British commanders in North Africa and the Eastern Mediterranean theater

We might be in a position to offer some assessments of the various British commanders in North Africa and the overall Eastern Mediterranean and Africa. The list includes General Wavell, General O'Connor, General Wilson, General Auchinleck, and General (later Field Marshal) Montgomery.

General Wavell was asked to do some very unreasonable things, but until the spring of 1941, he had responded with a reasonable effort. In many ways, he proved himself mostly lucky, as he seems to have been unknowledgable about the conditions of modern warfare. Perhaps his main strength was his ability to recognize talent and to utilize it. Churchill had ruined General Wavell's attitude by the spring of 1941, so he really needed to be replaced and used elsewhere.

General Wilson ("Jumbo" Wilson) was a solid, old-school soldier, who was given one difficult task after another, and responded reasonably well. The Greek campaign had been forced on the army by Churchill, and was an unmitigated disaster, but General Wilson acquitted himself as well as was possible, in difficult circumstances.

General Auchinleck was more uneven, as he seemed to have trouble with judging people. His main strength was on the battlefield, and Churchill constantly pressed Auchinleck to take command in the field, as Churchill recognized Auchinleck's ability. Auchinleck was out by the fall of 1942, as Churchill's political survival depended on making some changes. Still, Auchinleck had saved Egypt and defeated Rommel in the First Battle of El Alamein, and his plan (with Major-General Dorman-Smith) for Alam el Halfa worked well.

General Montgomery was very conservative, and perhaps that was what was needed to stabilize the situation in North Africa. He was too conservative, and this was enabled by the vast inflow of resources into Egypt in late 1941 and early 1943. We suspect that Montgomery understood Rommel's tactical principles, and used them (cautiously). Rommel let anti-tank guns fight tanks and used his tanks to fight infantry. The Second Battle of El Alamein suggests that might have been how Montgomery fought the battle. In any case, Montgomery seems to have believed in and used combined arms battle groups, but to a greater degree than Auchinleck (and Dorman-Smith). Given Montgomery's success, he is hard to criticize, except for his style and demeanor. Results justify a great deal, even if we dislike his style and demeanor.

The actual attack on Syria, commencing 8 June 1941

British and Free French troops moved into Syria and Lebanon. The 5th Indian Brigade quickly moved north 15 miles, to Sheikh Meskine, after taking Deraa, immediately after crossing the border. the 1st Royal Fusiliers moved into Kuneitra (familiar from the Yom Kippur War). On the second day, the Free French reached a point only 10 miles from Damascus. After they were blocked for several days, the 5th Indian Brigade was sent as reinforcements.

There were more Australians now involved. The 25th Australian Brigade was ordered to take Metjayun, but encountered heavy resistance. Still, they took Metjayun on 11 June, but the advance was altered to sweep through Jezzine. The 21st Australian Brigade moved north on the coast road. By 12 June, they had reached Sidon, where the Vichy troops were waiting. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

More of the Syria story

Syria was less of a threat than it had seemed. Apparently, when the Germans saw Rashid Ali's coming collapse in Iraq, they pulled out of Syria, hoping to remove any pretext for a British attack. Syria could wait until they had achieved victory in Russia. They had expended their airborne forces in Crete, and could not use them in Syria.

The British occupation of Syria took five weeks. The French in Syria hated the Free French, and shot at them, even when there was supposed truce, and abused prisoners. The British forces opposing the Vichy troops were an odd-assortment of units, with no cohesion. The air support at the start was meager:

No.11 Squadron (Blenheim IVs), short on aircraft and crews
No.80 Squadron (Hurricanes)
No.3 Squadron RAAF (requipping with Tomahawks)
No.208 Army Cooperation Squadron (one flight of Hurricanes)
X Flight (Gladiators)

The Vichy airforce was much larger. They had 30 bombers and 60 fighters, and these were quickly doubled with arrivals from metropolitan France.

General Wilson commanded the operation. The French were led by General Dentz, the governor. He was located in Beirut, so General Wilson decided to mount an attack there. The 7th Australian Division attacked on the coastal road and on the central road. C Battalion of the Special Service Brigade was attached to the 7th Australian Division. There were also additional units from the 1st Cavalry Division and 6th Australian Division. The right advance was spear-headed by the 5th Indian Brigade, battle-tested veterans. The Free French would follow them. The naval forces included "the 15th Cruiser Squadron (Phoebe, Ajax, with the Coventry, the landing ship Glengyle and eight destroyers). The Vichy French had the destroyers Guipard and Valmy at Beirut.

This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

Operation Exporter

General Wavell presented the plan for Operation Exporter, the occupation of Syria, to his superiors at home. The assault would be made by two brigades of the 7th Australian Division, "the Free French troops", and "part of the 1st Cavalry Division". General Wavell actually thought that more would be needed, but what was in the plan was all that was available. The Defence Committee told General Wavell to mount the attack and soon as the forces were ready. He could invite the Turks to occupy Aleppo, if they chose. The final attack force consisted of the following units:

7th Australian Division (two brigades)
2 cavaly regiments from the 1st Cavalry Division
5th Indian Brigade
a Free French force commanded by Genral Legentilhomme
  with 6 battalions, one artillery battery, and several tanks
one squadron of armoured cars
one light AA regiment
one heavy AA regiment
one field regiment, RA
C Battalion of the Special Service Brigade (a commando)

This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

Syria, the Free French, and a deteriorating military situation

By early May 1941, the British position in the Middle East and Mediterranean area was very precarious. The Germans had succeeded in setting the British back, and were looking for openings where they might create further chaos. Iraq was in the process of erupting, Greece had fallen, and Rommel had achieved a success that was unwanted by his superiors in Germany. His victories and created a problem, as the high command in Germany had wanted him to take a defensive posture, prior to the attack on Russia.

Already by 12 May, German aircraft had started to land in Damascus. With the force sent to Iraq, General Wavell was left with nothing to send to Syria. A new force needed to be found. The candidate seemed to be the 7th Australian Division. They had one brigade still in Tobruk, but they were ordered to leave Mersa Matruh and head for Palestine. The 5th South African Brigade and the Polish Brigade were their replacements.

The Free French commander, General Catroux, had portrayed that the French would let the Free French and British walk into Syria. In fact, intelligence proved that the French had taken up positions, ready to defend against an incursion. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

Syria increasingly becomes an unstable situation

In November 1940, a very strong pro-Vichy commissioner, General Henri Dentz, was appointed. As the year moved towards and end, more Germans arrived in Syria. The Free French had tried to promote their cause in Syria, but only succeeded in riling the French and Syrians. General de Gaulle visited the Middle East in April 1941. Everyone was opposed to using British forces in Syria, and they were stretched to the breaking point, already. After the fall of Greece, the commanders in the Middle East worried about the Germans making an airborne landing in Syria. Meanwhile, the situation in Iraq had gone critical, and General Wavell was forced to take command of that operation. By 12 May 1941, intelligence arrived that German aircraft were landing in Syria. The German arrival prompted the Turks to move troops up to the Syrian border. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

Syria becomes unstable

The situation in Syria was already unsettled, starting with the armistice in June 1940. The French split into Vichy supporters, with pro-German sympathies, and the Free French. The Polish Brigade, with some Free French crossed from Syria into Palestine to continue the fight. Syria had an ongoing problem with "civil unrest", because the local populace thought that the expected movement to give them self-government was moving too slowly. By 1 July 1940, the British had announced that they would not allow Syria to be occupied by any "hostile power". In late August, "the Italian Armistice Commission arrived in Syria". General Wavell was already making noises that there were no forces that could be spared for Syria. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

Resolute action paid off in Iraq

General Wavell had not wanted to deal with Iraq, but the high command in London (the Defence Committee) had rightly forseen that vigorous action was required to keep Iraq from becoming a major problem. General Wavell, the theater commander was overruled, and a force was dispatched to Iraq under strong leadership. The action of the local officers and the newly arrived force kept the situation in Iraq from spinning out of control. The attitude of soldiers and airman was enthusiastic, and with plenty of initiative, they overcame the Iraqi forces. The Germans and Italians like the idea of Iraq being in revolt, but the reality was that they could do little to help, as they were totally unprepared. What they were able to do was "too little, too late". The British were fortunate to be finished in Iraq when they were, because Syria was about to explode into crisis. This is my editorializing over the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

German aid to Iraq from Syria

The initial German solution to sending aid to Iraq was to run trains from Syria. Four trains loaded with munitions were sent to Iraq before "a few enterprising Frenchmen" blew up the "bridge near Tel Kotchek". That stopped further shipments by rail.

German reconniassance aircraft arrived in Syria in early May. They flew on Mosul on 11 May. The commander, Major Axel von Blomburg, was shot down and killed by mistake by Iraqi AA fire when he approached Baghdad at low level. The plan to send air aid to Iraq included 14 Me-110's and 7-He-111's from Fliegerkorps VIII. Some transports would also be sent. The Germans eventually suggested to the Italians that they send help, as well. Accordingly, 12-CR42 Falco fighters "arrived at Mosul on 27th May". By the time of Rashid Ali's exit from Iraq, the Axis had lost 14 Me-110s, 5 He-111s, and 3-CR42s.

