The New Zealand Division expanded on 14 May 1941

On 14 May 1941, the 10th Brigade was added to the New Zealand Division. The brigade consisted of the 20th New Zealand Battalion and the 6th Greek Battalion, along with a composite battalion from men from various organizations that no longer existed as cohesive units. That provided a nominally complete brigade, although there was really only one complete New Zealand battalion in the mix. Colonel Howard Kippenberger had commanded the 4th New Zealand Brigade, but he was appointed as brigade commander for the new brigade. In his place, Colonel Falconer was temporarily commanding the 4th Brigade. Brigadier Inglis was brought in from Egypt to command the 4th Brigade. Brigadier Inglis eventually was promoted to be a Major-General and commanded the 2nd New Zealand Division for a period in 1942. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The plan for the invasion of Crete in 1941

Prior to 20 May 1941, the Germans had greatly underestimated the British forces on Crete. The Germans had expected to take Crete cheaply in preparation for the invasion of Russia, since Crete was well-positioned to threaten Turkey. The Germans hoped to capture Crete with a small effort by paratroops. They were shocked by their losses on the first day. They might have responded in many different ways, but their actual response was to throw their entire airborne force against Crete. The Germans were able to make good use of the Greek landing grounds and airfields near to Crete. They were able to make shuttle runs with Ju-87 and Ju-88 bombers and had negligible air opposition from the British. The British did make a strong effort at sea that prevented the Germans from sending the 5th Mountain Division in by sea as planned. They were flown in by air instead and were a key factor in overcoming British resistance, where by British, we mean New Zealand, Australian, and British forces. This is based on the American military attache's report on the battle for Crete.

Shipping and Air Attacks on Suda Bay May 1941

The scale of air attacks on Crete, particularly on Suda Bay, had created a critical supply situation. Dring the period of 29 April to 20 May, some 15,000 tons of supplies were unloaded. That took fifteen ships, of which eight were damaged or sunk. They switched from laborers to unload ships to volunteer Australian soldiers. One of their achievements was to save some Bren carriers from the upper deck of a sunken ship. From the period up to 20 May 1941, the commanders could see that Crete could not be held indefinitely. There were already thirteen damaged ships lying in Suda Bay on 19 May. While using a southern port would have helped, there was no unloading equipment there and the roads to the north were bad or non-existent. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

the sixty 25pdrs in Egypt in late May 1941

As we said, the artillery situation on Crete in late May 1941 was desperate. In Egypt, there were the rive Australian field regiments with old artillery, except for 36 25pdr guns. During the last week, another 24 25pdr guns were issued to two Australian field regiments in reserve in Egypt. If Crete had gotten those sixty 25pdr guns, they would have been much better prepared to face the coming German attack. Instead, the guns were with field regiments held in reserve. Of those guns sent to Crete, 49 French and Italian guns. So many artillery units lacked guns that they were equipped as infantry for the time being. Supposedly, one hundred guns were sent to Crete, but they did not receive any where near that many before the German assault. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The gunners prepare in May 1941 on Crete

There were as many 100 guns sent to Crete before 20 May 1941. What was received was a mixed bag. There was great disarray in what arrived. There were missing sights and instruments. There was ammunition without fuses. The gunners did what they could to overcome the difficulties. In some cases, they improvised sights. In another case, they made charts that enabled them to fire without sights or instruments. The gunners were regular British army, Australian, and New Zealand. Some of the guns were Italian 75mm and 100mm calibers. The smaller arms were also mixed British, American, and Italian. While all this was happening, there were constant air attacks, particularly on Suda Bay, causing great loss. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The artillery situation in early May 1941

Due to having to make a hasty withdrawal from Greece, a tremendous amount of the Middle East artillery resources were lost. Both the 6th Australian Division and the New Zealand Division lost all their artillery. There had also been three British medium regiments and they had also lost all their guns. Since the Middle East had been short of guns, particularly modern guns, making up the loss was going to be difficult. On 20 May 1941, there were five Australian field regiments in reserve in Egypt that actually had guns. The guns included 36 new 25pdr guns, 59 18pdr guns, some of which were in poor condition, and 24-4.5in howitzers. The old system had been to have mixed field regiments with the 18pdr gun and 4.5in howitzer in their inventory. The 25pdr was a "gun-howitzer", so it replaced both the World War One-vintage 18pdr gun and the 4.5in howitzer. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

