Yugoslavia's choice

Discussions took place in Belgrade after Colonel Peresitch returned from Greece. Those discussions lasted until 24 March 1941, when Yugoslavia decided to side with Germany in the war. A delegation went sent to Vienna, where they joined the Tripartite pact. When the news was heard in Belgrade, young officers staged a coup d'etat. Prince Paul and his family were exiled and the young prince was proclaimed king. The coup was widely backed by the Serbs in Yugoslavia. General Wilson was on a reconnaissance mission to northern Greece, prompted by news of Yugoslavia joining the Axis. Winston Churchill was greatly heartened by news of the coup. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

A fallback position

Even before the British and Dominion troops went into Greece, General Wilson was concerned about a fallback position. He seems to have little faith, by about 9 March 1941, they there was any prospect of halting a German advance into Greece. General Wilson hoped to send a team of officers to look for defensible positions behind the line that they expected to go into initially. While this was happening, the Italians in Albania mounted a new offensive in the middle of the front. The Italians used 12 divisions, but where not able to make progress against a Greek force half their size. This says a lot about the quality of Italian troops and their morale, as the Greeks were not only a smaller force, but were poorly equipped. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official history.

An assessment of the Yugoslav visit and the aftermath

The Australian Official History says that the apparent mission of the Yugoslav envoy, Colonel Perestich seems to have been to collect enough information that Prince Paul, the Yugoslav regent, could decide which side to join. The Allies certainly did not get what they desired from the Yugoslav visit. They did hear that what Yugoslavia was concerned about was that Salonika would be held, as that was vital to their supply line. The Yugoslavs, however, were unwilling to make any commitments to the Greeks and British. While this visit happened, General Wilson, the British commander-designate for the Greek operation, was becoming increasingly concerned that his force would be overcome piecemeal and would be ineffective. This, of course, was General Blamey's concern as well. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The secret meeting in Greece

On 8 March 1941, a Yugoslav colonel carried out a secret visit to Greece where he met General Wilson, the eventual British commander of the force to be sent to Greece. General Wilson was not in uniform, to assuage the concerns of the Greeks. They were concerned, of course, at a German reaction to the visit of General Wilson to meet with the Yugoslavs about possible cooperation against the Germans. The Yugoslav visit was a response, rather late, to a British request for talks. Prince Paul, the regent, decided that he would rather negotiate with the Germans and hope to forestall an invasion. Therefore, the British got nothing from the meeting. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The Dominion government concerns

While both the governments of Australia and New Zealand agreed that they still backed the operation in Greece, they both asked that the promised British forces be sent to accompany the force, but that the necessary plans must be made to withdraw them if, as expected, the Greek forces would not be able to stop the German advance. The situation prompted Admiral Pound to send a personal message to Admiral Cunningham about the need to be prepared for a withdrawal of the Dominion forces. Admiral Cunningham refused, however, to commit any more than withdrawing the Australians and New Zealanders with the British when such a withdrawal happened. The Australians then raised the question whether General Blamey should command the force going into Greece, due to the majority being Dominion troops. Both Generals Blamey and Freyberg were very experienced and were qualified to command the Greek force. In the end, as the British wished, General Wilson commanded the force sent to Greece. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

More about General Blamey and the Greek plans

General Blamey was very unhappy with the British plans for Greece. He considered that the Australian forces were being sent to "Europe" in small pieces, rather than as part of a larger force. He had hesitated about being too open about his opinion, but when Mr. Menzies found out the truth in late 1941, he realized that the British had misled him about General Blamey's supposed agreement with the plan. General Blamey kept up a brave front in March 1941 and said despite the plan being bad, the Australians would perform well in battle. It appears, however, that General Blamey had hesitated to express his concerns forcefully to the formidable General Wavell when they met in early March. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

Churchill's reply to Mr. Menzies

The Australian cabinet were greatly distressed over General Blamey's opinion of the Greek plan. Mr. Menzies appealed to Winston Churchill for some reassurance that there was some chance of success in Greece. Mr. Churchill countered with what I had assumed all along was the driving force behind a move into Greece. The motivation was Anthony Eden's sense that they were morally obligated to go to the aid of Greece and that the political fallout was too great to risk not going into to Greece. We already suspect that the professional military opinion was that there was little chance of a successful outcome. So the British government was pushing the Commonwealth forces to go into an untenable situation for political reasons. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

A negative reaction

After General Blamey had complained about his treatment by Generals Dill and Wavell, the Australian government was greatly distressed by this and by the fact that General Blamey considered the Greek operation to be very risky. The Australian government was also concerned about a refusal being viewed in a negative light by other countries. Part of Wavell's attitude towards General Blamey was that Wavell had discussed the Greek operation with Mr. Menzies, prior to meeting with Blamey, so the second meeting seemed superfluous. General Blamey was ready to be the good soldier and go to Greece, even though he saw the plan as being fatally flawed. General Blamey suspected that the international political considerations outweighed his concern about a bad plan. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

Stories told

General Blamey had been promised that 23 squadrons would be available to support the force in Greece. The Prime Minister, Mr. Menzies, was told in London that there were only 11 squadrons available. The reality was even worse: only seven squadrons were ultimately to support the force sent to Greece. Both the Commonwealth commanders, Generals Freyberg and Blamey, felt that they had never been consulted about the planned operation to Greece. They had only been instructed by the CIGS and General Wavell as to their roles. Dill and Wavell seemed to not care about either Freyberg's nor Blamey's opinions on the subject. Dill had represented to the officials in Britain that he had obtained Freberg's and Blamey's "willingness" to participate in the Greek operation, which was very far from the truth. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The crisis in early March 1941

The British, particularly Anthony Eden, were ready to steamroller the Australians, especially General Blamey. General Wavell had not even discussed with Greek operation with General Blamey, the Australian commander. It was only when Antony Eden had received the cable from Churchill that he realized that the Australians, in particular, were reluctant to participate in the "Greek adventure". Generals Dill and Wavell called General Blamey for a meeting. Was Blamey being "called on the carpet"? General Blamey spoke later of this meeting and he felt like he was receiving instructions, not being consulted. General Blamey correctly understood that the British were determined to carry out the Greek operation, so he made a plea that they include adequate forces to give it some chance of success. The actual plan only included what amounted to token forces compared with what they would face in the Germans. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

Churchill loses faith in the Greek operation

By 6 March 1941, Winston Churchill had lost faith in the Greek operation. He sent a cable where he thought that they should change the plans to concentrate on taking Tripoli. That got an angry response from Anthony Eden, who pressed everyone involved to continue with the Greek operation, even though he was the only one who wanted to continue. The Australian General Blamey had already expressed jos concerns about the Australian forces to be committed to Greece. Prime Minister Menzies had already sent a cable about his concerns about the new situation in Greece. There was a claim that discounted the threat of German intervention in North Africa and they claimed that "Benghazi could be held". Apparently, Anthony Eden had wanted the operation to continue due to the commitments he had made, despite the opinions of Generals Dill and Wavell. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

Misgivings

The Australian Prime Minister, Mr. Menzies, expressed his unhappiness that Anthony Eden had made a written commitment of Australian forces that had "substantially" modified the proposal with which he had agreed. The Australian commander, General Blamey, requested permission to submit his concerns before the force was committed to battle. This was incongruous because the government had agreed to the original proposal with the word that General Blamey had agreed. As it was the government was now committed and any concerns would probably have to be ignored. The gist of General Blamey's cable sent from Alexandria was that the divisions committed to Greece were all just collections of smaller units that had never trained together as divisions. They would be facing highly trained and well-equipped German divisions. They would be facing the weight of German air power. General Blamey considered the Greek operation as extremely hazardous, and that proved to be correct. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

Further information

On 26 February 1941, the New Zealand Government had agreed to send their division to Greece, but only on the condition that it be fully equipped and have an armoured brigade accompanying them. The Australian Government agreed to send two divisions to Greece, but conditioned on there being plans and adequate shipping to withdraw them if the operation failed. As the situation looked increasingly bad, Mr. Menzies had asked that the plan to send troops to Greece be reconsidered. The Prime Minister, Mr. Churchill, also had misgivings. It was Anthony Eden who insisted that the doomed operation go forward. The government in the UK had then sent General Wavell a message taking responsibility for the Greek operation. The die was cast. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

March 3, 1941 in Greece

On 1 March 1941, after the intelligence had been received that the Germans were now in Bulgaria, the situation was radically transformed. The Greek attitude became defeatist. In actuality, the German advance into Bulgaria would only occur several days later. Still, Anthony Eden and General Dill were so alarmed by the changes that they asked General Wavell to fly to Greece. He arrived on 3 March and they had a meeting with the Greek King and General Papagos on 4 March. General Papagos proposed a compromise about how the Greek troops would be deployed. They considered withdrawing the offer of military aid, but finally accepted the compromise. The British delegation was left in an uncertain position. Anthony Eden had sent a communication to Yugoslavia, hoping for a positive response. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