This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

The German plan to cause trouble in Iraq

By 24 March 1941, Foreign Minister Ribbentrop thought that the time was ripe for military action in Iraq. The main difficulty was supplying the Iraqis with weapons. On 3 April was Rashid Ali's coup d'etat. The decision had been made by 17 April what arms were available to be sent to Iraq. On 18 April, the British landings in Basra occurred. The Germans hoped that the conflict in Iraq would lead to a general Arab uprising, which the Germans were ready to recognize and to support. Only by 6 May had the Germans decided to send weapons from French stocks in Syria. This was the day that the siege of Habbaniyah was lifted. Support for the Iraqis would be sent by air from Syria, if the Iraqis could hold out long enough. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

The Arab situation in the Middle East in 1940-1941

The Germans had maintained contact with dissadent Arabs in the Middle East from before the start of the war. Even though the Iraqis had a large group sympathetic with the Germans, the Iraqi government had broken diplomatic ties in September 1939. After the French collapse in May 1940, the Germans still made no effort to have influence in Syria, even though that seems to have been a natural possibility. The Italians, not Germans, sent an armistice commission to Syria. However, there was unrest among Arabs wanting to be free of British rule. The Grand Mufti of Jerusalem had tried to negotiate a deal with the Germans to recognize the Arab states as being independent. He had proposed that they send out agents from Syria to create unrest in Palestine and Transjordan. It was only in January 1941 that the Germans sent a man to Syria to assess the situation on the ground. This is based the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

The Iraqi collapse

The British forces were struggling to approach Baghdad while Habbaniyah was being hammered by German aircraft. Lt-Colonel Ferguson's force had arrived about eight miles north of Baghdad on 28 May 1941. They pushed back a night attack and then advanced another four miles. Brigadier Kingstone's force had been hung up at a canal, but by 30 May had a bridge across. These delays actually served the British interests well, as the Iraqi's had heard rumours that exaggerated the British strength. On 30 May, General Clark heard from his commanders in Egypt that Rashid Ali had left Iraq and crossed into Iran (which Churchill insisted on calling Persia). The British ambassador in Baghdad was finally able to communicate and said that the Iraqis had advanced with a flag of truce and asked for a meeting. An armistice was signed , ending hostilities. In the campaign, the RAF had lost 28 aircraft, 34 men killed and 64 wounded. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

The advance on Baghdad on 28 May 1941

Ramadi was occupied by a "considerable force of Iraqis", and there was another one south of Fallujah. Since General Clark preferred not to have these in his rear, he hoped they would surrender, if they were bombed. However, that was not sufficient.

On 28 May 1941, Brigadier Kingstone's force had advanced quickly, as they were on a hard, "flinty" desert plain. They had to fight an action at Khan Noqta, and then "a few miles further on". They found a working telephone, and an interpreter spread misinformation, hoping to panic the Iraqis. They ended the day 12 miles from Baghdad, but facing a blown bridge and having a canal to cross.

This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

Planning to attack Baghdad

The next step was to plan the attack on Baghdad. General Clark ruled out an attack from the south, by road, as that would mean passing through the "holy city of Karbala". The alternative was to send to forces. Brigadier Kingstone would advance on the main road to Baghdad. Lt-Colonel Ferguson and the Household Cavalry Regiment would circle to the north. The Arab Legion was already in place to the north, having cut the Mosul-Baghdad railway. Brigadier Kingstone's force was delayed by flooding, and the need to get vehicles across unbridged waterways. They also had to contend with German air raids. The northern column crossed the Euphrates on the night of 27 May 1941 "and disappeared inot the desert". This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

Bill Roggio has a good map that shows Habbaniyah

Bill Roggio is a blogger who is reporting from Iraq. In a post, he has a map that shows Habbaniyah, Baghdad, Fallujah, and Ramadi. You need to click the thumbnail to see the details.

The capture of Fallujah

The RAF softened up Fallujah with bombing raids, starting on 18 May 1941. Early on 19 May, 57 aircraft hit Iraqi positions around Fallujah. A final attack was made at 2:45pm, and then Captain Graham led his Assyrian company on an attack against Fallujah. They were covered by 25pdr fire. The defence of Fallujah proved to be a paper tiger. Thre was only token resistance and about 300 Iraqi prisoners were taken. The strike evoked a response from German aircraft, which bombed and strafed Habbaniyah, "destroying or damaging several aircraft and causing a number of casualties". The Iraqis attacked Fallujah "two days later", hoping to retake the town. The town was defended by two companies of the King's Own and Levies. Brigadier Kingstone arrived and took command. Kingcol was alerted, in case they were needed. After a second attack, "two companies of the 1st Essex Regiment arrived in time to repel it". They inflicted heavy casualties on the Iraqis, who withdrew. Aircraft from Habbaniyah attacked Iraqi reinforcements moving forward and driven back. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

A divergence from the current thread

This is off on a tangent from the current thread, but there is a good Russian site that has photos from the "Tank Museum in Kubinka".

The plan to proceed in Iraq from 18 May 1941

The air commander in Iraq was hurt in an automobile accident, so he was succeeded by Air Vice-Marshal D'Albiac, returned from Greece, and having been assigned to command in Palestine and Transjordan. He flew into Habbaniyah on 18 May 1941. That was concurrent with Kingcol's arrival there. He found that Colonel Roberts, commanding the Habbaniyah garrison was planning on attacking at Fallujah, hoping to take the bridge intact. Three columns were moving towards the objective, made more difficult by flooding. The first column consisted of the RAF Rolls-Royce armoured cars, one company of Levies, a small group from the 2/4th Gurkha Rifles, with some captured Iraqi howitzers crossed the Euphrates at Sin el Dhibban. The second column, consisting of one compnay of the King's Own, was flown to Notch Fall. They were tasked to conduct operations "against the Baghdad road from the north". The third column consisted of one company of Assyrian Levies, along with one troop of 6 25pdrs from Kingcol (the 237th Battery R.A.). This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

Kingcol moved into Iraq on 13 May 1941

Kingcol moved into Iraq on 13 May 1941. Advanced elements reached Rutba by nightfall. Those in Habbaniya recommended to Brigadier Kingstone that he approach Habbaniya from the South and avoid Ramadi. A German aircraft had attacked the column and had caused a few casualties. The principal problem was caused by the vehicles, particularly, the heavy lorries, not being desert-worthy. The heaviest bogged down, because they broke through the surface crust. They only reached the Habbaniya area by 18 May. Fortunately, the RAF had succeeded in writing off the Iraqi air force by repeated attacks against its bases. The remaining threat would now be from German aircraft from Erbil and Mosul, as well as from Syria. In response, the RAF was given permission to hit airfields in Syria, even though there would probably be French aircraft damaged in the process. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

The flying column, Kingcol

Brigadier Kingstone, commander of the 4th Cavalry Brigade led Kingcol, the "flying column" that that move the 500 miles across the desert. Kingcol had about 2,000 men and 500 vehicles, and was a combined-arms force, according to the current parlance. The units that comprised Kingcol were:

HQ and Signals, 4th Cavalry Brigade
the Household Cavalry Regiment
237th Battery, Royal Artillery
one anti-tank gun troop, Royal Artillery
one troop, 2nd Field Squadron, Royal Engineers
one detachment from Boring Section, Royal Engineers
two companies, 1st Essex Regiment
a detachment of the 166th Light Field Ambulance
3rd Reserve Motor Transport Company, RASC
552nd Motor Transport Company, RASC
8 armoured cars from  No.2 Armoured Car Company, RAF

This is based on the account and information in Vol.II of the Official History of the War in the Mediterranean and Middle East.

The attack on Rutba

Before Habforce could move into Iraq, an attack was made on Rutba. The fort at Rutba was occupied by Iraqi police. Rutba was attacked from the air by Blenheims from No.203 Squadron on 9 May 1941. On 10 May, part of No.2 Armoured Car Company RAF arrived. They found that the Iraqi police had left the fort during the night. The politics of the situation were such that a squadron of the Transjordan Frontier Force refused to take part. However, the Emir Abdullah of Transjordan had ordered the Arab League to take part, and they performed well during the campaign. Habforce was delayed, as the 1st Cavalry Division so far only had one motorized brigade, the 4th. The rest were still horsed cavalry. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

Further plans for Iraq

After General Wavell had been given responsibility for northern Iraq, against his wishes, he still persisted in recommending a negotiated settlement with Rashid Ali. Raschid Ali had already revealed his Axis ties, so Wavell's proposal made no sense. The Chiefs of Staff believed that the arrival of British forces in Basra had forced Rashid Ali's hand prematurely. In their opinion, strong action could solve the problem. Since the seige of Habbaniyah had been lifted, due to the action on the night of 5-6 May 1941, that greatly simplified the task. On 8 May, General Wavell took command in southern Iraq, as well as the north. Lt-General E. P. Quinan, the new commander on the ground, was told to establish a sold base in the Basra-Shaibah area and to prepare for reinforcements. The Indian government had actually wanted more vigorous action, and had ordered General Quinan accordingly. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

General Wavell stops being cooperative

General Wavell had acquiesced with many things to which he might have objected more vigorously. Now, on something that seems obviously the right thing to do, he balked. On 2 May 1941, the Defence Committee, in Britain, decided that the Middle East should be in control of operations in Iraq. General Wavell immediately started whining about the prospect and recommending negotiating with the Axis sympathizer, Rashid Ali. Thankfully, he was overruled, and he was told to go through the motions of preparing what would look like a large force to send to Iraq. What there actually was that was available was one mechanized brigade from the 1st Cavalry Division (incomplete in equipment), one field regiment, one motorized infantry battalion, "three machanized squadrons of the Transjordan Frontier Force". The combination would be called "Habforce". This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

The immediate end to the siege at Habbaniyah

On the night of 5 May 1941, King's Own Rifle Regiment partols staged a raid on the Iraqis surrounding Habbaniyah. On the following morning, the British found that the Iraqis had abandoned part of the plateau and had left a great deal of "arms and equipment for which a good use was soon found". RAF Rolls Royce armoured cars advanced up the road towards Fallujah, and ran into Iraqi forces. These were attacked and driven out by levies and troops form the King's Own Rifle Regiment. They were supported by Audaxes from Habbaniyah. A column was seen advancing from Fallujah in the afternoon of 6 May and they were bombed and straffed by forty aircraft. The results were ammunition explosions and vehicles burning. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

The second, third, and fourth days of British air attack in Iraq

The British assessment of the first day was that the Iraqi artillery was less of a threat than feared and there seemed to be no imminent threat of attack by the surrounding forces. That allowed the Air Officer Commanding to change his operation plan to include attacks against the Iraqi airforce and the Iraqi supply lines. On 3 May 1941, the British hit "the Rashid airfield", the road connecting Habbaniyah and Baghdad, and the forces besieging Habbaniyah. On 4 May, the effort against the Iraqi airforce, and a small German contingent, intensified. This day, 8 Wellingtons from No.37 Squadron hit Rashid airfield. They were intercepted by Iraqi fighters, but took no losses. Blenheim fighters from No.203 Squadron were used in low-level strafing attacks against Rashid and Baghdad airfields. They had an escort of two long-range Hurricanes sent from Egypt. They also hit Mosul airfield where some German aircraft were based. On 5 May, attention returned to the Iraqi forces besieging Habbaniyah, when one Wellington from No.37 Squadron and four Blenheims from No.203 squadron hit them, along with the aircraft from the training school at Habbaniyah. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

