Fighting Germans on 18 April

 The Germans were moving forward as the New Zealand cavalry pulled back. Enemy vehicles were located in the "hills north of Elasson". The Germans were taking "accurate fire". The Germans also had the problem of how to put their vehicles across river. Still, by later on 18 April, the Germans were able to ready for an attack. 

Large groups of German dive bombers (forty to sixty) flew over. Only one dive bomber went after the 6th Brigade. The medium guns had fired all their ammunition and left the scene. Almost by accident, a large amount of ammunition was moved to the "pass". The 2/3rd Field Regiment did most of the firing. They were given good targets and fired some 6,500 rounds.

Late in the day, tanks were driving up a road and the leaders hit mines. The guns were firing into the mass of tanks and did damage. Infantry dismounted and moved towards the 24th Battalion. The field guns stayed in action until about 11:30pm, when they pulled back. They blew up culverts as they withdrew. By 3am, they were at Larisa. The 24th and 25th Battalions drove to Volos on the road. The 26th Battalion left Larisa by train. 

It turns out that Brigadier Savige's units were in action that day. He had a rearguard "commanded by Lt-Col. King". They were located about five miles from Kalabaka. They drove to Zarkos "by dawn". By 11am, they were blowing up "sections of the road". Some of Savige's units crossed the Pinios River using a bridge that was still intact. By 11:30, three German aircraft bombed the bridge. The bridge was already ready to be demolished. The demolition charges were fired, perhaps by the bombing. Engineers made a ferry, and men crossed using it. This is based on the account in "Greece, Crete, and Syria" by Gavin Long.

The 6th New Zealand Brigade on 18 April 1941

 By 18 April, the 6th New Zealand Brigade was sitting "south of Elasson". There were two road to Larisa, by southeast and by a southwest track. The 24th Battalion protected the road to the east. The 25th Battalion protected the road to the west. The 26th Battalion was the brigade reserve. 

The 6th Brigade had artillery support. There was an Australian field regiment with 20-25pdrs. There was also a troop from the 64th Medium Regiment. There was also some New Zealand 25pdrs "operating in an anti-tank role". There were also some New Zealand 25pdrs in reserve and not so far committed. The 25th Battalion also had some supporting 2pdr anti-tank guns. The 24th Battalion lacked any guns in support. There were also some field guns in position so that they could fire into the area. 

It turns out that there were some German tanks advancing as the New Zealand cavalry withdrew. Some German tanks and motorcycles surprised the New Zealand cavalry from the road to Katerini. 

German tanks attacked again along both roads. Anti-tank guns lay in wait and knocked out tanks, an armored car, and a truck. By 10:30am, some medium guns were firing on German vehicles to the north of Elasson. 

This is based on the account in "Geece, Crete, and Syria" by Gavin Long.

More ongoing action from 18 April 1941

 New Zealand cavalry was surprised to see German tanks and motorcycles driving down the road from Katerini. They had expected that the demolitions that were done would have delayed the Germans. The guns on portees starting firing. They got two tanks and drove off the motorcycles. 

Howard Kippenberger's rearguard group took fire from German tanks. They men were "driven off, were killed, or captured". Kippenberger led some men "on foot" to the 25th Battalion. 

There was another German tank attack "along both roads". The anti-tank gunners were ready for this attack and got "four tanks, two armored cars, and a truck". This rearguard pulled back when they had received word that "other troops were protected by the 6th Brigade".  The 6th (presumably New Zealand) Brigade was located south of Elasson. There were two separate roads that connected to Larisa. 

To the East was the 24th Battalion. The 25th Battalion was on the West side. The 26th Battalion was located at Domenikon, where it was in reserve. There was some artillery in support. There was the Australian 2/3rd Field Regiment. There was "part of the 64th Medium Regiment." There were also some New Zealand field artillery "in an anti-tank role". They were backing up the 25th New Zealand Battalion. There were as well seven two pounders near the 25th Battalion. 

