively intervene in the battle for the Cauldron on 6 June 1942 when infantry and artillery was attacked by the Axis forces. The RAF frequently turned down requests for support during the day. This was at point B180, which was south-southwest of Knightsbridge. There were a Gurkha battalion and two Indian battalions, along with the 50th Reconnaissance Battalion and three RA Field Regiments and one RHA regiment. The Royal Artillery fought to the death, killed at their guns. A very few infantrymen escaped to the east. 7th Armoured Division was not able to intervene, despite having the 2nd and 4th Armoured Brigades. The usual problem occurred. Rommel knew what was happening, while the British commanders had lost touch with the the battle. They were not able to follow events as they happened. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

Chaos erupts: the divisional headquarters are overrun or dispersed

The Official History does a poor job of mentioning the date when events happen. Apparently, still on the afternoon of 5 June 1942, Rommel decided to go on the offensive with his mobile forces. The Ariete Division and the 21st Panzer Division attacked to the East and the 15th Panzer Division attacked north towards Knightsbridge. The 9th Indian Division and 7th Armoured Division headquarters were scattered by these attacks. Whatever control was being asserted over the constituent units was lost. The 5th Indian Division HQ was at El Adem. The 22nd Armoured Brigade was hit by the 15th Panzer Division. What made the situation worse was that General Ritchie, the army commander, had no real idea that the situation and gone so badly wrong. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

No one in command

As the situation worsened, it was every division for its self. The 7th Armoured Division and 5th Indian Division commanders both recognized that they had serious problems, but there was no corps commander between them and the army commander. The army commander was oblivious, so the divisions continued to commit their forces piecemeal, where they were defeated individually. The 2nd Armoured Brigade group was this skeleton organization with one tank regiment, one motor battalion, and one RHA regimentIt was sent off on its own towards a point to the south of Knightsbridge. At this point, on 5 June 1942, Rommel was formulating his plan of action, given the developing situation. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

the Gazala Battle turns against the British on 5 June 1942

Initially, the battle on 5 June 1942 favoured the British. Early in the morning, the battle turned and the Germans, particularly, had the advantage. The initial British thrust in the early morning dark succeeded only because the attacking forces stopped short of the main Axis force. The 22nd Armoured Brigade had a strength, before the fight, of 156 tanks. They were a mixture of Grants, Stuarts, and Crusaders. They quickly ran into heavy artillery fire and turned north. They left the infantry unsupported when they were struck by German tanks. The 2nd Highland Light Infantry were driven backwards onto the Gurkhas. The same sort of thing happened to the 2nd West Yorkshires. The British fought dispersed, without support and could be beaten in detail. The 32nd Army Tank Brigade had started their attack on the Sidra ridge with 70 infantry tanks and lost 50 before the attack was canceled. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

The flawed command structure

The planned attack on the Cauldron was to be mounted with no single officer in command. Instead, there were these independent units involved, but operating on their own. The plan sounds like another typical 8th Army operations, with the forces sent off in all directions, acting alone. The 10th Indian Brigade would attack to the west. The 32nd Army Tank Brigade would attack south and take the Sidra Ridge. Following those movements, timed to happen sequentially, the 7th Armoured Division and 9th Indian Brigade would attack west into the Cauldron. Why could they have not been more concentrated and moved together? This was all to commence on 5 June 1942. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

Auchinleck's plan

By 2 June 1942, General Auchinleck wanted to mount an attack towards Bir el Temrad from the XIII Corps front. He was the only one in favor of such a move, as it was opposed by General Ritchie and his corps commanders. He had also thought about a turning movement around the southern end of the front, but gave it up in face of opposition and the questions about their ability to keep the attack supplied. He then decided that they would attack the Axis forces in the vicinity of "The Cauldron". The attack would be mounted on 5 June and would start with the 10th Indian Brigade and the with 4th RTR support easily took their objective. The other moves also went well, but that was because the Axis forces were further to the west than the plan had foreseen. The result was that the result was very bad. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

Other moves on 2 June 1942

Rommel tried to distract the British from Bir Hacheim by sending the 21st Panzer Division on a feint towards Eluet et Tamar on 2 June 1942. They encountered the 5th RTR and destroyed 12 of their tanks. The 5th RTR was one of the regiments in the 4th Armoured Brigade. That was the only major movement for a few days while both sides were working on recovering and repairing tanks and reorganizing for the next phase of the battle. The DAK had been reduced to just 130 runners from the total of about 320 tanks that they had at the start of the battle. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

The fight for Bir Hacheim, starting 2 June 1942

The Germans and Italian forces moved on Bir Hacheim next. 2 June 1942 was a day of sand storms. On 3 June, the German air force started bombing Bir Hacheim. For their part, the RAF hit the easy targets presented by the concentrated German and Italian units moving on Bir Hacheim. The RAF shot down 16 German and Italian aircraft at the cost of 13 lost. The Free French forces were heartened by the strong air support.