On 30 April 1941, Iraqi troops headed west from Baghdad

The British commander in Habbaniyah was notified by the British embassy in Baghdad that Iraqi forces were headed west from the city. Immediately, the aircraft at the school were dispersed and armed with bombs. The natural next step for the British was to send aloft reconnaissance aircraft. They reported that something like two Iraqi battalions were on the plateau and equipped with artillery. The Iraqi commander sent a message at 6am, demanding that air operations at Habbaniyah cease immediately. The British commander sent a reply that any interference "would be treated as an act of war". Air reconnaissance showed that the Iraqis were growing in strenght and that Iraqi troops were in possession of Fallujah. The situation put the British in a difficult position. The British sent reinforcements of 8 Wellingtons to Shaibah with another 10 to follow. Fortunately, on 1 May, word was received from London that the British forces had permission to launch an air attack on Iraqi forces. The British attacked the Iraqis at dawn on 2 May. They had 33 aircraft from Habbaniyah and 8 Wellingtons from Shaibah. The Iraqi air force responded and a battle ensued. The Iraqis had some superior aircraft, primarily Italian-built (SM79 bombers, Ba65 ground attack aircraft, and Northrup 8a figher-bombers). The British at Habbaniyah had done well with what they had. They lost 5 aircraft destroyed and others were out of service. They had 13 killed and 29 wounded. Nine of these were civilians. Two more aircraft, Vickers Vincents from Shaibah, were lost while attacking targets to the north of Shaibah. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

Preparations for combat at Habbaniyah in April 1941

The British, at Habbaniyah in Iraq, fully expected to be engaged in combat in a short time. Three aircraft types were fitted to carry bombs. Hawker Audaxes were originally intended to carry the small 20-lb. bombs, were modified to carry two 250-lb. bombs. The Fairey Gordons received the same modification. The Oxford trainers were not intended to carry bombs, but they were fitted to carry the 20-lb. bombs. The Royal Air Force had 18 of the 1924 pattern Rolls Royce armoured cars, and those were used to patrol the road to the east, towards Falluja. Aircraft carried out reconnaissance to the east.
Despite the impending disaster Greece, a further 6 Gladiators were sent to Habbaniyah, so that there were a total of 9 available. British women and children were evacuated from Baghdad and first taken to Habbaniyah. From there, they were flown to Shaibah. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

Habbaniyah in April 1941

The story of Habbaniyah has echoes from the present. Habbaniyah is located 50 miles to the west from Baghdad. The road from Baghdad to Habbaniyah runs through Falluja, where the road crosses the Euphrates river. Habbaniyah is named for the lake near the Euphrates. Flying boats were able to land in the lake. The road running to the south connects to Karbala. To the west, along the road running to Haifa is Ramadi.

There were 1,000 airmen at Habbaniyah, along with "1,200 Iraqi and Assyrian levies", about 9,000 European, Indian, and Assyrian civilians. The facilities included the school, an "Aircraft Depot with repair shops, a Supply Depot, fuel and ammunition stores, and a hospital". The place had a watertower and a power station. The Official History said that the base was "almost indefensible". This is based on the account in the Official History.

Troop movements into Iraq in April 1941

The British decided to increase their strength in Iraq, following Rashid Ali's coup. On 13 April 1941, the cruiser Emerald arrived, followed by the aircraft carrier Hermes and then another cruiser. On 16 April, under the guise of moving troops through Iraq to Palestine, the British started to move troops into Iraq. The first was the 1st King's Own Royal Regiment on 17 April. On the 18th, "the 20th Indian Infantry Brigade, 3rd Field Regiment R.A., and the Headquarters of the 10th Indian Division" started to move into Iraq. the 10th Indian Division's commander, Major-General W.A.K. Fraser, was put in charge of the troops in Iraq. A second Indian brigade was to move into Iraq, as well. When Rashid Ali found that the British were going to ignore his demands, he decided to move against Habbaniya. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

The coup in Iraq on 31 March 1941 destabilized the situation further

The Iraqi regent fled to the RAF facility at Habbaniya on 31 March 1941, and he was flown out, landing at Basra and embarking on HMS Cockchafer. Rashid Ali staged a coup and with four other officers, and named himself head of the new government on 3 April. In answer, the Chiefs of Staff in Britain wanted to intervene, but the theater commanders opposed such a move.

The RAF had the following forces in Iraq:

At Habbaniya:

No.4 Service Flying Training School, 
  equipped with 32 Hawker Audaxes, 8 Fairey Gordons, 29 Airspeed Oxfords, 
  3 Gloster Gladiators, 1 Bristol Blenheim I, 5 Hawker Hart trainers
one flight

At Shaibah:

No.244 Bomber Squadron, equipped with Vincents

The Iraqi airforce had about 50 0ar 60 aircraft. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

The situation in Iraq was getting worse by September 1940

The situation in Iraq had deteriorated by late September 1940. The Iraqi Prime Minister was sympathetic to the Italians and the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem, who had been expelled from Palestine, was plotting with the Germans. The Iraqi army seemed sympathetic to the Germans and Italians, as well. The British hoped to send a mission to Iraq, headed by someone known to and respected by the Iraqis, but it never happened. By early 1941, the situation had deteriorated further. There was a new, Pan-Arabist Prime Minister, a political crisis, and "a threat of civil war". General Wavell did not want to be involved, and asked if India could control any operations that were required. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

Iraq in WWII, the background

Iraq had been a Turkish province until after WWI. Interestingly, Iraq was the first of the former Turkish province to become independent. Britain had a treaty from 1930 that required Iraq to come to Britain's aid in the event of a war. The only British left in Iraq after 1937 was the RAF training facility at Habbaniya. In September 1939, the King of Iraq was four years old, with his uncle governing as Regent. The uncle, Amir Abdul Illah, was pro-British. The Germans were expelled and diplomatic ties were severed. Italy was a different matter, and "the Italian Legation at Baghdad became the centre of Arab Nationalist and anti-British agitation." On 1 July 1940, the British decided that one brigade of the Indian division tasked with oil field protection in the Middle East should be sent to Basra, in southern Iraq. The British Viceroy in India and the commanders in the Middle East were opposed, as they thought that tensions would be exacerbated. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

The 6pdr ATG story

As mentioned, the 6pdr ATG development was started in April 1938. By June 1939, the project received a higher priority, and a prototype gun was ready for testing by June 1940. The British General Staff, in their infinite wisdom, decided that they needed to produce large numbers of the obsolescent 2pdr ATG, rather than smaller numbers of a really effective gun. In late 1940, converting one gun factory to produce 6pdrs was considered, but since they might only initially receive 100 6pdr guns in the rest of the year, when they might receive 600 2pdrs. Quantity production of the 6pdr commenced in November 1941 and by May 1943, perhaps "100 guns had reached the Middle East". The Official History points out that the 40mm 2pdr was superior to the German 37mm gun, but that gun was obsolete by 1941, and the 50mm PAK38 was in fairly wide use. The Official History also points out that the Germans had produced the 50mm L/42 gun for use in their tanks, although this was not as good at the 50mm ATG coming into service. With the shortcomings of the 2pdr in the anti-tank role, the 25pdr gun-howitzer was pressed into service against tanks. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History. As early as April 1941, development of a much larger gun, the 17pdr (a 76.2mm gun), commenced.

The British tank situation by early 1941

The British had all but ceased experimentation with tanks during the 1930's. Prior to the development of the 2pdr ATG, which was high velocity, the only tank gun available was the medium velocity 3pdr 47mm gun. The Medium Mk.III and its predecessors was armed with that gun. As early as April 1938, the development of the 6pdr 57mm gun was started, but it was not pursued with much energy. In the 1930's, the light tank series continued in development. By 1935, the Lt.Mk.V entered service. The following year, the first Lt.Mk.VI tanks entered service, with production being reduced by 1940. The first cruiser tank, the A9 Cru.Mk.I entered service in 1937. 125 were built. From 1937 until 1940, the small, machine gun-armed Inf.Mk.I was produced. They saw some service in France in 1939 and 1940. The A10 Cru.Mk.II started life as a "heavy cruiser". 100 were ordered in July 1938 and a further 75 in September 1939. The A13 Cru.Mk.III (and later the Cru.Mk.IV and IVA) were inspired by Lt-Col. Martel's visit to Russia, where he saw the fast Russian BT tanks with the Christie suspension. About 50 Cru.Mk.III were built, and some saw service in France in 1940 and later in North Africa. The best infantry tank of the early was was the Inf.Mk.II Matilda. 2,987 were eventually produced. The were (inappropriately) pressed into service with the armoured divisions as there was often no alternative. The Cru.Mk.IV and IVA were built in much larger numbers, as 655 were produced. They provided the core of the 7th Armoured Brigade in North Africa. The Cru.Mk.V Covenanter was a failure and was only used for training, except for special purpose vehicles. The next cruiser tank, the Cru.Mk.VI Crusader went into service in 1941. A total of something like 5,300 were eventually built. British tanks were only starting to mature by 1943, around the end of the North African campaign. Before that, the army had to do the best they could with an odd assortment of vehicles. This is inspired by a passage in Vol.II of the Official History and draws heavily upon Chamberlin and Ellis's old book about British and American tanks.

The 88mm guns in Battleaxe

In Battleaxe, in June 1941, the Germans employed the 88mm gun to great effect. They were effective beyond their small numbers. Near Halfaya were perhaps five guns. Near Hafid ridge, there were four pitted against the 7th Armoured Brigade. The 8th Panzer Regiment was supported by another four 88's. The Official History says that the 50mm PAK38 was also very potent in Battleaxe. Already, they were firing the arrow shot, with a tungsten core covered by an aluminum cover that could compress and fit against the side of the gun without doing appreciable damage. In this period when the German tanks were not fitted with an effective armour piercing gun, they let the anti-tank guns attack the British tanks and used their tanks against infantry and soft vehicles. This was standard doctrine in the Deutsche Afrika Korps. This is based, in part, on data from Vol.II of the Official History.

More analysis of the Battleaxe failure

The attack on the border areas near Halfaya Pass had some implications. For the infantry attack to succeed, the infantry tanks would be required, as there was insufficient artillery available. The problem was that the rush to attack precluded time for infantry and tanks to train together.