The Germans move into Bulgaria

While the British delegation was still in Ankara, on 1 March 1941, they heard that German forces had entered Bulgaria. That prompted another visit to Athens by the British group. The British envoy in Yugoslavia, thought that the Yugoslavs might be impressed by their plans to aid the Greeks. They knew that the Yugoslavs feared the Germans, but they seem to have an inflated concept of the small force that they could send to Greece. The Greeks were hesitant to withdraw from Macedonia until they knew how the Yugoslavs would react. With the Germans in Bulgaria, the Greeks thought that the time had passed for a withdrawal to the agreed-upon line. General Papagos did not want to start a withdrawal that he calculated would take 15 days, not with the Germans already in Bulgaria. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

After Greece in late February 1941

When the British diplomatic and military group left Athens, they first stopped in Cairo. From there, they went to Turkey. The British had hoped to have Turkish agreement to come into the war on the Allied side, but the Turks refused, given that the British had nothing to offer in return. All the available troops were earmarked for Greece. The Turks considered themselves to be ill-equipped and were considered about the unreliable Yugoslav government. The Turks were more concerned about Russia, which was still cooperating with Germany, then they were the Germans. The British still had the good will of the Turkish government and people, even though they felt that they needed to stay neutral. The Turks were impressed that the Germans had beaten the British in 1940, as the Turks had been beaten by the British in 1918. They calculated that the Germans must be very powerful. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

Negotiations

The British delegation to Greece included the CIGS, General Dill, General Wavell, and Anthony Eden. The British and Greeks negotiated most of the night. Finally, at about 3am, the Greeks accepted the British offer of assistance. Oddly, Anthony Eden was said to be "buoyant", after the Greeks accepted. Lt. Col. de Guingand, who accompanied the delegations says that Anthony Eden asked the the number of men be inflated beyond what was possible, presumably to ensure that the Greeks would agree. Considering that there was little possibility of success, Anthony Eden's attitude towards the outcome of the negotiations is telling. He apparently was more interested in having a successful negotiation to his credit than being involved with an operation that had almost no chance of success. The British military understood the situation, but that was ignored by Mr. Eden. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The Greek plan

The Greek general Papagos explained the plans to the British delegation about 22 February 1941. There were four Greek divisions east of the Axios River. That is located south of the border with Bulgaria. They formed the Eastern Macedonian Army. If the Yugoslavs decided to fight the Germans, then the Greeks should attempt to hold Salonika. That was the natural supply source for Yugoslavia. If the Yugoslavs stayed neutral, or worse yet, cooperated with the Germans, then the Greeks would leave only fortress troops in Eastern Macedonia and would withdraw to the passes at Olympus, Veria, and Edessa. That withdrawal would take the Greeks up to twenty days. The Greeks calculated that it would take eight divisions, along with a reserve division, to defend that line. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The British force for Greece

The British plan included about 100,000 men for Greece. This would include three infantry divisions and the Polish Carpathian Brigade. There would also be one armoured brigade, with another one a possibility. That would mean a force "with 240 field guns, 202 anti-tank guns, 32 medium guns, 192 anti-aircraft guns and 142 tanks." The intent was to ship the units in three groups. The first group would include one infantry division and an armoured brigade. Each group included one infantry division, with the Polish Carpathian Brigade included in the second shipment. The last might possibly include a second armoured brigade. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

Doing the wrong thing for political reasons

Even the CIGS, General Dill, had been involved in the decision to send a force to Greece, but had doubts that doing so would serve any useful purpose. Anthony Eden hoped to pressure the Greeks to take the help immediately, to increase the chance that it could be successful. All Anthony Eden hoped for was to be able to hold a line against the coming German attack. Mr. Eden thought that the lack of air power would preclude holding Salonika, which is what General Wavell wanted to do. They decided to "offer the command" to General Maitland Wilson. At the start of discussions between the Greek government and the British delegation, the Greek prime minister, Alexander Koryzis, expressed his government's intent to fight the Germans when the attacked. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

General Wavell in February 1941

General Wavell could see that for the British to hold Salonika and provide an air force to raid Rumanian oil fields would be desirable. He thought, though, that they were likely not to arrive in time to do either. Another possibility was that they could help the Greeks hold the Aliakmon River line. But Wavell had doubts about whether the Greeks would fight the Germans when the time came.

While all this was being discussed, the British air strength in the Middle East was declining. Losses exceeded what was being sent to North Africa. In the first three months of 1941, the British lost 184 aircraft and received 166. Also, there seemed to be no army units available for North Africa. The only division that had arrived from the UK after June 1940 was the 2nd Armoured Division, which was poorly equipped. There was a plan to send the 50th Division around the Cape of Good Hope, but they had not been dispatched as of February. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

New Australian units in the Middle East

Two Australian brigades arrived in the Middle East from Britain. They were the 18th and 25th Australian brigades. They were diverted to the 7th Australian Division since they were better equipped than other units. They joined the 21st Australian Brigade, which was already part of the 7th Australian Division. The 9th Australian Division was left with the 20th, 24th, and 26th brigades. The 8th Australian Division was in the Far East, in Malaya and Australia.

The Australian Prime Minister, Mr. Menzies, was in Egypt from 5 February to 14 February 1941. He met with General Wavell about the plans for Greece. After the meeting, General Wavell sent a telegram expressing his misgivings about sending a force to Greece when Greece and Turkey were hesitant to accept British aid. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The tentative plan for Greece

The tentative plan was that the experienced 6th Australian Division would be withdrawn from the desert and sent to Greece. They would be replaced in the desert by the 9th Australian Division. The 9th was poorly equipped and lacked combat experience. They gamble was that the Italians were beaten, so the British could afford to strip the desert of experienced troops and the best equipment and they could send them to Greece. The 2nd Armoured Division had just arrived in the desert in January 1941, but they had tanks with worn tracks that could not be replaced with what was available in the desert. Wavell's plan was to send half of the division to Greece and keep half in North Africa. This was a period where an armoured division had two armoured brigades and a support group with infantry and artillery. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The Greek commander was pretty savvy

The Greek commander, General Papagos, seemed to have more sense than the British leadership team. His assessment was that to mount a successful defense on the border with Bulgaria would take 9 divisions with air support. He thought that the British offer of three divisions drawn from North Africa was inadequate and was a strategic mistake for the Briitish. General Papagos thought that the three divisions offered should stay in North Africa, where they would have the greatest effect. General Wavell apparently agreed with General Papagos's assessment, because he was quoted as saying that sending three divisions was a "dangerous half-measure". Churchill and the Chiefs of Staff in Britain would hear nothing of it, and were hell-bent on sending the three divisions, even though it was the worst plan. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

A forelorn cause: fighting the Germans in Greece in early 1941

The British had opened a successful campaign against the Italians, and by early January 1941, were driving the Italians back to the west. At the same time, Churchill and the Chiefs of Staff concluded that they could not make an effective effort against the Germans in Greece. Perversely, they decided that they had no choice and must send forces to aid the Greeks in the fight. They would be entering the country on what was known to be a lost cause. Despite the continuing successes against the Italians, the army would be stripped of troops to be sent to Greece. The air forces would also be reduced and what was withdrawn would accompany the troops to Greece. A small force was offered immediately: an infantry tank squadron, a cruiser tank regiment, and several artillery regiments. General Wavel and Air Chief Marshal Longmore were sent to inform the Greek General Metaxis of what they could to to help. They told him that they could send two or three divisions in the next two months. General Metaxis declined the offer, as what could be sent seemed inadequate and he did not want to offend the Germans. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The two British issues to consider in late 1940

At home, the primary British concern was to defend the home islands from German invasion. The Germans had triumphed in the west and had their army available for an invasion of the British isles. In the Middle East, the goal was to defend the Mediterranean theater and Africa from Italian attack. The Italian invasion of Greece did not bring the Germans into the battle in the Middle East and southeastern Europe. The Greek Army was able to successfully defend against the initial Italian attack from Albania. Everyone was concerned about the German presence in Hungary and Rumania. Everyone knew that on a whim, the Germans could change the complexion of the war in the Mediterranean Theater. On 6 January 1941, Anthony Eden informed Churchill that they had intelligence that indicated that the Germans were planning an attack on Greece. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

Into a new volume: Greece, Crete and Syria

In the volume "Greece, Crete, and Syria", we go back to 1941, starting in the spring and going into early summer. This was a period when Australia became much more involved with decision making. This was also a period when Australians commanded significant forces in the field. We start in Greece, in March 1941. At the beginning, the Greek and British forces had defeated the Italian army. As the Italians faltered, the British and Commonwealth forces knew that they would soon face the Germans in combat. The Italian attack on Greece in October 1940 eventually brought the Germans and British into battle against each other. The Italians had hoped for a quick and cheap victory in Greece, but they found themselves in a very different situation. After the Italian attack, the British deployed aircraft to Greece in support of the Greek army. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

We are going to be summarizing Greece, Crete and Syria, by Gavin Long

My son gave me several volumes of the Australian Official History. I plan on summarizing, next, Gavin Long's Vol.II: Greece, Crete and Syria. This volume is from the Army Series of the Australian Official History of World War II. As you may remember, we summarized Vol.I, To Benghazi, some time ago. Volume II starts with the disastrous Greek campaign, where the 6th Australian Division served in the ANZAC Corps under the command of General Blamey. After the withdrawal from Greece, a few Australian units fought in the battle for the island of Crete in May 1942. The volume concludes with the Syrian campaign, where the Commonwealth forces captured Syria from the Vichy French. I find the process of summarizing interesting volumes to be very educational. I end up doing a detailed reading that I would have not otherwise done, and a pace where I can absorb the material.