This is based on the account in "Greece, Crete, and Syria" by Gavin Long.

More happening on 18 April 1941

 A German machine gun kept firing at the men near the road. A New Zealand officer decided to attack the mchine gun and asked for help. It took close to an hour to overrun the machine gun position. Thw machine gun sat "between the rails" and was protected by stones.The men eventually destroyed the machine gun after killng the four crewmen.

The attackers had taken casualties, so thy chose to not attack the second macine gun. The attackers moved back onto "flat ground" and decided to move around to Larisa,

Leaders checked vehicles, looking for their men, but there wete none. Those men present joined small groups and moved around to avoid the Germans. By dawn, Allen's men were dispersed into small groups, trying to move across country and along back roads. By then, a Germans force had moved to "block" the Larisa road. 

There were three rearguard groups on the move. It turns out that there small roads that tended to circumvent the rearguards. The men observed German troops moving into the New Zealand rear area. 

It was dawn on 18 April when the New Zealand cavalry with anti-tank guns, were guarding a critical junction. By then, the 4th New Zealand Brigade rearguard was reduced to Howard Kippenberger, "his batman and driver, with sixty sappers and three Bren carriers". The rearguard had taken time to sweep up stragglers while they moved. The rearguard had a two-pounder portee "sitting on the road to Servia" and three portees sitting on the road to Katerini. 

This is based on the account in "Greece, Crete, and Syria" by Gavin Long.

Flagging spirits and withdrawal without orders

 The Australians felt helpless when confronted by German tanks. As a senior man spoke: "Some are going back, but we have no orders to withdraw". This one group didn't receive word "but the rest were withdrawing. At this point, Murchison, a company commander, told his platoons to move to the road and get on the trucks. Lamb had already told one company to withdraw.

When it was getting dark, Lamb ordered the vehicles to halt started to position infantrymen in a defensive position. What might have been a "line" was actually an "L". They were next to the rail line "on the left". The men were close together to be actually touching. One platoon commander thought they were at the end of the line, so to speak. 

Soon, a German tank approached. A man standing up in the turret was shot full of bullets. there was totala chaos, but the Australians managed to hold onto their position due to a certain amount of discipline  Someone wondered why the Germans did not keep going, after hitting the Australians quite hard.

The Larisa road was looking small, narrow, lined by ditches. The road was crowded with  vehicles trying to drive. They ran into Germans energetically firing. There were many casualties. 

Some New Zealand carriers drove up and the commander decided to force is way through. Soon, the leading carrier was mined and blocked the road. A grlup of men then attempted to attack a German machine gun nest with four men. Eventually, all four Germans were killed. As we saw, there were still Australians and New Zealand troops ready and able to fight and defeat Germans. This is based on the account in "Greece, Crete, and Syria" by Gavin Long.

The 2/2nd Battalion continued in action on 18 April 1941

 The rear-guard for Chilton's headquarters consisted of a section armed with an anti-tank rifle and Bren gun. Once the German tanks approached to fifty yards, "the section relocated further up the hill". As darkness fell, men of the 2/2nd Battalion continued to move up the hills. 

By 5:45pm, two companies reached Allen's headquarters. They could tell that the 2/2nd and 21st Battalions must have been cut off. The New Zealand artillery that had been operating in support were also close by. Freyberg told Allrn to "hold the Tempe-Sikourion road junction until 3am."

Allen decided to order Lt-Col. Lamb, commander of the 2/3rd Battalion, to take control of the guns and use them to control the connection between the road and railway. Allen moved his headquarters to this location. Allen thought that he could hold this position until after dark. 

Between this location and Larisa, there were several good rearguard positions that they could use. In the latest position, they had some four companies arranged on the ground. They had one weak company from the 2/3rd Battalion in reserve.