British political considerations and leadership

As 1941 progressed, Winston Churchill b became increasingly desperate for something to go well. Early in the year, we saw the successful conclusion of the campaign to seize Italian Cyrenaica. That campaign was abruptly ended because General Wavell was involved in the the planning for the operation in Greece and he knew that the forces to continue the offensive in North Africa would be needed in Greece. We need to remember that General Wavell was the quintessential staff officer, not a fighter. Wavell's successor, Claude Auchinleck, was a fighter and lacked the ability to do the sort of staff work that Wavell could do. the affect of this was that arrangements that Wavell made did not generally fare well when faced with armed opposition. 1941 was filled with examples. The Italian campaign had gone well, but mostly because Wavell was not closely involved. The arrangements that Wavell made in North Africa failed miserably in the face of Rommel's probing attacks from February 1941. We must also remember that there were great events happening concurrently with the Mediterranean theater. We also so the action against the Bismarck and the loss of the battle cruiser Hood. We also saw Rommel's run up to Tobruk and the capture of Richard O'Connor and General Neame, his successor. By the end of April, the Greek operation had failed and some of the troops were ceremonially dumped on Crete. We shall see as we go further into 1942 the lengths that Churchill was prepared to go to make something good happen to aid his political position. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

Right before the German invasion of Crete

Right before the German invasion of Crete, there were still some 14,000 Italian prisoners on the island of Crete. The British wanted to transfer them off the island, but the Greeks had hesitated, because they were concerned that the transfer might violate international law. In any case, the prisoners were still there when the Germans invaded.

A small number of reinforcements and equipment had arrived on Crete prior to the German invasion. There were about 2,200 marines and their guns and searchlights. There were also two British infantry battalions, 16 light tanks, and 6 infantry tanks. There were also sent a troop of 3.7in mountain guns. All this was helpful but insufficient to meet the attack that would be launched. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The Greek King and Government

The Greek King and the Greek Government were still located at Canea in early May 1941. General Freyberg thought that the sensible thing would be to withdraw the King and Government since Canea was under constant air attack. Freyberg had arranged for the withdrawal to happen on 14 May 1941, when he received a cable from Churchill's War Cabinet saying that they wanted the King and Government to stay, even if Crete were being invaded. This was another case where politics were at odds with good sense. Given the situation, the Greek King and Government were provided a guard and were put into houses in the foothills. Freyberg wanted a ship or flying boat available to fly the King and Government out of Crete, which was the sensible thing to do, even if it conflicted the political aims of the British government. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

British air strength on Crete on 30 April 1941

The British air strength on Crete at the end of April 1941 was very modest. They were based mainly at Maleme, although one squadron was at Heraklion. The extra RAF personnel were flown to Egypt, consistent with the idea that only defenders should be kept on Crete. Everyone was agreed that Crete should not be allowed to be taken without a fight. The problem was that there were inadequate forces available. The air strength was as follows:

At Heraklion: No. 112 Squadron RAF with 12 Gladiator fighters
At Maleme:    No. 30 Squadron RAF with 12 Blenheim day bombers
              No. 33/80 Squadron RAF with 6 Hurricane fighters
              No. 805 Fleet Air Arm Squadron with 6 Gladiator and Fulmer fighters

When you realize that this modest force would be facing Bf 109 fighters and Ju-88 bombers, you can see that this small air contingent was inadequate to resist a strong air attack in support of an airborne invasion.

The Crete garrison plan on 8 May 1941

Many authorities were anxious to reduce the unwanted troops in Crete from what they were. There had been some 5,300 troops in Crete and then 25,300 more were brought from Greece. The plan on 8 May 1941 was to increase the garrison to 5,800 men and reduce the other men to 4,500 New Zealanders, 3,500 Australians, and 2,000 other British troops. The problem was that the navy had suffered such great losses in evacuating Greece that they could not move the desired troops to North Africa. As time passed, the air attacks on Suda Bay increased and it became obvious that the surplus manpower was stuck on Crete. They did succeed in moving to Egypt 3,200 British (many Palestinian and Cypriot workers), about 2,500 Australian troops, and 1,300 0f the New Zealand division. By 17 May 1941, there were about 15,000 British troops, 7,750 New Zealand troops, 6,500 Australian and 10,200 Greek troops. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

