Plans at the collapse on 2 to 3 November 1942

Rommel made plans for a withdrawal to the west. Over night on 2-3 November 1942, he "proposed" to withdraw X Corps, the Ramcke parachute brigade, and XXI Corps "to a line El Taqa-Qaret el Abd-Deir el Harra-Qatani." Farther north, he would have the German armored divisions hold a line. By 3 November, he would have "mobile forces" pull back "halfway from Rahman to Daba". After that, the whole army would pull back to Fuka. They would drive the infantry in trucks to that position. The "mobile forces would form a rearguard". They found that there were not enough trucks to carry the infantry.
Overnight on 2-3 November and early on 3 November, As Rommel was preparing to withdraw, he got a message from Hitler telling him to stand his ground and not pull back. He replied and then sent a "staff officer" to speak with Hitler. The nasty truth is that if they followed Hitler's orders, they would be wiped out.
Montgomery responded to the situation by not trying to attack directly in the north, but changing to "an enveloping movement to the south". They would attack with infantry to "take the main defended localities". They would use the 7th Armoured Division to break through to the enemy's rear. Montgomery didn't know about Hitler's message. He expected Rommel to withdraw to Fuka. He was going to have the armor "drive northwards towards the coast road". The New Zealand Division would follow the 7th Armoured Division to the west. The infantry attack began at 5:45pm on 3 November. What is rather funny is the statement "the chronic inability of armored formations to read the map".
The moves on 4 November began at 1:30am. The 5th Indian Brigade avoided the enemy strength in the north and pushed to the Rahman track. At dawn, an infantry attack was successful. That was sufficient to cause the enemy front to collapse. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

Early on 2 November 1942

One positive side effect of the Supercharge Operation was that it helped the Australian 24th Brigade in their positions in the Saucer. About thirty tanks drove up to the right of the 2/15th Battalion. They were mostly out of range of the Australian anti-tank guns, but one tank got too close and was knocked out. They seemed to be threatening the "Supercharge corridor". The 8th Armoured Brigade moved towards the enemy tanks and they moved away. A little later, General Morshead visited the saucer. He decided not to ask any more right then from the "tired battalions".
2 November 1942 was uneventful for the Australians. They had some incoming artillery fire, and noticed more movement near the coast. When General Morshead got news about Supercharge successes, he ordered the brigades to operate with the goal of keeping the enemy on the coast from withdrawing. The Australians had patrols out but they took losses. One patrol attacked some German positions and inflicted casualties. The Australians could hear vehicles moving. This was during the night of 2 to 3 November. 3 November saw the Australians patroling "both in carriers and on foot". They found that the enemy had pulled back "towards Abd el Rahman". The Australians could see that the enemy had started to withdraw. The pressure on the Australians had subsided. They sent out carriers to "tow in enemy guns".

The Desert Air Force was flying missions to hit vehicles and positions. British fighters mistakenly strafed Australians. The Australians were not harmed, fortunately.
They found that the enemy had pulled most of the "heavy weapons and anti-tank guns" from the 125th Regiment. They expected that "the rest would be withdrawn the next night." Rommel had already decided to pull back to Fuka. Fuka seemed to be a good spot for a delaying battle. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

From the evening of 2 November 1942 at El Alamein

The 2nd Armoured Brigade had arrived late, too late to help the 9th Armooured Brigade. Their orders seemed to require them to attack on the same path as before. Instead, General Briggs and Brigadier Fisher decided to get into position to protect against and enemy attack "between the bridgehead and the Rahman track". Events proved them to have taken the right action. They were not yet across the enemy supply lines, but they were "close enough". The enemy did in fact attack late in the morning. They continued the fight until "nightfall" and believed that they had knocked out 66 "enemy tanks". They in fact did better than that, and had gotten 77 German and 40 Italian tanks. They had not "broken open the enemy front" yet.
Early on 2 November, Montgomery had ordered that an "infantry reserve" of four brigades be formed. They would use infantry to widen the "corridor". In the evening, the 51st Highland Division launched two attacks to the south. At the "Snipe" area, they took 160 prisoners from the Trieste Division.
General Lumsden decided to use the 7th Motor Brigade to break the enemy's gun line. They would create a gap for the 1st Armoured Division to move forward. On the morning of 3 November, then the 7th Armoured Division would be able to "pass through". The 7th Motor Brigade attack did not succeed. At daylight, a South African armored car unit tried to break through, but were unsuccessful. The 8th Armoured Brigade attacked to the southwest. They ended up fighting with the Ariete Division. They were eventually stopped by 88mm guns. By the end of 3 November, the 1st Armoured Division had lost more tanks. The enemy seemed to be in bad shape, but the British were almost out of energy ("at the end of their tether"). This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