By then, Allen had a considerable collection of carriers, but he was short of infantry. While they were in position, part of the New Zealand Division Divisional Cavalry joined. The position had been subjected to German air attack. While they were waiting for events to play out, some German tanks approached. This was about 7:30pm. They knocked out one German tank, lost one gun, and had to pull the other gun back. 

Allen was present and directed Lamb to a place north of Larisa. New Zealand armored cars provided cover as Allen and his staff. This is based on the account in "Greece, Crete, and Syria" by Gavin Long.

Plan for continued operations on 18 April

 The Australian and New Zealand troops now had to contend with German armor and infantry on the move. They were traveling to an "area south of Evangelismos". Chilton ordered King's company to move because "they were thought to be in danger of being surrounded". Chilton followed "King's company". The withdrawal had been covered by one section with a Bren gun and anti-tank rifle. 

The section pulled back up the hill. As night fill, men from the 2/2nd Battalion moved up the hill, trying to keep under cover that the hills offered.

By 5:45pm, two companies began to join Allen's headquarters. New Zealand guns were passing by. By then, it had become evident that most of the Australian battaliion and the New Zealand battalion had a problem. They seemed to be cut off. Allen ordered the 2/3rd Battalion to take charge of the guns that had been near. He needed to use the to cover the road and railway. 

Allen went ahead and moved his headquarters to join this force. Allen was pretty sure that he could hold this position until darkness fell. :Between this position and Larisa, Allen was aware of some good spots to use to provide cover for rearguard groups. Some companies were put into position and Allen now had a large group of carriers. The carriers were from both Australia and New Zealand. 

Allen had one problem in that he had very little infantry available. Allen's force now had the problem in that the enemy was tempted to bomb and strafe the relatively large force. When trucks were hit, they tended to burn. 

This is based on the account in "Greece, Crete, and Syria" by Gavin Long.

What was happening with the New Zealand 21st Battalion on 18 April 1941

 As we have noted, the phone lines to Buckley's and Caldewell's companies were broken. Buckley's company was located high up on the slope above the road. By late in the afternoon, the company was firing down on German tanks on the road. The tanks were having to tow trailers carrying infantry. There were apparently German infantry trying to follow the tanks. 

Several 25pdr guns were located forward. They were in position to fire on the tanks and had some success. Perhaps as many as four tanks seemed to have been knocked out. Eventually, about ten German tanks broke into the area occupied by Caldwell's company.

General Freyberg was concerned about what was happening to the New Zealand units. He had lost communications with them. Freyberg had spoken with Allen. Chilton lost his line to Allen soon after. Given developments, Allen wrote an order to withdraw his forces. Allen gave his order to a liaison officer for delivery "to Chilton and Parkinson". Someone told the officier, mistakenly, that Chilton had been overrun. He gave Parkinson's copy of the order to the gun commander. Lt. Swinton, a liaison officer was in a carrier, but the carrier could not travel over the rough ground. Swinson drove back to the brigade headquarters. 

There had been a fight between German tanks and the 25pdr guns. The 25pdrs were eventually towed out. Later, a 2pdr was also withdrawn. German tanks firing on the carriers forced the carriers to pull back. A signals truck was hit and burned.

German infantry and tanks moved onto the road. Captain King's company was ordered to withdraw, given the situation. Chilton followed them out in leaving. 

This is based on the account in "Greece, Crete, and Syria" by Gavin Long.

More action on 18 April

 The lead platoon from the 2/ nd Battalion was in a bad spot. A German tank drove through their position, which caused them to "fall back". The men moved up the slope on the south side. The platoon commander was wounded and then was taken prisoner. 

There were now three German tanks on the road, on the move. There was what seemed to be German battalion attacking. They moved into the river, wading as they crossed. The Australians were taking machine gun fire from the slopes, higher up. 

The German infantry were now caught in a heavy concentration of Bren gun fire. The Germans were also taking mortar fire from "two three inch mortars". The Australiand had fired some 350 mortar bombs at the Germans. The infantry attack had been broken. The German tanks still continued to move forward on the road. 