Dispositions for the defence of Crete: 3 May 1941

At least by 3 May 1941, General Freyberg had issued an order with his plan for the forces defending Crete. The plan included artillerymen armed like infantry, since there were no guns for the medium regiment. General Freyberg called his little army "Creforce". Brigadier Chappel commanded the Heraklion sector. He had the 14th Brigade, or at least two battalions, along with others including the 7th Medium Regiment armed with rifles. There were four units with two Greek battalions. The Australian, Brigadier Vasey, commanded the Retimo sector. He had four Australian battalions and two Greek battalions. At Suda Bay, Major-General Weston had the 1/Welch and 2/8th Battalions along with one Greek battalion. The Maleme sector was defended by the New Zealand division, or least the 4th New Zealand Brigade now commanded by the eventually to be famous Howard Kippenberger. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

More about troops on Crete: early May 1941

The main British unit on Crete in early May 1941 was the "fresh" 14th Brigade. They had been the Crete garrison at the time of the Greek operation. After the Greek fiasco, there were also four units built up from withdrawals from Greece: the "Rangers, Northumberland Hussars, 7th Medium Regiment, and 106th ROhal Horse Artillery". There were also men from the mobile naval base, coast artillery, anti-aircraft units, and base units.

There were also some ten thousand Greek troops, of which only three battalions were of any value. The other eight battalions were just recruits. The 5th (Cretan) division had fought in Albania and had been lost in the Greek collapse. General Freyberg had hoped to help organize the Greek troops on Crete, but there was the shortage of arms, equipment and leadership that hampered the effort. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The Australian situation on Crete

The Australian troops on the island of Crete in early May 1941 were there due to the fallout from the Greek debacle. The Australians had gone to Greece with their senior officers knowing that the operation was doomed to failure. They would have been better never to have gone into Greece, especially with General Wilson and his staff in command. General Wavell had essentially liked to the Australian commander, General Blamey, and to his Prime Minister to get the Australians into Greece. They were fortunate to get as many men as they did out of Greece. Many were dumped onto Crete at Suda Bay to free up ships for more evacuation trips. When men were pulled out of Greece, they were told to leave their weapons and equipment. That included their great coats. That meant that there were thousands of Australians on Crete out in the weather with no organization or anything else. What order was eventually restored was due to Brigadier Vasey, the senior Australian officer on Crete. There was a rather large brigade group, that commanded by Brigadier Vasey, but he was being pressed to reform another brigade from the unorganized Australians on Crete. Brigadier Vasey was trying to get the Australians who were without equipment and organization transported to Egypt, but his desires were ignored. This is based generally on the information in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

Troops on Greece in early May 1941

None of the important commanders in Britain and Egypt had any real idea about the troops on Crete in early May 1941. There was a British infantry brigade, the 14th Brigade, along with other troops from the garrison before troops arrived from Greece. There was most of the New Zealand Division, but not all, along with Australian units that had been transported from Greece. There was also part of the 1st Armoured Brigade and other British units from Greece. The approximately ten thousand recruits from the population of Crete were almost untrained and useless. There were seven New Zealand battalions along with most of the New Zealand Division division troops. The brigades were the 4th and 5th New Zealand brigades. The battalions were the 18th, 19th, 20th, 21st, 22nd, 23rd and 28th battalions, of which the last were Maori. The 6th New Zealand Brigade had been sent on to Egypt on orders of the navy. The senior Australian officer, Brigadier Vasey, commanded some 8,500 Australian troops, despite nominally only commanding a brigade group. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The command situation on Crete in early May 1941

General Freyberg had a challenging job simply assembling a staff to aid him in defending Crete. He had arrived on Crete with only two of his division staff from the New Zealand division. He now had to create what amounted to a corps staff as well as a new division staff for the New Zealand Division. In the new scheme of things, Brigadier Puttick was New Zealand Division commander. Freyberg's chief of staff was Colonel Stewart. He had a British officer, Brigadier Brunskill, as his senior administrative officer. The commander of the 7th Medium Regiment, Frowen, was his artillery commander. He had played a leading role in making the artillery plan for the attack on Bardia. All these were supposed to support General Freyberg in his effort to plan a defense for Crete. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