A battle with German tanks was a certainty, and the logical thing to do would be to pull the Matildas into that battle, as they had the same gun as the cruiser tanks but had superior armour to anything on the battlefield. That meant that the commanders needed to establish good coordination between the 7th Armoured Division and the 4th Indian Division. For that to be assured, General Beresford-Peirse would have needed to be positioned forward, close to the battle. But he was further back, due to limitations to the British communications equipment. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

Reasons for the failure of Battleaxe

The most obvious reason for the failure of Battleaxe was the haste in which it was mounted, following the arrival of the Tiger convoy. There had been little opportunity for training. Many men were asked to operate new types of tanks that were unfamiliar.

Another factor was the mix of types, where there was one brigade of cruiser tanks and the other brigade of infantry tanks. The two types had radically different characteristics. The cruiser tanks were very mobile but were fragile and mechanically unreliable. The infantry tanks, Inf.Mk.II Matildas, were well-protected but had a low speed and shorter range. Due to their protection, they actually did better, in one stage, than the cruisers, in fighting the German tanks. The German tanks, in contrast, were more uniform in performance, despite having many Pzkw I and II tanks with MG's or 20mm guns. The Pzkw III was the best of the German tanks at this stage. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

The situation on 17 June 1941 got worse for the British

The British were in a increasingly worsening situation with the German attack on 17 June 1941. The 4th Armoured Brigade had been pulled out to the desert flank, and that left the 22nd Guards Brigade and the 11th Brigade Group very vulnerable. By 9:30am, the 7th Armoured Brigade and 4th Armoured Brigade had been reduced to 22 cruiser tanks and 17 infantry tanks still running. The unfortunate feature of the British situation was that they lacked the recovery capability that the Germans relied upon for returning damaged tanks to combat. General Wavell went forward to the 7th Armoured Division HQ with General Beresford-Peirse, and decided to order a halt to operations, after finding that General Messervy had ordered a withdrawal to prevent the loss of the 22nd Guards Brigade. A feature of the day is that the RAF still held air superiority over the battlefield. Only one divebombing attack broke through.

The results of the attack were disappointing. General Wavell had reservations about the operation, but at the insistence of Churchill, had gone forward. The British losses were 122 killed, 588 wounded, and 259 men missing. They lost 27 cruiser tanks and 64 Inf.Mk.II Matildas either trhough mechanical problems, mines, or hits by anti-tank guns. They also lost four guns. The RAF "lost 33 fighters and three bombers". This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

Later on 16 June 1941 in the desert

Developments on the British side on 16 June 1941 were that the corps commander, General Beresford-Peirse visited his two division commanders, Generals Creagh (7th Armoured Divsion) and Messervy (4th Indian Division). Later in the day, General Wavell flew up to Sidi Barrani. The plan for the next day was that with the 22nd Guards Brigade holding the Fort Capuzzo area, the 4th Armoured Brigade would join the 7th Armoured Brigade to fight the German armoured units.

The German situation was that while the 8th Panzer Regiment had taken many losses, the efficient German recovery and repair had restored many tanks to service. The 15th Panzer Regiment, facing the British along the coast and frontier was concerned that the British would advance from Fort Capuzzo. Meanwhile, the Germans at Halfaya Pass were running low on supplies, as they were isolated. There was a good deal of uncertainty as to how well the 5th Light Division was doing versus the British 7th Armoured Division. The German plan for the 17th was for both armoured divisions to push for Halfaya Pass. The 5th Light Division would follow a track through Sidi Suleiman while the 15th Panzer Division would hed through Alam Abu Dihak.
This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

The German attack on 16 June 1941

As the Germans were able to look at captured documents and continued to benefit by their superb tactical SIGINT capability, Rommel was able to more confidently plan an attack. The 8th Panzer Regiment attacked near Fort Capuzzo, but the Official History says "the 4th Armoured Brigade, the 31st Field Regiment R.A. and the Buffs hammered and broke it [the attack]". The Scots Guards took first Musaid and then the Sollum barracks. Below the escarpment, however, the 11th Indian Brigade continued to be blocked. On the desert flank, the 7th Armoured Brigade and two Support Group forces fought the 5th Light Division. The fight moved towards Sidi Omar, where the rest of the Support Group was located. The Germans tried to split the 7th Armoured Brigade, between the 2nd RTR and 6th RTR, but failed. They did succeed in reducing the briagade to 21 running tanks. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

Battleaxe: plans for the second day

The British plan for the second day of Battleaxe was for the 4th Indian Division to support the 7th RTR at Fort Capuzzo, and to continue attacking Halfaya Pass. If that was successful, then they would move towards Bardia. The 7th Armoured Division would continue fighting in the Hafid area and protect the flank from attack.

On the first day, the 5th Light Division (with 96 running tanks) had been moved forward to Gambut. A combined tank, reconnaissance, and artillery force was sent to reinforce the 15th Panzer Division. Rommel decided to send the 8th Panzer Regiment against the British near Fort Capuzzo and the 5th Panzer Regiment across the desert to hit the British flank and rear, with the hopes of rattling them. The assignment of the 7th Armoured Division was to defeat any such flanking moves.

This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

The start of Battleaxe

The plan for Battleaxe envisioned air attacks to precede the battle. Benghazi was bombed every night, and increasingly, Axis airfields and supply lines were hit. The buildup for Battleaxe was given good fighter protection that prevented any German attacks. On the day the offensive started, 15 June 1941, the RAF had air superiority, and only six minor attacks got through.

The ground offensive did not go well in the border area. The Germans had succeeded in fortifying Halfaya pass and siting 88mm guns in good positions. The 11th Indian Infantry Brigade was blocked, and 11 of 12 supporting Inf.Mk.II Matildas were knocked out. The Official History also says that of 6 Matildas on the lower level, four were trapped in minefields.

In the desert, the 7th Armoured Brigade had encountered a defensive position with four 88mm guns, but few tanks. By the end of the day, the 7th Armoured Brigade had 48 running cruiser tanks.

The 4th Armoured Brigade had more success and General Messervy had decided to attack Fort Capuzzo. At the same time "Point 206" was taken. The Matildas actually did well against the 8th Panzer Regiment (probably because they had so much better protection). The problem was that the infantry did not advance in support as was needed.

At the end of the first day, two of the three attacks had been blocked and the Germans were planning counterattacks. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

The British disadvantages prior to Battleaxe

General Wavell reckoned that the British would start Battleaxe stronger than their enemies. Since early May, the British had recognized some shortcomings in their forces and equipment:

1. British armoured cars (Rolls Royce 1924 pattern, Morris CS9, and Marmon-Herrington Mk. II) were weakly protected against air attack
2. British armoured cars were out-gunned by their German opponents (the German 8-wheel SdKfz 231 had a 20mm gun, against the British 0.55in Boys Anti-Tank Rifle). Even the smaller, 4-wheel SdKfz 222 had a 20mm gun.
   
3. The Inf. Mk.II Matilda, despite having heavy armour for the time, was too slow for mobile warfare, being designed more for trench warfare supporting infantry
4. The Inf. Mk.II Matilda could be knocked out by the German 88mm FLAK 36 (and perhaps the FLAK 18) dual-purpose AA/AT gun. The 50mm PAK38, at close range, with a side shot, firing the "arrow shot" could penetrate the Matilda's armour, as well.
5. The A13 Cru.Mk.IVA was faster than the German medium tanks (Pzkw III and IV), but was outgunned by the Pzkw III Ausf. F that had a 50mm L42 gun. The Pzkw IV only had a low velocity 75mm at this date, although it could fire a shaped charge. The A15 Crusader I (and here) was newly manufactured and was still unreliable. The British cruiser tanks all had the 40mm 2pdr gun, which had good penetration at close range (perhaps 84mm at a 100m), but at more normal battle ranges might often bounce off the German tanks, which had spaced, applique armour.

Sources:

1. Vol.II of the Official History
2. George R. Bradford, Armour camouflage & markings North Africa 1940-1943, 1974.
   

The prelude to Battleaxe

A sure sign of trouble was that the commander, Lt-General Beresford-Peirse, had his headquarters at Sidi Barrani, a five-hour drive from the battle. The choice was made to ensure communications with the RAF No.204 Group HQ. No.204 Group was a further 100 miles up the road at Maaten Baggush. Sidi Barrani also had an airfield from which reconnaissance aircraft could operate.

The British commanders were greatly concerned that they make maximum use of their air force in Battleaxe. The British had a considerable force available:

4     Hurricane squadrons
1     Tomahawk squadron
2     Blenheim squadrons (medium)
1     Maryland squadron  (medium)
3-1/2 Wellington squadrons (heavy)

1     Maryland reconnaissance squadron
1     Hurricane reconnaissance squadron

Aircraft strength:

British

total   operational
128     105          medium and heavy bombers
116      98          single and twin-engined fighters

German

total   operational
79      59           bombers and dive bombers
76      60           single and twin-engined fighters


Italian

total   operational
49      25           bombers
156     70           fighters

Additional German aircraft were available outside of North Africa. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

Battleaxe units for the attack on the frontier

Units that took part in Battleaxe in the attack on the frontier:

22nd Guards Brigade-Brigadier I. D. Erskine
   3rd Battalion, the Coldstream Guards
   2nd Battalion, the Scots Guards
   1st Battalion, the Buffs

11th Indian Brigade Group-Brigadier R. A. Savory
   2nd Battalion, the Cameron Highlanders
   2/5th Mahratta Light Infantry
   1/6th Rajputana Rifles
   25th Field Regiment, RA
   27/28th Medium Battery, RA
   two troops of the 4th RTR
   Central India Horse cavalry regiment
   4th Field Company, King George's Own Bengal Sappers and Miners
   
Jaxo Column
   one troop of 25pdrs
   one troop of 2pdr ATG's
   one company of 1st Battalion, the King's Royal Rifle Corps

This is based on a note from Vol.II of the Official History.

George Bradford's page on Battleaxe

George Bradford's page on Operation Battleaxe is worth another link. He has a map and a description of the action. This presages what I will be writing, but I hope to provide some more detail than he has. One question that I have still is the exact makeup of the tanks brought by the Tiger convoy. One of the classics from the long defunct Wargamer's Digest from the 1970's was a production list for all British tanks through the war. We believe that at least some of what arrived were Crusaders, presumably Crusader I's, as this was alleged to be from an early production run. The alternative tank would have been the A13 Cru.Mk.IVA. There is reason to believe that the light tanks were Lt.Mk.VIC's with the 15mm Besa MG, the same weapon used in Humber armoured cars.