The Gazala front, in retrospect

When the two armies faced each other at Gazala, they were both well-supplied and of similar strength. When the Axis forces were at Gazala, they could be supplied by road from Tripoli and by supply ships arriving at Benghazi. The British were also well-supplied from Tobruk, by the rail line, and by road from the east. With the British being defeated in the Gazala battle, the situation became fluid and Rommel was able to take Tobruk and then, ultimately, to push all the way to El Alamein. At El Alamein, Auchinleck was able to fight a defensive battle, where he was able to stop the forward progress of Rommel's army. As the British fell back to the east, they were more easily supplied, plus new equipment, units, and reinforcements arrived in greater quantity. They started to receive the new American Sherman tanks, with a good medium velocity 75mm gun in a turret. From the UK, they started to receive the 6pdr anti-tank gun in increasing numbers, along with newer marks of British tanks. This marked the turning point in the war in North Africa. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

The period from November 1941 to September 1942

Volume Three of the Official History (The Mediterranean and Middle East) covers the period of November 1941 until September 1942. The volume started with the Crusader battle and ended with the Battle of Alam el Halfa. At the beginning, General Auchinleck was forced to intervene in the battle and defeat Rommel's forces. At the end, he was no longer theater commander, being replaced by Harold Alexander, and the 8th Army commander was now Bernard Law Montgomery. The advantage of having Montgomery was that he knew how to win battles and how to find them in very static, very confined battle fields, such as was the situation at El Alamein. Montgomery closed out this volume with a victory, where his plans were based on those of Auchinleck, and where dug-in British tanks, mostly Grants, outfought the Germans. The pace of change in the Desert was very great by September 1942. A great deal of new equipment was arriving and there were fresh units and reinforcements arriving in time for the next battle. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

Infantry tanks

The Battle of Alam el Halfa, in early September 1942, was the swan song of the Matilda infantry tank in the desert. The Matilda had a cast hull and could not be easily given a larger turret ring and gun. The easiest thing to do was to obsolete the tank and move on to newer designs. The Valentine, on the other hand, was a different situation. Like the Matilda with the 2pdr gun, the 2pdr Valentine was also obsolete. In the case of the Valentine, the tank could be modified with a larger turret ring and could be given a 6pdr or 75mm gun. The Valentine VIII and IX were armed with the 57mm 6pdr gun. The Valentine XI had the 75mm gun. The Valentine was gradually withdrawn from British service, but continued in service with the Russian army. The Russians appreciated the good armour and like the small size, as they were smaller targets and may have been more easily concealed. Chamberlain and Ellis say that 8.275 Valentines were built. The Valentine X was built in 1943 and the XI built in 1943-1944, also according to Chamberlain and Ellis. This is based on Vol.III of the Official History and Pictorial History of Tanks of the World 1915-45 by Peter Chamberlain and Chris Ellis.

An assessment of the Battle of Alam el Halfa

For the Axis forces, the Battle of Alam el Halfa indicated that their hopes of breaking through to the Nile Delta were at an end. For the British, the battle inspired new hope and confidence. The British army had a new commander, had beaten the Axis forces in a battle, and were pleased with the performance of the air force. The Navy, for their part, in conjunction with the air force, were inflicting great damage on the Axis supply line. The Axis forces were being starved of all the supplies and reinforcements that would have kept them competitive. Instead, they were slowly starved of resources, which meant that it was only matter of time before they were pushed back. This sort of battle, on a fixed front, with little movement was where Montgomery excelled. To fight his sort of battle, he needed a strong force, but that was what he would have for the battle that would bust the front open and push the Axis back to the west. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History, along with my analysis.

The battle ends after a week of fighting in early September 1942

At the end of the Battle of Alam el Halfa, we can compare the losses of the combatants:

Germans:  
  1,859 men killed, wounded, or missing
  33 guns, 298 vehicles, and 38 tanks lost

Italians: 
  1,051 men killed, wounded, or missing
  22 guns, 97 vehicles, and 11 tanks lost

British:  
  1,750 men killed, wounded, or missing
  15 anti-tank guns and 67 tanks lost or damaged 
     (31 Grants and 21 Valentines used as infantry tanks)

This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

A costly attack

The attack by the New Zealand Division, in the end, achieved little except to cause heavy losses to the units involved. The enemy hardly noticed the attack, being much more affected by the air effort during the attack. The attempt to close the minefield gaps failed miserably. The 132nd Infantry Brigade had 697 killed, wounded, and missing. The New Zealand losses were smaller, but still considerable. The one bright spot was the air operations during 2 and 3 September 1942 over the battlefield. The five hundred Allied aircraft engaged flew an average of five sorties per aircraft. The Americans used their B-24 Liberators, B-25 Mitchells, and P-40F Kittyhawk IIs in support of the British air effort. The attacks were followed by an Axis wirhdrawal to the most western minefields. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

The New Zealand Division attacks

The New Zealand Division attack to close minefield gaps started with raids by the 6th New Zealand Brigade, starting at about 11pm on 3 September 1942. The raids, however, put the enemy on notice that something was happening. The 132nd Brigade was slow to reach the starting line, and when they did, the enemy was waiting for them. The 132nd Brigade commander, Brigadier Robertson, was severely wounded. The 6th New Zealand Brigade commander, Brigadier Clifton, was captured when he drove into an enemy position. The only bright spot was the 5th New Zealand Brigade, which not only reached its objective but penetrated beyond, thanks to the 28th Maori Battalion. In the early afternoon of 4 September, the enemy launched a counter attack, which was repelled. Another attempted attack was broken up by the New Zealand Division artillery, with bomber help. With the pitiful results of the attack, General Freyberg proposed a withdrawal, which happened in the night of 4th/5th September, with more losses. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

The battle after the Battle of Alam el Halfa

General Montgomery realized at the end of the Battle of Alam el Halfa that the Eighth Army was not ready for an attack with the aim of busting open the front. He still wanted time to prepare for the big attack. After the end of the last battle, he wanted to only harass the enemy, although he would proceed with General Freyberg's planned attack to close the minefield gaps.

That attack would begin late on 3 September 1942. The 132nd Infantry Brigade had been replaced in the line by the 5th Indian Brigade, so it became available for the planned attack. The attack would consist of two three mile advances. The second would have the 151st Infantry Brigade by 4 September. The 7th Armoured Brigade would attack to the west in support of the operation.
The attackers on 3 September consisted of the 132nd Infantry Brigade and the 5th New Zealand Brigade with supporting Valentine tank squadrons. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

The attacks on 3 September 1942 went badly

The plan on 3 September 1942 was to attack at 10:30am with two brigades, the 132nd Brigade and the 5th New Zealand Brigade. The 6th New Zealand Brigade would attack at 11pm in support of the 132nd Brigade. Each brigade had a supporting Valentine squadron. The 132nd Brigade was new to the Desert and was slow to reach the starting line. The enemy was waiting for the attack and created confusion in the new troops. The 132nd Brigade commander was wounded and the brigade lost 697 killed, wounded, and missing. The 5th New Zealand Brigade achieved success, penetrating the enemy lines and doing much damage behind the front. After the attack stalled, General Freyberg, the New Zealand Division commander, ordered a withdrawal, which happened after the sun went down. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

The Australians attack on 1 September 1942

A battalion of the 9th Australian Division staged a raid early on 1 September 1942. They were supported by the 40th RTR, equipped with Valentine tanks. The raid was to the west of the Tel el Eisa. They were supported by day bombers in their attack. The Australian raiders were opposed by the German 164th Division. The gap for the attack could not be held, although they succeeded in capturing 140 German prisoners. The raiders had casualties of 135. The supporting 40th RTR lost seven Valentines in the fight. This was pretty much the end of fighting on the ground in the Battle of Alam el Halfa. The Desert Air Force continued operations through the day and into the night. This is based on the account in VOl.III of the Official History.