General Freyberg on 4 May 1941

After Churchill had sent a reassuring message to the New Zealand prime minister, General Freyberg sent a message to Churchill. This was on 4 May 1941. General Freyberg expressed the opinion that they could repel a strictly airborne attack on Crete. If the attack were made simultaneously by air and sea, that was a different matter. If they troops were equipped with "guns and transport", they might be able to cope, but in the condition at the time, they would have been in trouble. General Freyberg also asked General Wavell to evacuate some ten thousand troops without arms or equipment from the island, as they were an administrative problem and would only get in the way of a fight. In the meantime, General Freyberg had his headquarters set up east of Canea. In the foothills, they had established dugouts to provide cover for the headquarters troops and equipment. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

General Blamey weighs in: early May 1941

General Blamey expressed his opinion on Crete in early May 1941. He agreed that every effort should be made to hold the island against attack. He thought that three brigade groups, along with "coastal and harbour defences" and a "reasonable air force" could hold the island against attack. They thought that the Germans might use one airborne division and one division brought by sea to attack Crete. While the troops from Greece on Crete gave adequate numbers, they were equipped with what was needed, especially artillery. General Blamey hoped to pull the Australians from Crete when a second British infantry brigade could be deployed. Almost immediately after that, General Freyberg and the New Zealand government were in communication with the British government over the inadequate state of the New Zealand contingent on Crete. this is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

What forces were on Crete? Early May 1941

After sending what had to be false information to General Freyberg, General Wavell sent a letter to General Dill, the CIGS. General Wavell thought that the brigade groups and a larger number of anti-aircraft guns would be adequate to hold Crete against an airborne attack. This was in early May 1941. He estimated that there were eleven battalions on the island, although the ones from Greece were understrength and without artillery. The implication was that if the required equipment were sent to Crete, that the island could be defended. The actual number of units on Crete was larger than Wavell knew. There were seven New Zealand battalions, plus part of a machine gun battalion. There were also four-and-a half Australian infantry battalions, and a machine gun battalion. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

General Freyberg in command on Crete

When General Freyberg was appointed commander of the defence of the island of Crete in late April and early May 1941, he had almost no information about the situation. He wrote later that he knew nothing about the island, the troops that he commanded, nor the maintenance situation, nor the size of the expected attack force. In fact, General Freyberg urged that if there were not sufficient air and naval strength available to support the defenders, that they should evacuate the island. General Freyberg used his connection to the New Zealand Prime Minister to pass on his assessment and asked him to pressure the British government to either bring the necessary forces needed to defend the island or to evacuate those troops that were presently on the island. General Wavell responded with a disingenuous note about how the estimate of the German attack scale were exaggerated that in the end, the needed naval support would be available. The latter was true, as the navy responded and for their bother, expended a large number of valuable warships sunk and damaged. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The situation on 29 April 1941

Newly arrived from Greece, General Maitland Wilson was sent packing. He was off to North Africa from Crete to "go to Jerusalem and relieve Baghdad". General Wavell then proceeded to tell General Freyberg about the expected German attack on Crete. They expected an attack by five to six thousand airborne troops, possibly supplemented by troops sent by sea. They would see if they could get more fighter aircraft from England. They should be able to repulse the attack with the force they had on Crete. In any case, there would be no withdrawal, because there were not enough ships. We might well think that they had all been lost in the withdrawal from Greece. That is not really true, because the navy was about to take another major hit during the attack on Crete and the subsequent attempt to withdraw troops after the Germans were seen as winning the battle. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official history.

The Greeks on Crete on 28 April 1941

By 28 April 1941, the Greek government was located at Canea. The Prime Minister, M. Tsouderos, had a meeting with the British general officers on Crete. He asked for there to be an Allied commander on Crete who would command all forces, including what Greek forces there were on the island of Crete. He requested that the Greek forces be armed by the British. The British officers included the air commander and a rear-admiral. Following the meeting, Churchill proposed that Genral Freyberg be appointed commander on Crete. General Freyberg, his staff, and the 6th New Zealand brigade arrived on 29 April. The 5th New Zealand Brigade was thought to already be on the island. Freyberg met with Generals Wilson and Wavell in a small village between Maleme and Canea and they held discussions about the withdrawal from Greece and the situation on Crete. General Wilson was to proceed to North Africa and be involved in the crisis that was ongoing there. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The impact of the evacuation from Greece on Crete

In early March 1941, before the Greek situation had unraveled, commanders had foreseen the need to accommodate in Crete as many as 50,000 troops evacuated from Greece. By 17 April, the command in Crete had requested 30,000 "tents, clothing and blankets" for evacuated troops. Troops and civilians brought from Greece started to arrive by 23 April. By 25 April and immediately after, there were 25,000 troops brought to Crete at Suda Bay by warship. There were no tents or even coats for them. Because of the lack of preparation for what many had anticipated, time was lost to prepare defences on Crete. Men sat around, even in organized units that had arrived. There were no tools or any of the normal essentials. After the disaster in Greece, the men relished the time spent doing nothing but resting in Crete.