Supercharge underway from 1 November 1942

Operation Supercharge opened with large British superiority in strength. The attack happened on the night of 1 to 2 November 1942. An air attack started the "bombardment". One casualty was the Africa Corps "signals system". The 151st and 152nd Brigades attacked early on 2 November. They were followed by the 8th Armoured Brigade (apparently) and the 50th RTR.
Some 192 guns fired a barrage while another 168 guns fired "in front and on the flanks". The 152nd Brigade had an easier time and reached their objectives "by 3:44am". The 151st Brigade had a harder time and did not reach their objectives until 5:53am on 2 November. In the case of the Maori Battalion, they took a strong point "west of Trig 29". "On the left flank, 2/Sussex and 5/Sussex took "Woodcock" on "Kidney Ridge".
The 9th Armoured Brigade took losses while advancing. They were reduced to 94 tanks from the 132 tanks they started with. The next move was delayed until 6:15am. The 2nd Armoured Brigade was to follow up behind.
The fighting on 2 November by the armor did not produce any obvious victories, but they were sure to break the enemy by the time they were finished. They would need another two days to break the enemy front. The 9th Armoured Brigade suffered as they fought. The Wiltshire Yeomanry was equipped with mostly 2pdr Crusaders. The 9th Armoured Brigade took heavy losses in the process of their fight. Still, the armored cars of the Royal Dragoons were able to breach the enemy front and were running amock in the enemy's rear. That had been the hope for the armored cars, and they were able to what was expected of them. Heavy fighting on 2 November had yielded results. "77 German tanks and 40 Italian tanks" had been knocked out. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

Operation Supercharge steps off on 1-2 November 1942

The initial attack on 1 November 1942 was supported by 87 bomber aircraft. The British observed fires and explosions. They later learned that Africa Corps headquarters, the signals operation had been disabled.
The two brigades from the 51st Highland Division started their attack at 1:50am. Two tank regiments, the 8th and 50th RTR were right behind the infantry. The supporting barrage was fired by a large number of guns. Other guns fired on the flanks and "in front". The 152nd Brigade had captured its objective by 3:44am. The 151st Brigade faced harder fighting and only reached the objective by 5:53am. The Maori Battalion had taken its objective as had the 2/Sussex and 5/Sussex, the objective being the strongpoint "Woodcock on Kidney Ridge".
By the time the 9th Armoured Brigade had arrived at the "infantry objective", they were reduced to 94 tanks. The brigade had to wait later than planned, to 6:15am. The 1st Armoured Division brigade, the 2nd Armoured Brigade was to follow behind the 9th Armoured Brigade.
The tank battles that were fought as part of Supercharge were not "great victories", but the sealed the fate of the enemy forces. The enemy were able to hold out for another two days. The men fighting the battles were not sure of the ultimate outcome, but they were actually doing well.
The 9th Armoured Brigade paid back the New Zealand infantry by a valiant fight. They did not feel like they were winning, but the brigade started out by doing very well ("carrying all before them"). The Wiltshire Yeomanry ended up being shot to pieces by German anti-tank guns. The brigade knocked out some 35 guns, but lost 75 of their 94 tanks. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