Plans for Operation Battleaxe

The original plan for Operation Battleaxe was for the 7th Armoured Brigade to sweep across the desert and hit the forces besieging Tobruk while the 4th Armoured Brigade, with infantry support, would strike the frontier. The commanders decided that they didn't have the transport available to support such a mobile operation. The second plan was for the 7th Armoured Division to move to the west of Fort Capuzzo and wait for a German counterattack. Some skeptics pointed out that the Germans could decline to attack, and simply wait for further events. The commanders also disliked any plan which did not utilize all available forces. The planners came back with a third plan, whose goal was to employ the largest possible force that could be supplied (and do something). The largest possible force still utilized the 7th Armoured Division, but also the HQ and artillery from the 4th Indian Division, along with the 11th Indian Brigade and the 22nd Guards Brigade. With the 4th Indian Division, a familiar officer first appeared: Major-General Frank W. Messervy. The 4th Indian Division and the 4th Armoured Brigade (infantry tanks) was to attack the Axis forces in the frontier area and destroy them. The rest of the 7th Armoured Division was relegated to covering the desert flank of the attackers. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

The "New" 7th Armoured Division

When the 7th Armoured Division was reconstituted after the arrival of the Tiger convoy, it had many new units below the brigade level. The armoured brigades were to be the 7th and the 4th. The 7th Armoured Brigade was equipped with two cruiser tank regiments and the 4th with two infantry tank regiments. The Support Group was now back with the 7th Armoured Division after being attached to the 2nd Armoured Division, which was destroyed in early 1941 in Cyrenaica and Greece.

While the British were reorganizing, the Germans were busy as well. The 5th Light Division was withdrawn from forward positions and their place was taken by the 15th Panzer Division. The 15th Panzer Division, in the forward area, consisted of the 8th Panzer Regiment (two battalions), the 33rd Reconnaissance unit (battalion-size), 1st Abteilung of the 33rd Artillery Regiment, 1st Battalion of the 104th Motor Infantry Regiment, 33rd Panzerjäger Battalion (12-50mm PAK 38 ATG's and 21-37mm PAK 35/36 ATG's), 15th Motorcycle Battalion, one AA battery (with 14-88mm FLAK 18 and FLAK 36 guns). In addition, the divisional commander had control of three Italian infantry battalions from the Trento Division and three Italian field artillery batteries.
This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

The planning for Battleaxe

From the perspective of the Chiefs of Staff, they were concerned about the German presence in Crete, and the prospect that the Germans could supply their forces in Cyrenaica from western Greece. The Chiefs of Staff wanted to have airfields forward between Derna and Sollum in Cyrenaica to interfere with such a supply line. Therefore, General Wavell needed to attack to take that area. Never mind the fact that he had only just received his 238 tanks which had made a long sea voyage and they would need to be prepared. Also, if it is true that the shipment included some brand new Crusader I's, they had not yet had the mechanical bugs worked out of them, and they would be a liability. Others needed a mechanical overhaul, which seems odd for tanks that were supposed to be used immediately. Oddly enough, the 7th Armoured Division had been dissolved, and needed to be totally reconstituted. Some of its constituent units had operated independently, or under the command of other units.

The plan for Battleaxe was to defeat the Germans in the frontier area and then advance to the vicinity of Tobruk and defeat the Germans there. From there, the British would advance to Derna and Mechili. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

The loss of Halfaya Pass

Brigadier Gott was in command in the border area, and he had been ordered to hold Halfaya Pass and patrol as far to the west as he could. As we previously noted, the 3rd Coldstream Guards held the pass, supported by Matilda Inf.Mk.II tanks, AA, and 2pdr ATG's. Mobile Columns from the Support Group were on the southern flank. At this date, they had not yet acquired their nickname of "Jock Columns", named after Jock Campbell.

Colonel Herff was still in command for the Germans in the border area. His armoured strength was now about 160 tanks. On 26 May, Colonel Herff staged a feint onto the high ground above the pass. When the Germans found that they faced light resistent, they reinforced the movement until it was a serious attack. That achieved its goal, and cuased the 3rd Coldstream Guards and their supporting units to stage a fighting withdrawal. Despite being successful, the British lost 173 casualties, 8-ATG, and 5 Inf.Mk.II tanks. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

Brevity was deemed a failure

The Brevity operation was deemed a failure. They simply did not have the strength to attempt the operation in the face of a growing German force. They were fortunate to achieve the early success they did.

The situation changed for the better with the arrival of the Tiger Convoy on 12 May 1941. 135 Inf.Mk.II Matildas, 82 cruiser tanks (at least Cru.Mk.IVA, and maybe Crusader I's), and 21 Lt.Mk.VIC's. The British hoped that the German logistical problems would allow them to continue to hold Halfaya Pass. The 3rd Colstream Guards, some Inf.Mk.II's, 2-pdr anti-tank guns, and AA guns were positioned at Halfaya. A Support Group column was operating on the southern flank. The Germans had about 160 tanks, but these were immobilized due the lack of diesel fuel. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

More about Brevity

Colonel Herff thought he was being attacked by two divisions at the border. The RAF actually dominated the skys over the battlefield and hit transport to the west. The 7th Armoured Brigade Group had reached Sidi Aziz, but that failed to draw the Germans back from Fort Capuzzo. Late in the day, the force on the coast took the lower level of Halfaya Pass. Rommel, however, guessed that there were only small forces engaged and planned a counter-attack. A tank battalion was to arrive early the next day to reinforce Colonel Herff's forces. The Germans were hampered by fuel shortages, as the 1st Battalion of the 8th Panzer Regiment ran out of fuel on arrival near Sidi Aziz. Eventually, the 7th Armoured Brigade Group withdrew to Bir el Khiregat. The eventual outcome was that the only new territory held by the British was Halfaya Pass. The British losses exceeded the German. They had 5 Inf. Mk.II as total losses and 13 damaged. The Germans lost "three tanks destroyed". This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

Operation Brevity under way

Operation Brevity commenced early on 15 May 1941. No.274 Squadron provided air cover with their Hurricanes for the advancing troops. The 2nd Scots Guards and one squadron from the 4/RTR took the upper Halfaya Pass area, but at the cost of 7 Inf. Mk.II's knocked out, probably by 88mm fire. To the west of Sollum, Bir Wair and Musaid were taken. 1st Durham Light Infantry and a squadron of tanks headed for Fort Capuzzo. The objective was taken, but now 9 tanks had been lost. The column on the coast was blocked and unable to advance, despite supporting attacks by Blenheims of No.14 Squadron. The 7th Armoured Brigade Group had no real opposition, and they pushed across the desert towards Sidi Aziz. German tactical signals intelligence learned of the attack before it began. The Germans were concerned that it would be a push to raise the seige of Tobruk, and Rommel made preparations accordingly. Colonel Herff staged a counterattack against the 1st Durham Light Infantry with the 2nd Battalion of the 5th Panzer Regiment. That pushed the British back to Musaid. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

General Wavell decided to stage operation Brevity

Since he knew that he would receive reinforcements in the form of the Tiger Convoy, General Wavell decided to stage an operation in the border area commanded by Brigadier Gott. The operation was called Brevity, and hoped to push the Germans from Sollum and Fort Capuzzo.

While Brevity was being planned, the Navy was busy attacking the German rear, including bombarding Benghazi, Gazala, and Derna. They achieved a certain amount of success, using gunboats and destroyers.

Brigadier Gott proposed to attack with three columns. The 7th Armoured Brigade Groups (an armoured brigade in name, only) would cut across the desert to Sidi Aziz, in the rear of Sollum and Halfaya Pass. They only had two squadrons of 29 cruiser tanks. The bulk of the strength was in three columns from the Support Group. The second column, in the center, consisted of the 22nd Guards Brigade Group supported by the 4th RTR with 24 Inf.Mk.II Matildas. The would attack the upper portion of Halfaya Pass, take Fort Capuzzo, and move north. The third column would advance along the coast, and included the 2/Rifle Brigade and 8th Field Regiment. They were to block any German advance from Sollum and to take the lower portion of Halfaya Pass and Sollum.

This is based on the account from Vol.II of the Official History.

The British situation in North Africa in April and May 1941

General Wavell had reason to be concerned about the stability of the British position in North Africa. They had learned that the 15th Panzer Division had arrived earlier than expected, by 18 April 1941. The British side was short of tanks, between the attrition from the original offensive to those diverted to the Greek adventure and lost. They only had a mixed unit at Tobruk (the 32nd Army Tank Brigade, formerly the 3rd Armoured Brigade) and a squadron of cruiser tanks at Mersa Matruh. From repairs and refurbishing they might be able to increase the inventory of runners by another 30 or 40 tanks in six weeks.

In London, the decision was made on 21 April to send the Tiger Convoy with a mixed cargo of tanks and Hurricanes. These included 135 Inf. Mk.II Matildas, 82 Crusader Mk.I tanks and 21 light tanks, probably Lt.Mk.VIC, and 53 Hurricanes loaded on five relatively fast transports. General Wavell and his staff, based on this expected reinforcement proceeded with planning for the next offensive codenamed Battleaxe.
This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History as well as this previous blog post.

The siege of Tobruk saw a continual movement of men in and out of the fortress

The siege of Tobruk lasted for 8 months. Tobruk was only relieved in December 1941, during the Crusader battles, when the German position collapsed under the British attack that had been salvaged by General Auchinleck.

The whole movement of shipping was engineered so that ships were only in port, being unloaded in the night, and then were gone by daylight. In May 1941, an average of 84 tons of supplies per day were brought into Tobruk. The goal had been to bring at least 70 tons a day, so that was surpassed. In June, they were able to increase the supplies brought in to 94 tons per day.

Naval losses were high, during the month of June, as the Australian sloop Auckland was sunk, as was the Australian destroyer Waterhen. Destroyers played a prominent part in the continuing supply operation, and they operated in pairs.

