More men escape from Greece

Some of the men who escaped from Greece joined together on the island of Skyros. On 10 May 1941, Lt-Col. Chilton joined up with the men already on the island. The Greek people rendered great aid to the men. There were now Germans on the islands of Chios and Mytilene, so there were low-flying aircraft to avoid. They eventually arrived in Turkey near Smyrna. There were already a group of 18 men there being cared for by Colonel Hughes, an Australian who knew his way around in Turkey. The men dressed in civilian clothes and were told to say that they were "English civilian engineers". They took the train to Alexandretta. From there, they sailed for Port Said on a Norwegian tanker. The tanker, the Alcides, also had another 250 passengers. They included 66 Norwegians who had crossed into Russia to escape the Germans. More soldiers from Greece had managed to reach safety. Some Australians and New Zealanders were going to walk to Turkey, but were taken by friendly Greeks to Skiathos and then to Skopelos. They eventually were able to sail to Cesme in Turkey, arriving in early August 1941. From there, after being quarantined, they were sent to Syria. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The New Zealanders on Crete in 1941

About three weeks separated the end of the Greek Campaign and the German invasion of Crete. New Zealanders played an important role in the latter battle. They also took losses there. 671 New Zealanders were killed in the battle and over 2,000 were taken prisoner at the end. New Zealand losses in Crete were much greater than their losses in Greece. They had lost not quite 300 killed and about 1,800 captured at the end in Greece. A New Zealander who had been evacuated from Greece, General Freyberg, commanded the Allied troops on Crete, replacing a British officer who had commanded the defenders prior to the end of the battle in Greece. He commanded a force of some 42,000 troops. Of these, about 7,700 were from the New Zealand Division. The men withdrawn from Greece had left their artillery and many other weapons there. The idea was that the weapons would only complicate the withdrawal and not having them would allow more men to be carried by small ships, which were mostly destroyers.

The battle for Crete lasted 12 days and ended with the evacuation of most of the defending British and Commonwealth troops to Egypt. At the beginning of the German attack, the battle looked to be winnable for the British. Command failures allowed the Germans to fly in enough troops to win the battle. The initial attackers were paratroops and glider-borne troops. They were strongly attacked by the defenders and took many losses. We will explore the operations in greater detail, as we proceed through the Australian Official History. This piece draws on the New Zealand history of the operation.

More men escape from Greece

After the last withdrawals by destroyer from Greece, there were still some large, organized groups of men left. Many were British, but some were Australian. One such group was the 2/2nd Battalion commanded by Lt-Col. Chilton. They had been cut off from the rest in the Pinios Gorge. Chilton had not been with the group, but Major Cullen, of the Headquarters Battalion, along with some New Zealanders, marched to near Kartisa on the coast, hoping to find a ship to pick them up. Eventually, the Greeks ferried them to Skiathos. They were only ten miles from Turkey, but did not want to be interned there. Several ships eventually took two groups of men to Crete, where they disembarked on 5 May 1941. Some 97 men, who could not be accommodated on the ships, were left on Chios. The group eventually grew to 133 men. They eventually sailed to Chesme in Turkey. The Turks were friendly to the Allies, even though they were neutral. There were men who had experience in Turkey, who helped arrange transportation. Meanwhile, Lt-Col. Chilton and a few men marched to the southwest. The group grew in size over time. They eventually reached Skyros by boat. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The focus on the island of Crete at the end of April 1941

Prior to 30 April 1941, there was already an island commander and British troops on Crete. With the close proximity of Crete to Greece, the island was a natural place to take troops evacuated from Greece. They were transported by sea to Suda Bay, in the northwest corner of Crete. The troops from Greece were practically unarmed, as those who were armed had only their personal weapon and many had been embarked on destroyers and cruisers without any arms.

The string of disasters that started with the battle in Greece, the battle for Crete, and then the disastrous Operation Battleaxe in June 1941 eventually cost General Wavell his job as theater commander. The British had great culpability in the string of disasters, as they had lied to the Australian Prime Minister, saying that General Blamey had approved of the operation and then liked to General Blamey, telling him that the prime minister, Mr. Menzies, knew of the operation and approved of it. This seems to have been the standard operating procedure, and it deserves to be condemned. The CIGS in Britain had opposed the operation and was overruled by Churchill. On story puts the blame for Greece squarely on Churchill. He was said to have ordered Anthony Eden to Greece to make the arrangements, while the Australian Official History tends to blame Anthony Eden and would say that Churchill went along with his young foreign secretary.

As we continue the story, we will shift the focus to Crete, where even before the end of operations in Greece, Hitler had ordered that Crete be taken. He gave the order, apparently, on 25 April 1941. The battle for Crete was pivotal, as it sold the Allies on the use of airborne troops while it discouraged the Germans from any further airborne invasions.