5pm saw telephone lines broken, distrupting communications. By 4:45pm, Australians were withdrawing. The Australians marched to their trucks and boarded them. They drove south to the brigade headquarters. "There were also some reserve companies from the 2/3rd Battalion".

Chilton had not seen the withdrawal orders, so he assumed that the companies had been overrun. This is based on the account in "Greece, Crete, and Syria" by Gavin Long.

Fighting in front of the New Zealand soldiers on 18 April 1941

 There was heavy fighting in front of the 21st New Zealand Battalion. The platoons of the 21st Battalion were eventually forced back by the strong German force opposiong them. The men were scattered across thte many gullies. Some men that were higher up the slopes were holding onto their ground. They men were slowly being forced back due to the German strength. Just over the top lay a village named Anthelakia. 

By "11 o'clock", there were groups of New Zeland soldiers moving back through Buckley's  men Chilton talked with Macky a few times. Eventually, the wire was broken. There were New Zealand soldiers pulling back, traveling through the Australians. 

The New Zealand battalion had mostly moved upwards on Ossa. Before communication was cut off, "Allen was told that there German tans in Tempe". There had been an anti-tank gun that might have covered the "exit from the village. The gun crew had left the scene with their breech block. The Australians that remained were noto pressed "for more than two hours". 

The area was taking mortar and machine gun fire. Artillery fire had stopped the German tanks near Tempe. The Australian losses were about forty "killed and wounded". The expected German attack started at 3pm. Some 35 aircraft arrived and flew in circles around Allen's headquarters. They bombed the train station, The front platoon from the 2/2nd Battalion sat some 400 yards "forward from Buckley's headquarters." Three German tanks were moving forward". This is based on the account in "Greece, Crete and Syria", by Gavin Long.

Action from 18 April 1941

 It was early on 18 April 1941 when the men saw forty German soldiers on the far bank of the river. This was on the right of the 2/2nd Battalion. The Germans were "bunched up" and this drew the Australians fire. They got all forty of the German soldiers. 

As the morning progressed, the number of Germans in front of the New Zealand 21st Battalion increased. By midday, the Germans attacked. The first thing that the Germans did was to remove the road block. That allowed German tanks to drive through. The first tank knocked out a 2pdr anti-tank gun. The next tank proceeded to drive past. More tanks were in action and there was German infantry. The New Zealand troops were sitting, in exposed positions, on Mount Ossa on the "forward slopes".

The forward men were back, while there were anti-tank guns and crews in front. Three German tanks were driving slowly along the road. When the tanks were closest, the anti-tank guns fired, knocking out two tanks and damaging the third tank. They had fired 28 rounds. 

German infantry had crossed the river and called on the gunners to surrender. One gun crew had escaped while another had some men captured or were driven off. 

At this point, field guns fired on the tanks and kept them pinned down. Eventually, the action became so intense that the men had to "fall back". This is based on the account in "Greece, Crete, and Syria" by Gavin Long.

Plans from 18 April 1941

 From Churchill's perspective, he wanted to concentrate on winning in Libya as the highest priority. A withdrawal from Greece seemed unavoidable. General Wavell wanted to hold the line at Thermopylae as long as possible. Wavell saw this as a way to buy time for defending Crete and Egypt. 

The lower-level commanders in Greece were not aware of these discussions. But the weather in Greece on 18 April was good. It was described as "clear and fine". The Pinios Gorge was seen as the obvious "danger spot". They could see German soldiers descending from Gonnos towards the river. The men on the spot recognized that the Germans were a "good artillery target". They did not have any artillery observers in place yet. A company commander from the 2/2nd Battalion, Captain Hendry, used a telephone to call for artillery fire. 

A carrier force was sent out to meet some German soldiers, although this move drew German mortar fire. Australian Bren gun fire was able to stop the mortar fire. They were able to retrieve their wounded men and pull back the carriers so that they were sheltered. An Australian platoon was now guarding the this flank. 