Once more senior officers arrived on Crete there was more serious consideration about how to prepare for the expected invasion. The existing garrison was positioned. There was a small air condition on the island. There were four squadrons withdrawn from Greece with six or eight Blenheim day bombers, six Hurricane fighters, six Gladiator biplane fighters, one squadron that flew in from Egypt with nine Blenheim bombers, and a Fleet Air Arm squadron.

General Wilson thought that if they wanted to defend Crete, they needed to increase the strength to a greater degree than General Wavell and the other commanders wanted. General Wilson thought that it was a mistake to try and defend Crete with inadequate resources, which was probably true. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

Plans for defending Crete in April and May 1941

Because the operations in Greece collapsed, the island of Crete was left as the nearest position to the Germans in the Balkans. Except Churchill and his leadership team, the Greek campaign was seen as being a likely failure by key participants. Only by late April were the leadership team acknowledging that they would have to withdraw from Greece after having failed to stop the Germans. The commander in Crete, General Weston, suggested that with the failure in Greece that Crete would be exposed to an invasion by sea. The commanders in Britain and the Middle East must have had access to decrypted German communications that indicated that they would attempt an airborne invasion. By 24 April, General Wavell and his staff projected that the Germans would use airborne troops to attack Crete. They would need three brigades, but for now, they would bring the garrison up to two brigades. They wanted to send troops from Greece to Egypt, but that did not happen. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

Major-General Weston takes over on 26 April 1941

After the commanders decided to make Suda Bay, in the northwest corner of the island of Crete, a fleet base, a Royal Marine, Major-General Weston was appointed to take command. He was commander of the "Mobile Naval Base Defence Organisation". The intent of that organization was not to defend against a major invasion, but to provide local defence. One role of the organization was to do the construction work required for a naval base. The construction included "buildings, jetties, and roads". There was also a defence group. Only about 2,000 men of the organization had arrived on Crete at the time of the invasion. The anti-aircraft artillery available was limited to 16-3.7in AA guns, 16-3in AA guns, and 36-Bofors 40mm AA guns. There were 24 anti-aircraft search lights available to work with the guns. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The Island of Crete in May 1941

The island of Crete was populated along the livable areas in the north. In the northwest was Suda Bay, near the capital city of Canea. About 30 miles east of Canea was Retimo. The largest seaport was at Heraklion, perhaps two-thirds of the length of the island to the east. Each of these towns had an airfield located nearby. The northern shore had a road that ran the length of the island. At times, the road ran further inland to minimize the distance traveled. There were also five roads that ran north and south. Suda Bay was the only port that could accommodate large ships, and it only had a quay without a large crane. In late 1940, the British talked about increasing their garrison on the island. By February 1941, the 14th Brigade had three battalions. What was disruptive, is that the island garrison commander changed many times during early 1941. At the same time, by April 1941, the higher command decided to make Suda Bay a major fleet base. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

Events in April and May 1941

Winston Churchill was constantly meddling in affairs. He considered himself a military and naval expert, and he assumed that his various creative enterprises were a help. for example, Churchill wanted to use the old battleship Barham as a blockship in Tripoli harbor in mid-April 1941. The fleet commander, Admiral Cunningham, objected, but he did bombard Tripoli on 21 April 1941. Churchill's next project was the Tiger Convoy, where about 240 tanks were sent through the Mediterranean on fast transports to reinforce the army in North Africa. Churchill then pushed Wavell to throw the tanks into combat even before they were fitted for desert operations. Churchill then pushed to have some tanks from the convoy. This met resistance, so then he wanted 12 tanks sent to Suda Bay after they were unloaded in Egypt. This was ordered, but Wavell came back to say that he had already had six infantry tanks and 15 light tanks sent to Crete. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The Iraqi operation in perspective