Operation Supercharge

Montgomery's plan for Operation Supercharge was to have  XXX Corps attack with infantry. The infantry were under the command of General Freyberg. The infantry attack would be on a "front" of some 4,000 yards. The aim was to penetrate the enemy defenses to some 6,000 yards. They would use patrols to push to the west. They would "cover" the armor "breakout". Armored cars would push to the west, "destroying" whatever they could. X Corps armor would push to "Point 46-Tel el Aqqaqir". If the XXX Corps attack did not succeed, then the X Corps would fight their way to the first "objective". The 2nd New Zealand Division would be ready to take over the area captured and free up X Corps to attack some more.
The plan was to "break into the enemy positions near the "Rahman Track". The 1st Armoured Division with two armored brigades and the 7th Motor Brigade would "cross the Rahman Track" and "defeat the enemy's armor." The task for the 51st Highland Division was to taken Point 32. They would be supported by 13 Field Regiments and 3 Medium Regiments. Prior to the start of Supercharge, the 1st Armoured Division had 271 tanks. The 9th Armoured Brigade had 132 tanks. The 23rd Armoured Brigade had 111 tanks. The reduced 7th Armoured Division had 84 tanks. The 7th Armoured Division was not involved in the main push. The 4th Light Armoured Brigade had 74 tanks, of which 53 were Stuart light tanks.
They thought that they knew the enemy force numbers. The 15th Armored Division had some six thousand men and 25 tanks. The 21st Armored Division was stronger with some eight thousand men and 125 tanks. The 164th Division had 6,800 men. The 90th Light Division had 7,800 men. The Italian 101st Trieste Division had 4,600 men and 30 tanks. The 102nd Trento Division had but 2,400 men. The Italian armored division Ariete had 4,300 men and 140 tanks. The Littorio Division had 4,200 men and about 60 tanks. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

The Australians on 1 to 2 November 1942 as Operation Supercharge starts

Later on 1 November 1942, the 24th Brigade was hit hard. The brigade commander was killed and others were killed or wounded. Col. Evans was appointed as the new brigade commander and he went to the headquarters area. At sunset, the Germans attacked. Attacks came from the west and northeast. Defensive fire was effective in stopping the attacks. The 20th Brigade also took fire during the 1st. The fighting in the Saucer continued to about 2:30am. About that time, they could hear a large bombardment starting to the south. This was the start of Montgomery's Operation Supercharge.

The 20th Brigade was under fire for much of 1 November. The composite force was told to send "machine guns, anti-tank guns, and pioneers forward to help the 2/43rd Battalion to the area between the rail line and the road. When the machiner-gunners reached the area, they were told that there was not room for them. They then moved into an area to support both battalions (2/43rd and 2/28th). They were in "position by 3:30am".
"For the rest of the night the 24th Brigade battalions were reorganized". The goal was to "give each battalion more room" and to have a reserve battalion in postion. The Desert Air Force had provided good support throughout 1 November. The enemy had dispersed to reduce their vulnerability to air attack. Fourteen attacks by 19 bombers (a "football team") were made on 1 November.
The 24th Brigade took 487 casualties from 30 October to 2 November. They were mostly taken before Operation Supercharge started. The 9th Australian Division had been asked to draw as much of the enemy strength to the north prior to Operation Supercharge.
Rommel ordered some 21st Armored Division and 90th Light Division units to attack to "reestablish contact with the 125th Regiment and the X Bersaglieri in the coastal area". The attack succeeded in that the Australians were pushed back across the rail line. That left 90th Light Division infantry along the rail line "facing south". This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

Fight in front of the 2/28th Battalion on 1 November 1942

German tanks attacked the 2/28th Battalion position. The tanks moved forward and then got into hull-down positions. The tanks concentrated their fire on anti-tank guns with some success. The guns were those of the 2/3rd Anti-Tank Regiment. Relatively  quickly, twelve 6-pdr Anti-tank guns and two two-pounders were disabled. The men of the 2/28th Battalion did not like having the tanks so close, so they opened up with all their weapons at the tanks. By 2:30pm, the German tanks pulled back, because they apparently realized that their infantry could not get through. The Rhodesian anti-tank gunners got special attention from the Germans and lost eight of their guns. While the fighting had died down, a troop of anti-tank guns was sent across the rail line and got into action.
At about 3:25pm, the enemy sent more tanks and infantry to attack the 2/43rd and 2/28th Battalions. The attack came from the north and hit the northwest "company of the 2/43rd Battalion." They managed to overrun a platoon "on Barrell Hill". The some of the men of the platoon were made prisoners. A sergeant regrouped his men and counter-attacked. He was able to retake the positions that had been overrun, except for one. Eventually, the enemy decided to withdraw. The 2/28th Battalion was also attacked, but they managed to hold on.
Some of the tanks pushed on "towards Thompson's Post". They also were going to try to attack with infantry, but they were shelled by British guns and stopped. German infantry on tanks and self-propelled guns moved forward. Austraslian fire was able to stop the attack. They succeeded in knocking out two self-propelled guns. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

