Tuesday, December 05, 2017

Further developments in August to September 1941 in North Africa

The German army command had tried to restrict Rommel's activities, because they were concerned about the supply line to North Africa. They had sent General Gause to be their man between the Army and Rommel. Instead, General Gause became Rommel's chief of staff and they got along well. Hitler was at work, much as was Churchill, because he was concerned about the losses sustained at sea. His first move was to divert the X Air Corps to change its mission to one of providing air protection for the convoys to North Africa. Their mission had been to attack Egypt.
All this was in accord with Rommel's plan of having an Army Group Africa, with himself as commander. Rommel was happy. He informed his wife that he and General Gause, his Chief of Staff, got along well, and Rommel was very pleased that was the case.
The situation was similar for both the British and Axis forces. They both had pulled their armored forces back from contact at the border between Libya and Egypt. The Germans kept their two armored reconnaissance units in a screen. The units both were based on mobile forces equipped with the German six-wheeled armored cars with 20mm gun armament. The British front was about six miles east of Halfaya pass. They were above the escarpment and were covered by a mine field. They had constructed fortifications, although the terrain did not favor having a strong defensive line.
The opposing forces had a gap that was not occupied, except by occasional marauding mobile forces. The British groups eventually became known as "Jock Columns" while the Germans were using ad hoc battle groups. They both were used for reconnaissance and to provide a means for engaging the enemy. The Australian historian gives some credit to Churchill for being impatient with a situation where his men were "shadow boxing" and never could "land a punch". This was the only spot where the British were in contact with German forces and could potentially fight actions.
We find that the British orders were to stake out spots in the desert to let the enemy know that if they went past them, there would be a battle. The truth was that the British were told that if the enemy came with a substantial force, that they were not to fight, but to withdraw towards Sidi Barrani. That gave the British commanders on the spot a mindset to be ready to flee, so as not to be trapped. They were not thinking about fighting, but about running away. East of Sidi Barrani was Mersa Matruh with a port and railhead. The place had defense built along similar lines to those at Tobruk. "New Zealand railway construction engineers" had extended the rail line further to the west. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

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