The Iraq operation was very important for a variety of reasons. The first was that by little cost, the Iraqi army was defeated by British forces. The obvious effects were to assert firm control over the port of Basra, the pipeline to Haifa, and the British-owned oil fields in Iraq.The forces involved were relatively small. There was a brigade-size force from Transjordan and two Indian brigades that had been en route to Malaya. All this had happened while the Greek campaign had been coming to a disastrous end and before the Germans were ready to attack the island of Crete. Knocking down the Iraqi Arab nationalist movement got the attention of the rest of the Arab world and put to rest any idea of similar uprisings, such as "in Syria, Lebanon, and Palestine". This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

Wavell and Auchinleck

I was curious about General Archibald Wavell's background and how that compared with his successor, General Claude Auchinleck. Wavell's father was an army officer, in fact a Major General, and he grew up in India. He followed his father into the army. He quickly accumulated staff officer experience, although he distinguished himself in the Great War in combat and was awarded the Military Cross. He also lost an eye in the process.

General Auchinleck was much more closely aligned with the Indian army and his Great War experience was in the Mespotamian Campaign against the Turks. While Wavell learned Russian before the war, Auchinleck learned Punjabi. Auchinleck commanded troops in combat when Wavell was in a staff officer role. Between the wars, both spent time on half pay. Wavell became a Major General in 1933 while Auchinleck was promoted to that rank in 1935.

Before the beginning of the Second World War, Wavell was head of Southern Command in the UK. He was appointed to command the Middle East in July 1939. He presided over the successful campaign against the Italians in late 1940 until early 1941. That campaign was ended prematurely and in an unsatisfactory way so that Anthony Eden and Churchill's ill-fated adventure in Greece could proceed. Wavell tarnished his reputation in Greece and subsequently in Crete. The Germans, with Erwin Rommel in command, upset the situation in North Africa and that would eventually lead to Wavell's removal.

Aunchinleck was appointed to replace Wavell. We can imagine that he was chosen for his experience in the region. In many ways, Auchinleck lacked the skills to be theater commander. He would have been more comfortable commanding the army fighting the Germans. In fact, Churchill repeatedly urged Auchinleck to do just that. Auchinleck took his role as theater commander seriously and thought that commanding the army in the field would detract from that role. Only twice did Auchinleck take command, and in both cases, he outfought Rommel and saved the situation. Once was in December 1941, when Auchinleck saved the Crusader operation when his choice as army commander, Alan Cunningham, was exhausted after the whirlwind East African campaign. He was not ready to take on command of the army in North Africa, where he had no experience with armoured forces. The second occasion was after the surrender of Tobruk in 1942, when Rommel threatened to advance to the Suez Canal.

Wavell had a better eye for choosing commanders to serve under him, while Auchinleck lacked that ability. However, if you needed an army commanded in a tight situation, you wanted Auchinleck, not Wavell.

German aid for the Iraqi's

Starting on 13 May 1941, the Germans had aircraft based at Mosul and Erbil to aid the Iraqi's in their fight against the British. Three German He-111 bombers raided Habbaniyah on 16 May and were able to do considerable damage. The German aircraft lacked the necessary support, however, so there were only one fighter and one bomber still operational by 28 May.

The Iraqi anti-British group were upset at the lack of support by the Germans and Italians. The Iraqis wanted arms and gold. Apparently, any Arab revolt against the British needed to have gold, presumably to buy support. The Germans saw the Iraqi revolt as more of a political event, rather than a real uprising of the Iraqi people against the British. The latter might have actually received substantive support. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

Iraq after Habbaniyah in 1941

Iraq was a critical link in shipping oil from the Middle East in 1941. A general from India was appointed to command Iraq to ensure the vital areas were protected. Lt-General Quinan arrived as early as 7 May 1941. There were grand plans to put three infantry divisions into Iraq and possibly an armoured division. Then, Iraq was switched from the India command to the Middle East Command under General Wavell. Wavell had no forces to speak of to put into Iraq. Instead, light forces, including a small force from the Transjordan Frontier Force and a cavalry brigade that attacked and drove Rashid Ali from power. This was a spontaneous uprising, not something planned by the Germans. At the time, Germans were assumed to be involved. By the end of May, the two remaining brigades of the 10th Indian Division arrived at Basra. The one thing that the Germans were able to do is to deploy aircraft to aid Rashid Ali, although they were insufficient for the task. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