1 November 1942 at El Alamein in the north

What was left of the 2/24th and the 2/48th Battalion were moved back to the
coast "sector". They were still next to the enemy forces where they were placed. 1 November
1942 was a Sunday. At the "Saucer", they were in close to the enemy in all directions. That was
only obvious when there was light. The enemy started firing on the Saucer
with a variety of weapons, including 88mm guns firing "air bursts". Most guns were firing
from the west and northwest. There were still some firing from the northeast and southeast.
The enemy was both short of guns and ammunition, so the British were able to hurt them
with greater firepower. As we mentioned, it was at 8:30am that the enemy launched an
unsuccessful airraid. They were met by British and American fighter aircraft and took losses.

The British intercepted a message from Rommel that ordered the 90th Light Division and the 21st Armored Division to attack "Barrell Hill". Barrell Hill lay between the road and rail line.
They thought that Rommel did not understand how strong the area was defended. General Morshead drove to the Saucer to meet with his brigade commander. The enemy repeatedly attacked three Australian battalions. They were hitting the area between the road and rail line. The Australians were successful in fighting with their mortars against the Germans.
Infantry and tanks were used in the first attack. As many was eight or more 88mm guns were firing air burst shells over the Australians. Bombers were called in on the first attack. At 12:45pm, some six tanks attacked the 2/43rd Battalion. The enemy was able to push back on platoon from Barrel Hill, but they were able to retake the position. Anti-tank guns knocked out three tanks and an 88mm gun. This happened to to the north of the Australian battalion. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

31 October to 1 November 1942 at El Alamein

Fighting during the day on 31 October had pushed the Australians off the coast road. At dark, the Pioneers regrouped and dug in to the south of the railway, using the embankment. At the saucer, the defenders managed to hold on. The Germans had attacked with tanks and infantry. Each attack had been stopped by defensive gunfire. Rommel decided to use the Africa Corps to attack to release the 125th Regiment. Battle Group Pfeiffer was formed with 15 tanks along with some self-propelled guns. It would move to the mosque by 11am and move along the railway. Rommel decided to have the battle group attack to the north of the rail line.
An attack by 361st Regiment infantry was stopped by tanks and infantry. The attack by Group Pfeiffer and the 361st Regiment had initial success. They were eventually stopped by tanks and infantry. By 5:35pm, they had contacted the 125th Regiment. They had difficulty in moving forward along the rail line and were eventually stopped. This was when General Morshead decided to replace the 26th Brigade by the 24th Brigade. The replacement worked out and was finished by 3:30am. The enemy was very tired, which helped.
A rebuilt 2/28th Battalion replaced the 2/24th. The 2/43rd replaced the 2/48th. The 2/32nd Battalion stayed in position as did the 2/3rd Pioneeers. Brigadier Godfrey commanded from the Saucer. The Saucer was in disarray, Dispositions were made by commanders on the spot. Anti-tank guns and machine guns were brought in. An artillery duel started on 1 November. The Germans were low on guns and ammunition, so they had a hard time. At 8:40am, a divebomber raid was intercepted by British and American fighters. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.</p>