On 1 September 1942

While the 21st Panzer Division was not able to travel, the 15th Panzer Division was still able to operate. They started a flanking move around the 22nd Armoured Brigade, to the right. As we said, the 8th Armoured Brigade had been ordered up in support, but was held by the German anti-tank screen. Still, by noon, Rommel realized that there was little prospect of bringing fuel forward and decided to go into a defensive posture. General Montgomery's response was order the 30th Corps to form a reserve and ordered the 2nd South African Division to move to the north of Alam el Halfa. He also pulled a 50th Division brigade forward. They were replaced on airfield protection by a 51st Division brigade. We happen to know that for this operation, the 8th Armoured Brigade had 12 Crusader and 72 Grant tanks. They also had two Field Regiments and an Anti-tank Regiment of the Royal Artillery. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

The end of the first day, 31 August 1942

General Montgomery was pleased with how the first day of battle had gone. This was 31 August 1942. Once the two German panzer divisions were known, Montgomery placed the 23rd Armoured Brigade, with 100 Valentine tanks, under 10th Armoured Division command. They were positioned between the New Zealand Division and the 22nd Armoured Brigade. The dust storm during the day had kept the Desert Air Force from intervening in the battle. The dust storm died down at dusk, and this allowed the air force to operate. Night bombers hit the Axis transport, doing great damage. The action resumed on the ground early on 1 September. The 15th Panzer Division tried to bypass the 22nd Armoured Brigade to the right. The British responded by sending the 8th Armoured Brigade against them, but they were stopped by the German anti-tank screen. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

The first tank fight of Alam el Halfa

On the German side, the 15th and 21st Panzer Divisions were advancing. They ignored the decoy Crusaders of the 22nd Armoured Brigade and were going to move post. When that happened, the 22nd Armoured Brigade moved some of its Grants into view. This drew the 21st Panzer Division into a gun battle. They moved towards the 3/4 County of London Yeomanry, the center regiment. The Royal Scots Greys and 1st and 104th RHA, along with some of the 44th Division artillery. The 15th Panzer Division started to go around the right flank, when the current DAK commander, General von Vaerst, stopped the attack. In other actions, the 7th Light Armoured Brigade had fallen back when the German reconnaissance group advanced. The Italian mobile corps had come forward on the left flank of the DAK. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

Early on 31 August 1942

The Battle of Alam el Halfa had started right before and right after midnight between 30 August and 31 August 1942. The Axis forces had reached a minefield by 2am. They were facing the 7th Motor Brigade and the 7th Light Armoured Brigade. After General Nehring was wounded, Colonel Bayerlein commanded the DAK. Rommel arrived at the DAK headquarters at 9am. Rommel was ready to give up the fight, but Colonel Bayerlein argued that they should still try and capture Alam el Halfa. The attack was rescheduled to noon. The DAK would attack the western end of Alam el Halfa, which was an unfortunate choice. The situation deteriorated further due to a dust storm. The attack was delayed further. At the point of attack there were two Crusader squadrons positioned as decoys, while the Grant tanks and 6pdr anti-tank guns were all dug in. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

the Allied bomber force in North Africa in late August 1942

The American air force was in the process of establishing itself in North Africa. They had B-25 Mitchells and P-40F Kittyhawk IIs. There were also soem American-built B-24 Liberators and a very few B-17 Flying Fortresses. The Britiwh had140 medium bombeers and 25 heavy bombers. The medium bombers were probably Wellingtons, previously classed as heavy bombers. Late on 30 August 1942, Wellingtons, led by Albacore pathfinders, hit Axis forces assembling for the planned attack. The day bomber force, by 30 August, consisted primarly of Douglas Boston and Martin Baltimore aircraft. There was also a very small number of Marylands left in service. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

Montgomery's plans prior to Alam el Halfa

Right before the Battle of Alam el Halfa, Montgomery talked about his planned offensive. He would attack in October, and he would form a corps that mimicked the DAK. The new 10th Corps would be strong in armour. In keeping with that plan, Montgomery urged General Brian Horrocks to preserve his armour, so as to be ready for the attack in October.

For the immediate battle, Montgomery intended to use the Desert Air Force to continuously attack the Axis forces. He would also keep the Luftwaffe from interfering in the battle. The convoy battles in August 1942 were largely fought by the Italian air force, which allowed the German air forces to be repositioned to better support Rommel. The Axis air force in North Africa was now 720 aircraft strong, although about 450 were actually serviceable. To oppose them, the British had about 400 serviceable aircraft. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

The British position on 30 Augusts 1942

The 30th Corps, now an infantry corps, lay in the north. They were behind defenses that had considerable depth. The 23rd Armoured Brigade, consisting of Valentine tanks, lay in reserve. A mixed 13th Corps lay to the south. There was the New Zealand Division, the 44th Division, the 7th Armoured Division, having little strength, and the 10th Armoured Division, still using the old, two-armoured brigade organization. The 44th Infantry Division (with only two brigades), held the Alam el Halfa ridge. The New Zealand Division was deployed in front of the ridge. The 7th Armoured Division was to the south, while the two stronger armoured brigades had their tanks dug into the ground. All the classic photographs of the battle show the dug-in tanks. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

Rommel's plan vs. reality for Alam el Halfa

Rommel hoped to catch the British by surprise on 30 August 1942, but in fact, the British expected the attack. Rommel's hope for the timing was as over-optimistic as any of Auchinleck's plans. The two German reconnaissance units would penetrate deeply and then turn north. To their west would be the Deutsche Afrika Korps, with the Italian 20th Corps (Ariete and Trieste divisions) to their west. The 90th Light Division would be to the Italians' west, with the Italian infantry corps to their west. All would penetrate and then turn north in their respective positions. As for the timing, an example was the plan for the DAK, which would go 30 miles in seven hours. The remaining Axis troops would hold their front against any British attack. The Germans had 203 battle tanks: 93-Pzkw III's, 73-Pzkw III "special", 10-Pzkw IV, and 27 Pzkw IV "special". The Italians had 243 medium tanks, but many were in poor condition. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

The Axis supply situation was grim

By late August 1942, the Axis ability to ship supplies to North Africa had deteriorated further. Many of the ships dispatched towards Libyan ports were sunk. Rommel decided to gamble on a quick victory and decided to proceed with his planned attack. Even the fuel supply to the front was problematic, as Tobruk was 350 miles from El Alamein. At the same time, Rommel was experiencing incrasingly bad health problems. It was so bad that on 22 August, he had requested that General Guderian be sent to command in his place. Rommel was informed that not only was General Guderian not available, but no one else was, either. Rommel's plan of attack was that his troops would move forward on 30 August, at 11pm. They would initially move to the east, but would then turn north. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

Rommel in August 1942

Rommel knew in August 1942, that time was running out for any chance of defeating the British in North Africa. He was acutely aware of the convoys bringing reinforcements and equipment that were headed for Egypt. He also knew that he was unlikely to receive any substantial reinforcements. There was still a window where he had a chance to win a substantial victory. While the British were solidly placed in the north and the extreme south, there was an opening in the middle that might allow him to break through and turn north to the coast road. He could surround the emplacements on the coast and take them. To have a chance, he needed moonlight, which dictated a date in late August. To attack, however, he needed supplies delivered to the troops at the front. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

The air forces in August 1942

The British were really anxious to keep the Axis air strength in North Africa from growing, at the beginning of August 1942. The British conducted a bombing campaign against Axis landing grounds during the month. The one success that they had was when they destroyed ten aircraft on the night of 8/9 August. At the same time, the Germans changed commanders for their air force. Major-General Hans Seideman took over from General van Waldau, and he stayed in command for the rest of the North African campaign. Both Axis air forces concentrated on increasing their strength during the month. Operations were hampered by the lack of fuel for aircraft. The supply improved in the second half of August, and the Germans concentrated on fighter operations against the British. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

Run up to battle: August 1942

By the middle of August, the British became aware of Axis troop movements to the south of the El Alamein front. The Axis used fighter aircraft to shield their movements, making reconnaissance difficult. The British responded by escorting their reconnaissance aircraft with a large number of fighters. In August, the British lost eight reconnaissance aircraft and pilots, with another fifteen aircraft damaged. They had flown 481 sorties up to 20 August 1942, but then flew another 492 sorties in the remaining ten days of the month. Wellingtons were used tactically after 21 August against targets on the battlefield. These attacks prior to the actual start of the Battle of Alam el Halfa made life very difficult for the Axis troops. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