By 11am, Captain Hendry was able to communicate with a company from the 2/3rd Battalion. Because trucks had gone astray, the company was low in strength, initially. Their strength gradually grew as the afternoon progressed. 

The Australians fired on some Germans and "wiped them out". There was German activity in front of the 21st New Zealand company until by "midday", there was an attack happening. This is based on the account in "Greece, Crete, and Syria" by Gavin Long.

The withdrawal in Greece from 17 April 1941

 By 6pm on 17 April, the withdrawal "was well underway". There was a rearguard in place consisting of two infantry companies along with a troop og guns. The New Zealand 5th Brigade were on the main road, just to Pharsala. At Pharsala, they moved to the eastern road. 

The Servia Pass had no infantry fighting on 17 April. The only fighting was artillery firing periodically. The New Zealand guns were pulled out "later in the afternoon". The New Zealand infantry were loaded into trucks after 8pm. 

A famous New Zealand officer, Howard Kippenberger, was put in charge of demolition. He was to leave the pass by "3am on 18 April". The 19th New Zealand Battalion was out of there "before midnight". Their vehicles were traveling dispersed and were moving quite fast to the south. The New Zealand 18th Battalion was having problems. By 3am, two of their companies had not yet reached where Kippenberger was waiting to start demolition. One of the two only arrived right before 4am while the second company arrived soon afterward. At that point, Lt-Col. Kippenberger ordered the senior engineer to "demolish the road". Once the demolition had started, there were "cries" from New Zealand troops "on the other side". The engineers waited for the stragglers to arrive. Kippenberger only ordered the "final  demolition" at 6am. 

After the demolitions, the 6th Brigade Group now covered the road from Elasson. You now had Savige Force near Kalabaka. Savige Force was visited by Liaison officers four times. As the historia said, the bridge had been destroyed twice and repaired twice. After the Greek commander, General Papagosk thought the British should leave. When Churchill heard that, he thought that they had to leave. 

General Wavell agreed that an evacuation was inevitable, but thought that Wilson should not rush the withdrawal. This is based on the account in "Greece, Crete, and Syria", by Gavin Long.

 Men from the 2/2nd Battalion moved along the earth road to travel through the Gorge. They moved past the New Zealand posts. They expected that they would not see any Germans in their travels. They believed that the Germans were still "far away". When the Australians had reached a railroad tunnel, they drew fire from some 150 yards from "either side of the tunnel". Some men were wounded by the firing. The Australians found cover and returned fire. A New Zealand platoon also opened fire on the Germans. 

The firefight continued for some two hours. At dusk, the Australian leaders brought their men out. Men from the New Zealand battalion brought their men out and carried out two wounded Australians. Blamey had issued orders to the New Zealanders to withdraw following the "Larisa-Volos road". The main road between Larisa and Lamia was left for Mackay to use.  It turns out that the road "to Volos" was just a "dirt track". The road led over flat county. There had been enough rain that road was muddy. 

Sometime on 17 April, General Freyberg wrote to General Blamey, informing Blamey of an arrangement Freyberg had made with General Mckay to let the New Zealanders make use of the road that had been allocated to the Australians. The letter was slow to reach Blamey. 

Freyberg had ordered the 5th New Zealand Brigade to mount their vehicles. That put two battalions on the "top of the pass" some three miles south of "Ayios Dimitrios". A third battalion was sitting at Kokkinoplos. 

It turned out that by blowing craters in the road, the Germans were so delayed that they were not seen until 6pm. This is based on the account in "Greece, Crete, and Syria" by Gavin Long.

Germans in sight from the afternoon of 17 April 1941

 Men and pack animals were seen up high "above Gonnos". They observed the Germans firing Very lights when German aircraft flew over the area. New Zealand troops were able to see that the Very lights were fired from "high ground to the east". Later, the men could see men leading mules "entering Gonnos".