The British commanders had a very unrealistic expectation about what the planned attack might accomplish. That is, the coast road was not open and the defenses on either side of the road had not been taken. In retrospect, we cannot understand why that the forces available for the attack might have accomplished any of that. The responsibility for what happened was General Morshead and his staff's. There were four "weak battalions" in the north soon to face trouble. There was the 2/3rd Pioneer Battalion, and the 2/32nd Battalion on a line that crossed the rail line. There was a gap on the left before you would see the 2/15th Battalion. The remnants of the 2/48th Battalion sat behind the 2/32nd Battalion. There was also the remaining men from the 2/24th Battalion. The first unit to receive enemy fire was the Pioneers. The Germans asked for the Pioneers to surrender, but they refused. The Pioneer company was then "encircled". The 2/48th Battalion had most of the 40th RTR arrive to support them. There were two squadrons of tanks that moved into hull-down positions. They were located north of the railway. At about 11:30am, some fifteen German medium tanks drove to the north of the road. The Germans drew enough fire that they eventually pulled back. Accompanying infantry was pushed back by artillery fire.
One company of Pioneers was being pressed and was without ammunition. They were eventually overrun and most were taken prisoner. It seems that something like three officers and 43 men may have been captured by the Germans. The Germans eventually staged an attack on the saucer by early afternoon. The German pressure had eventually forced the British to pull off the road.
Rommel had a Africa Corps battlegroup that had some 15 tanks and some self-propelled guns. They were to move to the mosque and then move across the railroad. They were to help the 125th Regiment. At first, the battle group attack seemed to be succeeding. Eventually, the British were able to stop the attack with tanks and infantry in the defense. They had stopped the attack by 7pm.
Morshead considered the situation and decided to go ahead with the plan to relieve the 26th Brigade by the 24th Brigade. He sent orders at about 7:30pm and the relief had happened by 3:30am. The enemy was too tired to interfere. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

The situation of the 2/24th and 2/48th Battalions on 31 October 1941

As we saw, the 2/24th Battalion was withdrawn. The same was true of the 2/48th Battalion. Lt-Col. Hammer had withdrawn his survivors to the base at the Saucer. Once there, they dug in "just to the east of the 2/32nd Battalion. In their battle, they had taken some 200 prisoners, all of them German. As far back as 23 October, the battalion had 30 officers and "656 other ranks".
During this operation, the 9th Australian Division had taken 544 prisoners, mostly German but also some Italian. While the infantry had fought hard, the medical staff had been overworked. The wounded were brought to the Blockhouse in the Saucer.  The German medical staff worked alongside the Australians.
Welcome reinforcements in the form of a Rhodesian anti-tank unit had arrived and were assigned to support the 2/32nd Battalion. In the next morning, more anti-tank guns and gunners arrived. They were Australian anti-tank gunners and guns.
The Pioneers had been waiting for orders. The commander then asked for orders, and received orders to attack after the scheduled time to attack. One company that was to move the farthest was sent off shortly before dawn, with little time remaining. The Pioneers were to advance and then dig-in. The Pioneers were stuck without any communication equipment. They were in need of artillery support, but had no way to call it in. The Pioneers were sitting in a saucer with no supporting weapons, being fired on from three sides, perhaps.
After the 26th Brigade attack, Rommel had realized that they would not be able to hold the El Alamein position and that they would need to withdraw to Fuka. Late pm 30 October, Rommel expected a British "breakthrough" and would try to meet it to give his infantry time to withdraw. The Axis forces had received more fuel, so Rommel told the 21st Armored Division that they would need to be "mobile" by the next morning and should "hand-over" to the Italian Trieste Division.
The 90th Light Division had formed a defensive line. The attack by the 2/24th and 2/48th Battalions had also hit the 90th Light Division forces. An Italian light artillery unit was also hit and "overrun". Rommel got a message saying that 30 British tanks had moved forward to the main road. Rommel set up a command post near the Sidi Abd el Rahman mosque. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