Operations in the air in August 1942

The shipping situation was so bad, due to losses of suitable ships, that the Germans were forced to send troops and what supplies could be carried. There were as many as 500 aircraft engaged in this effort to help German forces in North Africa. For some reason, the British had difficulty in stopping these flights. The British used long-range Beaufighters in the effort to stop them. They also used bombers against the bases in Crete. The air reconnaissance to support the effort was conducted by photo-reconnaissance Spitfires and Baltimores. Tactical reconnaissance was left to Tomahawk I's and Hurricane I and IIA aircraft. Administrators in the UK were not willing to risk valuable Spitfires for the low-altitude reconnaissance work, even though they would have cut losses in the operations. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

The Axis supply situation in the late summer and fall 1942

While the British supply situation had greatly improved by August 1942, the Axis forces were not receiving adequate supplies. There were adequate supplies in Italy, waiting to be sent to North Africa, but there were some serious obstacles. Rommel complained that when supplies were sent, that the Italians monopolized the available space on cargo ships. One issue was the lack of Italian escorts for convoys. The primary issue was lack of fuel for the escorts. Another serious problem was the scarcity of coastal cargo ships by this date, after sustained losses in transit. Once supplies arrived in North Africa, getting them to the front was problematic, partly due to the poor condition of the coast road and partly due to the unreliable vehicles due to the lack of spare parts. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

Command questions and an army for Persia and Iraq

Because the Prime Minister wanted the new commanders in the Middle East to focus on defeating Rommel, he proposed a separate command for Persia and Iraq. He proposed that General Auchinleck be the commander. Auchinleck, himself, opposed the idea, as he felt that command over forces in Persia and Iraq belonged with the Middle East. Because General Auchinleck refused the command, General Maitland Wilson was appointed as commander. Auchinleck left the Middle East with Churchill's undiminished admiration, despite all the troubles. Auchinleck had been able to stop the Axis advance in the July battles and had thrown the Axis back on the defensive, with the British forces on the attack. Auchinleck had reported that the British would not be ready until mid-September, but in the event, the attack was not launched until 23 October. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History, which we have summarized here.

The air strength situation in the summer and fall 1942

As the American air presence built up in the Middle East, supplies of replacement aircraft to the British were not keeping pace with losses. 11 RAF fighter squadrons had been reduced to half-strength. 9 more squadrons had no aircraft. The British were receiving Kittyhawks and Baltimores from the United States, but not in numbers sufficient to make good the losses. The Merlin-engined Kittyhawks all went to American squadrons. The problem was exacerbated by the fact that the American squadrons were not ready for combat operations. There was plan to limit the RAF to just 65 squadrons and to have 24 American squadrons. Even if the RAF were reduced in strength, they still needed to replace obsolescent aircraft. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

Tanks shipped to the British forces in the Middle East

Tanks are the common factor in two tables in the Official History. One table gives tanks shipped to the Middle East from the UK in 1942, up until September:

January     60
February   143
March       74
April      264
May        113
June       179
July       114
August     254
September   34

This shows the tanks shipped to the Middle East from North America:

January     102
February    192
March       251
April        73
May          25
June          3
July         33
August      132
September   407

We don't know this, but we can only imagine that many of the 407 in September were M4 Sherman tanks. This information is from Vol.III of the Official History: The Mediterranean and Middle East.

General Montgomery takes command

General Montgomery addressed officers at the Army headquarters to inform them of his high-level plans and intentions and to start the process of building some enthusiasm. Montgomery intended to defend Egypt at El Alamein. The army would succeed there or die. Montgomery knew that a great influx of reinforcements was en route and that the army's circumstances would be completely changed. Montgomery planned to hit Rommel's army, and keep hitting them, until they were out of North Africa. The British and their allies would finally have the resources available to make that a reality. One of Montgomery's first acts was to bring the headquarters at Burg El Arab, where they would be close to the air force headquarters for better cooperation. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

The replacements: August 1942

After General Gott's death, the CIGS tapped Lt-General Bernard Law Montgomery to command the Eighth Army with General Alexander as his theater commander. Churchill's instructions to Alexander were to "take or destroy" the Axis army. All other activities were to be subordinated to that task. The policy was "no more retreats" and that the army would fight with the divisions kept intact. Given the static situation that the British found themselves in at the El Alamein line, General Montgomery was the man they needed to fight the coming battle. Montgomery was the master of the static battle on a fixed front. He was not the man to fight the fluid, mobile battle. The plan was to wait to fight until all the preparations were made, at least if Rommel permitted that to happen. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

Churchill gives Auchinleck guidance

On 12 July 1942, the Prime Minster, Winston Churchill informed General Auchinleck that there no available divisions that could be sent to the northern front by October. At this date, there still had to be negotiations with the Americans about future plans and dispositions. Churchill recommended beating Rommel as the best solution for now. The General Staff expected that the winter would postpone the threat in the north until spring 1943.

Churchill had long been an Auchinleck supporter. He had from early on encouraged him to take command of the army in the field. Auchinleck had always thought that taking command of the army would cause the overall theater command to suffer, so he kept looking for subordinates to fill in as proxies in the army command. By May 1942, Churchill had become increasingly irritated that Auchinleck would not step in and command the army when Churchill had urged him to do so. By the time of his visit to the Middle East in the fall of 1942, Churchill decided that new commanders were needed in the Middle East to fight Rommel. He would move Auchinleck to a different command in the area (Iraq and Persia). Churchill wanted General Brook, the CIGS, to theater commander, but he demurred. Instead, Harold Alexander was become theater commander with Lt-General Gott as the 8th Army commander. These plans were disrupted when General Gott was killed when a Bombay was intercepted by German fighters, was forced down, and destroyed. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

Uncertainty in the Middle East

During the summer of 1942, the commanders in the Middle East became increasingly concerned about threats from the north against their position. The Germans might well blitz across Russia and down the east side of the Black Sea. The smaller countries like Iran (the British insisted on calling it Persia), Iraq, and Syria might throw their support to the Germans. The commanders had hoped to get a better intelligence assessment from Britain, but received none and, in fact, no guidance at all. In Britain, the War Office dismissed the idea that there was anything of substance to the concerns of those in the Middle East. The Middle East commanders worried that all their forces were engaged in the desert and that they had no defenses facing north. They were keenly aware of the forces that had been diverted to the Far East after December 1941, and had some vague hope that some of them might be pulled back to face the uncertain threat. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

High level meetings in July 1942

Winston Churchill was in negotiations with the Americans in July 1942, at a time when the British had no military successes. The Americans had been keen for a cross-channel invasion in 1942, but Churchill was able to dissuade them and to put in place plans more compatible with what he wanted to see happen. He was successful in getting the Americans to agree to a North African invasion and to postpone the cross-Channel invasion until the Allies were better prepared. The North African invasion was named "Torch" and was planned for 30 October 1942.

After these discussions, Churchill turned his attention to the Middle East. He had the sense that a change of leadership was needed in North Africa and the Mediterranean Theater. The British ought to have beaten Rommel in North African, and the generally held opinion was that with a better general, they would have. While Churchill was thinking of visiting the Middle East, he received an invitation from Stalin to visit Moscow. In the event, he made the trip on an American B-24 Liberator, an aircraft with the necessary range. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

The situation at the end of July 1942

General Auchinleck had persisted in attacks that always seem to end in disaster because he sensed that the Axis forces were close to the breaking point. Too much was being tried on an ad hoc basis, but Rommel agreed with Auchinleck's assessment that his forces were being pushed to the limit. General Auchinleck thought that the Italians were at the point of collapse, so he concentrated on attacking them. Rommel wrote on 17 July 1942 that the British were destroying Italian formations, one at a time. The Germans were too weak, however, to fight without the Italians. The Axis forces were fortunate to survive this period with their lines intact and it was a very close thing. The saving grace for the Axis was that the British operations were hastily mounted and without adequate preparation or planning. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

Tanks, anti-tank mines, and anti-tank guns

The Official History's assessment was that at the end of July 1942, the British had not figured how to use infantry and armour in cooperation, at least in a changed environment dominated by more powerful anti-tank guns (used offensively) and by widespread use of anti-tank mines. The British plans for the battles in July were formulated as if the old situation were still in place. That is, that infantry could attack and open up corridors for armour to advance into the enemy's rear area.

The situation had also changed in that Rommel had gone on the defensive, rather than being prepared to blitz to exploit British weakness. The land in the narrows between the Qattara Depression and the Mediterranean was fast being blocked by mines and barbed wire. Fortunately for the British, by November, they would be commanded by the master of the fixed-piece battle, Bernard Law Montgomery.