British and Commonwealth ground forces were active, but mostly with Jock columns operating on the German supply lines that cut through the minefields at Trigh Capuzzo and the Trigh el Abd. Columns were drawn from the 1st South African Division, the 50th Division, and the 7th Motor Brigade. The one brigade-size attack was made by the 1st South African Brigade against the Trento Division. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

Bir Hacheim

Rommel was in a somewhat more secure position by 2 June 1942. After taking the Sidi Muftah area, he intended to attack Bir Hacheim with some of his better infantry: the 90th Light Division and the Italian Trieste Division (motorized). The Official History notes that by this phase of the battle, Rommel had lost General Gause and Colonel Westphal to wounds.

Since 30 May, the British had been very active in the air, but by 2 June, they had taken many losses and had to stop low level attacks on Axis ground forces due to the dwindling stocks of Kittyhawks. The British had lost 50 aircraft in the first 5 days of the battle. The only good sign was the arrival of the first Spitfires in the fighter role. The plan was to use them to fly high cover for Hurricanes used as fighter-bombers. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

The battle turns against the British by 2 June 1942

General Ritchie seems to have been slow to react to the events of 30 May 1942. General Ritchie had planned an attack in the vicinity of where the 150th Brigade had been located. He hoped to destroy the Axis forces in the Cauldron, but the attack that was mounted was hopelessly inadequate. One battalion from 151st Brigade attacked Sidra ridge, but was rebuffed on the night of 1st/2nd June. The 10th Infantry Brigade never even responded, due to the late receipt of orders. While the British plan still-fired, Rommel was busy formulating new plans. His next objective was the Free French at Bir Hacheim. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

The 150th Infantry Brigade was lost on 1 June 1942

The 150th Infantry Brigade had fought well against heavy odds, but they were unsupported. On 1 June 1942, they were heavily attacked by divebombers and were defeated by "concentric" attacks. The 150th Brigade had been holding five miles of ground, and had been attacked from all sides. The British Army command was so inept that Rommel was able to withdraw strong forces from "the Cauldron" to throw at 150th Brigade. 30th Corps had sent the 2nd and 22nd Armoured Brigades against Rommel's anti-tank screen and they had been rebuffed on 30 May. In typical fashion, parts of the 4th Armoured Brigade and 201st Guards Brigade had been sent off on foolish errands. At this point, General Ritchie and his commanders had lost control of the battle to Rommel. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

Against the 150th Brigade, starting early on 30 May 1942

The Germans had not been aware of the 150th Brigade, early on 30 May 1942, until they had tried to break through to the west, south of Sidi Muftah. They lost 11 tanks and stopped. The breakthrough force had included the 5th Panzer Regiment. The next day, the attack recommenced with greater force. The 90th Light Division and the Italian Trieste Division had been added. They were stopped and waited until 1 June, the next day, when they had strong divebombing support and elements of the 21st Panzer Division. The 150th Brigade was increasingly being pressed and was in great danger. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

The 150th Infantry Brigade

Vol.III of the Official History gives the composition of the 150th Infantry Brigade on about 28 May 1942:

150th Infantry Brigade
commander: Brigadier C.W. Haydon

4th Battalion, East Yorkshire Regiment
4th Battalion, The Green Howards
5th Battalion, The Green Howards
D Company, 2nd Battalion Cheshire Regiment (MG)
72nd Field Regiment RA
25th/26th Medium Battery (7th Medium Regiment) RA
259th (Norfolk Yeomanry) Anti-Tank Battery RA
81st/25th LAA Battery RA
232nd Field Company RE

Rommel changes his plans on 29 May 1942

Rommel decided that his plan to push north needed to be dropped due to his supply situation. His new plan, as of 29 May 1942, was to screen the British armour with anti-tank guns while his infantry broke a hole in the British minefields. That would solve his supply situation and "a way of escape, if need be". The British were over-confident and thought that he time was ripe for a counter-attack to defeat the Axis armour and disrupt the supply line. The whole idea that a counter-attack was possible was based on the mistaken idea that the Axis armour was trapped and was deteriorating. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

Lord Lovat

Something reminded me of Lord Lovat today. I had seen a History Channel documentary when I was working away from home and came away with a mistaken impression of Lord Lovat's role in the Normandy invasion. I had thought that he had jumped into Normandy, but he actually went ashore at Sword Beach. He did lead part of his brigade, the 1st Special Service Brigade, to Pegasus Bridge to reach the airborne troops of the 6th Airborne Division who had gone in behind the beach in darkness. I can see that he was a charismatic leader of men in combat. I had not realized that his name was Simon Fraser although I had remembered that he was a Scot. This is the Wikipedia image of Lord Lovat in 1942 at Newhaven after Dieppe. Note that Lord Lovat was a 31-year old Lieutenant-Colonel in this photograph and was a 32-year old Brigadier at Normandy. By the wawy, he was known for carrying a Winchester rifle as his personal weapon in battle. The Wikipedia page has more about his life.

The 150th Infantry Brigade late on 28 May 1942

The 150th Infantry Brigade commander, Brigadier C.W. Haydon, knew by late on 28 May 1942 that he was in trouble. He redeployed to defend in all directions, as an attach from the East, previously his rear, seemed very likely. Early on 29 May, he was joined by the HQ of 1st Army Tank Brigade with the 44th RTR and a squadron of 42nd RTR with 30 infantry tanks. The only bright spot for the British was that General Cruewell had to make a forced landing and was captured. He had been one of the key Axis commanders and his judgment and skill would be missed. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.