Hard times for the 2/24th and 2/48th Battalions on 31 October 1942

We would say that the tasks given to the 2/24th and 2/48th Battalion in the fight to the north were beyond what was reasonable. We can only say that when you recognize that both battalions had taken heavy losses that had reduced them to token strength. The men still showed great spirit. The remnants of the right company in the advance, now commanded by Lieutenant Allen, charged an enemy post that had held up a company, and using grenades and bayonets, "overcame" the post. Robbins had led his company wide to the left to escape a minefield. His battalion commander never heard from Robbins, because he had been killed, and "all his  platoon commanders and headquarters men had been either killed or wounded". They had been "caught in the open" and lost 16 men attacking their objective. Sergeant Kibby took command and led and attack on the "objective". Kibby was killed and the surviving soldiers were "forced to ground twenty yards from the objective.
Colonel Hammer, the 2/48th Battalion commander, held a meeting of the commanders of what remained of his battalion. There were only 41 men surviving from the 2/48th Battalion. Colonel Hammer decided to make contact with the 2/24th Battalion to see if it was even feasible for the 2/48th Battalion to hold their ground "north of the road". Colonel Hammer ventured off on his own, with only a pistol, to find the 2/24th Battalion. Colonel Hammer had found the 2/24th Headquarters, but not the battalion commander. When he returned to his battalion, he had been shot "through the face". He ordered a retreat "to the blockhouse". He assumed that the 2/24th would also withdraw. That was actually not the case, but they both withdrew anyway. Both the 2/24th and 2/48th remnants had reached the "saucer" before dawn. The 2/24th had the misfortune to go through "a minefield of aerial bombs, of which two exploded. Two carriers arrived and took the wounded out. The two battalions were near the 2/32nd Battalion positions. There had been 54 men left from the 2/24th Battalion. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

The Saucer battle on 30 to 31 October 1942

The 2/48th and the 2/24th Battalions went ahead with their attack even though they had missed the barrage. They both attacked with two companies forward and two companies following. They were hit whle advancing by anti-tank guns, heavy mortars, and machine guns. They were both able to take their initial objectives, after some fighting. They found themselves "advancing with ever dwindling strenght against ever stronger opposition. As someone ran into trouble, help arrived from the other battalion.
While the 2/24th Battalion moved forward, the heaviest fighting was on the left. The company on the right had an easier time. The left company had one platoon that took three posts. Two other platoons attacked another post and took an 88mm gun. The two other companies were caught by machine gun fire and wounded the company commander. He was replaced by a lieutenant. They had to help another company that was stopped short of their "first objective". The 2/48th Battalion also helped and they took the post. The back companies were able to "pass through". Many leaders were wounded or killed. Warrant Officer Cameron was eventually the company commander. He ended taking the last eight surviving company members back to the rear, where they dug in. The remnants of the 2/24th Battalion were concentrated "north of Thompson's Post", where they dug in, ready for "all-around defense". They got a report that Thompson's Post was not occupied. They were asked to check it out. The battalion commander took 15 men to check the report.
The 2/48th Battalion also had heavy fighting. They were involved in attacking posts and in case disabled an 88mm gun and two machine guns.
The two reserve companies were in a fight and had to fight posts on the edge of their path. Agsin, leaders were killed or wounded. One company was stopped and had to get down due to fire, "forced to gound". One company on the left side had moved out to miss a minefield, but then was out of touch with the rest of the group. A lieutenant was ordered to "deal with mortar and machine gun posts". One company was reduced to five men by this time. The battalion headquarters moved forward but were quickly in front of the companies. Two companies were merged to form a 45 man company. The 2/48th Battalion commander met with the current leaders of his battalion. He ordered them to dig in and hold the ground that they had taken. This  is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

The battle for the "Saucer" on 31 October 1942 at El Alamein

The Australian attackers started taking many casualties. The commander of the 2/32nd Battalion was wounded again and had to be relieved by Major Joshua. Vehicles trying to move forward were "shot up" by a German 88mm gun. The vehicles were mainly trying to bring ammunition to the front. Vehicles belonging to a company of the 2/32nd Battalion were among those hit.

The work of the engineers on the rail crossing met with success by 3:45am. Some fifty men had been working on the rail crossing. 2/32nd Battalion vehicles were now able to cross to the north. The enemy had responded by pressing along the rail line from the west side. They were concentrating fire on "the gap". Because of that, the 2/32nd Battalion was not able to connect to the 2/15th Battalion. The ground that the 2/32nd Battalion held came to be known as "the saucer", because that is what it looked like. The "saucer" had become the key point that was fought over by the two armies.