Habbiniyah goes on the offensive: early May 1941

2 May 1941 saw the British go on the offensive at Habbiniyah against the besieging Iraqi troops. The British attacked the Iraqi troops with bombs dropped from training aircraft. The Iraqis opened fire with artillery in return. The British bombed the guns, but only succeeded in knocking out half of them. The British only had two Great War-vintage 18pdr guns, but they were able to aggressively patrol against the Iraqi besiegers. The Iraqis disliked that so much that the pulled back from the perimeter. On 6 May, British troops with Iraqi levies fought and defeated the remaining Iraqi troops. The plateau was now free of enemy Iraqi troops. In the process, 400 Iraqis were captured along with their equipment, which was very useful to the defenders. The RAF flew in four Blenheim fighters to reinforce the base. Iraq started to receive more British attention in the form of a greater air and airbase presence and a new commander. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

More details about Iraq in 1941

When a brigade of the 10th Indian Division was diverted to Basra, the oil port, they had been destined for Malaya. They were boarding ship a Karachi when the diversion happened. As we have said, General Auchinleck, was the Commander-in-Chief in India. General Auchinleck had been in that position since January 1941. Since he was considered to be close to the action, he was to be the overall commander.

The Iraqi government of Rashid Ali was getting nervous about the brigade at Basra. They insisted that no more British troops should be sent to Basra until those that were there had moved out. When in late April, more troops arrived at Basra, two Iraqi brigades with artillery and armoured cars surrounded the air base at Habbiniyah. There were about 1,000 men of the RAF there as well as 1,000 British and colonial troops. A British battalion was flown in as reinforcements on 30 April 1941. At that point, the Iraqis were asked to withdraw. Then the Iraqi commander refused, the airbase commander decided to attack the Iraqis from the air with training aircraft fitted with bombs. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

Another distraction about the time of the Greek collapse in April-May 1941

Especially in the Middle East, the local people were hostile to the Colonial Powers like Britain. We can imagine that the Iraqi Rashid Ali was encouraged by the British difficulties in Greece and North Africa to harass the British in Iraq. Rashid Ali was influenced by the pro-German Grand Mufti of Jerusalem. A coup d'état overthrew the pro-British regent and installed Rashid Ali as Prime Minister of Iraq. Many of the same themes as in present times were present in 1941. There was the strong Arab nationalist and Islamic fervor that exists now.

The British responded to the coup by sending the 20th Indian Infantry Brigade to Basra, the oil terminal. The next move by the Iraqi government was to send troops to the RAF base at Habbiniyah on the Euphrates. The base was just 50 miles west of Baghdad. The RAF mostly had obsolete aircraft at Habbiniyah that were used for training. They were enough, however, to establish air superiority over the Iraqi air force. Once enough British and Indian Army troops had been sent to Iraq, they were able to overcome the Iraqi Army and lift the siege and capture Falluja and Baghdad. While the action to remove Iraq as a factor continued, it was at an inconvenient time, opposite the end of Greece and the Crete campaign, as well as the fighting in Libya, on the western desert in Cyrenaica. There was also the Tiger Convoy and the need to resupply Malta all happening at the same time.

Iraq became an issue in 1941

Because Britain depended on oil from Iraq, and from "Persia" (what Winston Churchill insisted on calling Iran), they could not afford an interruption to supply. Even in 1940 and 1941, anti-British Arabs were sympathetic to Fascists. The Grand Mufti of Jerusalem had a secret plan to cooperate with the Germans and expel the British. Rashid Ali was the leader of the pro-German group in Iraq. The Iraqi army consisted of 50,000 troops commanded by British-trained officers. Rashid Ali became Prime Minister in April 1941. The regent, who was pro-British, Amir Abdul Illah, thought that he would be arrested by Rashid Ali. He fled Iraq by way of Basra, and then ended up in Transjordan.

The British planned to respond by putting a force into Basra, as a starting point. They decided to send a brigade group from the 10th Indian Division. The commander in India was Claude Auchinleck. He would command the Basra operation. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The situation in March to April 1941 in the Mediterranean

In early April, 1941, the German force in Libya had pushed back the defending troops. After Richard O'Connor had almost defeated the Italians in Libya, the army in eastern Libya was stripped to provide troops for Greece. O'Connor was ill, but available as a consultant. The one bright spot was east Africa, where Alan Cunningham had conducted a brilliant campaign against the Italian and African colonial army.