This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

General Paulus's assessment in May 1941

General Paulus wrote a report submitted on 12 May 1941. He thought that the main issue was the supply situation. The tactical situation was difficult, but the supply line needed to be made secure. Otherwise, the a crisis was inevitable. The port of Benghazi was so damaged that Tripoli would have to handle the great bulk of supplies. Adequate air defenses of the ports was critical, as Benghazi was especially vulnerable. The current need for the troops in Libya was 50,000 tons per month, although perhaps only 30,000 was needed for the current use, while the rest was to build up stocks for further advances. By attacking, Rommel had increased the instability of the Axis position in North Africa. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

The second attack on Tobruk failed

The attack that ended on 4 May 1941 ended in failure for the Germans, although the Australian counterattack fizzled out, as well. In stark contrast to the battles in Greece and Crete, the RAF in the form of No.73 and No.274 Squadrons flew cover over the battle scene during daylight hours. The cost to the Germans had been 650 casualties and 500 to the Italians. General Paulus thought it went well, and the result was a bulge into the defences. Give the overall German strategic priorities, with the pending attack on Russia only about 7 weeks off, General Paulus wanted to see the Germans go on the defensive to consolidate their gains. Of course, General Rommel saw the situation differently. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

Another attack on Tobruk

Rommel was in a hurry to attack Tobruk. He was so anxious to attack that the Official History criticizes him for having not very carefully prepared the attack. They say that Rommel had lost confidence in General Streich, so he brought forward General Kirchheim to lead the attack, even though he was recovering from a wound. Rommel had given General Kirchheim half of the 5th Light Division, with more than 70 tanks to go with elements of the 15th Panzer Division. The Official History notes that the 104th Motor Regiment had only been in North Africa since 29 April 1941.

General Kirchheim was going to attack Tobruk defences that were stronger than they had been. Tobruk now had another 12 Inf. Mk.II tanks in addition to what they already had. Rommel had planned a night attack on Tobruk, starting at 8pm on 30 April. Troops from the Italian Ariete and Brescia divisions would aid in the assault, on the flanks. The attack hit the 26th Australian Infantry Brigade. The attack was expected, and Axis troops had been shelled prior to the actual attack. The attack made in initial intrusion, but became stalled. Fighting continued until early on 4 May. The Germans had been able to make a bulge into the Tobruk defences, but they had held. In the one tank-versus-tank battle, the British lost five tanks, but stopped the German advance. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

Back to the desert

We now shift our focus back to events in the desert in May and June 1941. The German High Command General Paulus (often erroneously called "von Paulus") was sent to investigate the situation in the desert and to warn Rommel that there were "few resources" to send him. General Paulus eventually sanctioned Rommel's planned attack on Tobruk scheduled for 30 April 1941. General Garibaldi visited and agreed, as well. The German High Command had a mindset much like the British had prior to Rommel's arrival. They did not want to commit forces in the desert that were needed elsewhere, and did not want to take risks. If Tobruk should fall in the planned attack, Paulus wanted a defensive line established along the line of Sollum and the Siwa Oasis. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

The role of Dominion troops in the Middel East

The Official History notes the important role played by Australian and New Zealand troops in the war in the Mediterranean and Middle East. Their commanders had a dual allegiance and had privileges not available to British and Colonial forces (such as the Indian Army). They had the responsibility to keep their governments informed as to developments, and to keep their formations intact, as much as possible. General Blamey commanded the Australians and General Freyberg the New Zealanders. Despite their status, both very much desired, and their troops, as well, to make a significant contribution to the war effort. However, after the debacle on Crete, the New Zealand Government was concerned that their forces not be put into such an untenable position again, as had happened on Crete. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

The cost of capturing Crete

The Official History suggests that the cost to the Germans of taking Crete were such that they never again attempted an airborne operation of this scale. The attack came within a narrow margin of failing on the first day. It was only once that transport aircraft brought in the mountain troops that the balance shifted in their favor. That was made possible by landing the transports in the face of artillery fire on the field. From the German perspective, Operation Merkur needed to be over as soon as possible, due to the pending attack on Russia. They had hoped that Barbarrosa would start on 15 May 1941, but it was delayed about five weeks, which meant that instead of possibly succeeding in the fall, the Germans becamed engulfed in the Russian winter before reaching their goals. The delay required because of Balkan operations probably affected the outcome of the war. The Yugoslav coup d'etat was also a wild card. That forced the German hand in the Balkans, and forced them to intervene.

Losses in the Battle for Crete

At the start of the Battle for Crete, there were about 32,000 British servicemen on the island. There had been 6,000 prior to the evacuation from Greece, and 21,000 more came from there. There were also 10,000 Greek soldiers. The British forces lost about 1,800 killed and 12,000 taken prisoner in the battle. We have already listed the naval losses, which were great. The RAF lost 7 Wellingtons, 16 "medium bombers" (Blenheims and Marylands?), and 23 fighters. The Gremans lost more: 147 aircraft lost and 64 damaged in action. They lost another 73 destroyerd and 84 damaged "by other causes". The Germans lost about 1,990 killed, 2,131 wounded and 1,995 missing. The British forces clearly held their own, and fought well, but in a lost cause. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

The final evacuation from Crete

The evacuation from Sphakia started early on 30 May 1941. 6,000 men were initially embarked. The ships involved included the amphibious warfare ship Glengyle and the cruiser Perth. On 31 May, four destroyers lifted 1,500 soldiers. General Freyberg and the naval commander at Suda Bay were flown out by Sunderland, by orders from General Wavell and the other commanders. The last rearguard position protecting the beaches was commanded by Brigadier Vasey, with the 19th Australian Brigade, a few 3rd Hussars light tanks, the Royal Marine Battalion, and Layforce. Most of them were able to be evacuated, as the Germans did not press them hard. The Germans contented themselves with turning the flanks, which went slowly enough not to affect the withdrawal. 4,000 men were evacuated, but "5,000 were left behind". The navy had suffered heavily, with one aircraft carrier and three battleships damaged. Three valuable cruisers had been sunk, along with 6 destroyers. Another 6 cruisers and 7 destroyers were damaged, as well. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

The losses from the Heraklion evacuation gave the commanders pause

After taking the losses from the Heraklion evacuation (800 troops killed and the destroyers Imperial and Hereward sunk, with Orion, Dido, and Decoy damages), the commanders hesistated to attempt the evacuation from Sphakia. Factors that helped make the Sphakia evacuation go more smoothly were that fighter protection became increasingly effective and the Germans became more tentative in their efforts. Successful fighting by the 5th New Zealand Brigade and 19th Australian Brigade and other rearguard actions relieved pressure on the evacuation. Considering that the battle for Crete went badly, the Official History points out that credit must be given to the troops for toughness and bravery under desperate conditions. Two VC's were given to New Zealanders, Lt. C. H. Upham (20th NZ Battalion) and Sergeant A. C. Hulme (23rd NZ Battalion). This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

At the last minute, the navy was expected to evacuate 20,000 men from Crete

The evacuation from Crete started on the night of 28 and 29 May 1941. The navy was expected to rescue the 20,000 soldiers on Crete, 4,000 from Heraklion and 16,000 from the beach at Sphakia. In fact, the situation was so dire and communications were lost that some were never informed. Colonel Campbell and his men at Retimo surrendered on 30 May, after they were running out of ammunition and food.

On the first night, Captain Arliss, with four destroyers, took 700 men from Sphakia and carried them back to Alexandria. At Heraklion, three cruisers and six destroyers were under attack. The destroyer Imperial took a near miss and the cruiser Ajax was damaged enough to have to withdraw. Still, by 3am, the ships had evacuated 4,000 men and were headed for Alexanderia. The Imperial's steering gear failed and she was sunk. That delayed the withdrawal, and they were caught in daylight. In the attacks, about 800 of the soldiers evacuated were killed.

This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

The situation on Crete on 26 May 1941 was getting very bad

On 26 May 1941, General Freyberg's concerns about the feasibility of withdrawing forces from Crete were ignored by the commanders in Egypt. The air attacks were so intense that all unit cohesion and control were evaporating. We see that General Wavell had informed London, and Churchill replied that they could not afford to lose Crete. In fact, the "Canea front had collapsed", and there was no prospect of bringing in reinforcements. They would be fortunate to hold off the Germans long enough to withdraw any of the troops. The Chiefs of Staff finally authorized a withdrawal. How the navy would be able to withdraw 20,000 troops was a mystery. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

From 24 May 1941, the Chiefs of Staff were living in unreality

When asked on 24 May 1941, Admiral Cunningham informed the Chief of Staff that the fleet could not operate in the Aegean or near Crete in daytime without crippling losses. The Chiefs of Staff responded that the fleet had to be ready to accept those losses. On 26 May, Admiral Cunningham told the Chiefs of Staff that he could predict losses if the fleet were required to operate in daytime. By 24 May, the battle on the ground was clearly lost. The airforce was able to do some damage, through heroic efforts, but the available strength was too small and the distance from Egypt was too great. Interestingly, the SAAF was using Marylands on offensive sorties, not just maritime reconnaissance. By the morning of 26 May 1941, General Freyberg informed General Wavell that if they wanted to save any of the troops on Crete, the withdrawal should start immediately. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

At sea on 22 and 23 May 1941 near Crete

Admirals King and Rawlings were headed southwest from Crete in the afternoon. At one point, the battleship Valiant was hit. Lord Louis Mountbatten, with the 5th Destroyer Flotilla, arrived at 4pm on 22 May 1941. They were sent to the southwest side of Crete. Kelly and Kashmir attacked a caique laden with troops, and then bombarded the airfield at Maleme. Captain Mack and four destroyers were sent to patrol on the north side of the island. On the south coast, two destroyers embarked the King of Greece, "the British Minister and other important persons". Admiral Cunningham ordered the ships at sea to replenish during the night to be ready for another day of activity. By mistake, the commanders thought that Warspite and Valiant were low on light AA ammunition, although this was not the case. They were ordered to withdraw, leaving Lord Mountbatten unsupported. In the morning, about 8am, 24 divebombers attacked Lord Mountbatten in the Kelly with the Kashmir and sank them. The Kipling was able to rescue Lord Mountbatten and 278 other men. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

The Australian War Memorial website has a page about the battle for Crete, as do others

The battle over the island of Crete in late May 1941 was of epic proportions. Our friends from the southwest Pacific played an important part. The Australian War Memorial website has a page on the battle. The History Learning Site in the UK also has a page called the "Fall of Crete". The Explore Crete site has a page called the "Battle of Crete". The Wikipedia also weighs in with a Battle of Crete page.