British special operations in support of the attack

An effort was made with British special forces (the SAS and the LRDG) against Axis airfields in the night of 26/27 July 1942. They estimated that they destroyed 30 aircraft in this raid. In addition, tank fire destroyed three German aircraft. It is unclear what Italian losses were. On 27 July, the British air force made a special effort to support the army. The operational tempo was starting reduce the available air strength, but the 27th was the biggest day in the last ten days (since 17 July). The effort was wasted in a sense, since the infantry was left unsupported by armour and decimated in the attack. The problem was that the widespread use of anti-tank mines that had not previously been a factor. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

The 69th Brigade comes to a bad end

Since the 69th Brigade had moved forward, starting at 1:30am, they were able to reach their objective with two battalions. As we know, they were lacking their planned anti-tank gun support. In the confused situation on the morning of 27 July 1942, the 2nd Armoured Brigade was not able to come forward in support. The Germans realized the exposed position of the 69th Brigade and attacked. The 6th Durham Light Infantry and the 5th East Yorks were overrun. The 2/28 Australian Battalion was supposed to be clearing mines, but they received heavy fire, so that they were not able to clear the way for the 50th RTR. The 50th RTR lost heavily and then the Australians were overrun as well. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

The operation starts to go wrong

A feature of Auchinleck-planned operations is that the timelines tended to be over-optimistic. The attack early on 27 July 1942 was no exception. The Australians had taken their objective by 3am. The 69th Brigade moved forward when they learned that progress had been made in clearing gaps in the minefields. Two of the brigade's battalions got through the gaps and reached their objective by 8am. Their anti-tank support did not come forward as was needed. Only a small detachment was near the forward infantry. After that, the situation deteriorated. Confusion reigned among the infantry that was supposed to clear gaps for tanks. That meant that the 2nd Armoured Brigade was not able to advance on the planned schedule. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

One last attempt to break the Axis front

General Auchinleck planned one last attack to attempt to break the Axis front at El Alamein. The attack was planned for 26 July 1942 and would be mounted in the north. 30th Corps was augmented by the 1st Armoured Division (without the 22nd Armoured Brigade), the 4th Light Armoured Brigade, and the 69th Infantry Brigade. The 13th Corps would hold and make a feint on tbeir front. The attack would start on the night of 26/27 July 1942. The South Africans would lift mines and mark a path through the minefield. At 1am, the 24th Australian Brigade would advance and take one end of the Miteirya Ridge. At that point, the 69th Infantry Brigade would move forward through the minefield gap. They would be followed by the 2nd Armoured Brigade and the 4th Light Armoured Brigade. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

30th Corps, now an infantry corps

The odd situation in the British army in the desert included the fact that the 13th Corps and 30th Corps had switched roles. The 30th Corps had contained the armoured divisions, while the 13th Corps had the infantry divisions. Now, it was the 30th Corps that had the infantry. The 9th Australian Division, now in 30th Corps, attacked early on 22 July 1942. The division consisted of the 24th and 26th Brigades. The Australians were successful in the first phase of the attack, taking the ridge at Tell el Makh Khad. The second phase of the attack started at 7pm, when the 24th Australian Brigade. The 50th RTR was intended to act in support, but ended up operating independently, as they were not trained in infantry support. As darkness fell, they had lost 23 tanks and withdrew as planned. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

The 2nd Armoured Brigade tries to intervene

An effort was made to bring the 2nd Armoured Brigade into action in support of the 23rd Armoured Brigade and the New Zealanders. This meant clearing a path through minefields so that the tanks could more forward. Finally, at 5pm, the 9th Lancers and 6th RTR were able to roll. They almost immediately came under artillery fire and anti-tank gun fire. They lost five tanks that burnt and others were hit. General Gatehouse had already been wounded, so the acting commander, Brigadier Fisher called off the attack. By the time the regiments had backed out, the brigade had lost 21 tanks. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

The 161st Indian Motor Brigade attacks

On the night of 20/21 July 1942, the attacking 161st Indian Motor Brigade also ran into problems, much as the New Zealanders had. Their northern flank was protected by the 2nd Regiment Botha. The brigade had somewhat mixed results, but the 1/1st Punjab regiment took 190 prisoners. In fact, the enemy defenders were shaken by this attack. By 8am, the two regiments of the 23rd Armoured Brigade had arrived in support. The 40th RTR quickly lost 17 tanks to mines and anti-tank guns. 15 tanks succeeded in reaching the objective, but without support, they were rapidly knocked out. The 15 was reduced to five effective tanks. The 46th RTR had a similar experience. All together, the brigade had 40 tanks knocked out and 47 others damaged. After the 21st Panzer Division attacked at 11am, the brigade was ordered to withdraw. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

Another disaster for the New Zealanders

In the attack on 21 July 1942, the 6th New Zealand Brigade captured their objective, although some vehicles and troops got lost in the dark. General Inglis was chagrined to hear that his troops were in danger from German tanks. In the event, the brigade was overrun, Brigadier Clifton was captured, and almost 700 men were lost. Brigadier Clifton succeeded in escaping, after pretending to be a private. Again, the New Zealanders were not properly supported by British armour. In this battle, two 2nd Armoured Brigade regiments had tried to come to the New Zealanders' assistance, but one ran afoul of a minefield while the other was held up by the usual aggressive use of anti-tank guns by the Germans. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

Trouble for the 1st Armoured Division on 18 July 1942

Harassing air attacks would trouble both sides involved in the battles at El Alamein in July 1942. An air attack on 18 July wounded the 1st Armoured Division commander, General Lumsden, and Brigadier Raymond Briggs, one of his armoured brigade commanders. A desert veteran, Major-General Gatehouse, was called forward to command the 1st Armoured Division. General Gatehouse only arrived at the front in the evening of 20 July, when plans had already formulated for his division's role in the coming attack. Sadly, the 1st Armoured Division would again be too late coming to the aid of New Zealanders left exposed to German attack. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

The planned attack on 21 July 1942

Grand plans were made on 19 July 1942 to attack on 21 July. Very elaborate instructions were given to 13th Corps to break through and to push to the west. The main attack would come at Deir el Shein and Deir el Abyad with a secondary attack in the south. General Auchinleck fully expected to bust the Axis front open and to be able to exploit to the west. The 13th and 30th Corps had reversed their previous roles, as 30th Corps was given a static task with the 13th Corps being in the mobile role. The air attack would being with Wellingtons and Albacores during the night of 21st to 22nd July. In the morning, a there would be a very large attack with light bombers and fighter-bombers. The fatal flaw was to give important assignments to inexperienced units and that insufficient time was allowed for the initial operations. There was also an over-optimistic assessment of British ability to overcome Axis minefields. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

British forces after the three day battle (circa 18 July 1942)

The British had considerable strength left on 18 July 1942, after three days of fighting where they took losses. They had two infantry divisions at nearly full strength: the 1st South African and the 9th Australian Divisions. The New Zealand Division and the 5th Indian Division had both been reduced to two brigades. The 7th Armoured Division was being reconstituted as a mechanized division, with the 4th Light Armoured Brigade, the 7th Motor Brigade, and the 69th Infantry Brigade. The 1st Armoured Division still had a strong tank force: 61 Grants, 81 Crusaders, and 31 Stuarts. There were also two independent brigade groups available: the 161st Indian Motor Brigade and the 23rd Armoured Brigade. The latter brigade was equipped primarily with Valentine tanks, along with Matilda close support tanks. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

The situation on 18 July 1942

General Auchinleck believed that after the previous three days of battle, the Axis forces were in a greatly reduced state by 18 July 1942. He believed that by striking the Italians again, they would collapse. Certainly, by 21 July 1942, the Germans had only 42 tanks as runners with another 100 to repair. Their operational tanks included 6 Pzkw IIs, 27 Pzkw IIIs (probably 5cm L42), 6 Pzkw IIIs (5cm L60), 1 Pzkw IV (75mm L24), and 1 Pzkw IV (probably 75mm L46). The British greatly outnumbered the German tanks, as they had in excess of 172 tanks, including 61 Grant tanks with the 75mm medium velocity, dual-purpose gun in a sponson. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

Air activity from 14 to 17 July 1942

During the battle from 14 to 17 July 1942, the Desert Air Force had made a great effort to aid the Army. Altogether, some 1,900 sorties were flown during this period in direct support of the Army. On 17 July, eight Allied Liberators made a daylight raid on Tobruk. They flew over Tobruk, approaching from over the sea. The bombing raid was made without loss. The 1,900 sorties was equivalent to every available aircraft flying at least two sorties. The Official History gives a lot of credit to the aircraft maintenance infrastructure in supporting this operation. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

Unhappy New Zealanders after taking heavy casualties

During the period of 14 to 17 July, 1942, the New Zealanders had been committed to battle and had heavy casualties that they blamed on lack of support. This period had cost the New Zealand Division as much as 1,405 officers and men. These were either killed or wounded or taken prisoner by the Axis forces. The New Zealand forces had been initially successful in their operations. What had gone wrong is that they had moved forward and then were left vulnerable to attacking German armour. General Auchinleck felt that they needed to take some risks in order to make an attack that might cause the enemy to retreat from El Alamein. The New Zealand Division commander had been told that the 1st Armoured Division would support his division's operations. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

The Australians on 17 July 1942

The Australians attacked with infantry tank support on 17 July 1942. The forces engaged consisted of the 24th Australian Brigade supported by one squadron from the 44th RTR. They attacked towards Miteirya Ridge and at least produced some 800 prisoners from the Italian Trieste Motorized Division. In return, the Axis forces responded with bombing and a counter-attack that included the German reconnaissance units. The Australian brigade had over 300 casualties from the attack. The Australian brigade consolidated a bit north of Tell el Makh Khad. This is based on the account in Vol.III in the Official History.