When it was dark, one platoon with a punt set across to check out Gonnos and to the east "at Tempe". They could see Germans in Gonnos while there were men with animals moving "west to Elia". At about 11pm, Germans attacked men watching the ferry. In the fight, a German was killed and one Australian was wounded.

On the right, one Australian platoon moved along the earth road on their way through the Gorge. They passed the New Zealand positions. They believed that the Germans were not yet close. When they were near the railroad tunnel, they drew fire from Germans. It turned out to be German infantry with a tank. They had reached the tunnel, which had been blocked. The men fought for about two hours. At dusk, the Australians moved out. Soldiers from the 21st New Zealand Battalion were able to bring out two "wounded Australians". 

General Blamey had ordered the New Zealand Division to "withdraw along the Larisa-Volos" road. General Mackay was given the "main road between Larisa and Lamia". It was seen that the road to Volos was poor, just a "dirt track". This is based on the account in "Greece, Crete, and Syria" by Gavin Long.

From the afternoon of 17 April 1941

 Brigadier Allen had just arrived at 1pm at the critical area. The 2/2nd Battalion had been without their digging tools until sometime in the morning. The tools allowed the men to dig "weapon pits". They found that there were stone walls that were low, but were suitable for use in the defences. The battalion had brought Italian "signal wire" with them from Libya. The wire allowed communications to be established. 

The battalion did not have any barbed wire or anti-tank mines. The mines would have been especially useful. The men of the 2nd Field Company set up naval depth charges in the pass, in culverts, ready to  be blown once the men had moved out. 

Brigadier Allen had three battalions. The 2/3rd Battalion reached the road just to the south of the "Servia Pass". This had been at around midnight on 16-17 April. The men were marched for two more hours before they reached the vehicles that were waiting for them. They drove to Pinios by way of Larisa. 

One of the companies was used to patrol roads that the enemy might use. They were particularly worried about the Germans making a flanking move. They expected that the enemy might come from the "east and north east". The battalion had some under strength companies due to truck drivers making wrong turns while driving towards Larisa. 

Brigadier Allen was concerned about the left. He had the 2/3rd Battalion extend the left even further. One company was put on high ground do that they could see across the river. Allen had already had Chilton put a company on high ground to the west of the road. 

The other two companies from the 2/3rd were being held as a reserve. "They were about four miles to the south of the 2/2nd Battalion position."

This is based on the account in "Greece, Crete, and Syria" by Gavin Long.

Plan for the day on 17 April 1941

 The Australian priority was to stop German tanks from exiting "the defile". He ordered a crater be made in the road. He also had the New Zealand battalion positioned east of Tempe. They would cover the exit from "the defile". The Australian battalion was put in position to "protect the left flank". They would be watching for an infantry attack across the river. 

The truth was that if the New Zealand battalion were bypassed, the German tanks would "fan out", causing the 2/2nd Battalion to be in trouble. To prepare for such an event, the New Zealand 21st Battalion was spread out so that they had a platoon "at the road block". One company would be sitting a mile "to the west" with an anti-tank gun. One company would be sitting high up to be able to see, while two companies with anti-tank guns would be "en echelon" "at the road to Tempe". A flank group would be on the slope. 

Companies belonging to Chiltion were put "at the western exit" were spread out. They would be watching the river flats, the road, and the railway. The right-most company had an anti-tank gun and was sitting on the road. They also were on the "river flats". Another company was at Evangelismos. A third company was put at the "southern edge of the village". One company supplied a platoon was put on the hill "above Ambelakia". It was able to look down on the Pinios. 

Brigadier Allen arrived at about 1pm. He suggested that Chilton stretch out and put a rifle company high up to be able to look down on the river. Carriers were set to "a 3,000 yard gap. This is based on the account in "Greece, Crete, and Syria" by Gavin Long.