The German plan to attack Crete by sea

The Germans had hoped to use two groups of caiques to carry troops to Crete's beaches. The first of caiques, carrying about 2,000 troops came to a bad end at the guns of Admiral Gennie's ships. The second group of 38 caiques, carrying about 4,000 troops, is what Admiral King had seen when forced to withdraw because of diminishing AA ammunition. After word had been received of the disaster to the first group, the German admiral ordered the second group to turn back. He also had planned to tanks and artillery carried in merchant steamers, as well, but these apparently did not arrive in time for the battle. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

The naval defence of Crete: 21-22 May 1941

After destroyers had bombarded Scarpanto airfield during the night of 20 to 21 May 1941, they withdrew to the south. They came under heavy air attack and "the destroyer Juno was sunk and the cruiser Ajax damaged". A Maryland maritime reconnaissance aircraft from No.39 Squadron saw destoyers escorting small vessels approaching Crete from the direction of Milos. They were attacked around midnight of 21-22 May by Dido, Ajax, Orion, and four destroyers. The Italian torpedo boat Lupo was damaged and 10 caiques carrying German troops were sunk. The British force then withdrew to the west. During daylight on 22 May, Admiral King's force swept to the north. He had Naiad, Perth, Calcutta, and Carlisle, with four destroyers. They found some stragglers and sank them. As they were running out of AA ammunition, they were forced to retire, even though there were obviously more small vessels with German troops. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

The naval defence of Crete: 21-22 May 1941

After destroyers had bombarded Scarpanto airfield during the night of 20 to 21 May 1941, they withdrew to the south. They came under heavy air attack and "the destroyer Juno was sunk and the cruiser Ajax damaged". A Maryland maritime reconnaissance aircraft from No.39 Squadron saw destoyers escorting small vessels approaching Crete from the direction of Milos. They were attacked around midnight of 21-22 May by Dido, Ajax, Orion, and four destroyers. The Italian torpedo boat Lupo was damaged and 10 caiques carrying German troops were sunk. The British force then withdrew to the west. During daylight on 22 May, Admiral King's force swept to the north. He had Naiad, Perth, Calcutta, and Carlisle, with four destroyers. They found some stragglers and sank them. As they were running out of AA ammunition, they were forced to retire, even though there were obviously more small vessels with German troops. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

Naval dispositions at the start of the invasion of Crete

The navy started the fight to defend Crete at a disadvantage, as the aircraft carrier Formidable was unable to participate, as after the Tiger Convoy, her fighter strength was reduced to four. Suda Bay was no longer usable, so the fleet had to return to Alexandria to restock with ammunition and to refuel. There were only some motor torpedo boats based there.

Admiral Cunningham's plan was to interdict traffic by sea at night and to withdraw to the south during daylight hours. He had assembled three groups of cruisers and destroyers, augmented by the MTB's from Suda Bay.

The Corinth Canal was mined to impede traffic flow, and this was successful.

At the start of 20 May 1941, Rear-Admiral Rawlings, in the Warspite and with the Valiant were to the west of Crete. They had a screen of 10 destroyers. The Naiad and Perth, with four destroyers were heading south from Kaso Strait. The Dido, Ajax, and Orion, with four destroyers were heading to join Rear-Admiral Rawlings from Antikithera Channel. The cruisers Gloucester and Fiji had left Alexandria, heading to join the battlefleet, as well. The Queen Elizabeth and Barham had returned to Alexandria after the Warspite and Valiant had arrived.

This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History

The second day in the attack on Crete

On the second day, two companies of the Second Parachute Regiment were dropped into near Pirgos. In the event, the Maoris cut them up pretty badly and they were pinned in Pirgos. What started to tip the scales was that transport aircraft, landing under artillery fire, brought in the 100th Mountain Regiment. This was apparently at Maleme. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

The German attack on Crete on the first day

German air superiority meant that the British forces defending Crete had to keep under cover, as any movement brought an attack from roaming German aircraft. The air attack was so intense at Maleme airfield that the commander of the defenders had little idea of what was happening. All of his communication lines had been cut. The defenders had to withdraw to better cover, and this left the airfield in contention. In Prison Valley, the attackers had not been able to advance. At the end of the first day, Retimo and Heraklion airfields were still in British hands. Georgeopolis had not yet been attacked, and General Freyberg moved an Australian battalion to Suda Bay. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

Correlli Barnett points out all that was happening in April to June 1941

Correlli Barnett says, in The Desert Generals, that General Wavell hoped for relative quiet in Cyrenaica, as he was fully occupied in many other places. He characterizes withdrawal from Greece as the British being "thrown out", with the loss of one fifth of their forces on 29 April 1941. In Iraq, on 5 May, Rashid Ali led a coup that was sympathetic to the Germans. On 20 May, the Germans attacked Crete. Intelligence indicated that Germans were entering Syria, so Wavell resolved to take the country. The British invasion launched on 8 June, with forces inferior to the Vichy French. From 12 May, Churchill starting pressing Wavell for a date when the Tiger Convoy tanks would be used in an offensive. Wavell seems to have been unable to deal with this sort of political pressure for premature or unwise action, and it ultimately led to his downfall. Churchill's lease on power must have seemed tenuous enough to him, that he continually made decisions based on politics, and his anxiety to see action taken.

The attack on Crete proceeds

Aside from a psychological effect, the paratroopers mostly were ineffective, except where they dropped into an area where they were unopposed. The glider-borne troops were decimated. The two points where they posed a real threat were the Assault Regiment landing in the dry river bed of the Tavronitis and where the 7th Air Division had dropped in the southwest of Canea, in the Prison Valley. The New Zealand Division took the main assault. From 6am on 20 May, the attacks proceeded. Many of the paratroopers dropped into a bad situation and were immediately pinned down, reminiscent of Normandie, three years later. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

The attack on Crete

General Wavell had one eye on Iraq in mid-May 1941, as the Iraqi's had moved their army up on the plateau near Habbaniyah, the RAF training station. He soon had his attention fixated on Crete and on 14 May, bombing and strafing attacks had commenced against British airfields on Crete.

The German attack forces were distributed against what they considered to be the main targets. The Assault Regiment would take Maleme. The 7th Air Division would take Canea, Retimo, and Heraklion. One regiment of paratroopers was allocated to each target. The Assault Regiment would use gliders against Maleme. The attack would commence in the early morning on 20 May 1941. The Germans planned to have the airfields under their control by evening of the first day. The attacks were intended to be made where there were no defenders, a pretty reasonable plan. In the event, the plan did not work, as the Germans lacked adequate intelligence of the defences. This is based on Vol.II of the Official History.

Crete: one British advantage

The one shortcoming of the German preparations for attacking Crete is that they new essentially nothing about the forces opposing them. The seem to have expected far fewer troops in the defence than there were actually there. The British, in contrast, had been keeping watch over preparations through aerial reconnaissance. Undoubtedly, they must have had agents in Greece, as well, since they had only recently left there. They had a fairly complete picture of the forces being prepared for the assault. The mistaken report that the Germans might attack Cypress, instead of Crete proved an unwelcome distraction for Wavell and his staff. The deteriorating situation in Iraq seemed to lend credence to Cypress being the target. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

German preparations for the attack on Crete

One reason that the Germans were able to ready so large an airforce for the attack on Crete was the weather had become drier. They also were able to perform such feats as building a new airfield at Molaoi in a week. They also took Milos Island on 10 May 1941. In three days, they built another airfield. As it was, airfields were greatly congested. The German organizational skills were displayed in their ability to distribute fuel to all the bases. The shorter range Ju-87 and Me-109 fighters were deployed forward at Milos, Molaoi, and Scarpanto. Their bases were back at Corinth and Argos. The Me-110's operated from the Athens area. This was about 200 miles from Crete. The longer range bombers and reconnaissance aircraft could be accommodated further away, a locations such as Salonika, Bulgaria, and the island of Rhodes. The Ju-52 transports were based forward in southern Greece at places such as "Corinth, Megara, Eleusis, Tatoi, Tanagra, and Topolia". Everything but the gliders were ready by 14 May. The gliders only arrived at Tanagra on 16 May. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

The leadup to the attack on Crete in May 1941

May 1941 was action-packed. There was the battle for Crete, the Bismarck voyage and destruction, and there was the Tiger Convoy. British resources were stretched to the breaking point. Prior to the German attack on Crete, Wellingtons from No.37, 38, 80, and 148 squadrons flew from Egypt to bomb airfields in Greece every night. Egypt was 300 miles from Crete while Crete was within range of an arc of German air bases.

The German effort would primarily involve the army and air force, as Hitler had decided to leave naval efforts in the Mediterranean Sea to the Italian navy. The air force proposed taking Crete with an airborne attack, and planning proceeded in April and into May. The attack on Crete was named Operation Merkur, and the command was given to General Löhr, commander of Luftflotte 4, with Fliegerkorps VIII and XI. The latter had the airborne troops and their aircraft. The operation included 13,000 troops from the 7th Air Division and 9,000 mountain troops.