Action on 16 July 1942 at El Alamein

The Axis forces were concerned that the British might break open their position with an attack by armour. They decided to preempt such a move with their own attack. Early on 16 July 1942, they attacked the 5th Indian Brigade "near Pt 64". The Axis forces were repulsed, but communications traffic indicated that another attack was likely. In preparation for such an attack, the 2nd Armoured Brigade was augmented by a regiment from the 22nd Armoured Brigade. They were well-supported by artillery. The expected attack started at 7:30pm and was defeated. The Australians had tried to retake ground near Tell el Eisa, but the artillery fire was too heavy to hold the captured territory. The operations on 16 July were well-supported by the air force, as there were 641 sorties by both fighters and fighter-bombers on that day. This was a record number. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

From later on 15 July 1942

By late on 15 July 1942, General Gott directed the NZ division commander to reduce the front he was holding. This was after General Gott had received word of the fate of the 4th NZ Brigade. The other parts of the front were less eventful. The 90th Light Division and the Italian Ariete Armoured Division tried to attack to the north, but were repulsed by the 22nd Armoured Brigade and by what was left of the 7th Armoured Division. The once-strong division had been reduced to the 7th Motor Brigade with 8 Stuarts and three armoured car regiments. The German air force had launched attacks with Ju-87 and Ju-88 bombers without effect. The British air force accomplished more with as many as 150 fighter-bomber sorties. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

Thr 4th NZ Brigade in dire straits

Once Rommel had realized that the two Italian divisions, the Pavia and the Brescia Divisions, had disintegrated, he decided to push German troops into the breach. General Nehring would command a scratch group: the two reconnaissance units, a part of the 21st Panzer Division, and part of the 15th Panzer Division (Baade Gruppe). The attack started at 5pm on 15 July 1942. The 4th NZ Brigade took the brunt of the attack, and they were unsupported. They had minimal anti-tank capability, which was soon overwhelmed, and the infantry was unable to resist. 380 were quickly put into the bag, including Captain Upham, who was awarded a bar to his Victoria Cross for his actions. By 6pm, the attack reached the brigade headquarters and captured them and the brigade commander, Brigadier Burrows. Brigadier Burrows later escaped. By 6:15pm, the 2nd Armoured Brigade appeared and stopped the German advance. By dusk, the Germans withdrew, leaving the British in possession of the ground. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

The New Zealanders regroup

During the first part of 15 July 1942, the New Zealanders became scattered and had pockets of enemy troops in their rear. After the 22nd NZ Battalion had been overrun by German tanks, Sergeant Elliot and some men from his battalion, as well as the 21st and 23rd Battalions moved north, only to find themselves within an Italian position. Sergeant Elliot organized and led the attack that took 200 Italians prisoner before they New Zealanders withdrew. Sergeant Elliot had been wounded three times in the battle. He received the Victoria Cross for his efforts and bravery. The isolated pockets of Axis troops in the rear continued to be a problem. They prevented forward movement of vehicles and tied down the British forces with their fire. Artillery fire was what finally weakened resistance to the point where positions could be taken. Only by 4pm were vehicles able to move forward to Ruweisat Ridge. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official history.

The 2nd Armoured Brigade intervenes

After Brigadier Kippenberger had contacted the NZ Division commander and the 1st Armoured Division commander, the 2nd Armoured Brigade had moved forward on hte morning of 15 July 1942. Unfortunately, two of its regiments ran onto minefields near "Strong Point 2". The remaining regiment was able to support the 5th Indian Brigade in its attack. They helped capture Point 64. Now, the British task was to deal with the bypassed Axis forces in their rear. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

The Axis forces respond on 15 July 1942

As survivors of the Brescia and Pavia divisions moved towards the rear, they told stories about the British attack that hurt Axis morale. The one setback to the Allied cause was made by a small detachment from the 8th Panzer Regiment. They had about 8 to 10 tanks and had moved past the advancing British forces and encountered the unfortunate 22nd NZ Battalion. The New Zealanders had just four anti-tank guns on portees and these were quickly disabled. The New Zealand infantry was caught without cover or the ability to fight tanks, so about 350 men surrendered. They were rapidly sent towards the Axis rear. Brigadier Kippenberger had seen some of these events at a distance and hurried to report to his division commander, General Inglis, about what had happened. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

An assessment of the New Zealand Division on 15 July 1942

The New Zealand Division had commenced its attack at about 11pm on 14 July 1942. The night was dark, as there was no moon. FAA Albacores were out dropping flares to provide illumination for the advancing troops. They also dropped bombs on Axis transport behind the lines. Both the 4th NZ Brigade and the 5th NZ Brigade were short-handed, so they both advanced on very narrow fronts. They reached the Axis minefields and then received MG fire. The troops gradually became dispersed as they reached their objectives. In the process of moving forward, Axis troops were bypassed and were left untouched. When the 5th NZ Brigade reached its objective, they had lost track of their anti-tank guns. They were advancing more slowly and were to the rear. They were having the usual British problems with unreliable communications, which had dogged them through the great battles. At least the 4th NZ Brigade was able to keep their anti-tank guns forward and was able to place them forward in the German style. The 5th brigade had also bypassed many Axis strong points, which were now in their rear. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

The New Zealand Division commences its attack: 14/15 July 1942 at El Alamein

At 11pm on 14 July 1692, the New Zealand Division moved forward towards its objective, which lay six miles away. The Division consisted of the 5th NZ Brigade on the right and the 4th NZ Brigade on the left. The 5th NZ Brigade reached the objective by dawn, but had one battalion complete dispersed in the process. The 4th NZ Brigade also reached its objective and had moved some anti-tank guns forward, German-style. One problem was that the division artillery and reserve were out of support range. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

Auchinleck's plan of attack for 14 July 1942

General Auchinleck thought that his forces should be able to break the Axis center. He planned the attack for 14 July 1942. In the event, the battle lasted through 17 July. Forces from 30th and 13th Corps were chosen for the attack: 5th Indian Brigade from 30th Corps and the two-brigade New Zealand Division from 13th Corps. The 1st Armoured Division was on the left of the New Zealand Division and was ready to move forward if a breakthrough was achieved. The 1st Armoured Brigade also provided a battle group "Wall Group" to support 30th Corps. Before the attack even began, the 22nd Armoured Brigade was diverted to Alam Nayil to fight some Axis tanks. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

British armour on 15 July 1942

The two British armoured brigades engaged in the next battle were the 2nd Armoured Brigade and the 22nd Armoured Brigade. Their strength on 15 July 1942 consisted of:

2nd Armoured Brigade
   6th RTR (with 1 squadron of 10th Hussars)
   3/5 RTR
   9th Lancers (with 1 squadron of 2nd Royal Gloucester Hussars)

   equipped with 46 Grants, 11 Stuarts, and 59 Crusaders

22nd Armoured Brigade
   3rd County of London Yeomanry
   joined in the afternoon by the Royal Scots Greys

   equipped with 31 Grants, 21 Stuarts, and 23 Crusaders

This is based on Note 1 on page 349 of Vol.III of the Official History. I find this sort of information helpful, as the usual high-level descriptions lack actual strength data.