The commanders in the Middle East were said to have been concerned about defending against a German airborne attack on Greece, but we have a hard time finding any positive steps that were taken with that defence in mind. Dominion troops just removed from Greece were in Crete and would soon have to fight the Germans again, under even more difficult circumstances.

But it was in North Africa, in Cyrenaica (eastern Libya, that the situation had grown critical. The small German force sent to Libya was seen as a blocking force to prevent the British from capturing the rest of Libya without a fight. The wild card was General Rommel, the commander, who had been trained in infiltration tactics in the Great War, and who had experience as a commander of mechanized warfare in May 1940. He was not content with simply being a blocking force. As was his style, he made a personal reconnaissance of the area that was lightly defended and decided to see if he could panic the British and cause them to withdraw. They did panic and withdraw. In the process, Rommel very nearly took Tobruk, the former Italian fortified position and port. He managed to destabilize the British position which had been left poorly defended. This is in part based on Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The challenges posed by Crete

The Germans saw Crete as an important target for conquest. Perhaps the primary motivation was to rob the Allies of an airbase within easy striking distance to the Rumanian oil fields. Crete was also relatively close to the new battleground in Cyrenaica. Since a purely naval assault of Crete seemed too risky, due to the concern about the Italian navy, an airborne assault seemed appealing. They had successfully used airborne troops in Holland and against Corinth in Greece. They could combine that with ferrying troops and equipment to Crete from Greece using small ships. They did not need to solely rely upon paratroops, because they had the ability to ferry troops using Ju-52 transports, if they could secure the necessary landing fields.

The British were concerned about defending Crete from an airborne attack, given the recent successful use of airborne troops by the Germans against the Corinth canal. The concern with holding North Africa against attack that was now commanded by Rommel was the primary concern. The primacy of that effort meant that insufficient forces would be available for defending Crete. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The ANZAC Corps had done well in Greece

The ANZAC Corps, consisting of Australian and New Zealand troops, had done well in Greece. They were outnumbered and were operating under air attack without protection. Still, they learned the craft of mountain troops, and performed well against experienced German mountain troops. By the time they had arrived in Greece, the ANZAC troops were well trained and experienced. While they assumed that the Germans were better equipped, in fact, they were at least comparable. The Germans were very happy to acquire discarded ANZAC and British equipment and arms. If anything, the difficult terrain aided the troops conducting a withdrawal and a series of rearguard actions. The defeat in Greece was not from any fault with the troops. Rather, it was a badly chosen operation, where there was an inadequate force deployed. They were badly commanded at the army level. From the corps and below, the command was above average. Churchill had put General Wilson and an inexperienced and inadequate staff in charge, and that only aggravated a bad situation. The British bias always dictated that a British officer should command. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

Air Power in the Greek Campaign

After the collapse of General Wilson's command structure in Greece amid the withdrawal, an attempt was made to blame the British Royal Air Force for the failure. From the initial air contingent sent to Greece in late 1940 up until the withdrawal in the face of vast German air forces and army, the RAF put on a credible performance, given what they had in the field.

The really surprising fact was the failure of the German air force to achieve more, given the lack of opposition. The author of this volume of the Australian Official History asserts that the German air force had no affect on the outcome. We are more skeptical, but we know that sensible measures taken by the Australian and New Zealand troops during the withdrawal to the coast were sufficient to protect them from German air attacks. We would say that the Germans were still learning about the sort of operations that were conducted in the air over Greece and it was not until 1942 that they became more effective. They were forced to become more efficient in Russia and in North Africa. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The Dominions were treated badly over Greece

The Australian Official History at least in part blames the Australian Prime Minister, Mr. Menzies, and the senior army officer, General Blamey, for not being in better communication. We have seen that the British, probably in form of General Wavell had mislead the men about any agreement with the British plan for Greece. Without consulting the Dominions, the British had promised the Greeks an army of three divisions: two Australian and one New Zealand. They had committed the Australians and New Zealanders without their permission. To get their acquiescence, they lied about the circumstances. The British acted very badly all through this process.

The Greek army got no better treatment from the British. The British commander expected the worst of the Greek army, when they made a good-faith effort that delivered results, considering the bad equipment and training of the Greek Army. The Greeks, however, were sold out by a corrupt German sympathizer who surrendered a significant portion of the army. That was after the British had undercut the Greek defensive posture. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.