Fliegerkorps VIII was equipped with "228 bombers, 205 dive bombers, 114 twin-engined fighters (Me-110), 119 single-engined fighters (probably mostly Me-109), 50 reconnaissance aircraft". The total was 716, of which 514 were serviceable on 17 May. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

More preparations and misgivings about defending Crete

General Freyberg must have contacted his government and expressed his concern, because the New Zealand government approached Churchill with their misgivings about their troops defending Crete. Churchill simply replied that defending Crete would greatly contribute to the security of Egypt, and that was it. General Freyberg was particularly worried about a combined seaborne and airborne attack. Many support personnel were withdrawn to reduce to the drain on provisions, and the rest were armed with rifles. The heavy AA guns were all protecting Suda Bay. The light AA were spread over the other sectors, except for Retimo, where there were none. The air strength was decimated over time, and with General Freyberg's agreement, the Air Officer Commanding "sent away the surviving four Hurricanes and three Gladiators". This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

Preparing to defend Crete

General Wavell flew to Crete on 30 April 1941 to tell his senior officers that he wanted to deny Crete as a base to the Germans. He expected that the most likely targets would be the two airfields, at Heraklion and Maleme. General Wilson was sent to Palestine to command the force against Iraq, leaving General Freyberg to command the defence of Crete. General Freyberg's reaction was to tell the high command that either they give him adequate force or they should reconsider the decision to hold Crete. The air resources on the island were 6 Hurricanes and 17 "obsolete aircraft, clearly inadequate. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

More about the early situation in Crete

One thing that General Wavell told General Wilson was that the RAF strength in Crete would not be increased. At least, the anti-aircraft artillery had been increased, but only to 32 heavy AA and 36 light AA, "of which 12 were not mobile". A consequence of the decision to not increase the air strenght was that there would be almost no capability for aerial reconnaissance north of Crete. The only aircraft with the range would be Sunderlands, and they were too vunerable. General Wilson told Wavell that without additional aircraft, their ability to resist invasion by sea would be limited. There was too much beach to be able to defend it all. General Wilson also told General Wavell that unless all the services could increase their force levels, that the island could not be held. Basically, he was saying that as the situation stood, the "he did not think that the island could be successfully defended". This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

The island of Crete by April 1941

When General Papagos suggested the British withdraw from Greece, he assumed that Crete would be defended. Apparently, by 17 April 1941, Churchill had decided that Crete would be held. Only the day before, the Mediterranean Fleet had been given guidance that their top priority was to interrupt the flow of supplies to Libya. By 18 April, Churchill acknowledged that in fact, the top priority was to withdraw the troops from Greece. With all the conflicting priorities, a new one was forming: a pro-Axis coup in Iraq. Given the chaotic state in the Mediterranean theater, supplying Crete was low on the list. General Wilson arrived at Suda Bay on 27 April. General Wavell immediately asked for his recommendation for defending Crete. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

The British presence on Crete

Early in the war, the British and French had contingency plans for French troops from Syria to occupy Suda Bay in Crete, as soon as Greece was attacked by Axis forces. After the fall of France, the British were hard-pressed to find the resources to defend Suda Bay. The issue became critical after Italy had invaded Greece in late October 1940. Once they went to Suda Bay, a natural refuelling spot, the Royal Navy provided a few defenses and the army stripped Malta to provide a weak brigade along with 8 Heavy AA and 12 Light AA guns. A landing strip was built a Maleme so that fighters could defend the harbour. The only available aircraft were from the Fleet Air Arm. The Greeks withdrew their troops to the mainland when they assessed that the Italians were unlikely to attack Crete. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

The Mediterranean Fleet Prior to the Loss of Crete

The Mediterranean Fleet had been involved in intense operations from the date that the fleet sailed from Alexandria on 18 April 1941 to bombard Tripoli. Shortly after returning to Alexandria, they had the withdrawal of the army from Greece to carry out. This was followed closely by the Tiger Convoy. The only losses incurred were one of the Tiger Convoy fast transports and the damage to the destroyer Fortune. This was mainly possible due to the highly unusual weather in late April and early May 1941. The heavy clouds and rain meant that the fleet had considerable immunity from air attack. There was also the factor that the Italian navy was recovering from the attack at Taranto on 11 November 1940 that crippled their fleet. While good fighter cover and AA fire had so far saved the fleet from losses, the coming battle over the island of Crete would be a different matter. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

The second bombardment of Benghazi

Lord Louis Mountbatten commanded the 5th Destroyer Flotilla, which had five destroyers. A short time after midnight on the night of 10 May to 11 May 1941, they closed with the harbour at Benghazi and commenced firing. One merchant ship "lying at the northern breakwater as severely damaged", but the remaining ships could all be seen to be wrecked, so firing stopped. In the first case of divebombing at night in the Mediterranean Sea, the 5th Destroyer Flotilla was attacked. AA fire was difficult due to the aircraft only being visible at the last moment before bomb release. Lord Mountbatten decided that instead of the further sweep planned, they should withdraw to Malta. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

The Tiger Convoy on 8 and 9 May 1941

On 7 May 1941, Vice-Admiral Malta had reported that the harbour was closed due to mining. Admiral Cunningham resolved that the two Malta convoys should continue, despite that word. On 8 May, there was rain and restriced visibility. Two Albacores from Formidable were lost, and only one crew was recovered. The light cruiser Ajax and three destroyers rejoined the fleet at 5pm after having bombarded Benghazi. On 9 April, the Mediterranean Fleet was still giving general cover to the convoys. The fleet was about 120 miles to the south, while the convoy was 90 miles west of Malta. The two Malta convoys were able to enter the harbout due to minesweeping and dropping depth charges to explode mines. The Tiger Convoy met the fleet at 3:15pm and continued with them in close escort towards the east. Axis reconnaissance aircraft had seen the convoy and fleet, but there had still been no attacks. Beaufighters from Malta continued to fly cover for the convoy and along with the weather conditions, this had so far deterred air attacks. In the twilight of 10 May, 9 Malta-based Beaufighters straffed bombers on the airfields at Catania and Comiso, Sicily. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

More about the Tiger Convoy

Five 15-knot transports made up the Tiger Convoy. Three had "Clan" names: the Clan Chatton, the Clan Lamont, and the Clan Campbell. The others were the Empire Song and the New Zealand Star. They carried 295 tanks and 53 Hurricanes. The convoy entered the Mediterranean Sea on the night of 5th and 6th May 1941. In the Skerki Channel, on the night of 8 May, the Empire Song hit two mines, which set ammunition afire. The New Zealand Star had a mine explode on a paravane with little damage. The Empire Song exploded, but her crew had been removed by a destroyer, prior to that moment. The Empire Song had carried 10 Hurricanes and 57 tanks, all of which were lost. 238 tanks and 43 Hurricanes eventually arrived at their destination. These included 135 Inf. Mk.II Matildas, 82 Crusader Mk.I tanks and 21 light tanks, probably Lt.Mk.VIC. A torpedo bomber, probably an SM79, staged an attack on the Queen Elizabeth, but she narrowly avoided the torpedo. The next day, Beaufighters from Malta flew cover for the convoy. The destroyer Fortune, with Force H, was hit, but reached Gibraltar. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

The motivation for the Tiger Convoy

General Wavell sent a message to the commanders in London on 20 April 1941, telling them of his inferiority in armoured vehicles, and that the situation was to get worse. When Churchill saw the message, he decided to make a bold stroke and send tanks through the Mediterranean Sea to Egypt. For such an operation, Admiral Cunningham thought the risks were acceptable. This was despite the increased air threat from Fliegerkorps X. As usual, multiple convoys would run concurrently. One fast and one slow convoy would be run from Alexandria to Malta. Force H would escort the Tiger Convoy to Malta and the Mediterranean Fleet would take over the escort and accompany them to Alexandria. Force H consisted of the Renown, Ark Royal, Sheffield, and 9 destroyers (soon to be involved in the Bismarck operation). There were also reinforcements being added to the Mediterranean Fleet: Queen Elizabeth, Naiad, and Fiji. Based on Malta, there was Gloucester and 5th Destroyer Flotilla. Malta harbour was mined after Gloucester, Kipling, and Kashmir had sailed, so they were not able to return. The Mediterranean Fleet consisted of Warspite, Barham, Valiant, Formidable, Orion, Ajax, Perth, Abdiel, and destroyers. The Breconshire carried fuel and munitions for Malta. The slow convoy to Malta had "two tankers, [and] was to be escorted by two anti-aircraft cruisers, three destroyers and two corvettes". This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

The Admiralty was going to press Admiral Cunningham to put a battleship at Malta

The commanders in London seem to have been far removed from reality. They had stopped the advance in North Africa. They had sent and army to Greece that was unable to affect the issue, and mainly served to expend equipment not easily replaced. It also placed a great burden on the Mediterranean Fleet. They had pressed for the bombardment of Tripoli, which achieved little but which risked the fleet. They even were ready to press Admiral Cunningham to put a battleship at Malta. That would have been a grave mistake, as increasingly, ships in Malta could not be defended from air attack. What decided the issue, however, was that the Germans were increasingly using air-dropped ground mines. When originally broached on the subject of a battleship at Malta, Admiral Cunningham had agreed, if there were two fighter squadrons available to give cover, with 150% reserve of spare aircraft. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

Aftermath of the attack on Tripoli

We might be excused if we wondered what happened to Fliegerkorps X during the operation to bombard Tripoli. The fleet was at sea during the day on April 21 and 22, and did not experience any air attacks. Fliegerkorps X did attack Malta on those two days. The Official History speculates that the German command was too inflexible to be able to respond to a fluid situation. They also point out that during this period that Fliegerkorps X had a lower aircraft availability and a shortage of crews trained for maritime operations. In any case, for the next week or two, the British Mediterranean Fleet was heavily involved with withdrawing the army from Greece, where they were exposed to intense air attack. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

The aftermath of the attack on Tripoli

We now know that the attack on Tripoli caught the Italians completely by surprise. The results were disappointing, considering the 478 15in rounds and about 1,500 smaller caliber rounds were fired at the city and port. Only one cargo ship with fuel and bombs was sunk. The torpedo boat Partenope was damaged. Many 15in shells hit the city, but many failed to explode. Reports give the civilian casualties as 100 killed and 300 wounded. The Official History notes that more damage was done when a cargo ship exploded on 3 May 1941. The ship was said to have carried German bombs which spontaneously exploded. Two merchant ships were sunk and the quays were seriously damaged. Admiral Cunningham was thankful that the fleet was untouched, but expressed the opinion that the operation was a poor use of valuable resources. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

The operation to bombard Tripoli in April 1941

The Mediterranean Fleet sailed on 18 April 1941 and headed "through the Kaso Strait". The escorting destroyers refueled in Suda Bay, in northwest Crete. The fleet met Pridham-Whipple's cruisers and destroyers and the convoy for Malta (the Breconshire and her escort). The empty ship convoy from Malta passed them on their way back to Alexandria. In the dark, the Breconshire and one destroyer made their dash to Malta. The bombardment force and the carrier force headed in the general direction of Tripoli. The bombardment was preceded by an air attack by 8 Wellingtons and Swordfish, all from Malta. The bombardment ships passed the submarine Truant, which was acting as a lighthouse. The bombardment of Tripoli commenced at 5:02am. The dust in the air and the AA fire made spotting impossible, so we can imagine that the gunfire was less effective than it could have been. The fleet turned for a second pass and only then did shore batteries fire, and then ineffectively. The firing lasted 40 minutes and then Force B, the bombardment force withdrew, covered by Force C, the carrier group. The fleet arrived back in Alexandria the next morning. The attack had been carried out without loss. The results were paltry, however, due to the firecontrol difficulties. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.