Air action on 11 and 12 July 1942

The strong British effort in the north brought out the Axis air forces to support their beleaguered troops. Several large formations of Ju-87 and Ju-88 bombers, escorted by fighters, attempted to intervene. They all were intercepted by British fighters and were forced to turn back. The British, in turn, tried to intercept the Axis transports headed for Africa from Crete. They succeeded in attacking a formation and shot down a Ju-52 transport for the cost of one Beaufighter lost. Both sides had two aircraft damaged. Over the night of 11/12 July, the Wellingtons bombing Tobruk had a Halifax as companion. This was the first British four-engined heavy bomber used in the Middle East. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

The Australians on 11 July 1942

The 2/24th Australian Battalion staged an attack, starting at 6:30am on 11 July 1942. They were supported by Valentine infantry tanks from the 44th RTR. The objective was the Tell el Eisa, which fell to them by midday on 11 July. They sent off a column of "tanks, infantry in carriers, and field and anti-tank guns" to Deir el Abyad. In transit, an Italian infantry battalion surrendered to the column. The column was stopped at Miteirya Ridge. They received so much attention that by evening, they withdrew to the El Alamein defences. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

The Axis forces fight back on 10 July 1942

At Panzerarmee Afrika headquarters, Rommel was absent. The officer left in charge, Lt-Col Von Mellenthin showed his usual energy and initiative. He ordered a portion of the 382nd regiment (they were a component of the newly arrived 164th Division) to form a defensive position facing he Australian advance. Lt-Col Von Mellenthin also commandeered some machine guns and anti-aircraft guns to be part of his improvised force. They were able to halt the Australian advance at the coast rail line.

Rommel had been caught in the south at Bab el Qattara. He hurried north with a battle group assembled from the 15th Panzer Division. The counter attack mounted broke through the 26th Australian Brigade front, but was thrown back. They left behind four knocked out Pzkw III tanks, one with spaced armour. All four had been knocked out by 2pdr anti-tank guns firing at their sides, where the armour was weaker. The British forces ended the day with about 1500 prisoners, most of them Italian. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

The action at El Alamein on 10 July 1942

The British attack on the planned objectives started very early on the morning of 10 July 1942. Some Germans likened the bombardment to "drum fire" from the Great War. There were salt marshes near the coast road, and some of the infantry tanks bogged down in them. Others went forward with the infantry, however. The Australians had 32 Valentines and the South Africans had 8 Matildas. Eight tanks continued in support of the Australians, who had cleared the Italians from the Sabratha Division from around the coast road. By 10am, the South Africans had captured Tell el Makh Khad and were preparing to defend what they had captured. The Australians were also occupying what they had taken, but were only preparing to attack one end of Tell el Eisa. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

8 July 1942 in the north

General Ramsden had been appointed to replace General Norrie as 30th Corps commander. General Auchinleck ordered him to capture Tell el Eisa and Tell el Makh Khad on 8 July 1942. These were low ridges, lightly defended and manned by Italian troops. 13th Corps would block reinforcements from the south that might move north in response to the attack. The 2nd Armoured Brigade would come under 13th Corps command on 9 July. The 9th Australian Division would take Tell el Eisa while the 1st South African Division would attack Tell el Makh Khad. The two divisions would have infantry tank support. The 1st Armoured Division would provide a force to mount a raid on El Daba. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

A change in air operations

Once the Axis forces had rested from attacking the British positions at El Alamein, the air forces were able to shift their focus to targets further in the Axis rear. As soon as 5 July 1942, they commenced attacks on the Axis air fields. At the same date, Wellingtons hit Tobruk and Liberators hit Benghazi. The British air commander switched his fighters to the fighter-bomber role and made life quite difficult for the Axis forces with their attacks. Beaufighters were employed to intercept Axis air transport coming into North Africa from Crete. They only achieved modest success on 8 and 9 July. Several transport formations were intercepted near Tobruk, but inflicted minor casualties. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

Columns in action after 4 July 1942

General Auchinleck had started to think that he would launch 13th Corps in an attack in the south, and then thought better of the idea. Instead, the action was confined to a raid by the 23rd New Zealand Battalion and some columns. The only column which achieved anything noteworthy was a column from the 7th Motor Brigade. This column slipped through to the Axis rear and shelled the air field at Fuka on 7 July 1942, in the evening. The column was able to elude pursuers and rejoined the brigade after traveling in the dark. The SAS, with help from the LRDG, attacked another air field and destroyed some more Italian CR-42 fighters. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History and overlaps some other posts.

Rommel regrouping on 4 July 1942 and later

Rommel hoped to form a armour reserve by replacing the German troops with Italians in the line at El Alamein. The panzer divisions, and 90th Light Division, and Italian 20th corps (armoured and mechanized divisions) would be relieved by the Italian 10th and 21st Corps. The German air force, with Stuka divebombers provided support for the moves. The troops were heartened by the long delayed reappearance of the Stukas. When the 21st Panzer Division moved on 4 July, the British commanders misinterpreted that as a retreat. Rommel hoped to cut off the New Zealand Division, but the British focus changed from the south to the north. In fact, the 21st Panzer Division made a full attack on Bab el Qattara, which had been recently abandoned by the British. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

The situation by 4 July 1942

The fighting on 3 July 1942 had forced the Axis forces to go over to the defensive. The German divisional strength was extremely low, Rommel reporting them as only 1200 to 1500 men. He also complained about the effective British bombing at night, as it made supplying the troops almost impossible. The Italians may have been in even worse shape at that date. Auchinleck was encouraged enough to imagine that they might be pursuing Rommel's forces back from this position. It was not to be, as when the British probed towards the Axis positions, they were stopped by anti-tank gun screens that were hastily assembled. Some more smaller attacks were mounted over the next few days, but there was little success. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

The action on 3 July 1942 at El Alamein

As we saw, the British armour had let the Germans attack and had left the Germans in extreme distress. In the South, the New Zealanders had a good start to the day, from 7am. Columns from the New Zealand Division had engaged Ariete Division artillery and infantry. 19th Battalion of the 4th New Zealand Brigade had attacked and captured 44 guns and had taken 350 prisoners, with weapons and transport. The 5th New Zealand Brigade had attacked El Mreir, where the Brescia Division was located. By the next morning, the brigade had secured a position close to the Qattara Depression. The Royal Air Force flew 900 sorties up to sunset on 3 July. The Desert Air Force had flown 770 of those sorties. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

2 July to 3 July 1942 at El Alamein

Even though the British armour, backed by their artillery and New Zealand and 7th Motor Brigade columns, were left in possession of the ground, Rommel considered the fight on 2 July to have been indecisive. Rommel intended to attack the next day, although the German tank strength was down to 26 runners. The Italian 10th Corps would hold El Mreir, while the 20th Corps would more forward in the south.

The British mounted heavy air attacks all night, including one where the attacking Wellington was destroyed by the blast on the ground. The Axis ground forces did not receive the force of the attack, however, which was directed against the supply dumps near the coast.

General Auchinleck also intended to continue with his current plan. He made a few adjustments, as he placed the 1st Armoured Division under 30th Corps command. He ordered the 13th Corps to turn the enemy flank and attack their rear. The British armour actually absorbed the Axis attack in place, fighting a sharp action near Ruweisat Ridge. As we heard, the Germans started 3 July with 26 tanks while the 4th Armoured Brigade had 18 Grants, 22 Stuarts, and 12 Valentines. The 22nd Armoured Brigade had a further 20 Grants, 28 Stuarts, and 8 mixed cruisers, probably mostly Crusaders. The Official History, in Vol.III., upon which this account is based, says that at the end of the tank battle, the German troops were at the breaking point.

The afternoon of 2 July 1942

Two things happened at El Alamein, on the afternoon of 2 July 1942. One was the German attack against the El Alamein defences. The other was the counter-attack by 13 Corps. The 1st South African Brigade successfully withstood the German attack, supported by "Robcol" from the 10th Indian Division. General Pienaar was still worried about exposing his troops to capture, unsupported by armour. General Auchinleck responded to that concern by replacing the brigade with "Ackcol" from the 50th Division. The 90th Light Division made no progress and complained about the heavy air attacks that had a strong fighter escort. Two armoured battles were fought further south: the 4th Armoured Brigade versus the 15th Panzer Division and the 22nd Armoured Brigade versus the 21st Panzer Division. The Germans retreated, leaving the British on the ground under dispute. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

2 July 1942 at El Alamein

Early on 2 July 1942, the 90th Light Division had attacked without success at El Alamein. Instead of sending the DAK around the British rear, Rommel redirected them to help the 90th Light Division break through to the coast road.

General Auchinleck also changed his plans, given the progression of the battle. Rather than have the %th Indian Division HQ and the 9th Indian Brigade be exposed in the far south, they would leave a column and pull back. The same was ordered for the 6th NZ Brigade somewhat further to the north. With Rommel clearly readying an attack at El Alamein in the north, Auchinleck planned a counter-attack by the 13th Corps, with the 30th Corps containing the Axis attack. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.