Two Australian battalions, the 2/24th and the 2/48th, were attacking to the east, trying to advance some 2,250 yards. They were moving towards their own bombardment. They left a trail of dead and wounded as they moved forward. They were energized by their spirit. The bombardment had started at about 1am. The Australians were to move forward behind the bombardment as it was adjusted to the east. The start line ended up being fired on by the enemy and their own bombardment. The 2/48th Battalion were early to arrive at the start. That meant that they to stay back from the bombardment. When the 2/24th Battalion arrived, they did not see the 2/48th Battalion, so they figured that they must have already started. There was confusion about the battalion locations. A 26th Brigade liaison officer helped sort things out. Battalions were now adopting the formation of two companies forward with two following. They would then allow the following companies to move forward through the other two companies. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

The attack in the north starting on the night of 30 October 1942 at El Alamein

Before the attack started, two officers from the 2/32nd Battalion were wounded, one mortally. The barrage started at 10pm. Two companies stepped off at 10:10pm. There was no opposition, so the companies had caught up with the barrage. Their objective was the rail line. They had taken some 175 prisoners, almost all were German from the 1/361st Battalion. They had paused on reaching the rail line. They then moved forward, but started to incur casualties.

Once they had reached their objective, they had two companies covering the road. They had cover by being on a reverse slope. Two other companies moved into an area "south of the railway facing west". The engineers were busy clearing mines from tracks that could be used to move forward. The companies were facing west. The engineers had started work to break down the "12-foot railway embankments". The important truck carrying their essential equipment did not arrive, so they were left to improvise. German medical officers and personnel were in a blockhouse used as a medical station. Rommel always tried to treat wounded carefully and follow the "rules of war". The Germans treated everyone brought in, German or Australian. The Germans were joined by the Australian medical personnel.

The 2/48th Battalion, 2/24th Battalion, and the 2/3rd Pioneer Battalion had set out from Trig 29 at: "10:30, 10:40, and 11:00pm". They were following the 2/32nd Battalion. They had met some opposition and fought their own actions. The three battalions then dug-in "near the 2/32nd". Some of the pioneers went to help the engineers working on the railroad embankment. One pioneer platoon and a 2/32nd Battalion company attacked troublesome positions and eventually subdued them. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

More about the 9th Australian Division plan for an attack

The attack by the 9th Australian Division would hit the coast road and railway. The attacker vehicles would need to cross the "railway embankment". The plan envisioned the engineers would blow up the rail line and then use a bulldozer to move away the dirt from the embankment. A field company, the 2/3rd was added because the engineers had some many responsibilities. Brigadier Ramsey commanded the artillery. The artillery had 360 guns in "12 field regiments and 3 medium" regiments.

The plan was devised by General Morshead, who issued the outline at 5pm on 29 October. He passed his final plan to Brigadier Whitehead at 7am on 30 October. The plan included having the 24th Brigade relieving the 26th Brigade during 31 October to 1 November. He wrote later that "Whitehead does not want any tanks".

There was a lot of enemy action. The enemy attacked the 2/15th Battalion as many as four times during the period from midnight until dawn. One enemy attack had penetrated, almost reaching the anti-tank guns. In the end, they were able to push back all the attacks and regroup on the line. They thought that it seemed that the enemy had been building up the area where the attack was planned. General Morshead was aware that two battalions were reduced in strength. He decided to use the 2/3rd Pioneer Battalion as a reserve, available for use as needed. It the pioneers were not needed, they would be used to attack the enemy lines north of the coast road. The pioneers had a lot of possible responsibilities. In order of priority, they should be ready to help the 2/32nd Battalion. If that was not needed, they would help the 2/24th Battalion take Thompson's post. If they were not needed there, they would help the 2/48th Battalion take the area from the road to the sea. If that was not needed, they would do what was originally planned, to move north to the coast. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

The meeting where Churchill was persuaded and a new plan was formulated

Churchill held a meeting on 29 October 1942 where he met with the chiefs of staff, with the addition of Field Marshal Smuts, the South African. Churchill started the meeting by attacking Montgomery. Alan Brooke, the CIGS, defended Montgomery and pointed out that Montgomery was gathering a force to use for the next offensive. When Field Marshal Smuts supported Alan Brooke and Montgomery, Churchill backed off. Churchill's bad message to Alexander did not get sent and instead, another was sent.