A controlled retirement from 17 April 1941

 A couple battalions from the 17th Australian Brigade were being moved by train on the way from Athens to Thessaly. The train crew that were carrying the 2/6th Battalion had stopped because the crew were afraid of air attack. The train had stopped for some nine hours in the night during 14 and 15 April. The 2/7th had their train attacked and the crew left them stranded. Fortunately, there were Australians with rail experience along. The men set up one engine as a decoy. They took another engine and made a train to carry the 2/7th Battalion to Domokos.

The men actually holding the defensive line on 17 April were able to execute a withdrawal by stages. They occupied carefully chosen postions. As they moved, they blew bridges and cratered the roads. There was artillery holding the Servia and Katerini Passes. As we had mentioned, the men climbed from the foot  of the road to the top at the passes and put craters in the road to slow the German advance. 

The Germans were forced to cautiously advance, stopping to repair the road as they went forward. The Germans were not able to use their tanks so they had to rely upon their artillery. 

There was action at the Pinios Gorge on 17 April. The three colonels there were busy preparing defenses. Colonel Chilton, a relatively young Colonel, had deployed their force in the defenses. Macky had agreed to Chilton's plan for the New Zealand force. The Pinios Gorge extended for some five miles. The gorge was quite narrow and had steep walls. The river in the gorge was narrow and the railroad ran along the north side. 

This is based on the account in "Greece, Crete, and Syria" by Gavin Long.

Continued developments on 17 April 1941

 By 16 April, General Wavell mentioned a "further withdrawal", which was thought to mean evacuating from Greece. As we had mentioned, there was rain for much of 17 April. As vehicles moved along the road to withdraw, there were vehicles with supplies trying to move the other direction on the road.

There were a very few Greek vehicles carrying refugees, moving with the dominant traffic flow. At the northern end of Larisa, there was a bridge that crossed the Pinios. The bridge was the center for a circle of bomb craters, although the bridge had so far escapes damage.

There had been a British canteen at Larisa, although it had been abandoned. Retreating British and ANZAC soldiers had taken cases of beer from the canteen. Many beer-drinkers had fallen asleep down the road. 

One thing that happened was that the defenders of the Servia and Katerini passes had moved up to the top of the passes, making the road impassable with craters along the way. 

The three colonels in the Pinios Gorge were able to prepare defences. Chilton had put the force in place. Macky agreed with the arrangements and the plan for siting the one New Zealand battalion. 

The Pinios Gorge had a length of five miles. The gorge sides were very steep. The Pinios River lay in the gorge and flowed fast. 

A railway lay on the north side of the river. The rail line crossed the river at the west end, where it turned towards Larisa. 

The Australian officer was concerned about German tanks so he had a crater blown in the road. He had the New Zealand battalion positioned to cover the crater. This is based on the account in "Greece, Crete, and Syria" by Gavin Long.

The situation as of 17 April 1941

 Brigadier Savige finally received Blamey's written order by 12:30pm on 17 April. Somewhat later, Savige told Blamey that the armored brigade was already moving out. 

The armored brigade had serious problems with worn-out tanks and "defective tracks". The brigade had heavy losses due to being ordered to withdraw "over a rough mountain road rather than the main road. That was "Group W's" fault. It had been on 16 April that Wilson had told General Papagos that they would withdraw by way of Thermopylae.

The Greeks were in fact ready to give up the fight. The only viable British option was to withdraw from Greece. 

Most of Thessaly had rain on 17 April, as there had been on 16 April. 

The vehicles on the road were somewhat protected by the low clouds. At times the sky cleared and that allowed German aircraft to attack the vehicles on the roads.

Increasingly, Greek soldiers wandered along the roads. There was some signs of Greek refugees traveling in vehicles often towed by tractors. By now, Larisa lay in ruins. The damage was apparently the result of earthquakes and German air attacks.

Traffic on the roads was now bogged down. By now, the railroads were now disorganized at least partly the result of a fear of air attacks. 

This is based on the account in "Greece, Crete, and Syria" by Gavin Long.