Another meeting was held in North Africa with Alexander and then with Montgomery. The new attack would be called "Supercharge". They would attack as far north as possible. They would try to breakthrough between the 90th Light Division and the Trento Division. The new attack would happen on the night of 31 October to 1 November 1942. Montgomery wanted to "destroy the enemy's armor", "to fight in the open", and "use up his petrol". General Freyberg would command a division with two British brigades and the 9th Armoured Brigade. The 1st Armoured Division with two armoured brigades and the 7th Motor Brigade would create a new "bridgehead". Freyberg wanted more time, so Montgomery postponed the attack on day to the night of 1 November to 2 November.

To keep pressing the enemy, the 9th Australian Division was to keep attacking to the north. They would use four battalions. One would be used "to cut the road". Two more would be used to clear the road. The fourth battalion would "push through to the coast".

Brigadier Whitehead was the attack commander for the night of 30 to 31 October 1942. The main force was from his 26th Brigade. He would not have one battalion, but had two more added along with the 40th RTR. They would attack from the 2/23rd Battalion front. The 2/32nd Battalion would be a mobile force with an anti-tank battery and some machine guns. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

German perspective from 29 October 1942 at El Alamein

Rommel attempted to counter the progress made by the 9th Australian Division on 29 October 1942. One thing he did was to put the "northern sector" under the command of the 90th Light Division. They were given the "125th Regimental Group". Rommel ordered them to form a new line and dig positions as quickly as they could. Of course, he wanted the line to be "firmly held". The line would extend from Sidi Abd el Rahman to the coast. In terms of the 9th Australian Division, the line would start near the far southwest corner of the division. The line would be in the "north-northeasterly direction".

The 200th Battle Group (Kampfgruppe) was responsible for the attacks on the 2/15th and 2/17th Battalions on 29 October. The attacks failed to recapture "Bir Sultan Omar" and be able to recapture the line the line that the 2/15th Battalion had broken into. The attack failed, but they were able rescue the remnants of the II/125th Battalion.

The losses suffered by the 164th Division and the Italian Trento Division were so great, that Rommel had to eventually commit most of the Africa Corps to the northern area. Rommel had been forced to leave other areas unprotected in order to fight the Australians in the north.

By now, the authorities in Britain were getting pretty anxious about the course of the Battle of El Alamein. They had thought that with the great superiority in strength, the battle would have been already won. We can image Churchill "bouncing off the walls and ceiling" and wanting to intervene, because he considered himself to be this great military genius, which he was not. The CIGS, Alan Brooke, was also concerned, but he did not want to further inflame Churchill, so he kept quiet. Churchill could not help himself, so he wrote an unpleasant telegram to General Alexander. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

The Australian 20th Brigade took over the Northern Front on 29 October 1942

The Australian 20th Brigade took control of the "northern sector". They also took over the 2/23rd Battalion. The brigade commander, Brigadier Windeyer, heard that the 26th Brigade was planned to attack on the night of 30-31 October. In response, her told the 2/23rd Battalion to move forward a thousand yards during the night of 29-30 October. This happened and had the effect of "linking" 2/15th Battalion with the 2/13th Battalion. The state of the enemy forces was such that the move was accomplished without any trouble.

Rommel's army had endured extensive losses. By the end of 28 October, the 15th Armored Division had just 21 medium tanks. The 21st Armored Division had 45 medium tanks. The Italian divisions still had 196 tanks. The Germans had lost 1,994 men missing since the start of the 2nd El Alamein battle while the Italians had 1,660 men missing. The German 164th Division had taken heavy losses. The 382nd Regiment had three battalions at the start. They had only one left by the end of 28 October. The one left had lost about one-quarter of its men. One of the battalions of the 115th Regiment was reduced to forty men.

The German 90th Light Division was holding an area near Trig 29. There were two battalions of the 125th Regiment "holding the original front from Thompson's Post across the railway and road to the sea". The II/125th Regiment was sitting in an area that was behind the original "front line" positions.

When the Australians had attacked on the night of 28-29 October, they had broken the German line "between the II/125th Battalion and a battle group from the 90th Light Division. They had also overrun an Italian bersaglieri unit. Rommel responded to the attack by moving armor forward including part of the 15th Armored Division and the Italian Littorio Division. He intended to stage a counter-attack with the armor. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.