The Germans at the end in Greece

After the withdrawal from Thermopylae and Brallos, German advance on Athens progressed rather slowly. It was only on 27 April 1941 that German troops from Corinth arrived at Athens. The Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler division moved south from Yanina starting from 26 April. They left the 73rd Infantry Division at Epirus to accept the Greek surrender. The Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler moved to Patras on 27 April and held back while the more orderly embarkation of British and Commonwealth troops occurred. The exception was the 5th Panzer Division, which pushed rapidly south into the Peloponnese. They reached the embarkation ports of Argos, Navplion, and Tripolis during the day on 28 April. By the night, they were in Kalamata. At that point, the 5th Panzer Division and Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler were in the Peloponnese, the 2nd Panzer Division and 5th and 6th Mountain Divisions were near Athens and Lamia. The 9th Panzer Division was in Thessaly. The 73rd Infantry Division was near Grevena and Yannina. The 72nd Infantry Division was near Katerini. The 50th Division was near Salonika. The 164th Infantry Division was in Eastern Macedonia, near the Aegean and possibly in the islands. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The losses in Greece

After the end of the campaign in Greece, the Germans announced that their losses in the 12th Army were 1,160 men killed, 3,755 men wounded, and 345 were missing. The total strengths of British and Commonwealth forces in Greece were:

British army: 21,880
Palestinian and Cypriot: 4,670
British RAF: 2,217
Australian: 17,125
New Zealand: 16,720

The losses were as follows:

          Killed    Wounded    Prisoners
British         146         87       6,480
British RAF     110         45          28
Australian      320        494       2,030
New Zealand     291        599       1,614
Palestinian &    36         25       3,806
   Cypriot

This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The next phase: the move to Crete

As we have mentioned, some 50,000 troops were evacuated from Greece in late April 1941 as the situation there collapsed. We believe that the collapse in Greece has hastened by the nature of the staff work done by Group W, under the command of General Wilson. General Freyberg, commander of the New Zealand Division (later called the 2nd New Zealand Division) ended up as senior officer present in southern Greece as the Germans pushed deeper to the south. The troops consisted of the New Zealand Division, the 6th Australian Division and the 1st Armoured Brigade, or the remnants thereof. Most of the troops were removed by cruiser and destroyers (it seems), although some were removed by transport. The original plan was to have the transports embark the troops, in part from quays or using landing craft from the beaches. As the pace of the collapse quickened, the last troops were removed mostly by warship. Since cruisers could take larger numbers, they played a key role. From Greece, some were lucky enough to arrive in Egypt, but most were dumped at Suda Bay without anything but the clothes that they wore and with what small arms that they had carried out of Greece. Since Crete was the logical next German target, something had to be done. There were about 42,000 British and Commonwealth troops on the island of Crete. A British officer had been told that he was in charge of Crete, but General Wavell replaced him with General Freyberg, newly arrived from Greece with about 7,700 men from the New Zealand Division (two brigades). The third New Zealand brigade had ended up being sent to Egypt. The next part of the story will deal with preparations to defend Crete, the actual German attack, and the unfolding story of the battle for Crete. The fall of Crete ended up being messier than even that of Greece and left the Allied position in the Mediterranean Sea in an even more precarious state by the summer of 1941. The result was that General Wavell was sacked by Mr. Churchill and a new set of commanders was put in charge. Sadly, the results were little better.

The Greek Campaign: was it necessary?

A claim was made that Great Britain was obligated by treaty to defend Greece against a German attack. Certainly, Anthony Eden, Churchill's foreign minister took that obligation seriously. He apparently convinced the prime minister of the necessity to put troops into Greece. General Metaxas, the Greek dictator thought that the British expedition would be a strategic blunder, which it turned out to be. General Metaxas died suddenly, so he was not able to influence the decision. The Australian government and senior commanders were opposed to the operation. The decision to go into Greece had grave consequences. First, an approximately 50,000 man force was expended. They withdrew most of the men from Greece, many going to the island of Crete. Crete was soon invaded and there were further losses. The most damage was done to the navy. From April 1941 until late June, there were heavy losses in cruisers and destroyers. These losses came at a time when they were very damaging. This was at a point when Churchill wanted to run the Tiger Convoy to Egypt with tanks. There was an escalating need to keep Malta supplied, and convoys run through the Mediterranean were still more efficient than running then around the Cape of Good Hope. So yes, the campaign in Greece was a mistake. The mistake was compounded by putting General Wilson and his staff in charge, as neither was up to the task they were given. The operation could have been better executed if as requested, the Australians had been given control with General Blamey in charge.

More about HMAS Perth

As we have seen, the Captain of HMAS Perth was responsible for not approaching Kalamata when some 6,000 troops could have been embarked. He commanded a group consisting of two cruisers and six destroyers. This was in late April 1941. The Perth had only been in Australian hands since the summer of 1939. The Perth had been HMS Amphion, which as a modified Leander class cruiser with 8-6in guns. Almost immediately after being commissioned as an Australian ship, there was a mutiny of some sixty sailors. As these things go, a seemingly small issue blew up into a confrontation. New York police even gathered on the pier in preparation to intervene. In the even, the captain at the time, Harold Farncomb, was able to defuse the situation. The Perth was to go to Australia, but the start of the war delayed that trip until early 1940. The Perth was employed as a convoyer until late 1940 when she was dispatched to the Mediterranean to replace HMAS Sydney, a sister-ship. By April 1941, the Perth was commanded by Captain Bowyer-Smith. He showed unusual lack of initiative or perhaps even courage and did not go into Kalamata when there was the one opportunity to embark the troops and save them from German prisoner-of-war camps. Admiral Cunningham and Vice-Admiral Pridham-Wippel tried to salvage the situation, but the navy was only able to retrieve less than 1000 troops. This is based on widely available information about the Perth and the situation at Kalamata in late April 1941.

The navy still tried to get troops from Kalamata after 28-29 April 1941

The great Admiral Cunningham ordered Vice-Admiral Pridham-Wippell to pick up troops who might be on the coast south of Kalamata after the night of 28 to 29 April 1941. The destroyers succeeded in picking up over 900 men the next two nights, including 700 from the island of Milos. There was one Australian hospital left in Greece. The Germans took the hospital on 27 April, but let them continue to provide care. They ultimately started to take equipment and rations, however. On 7 May, the hospital was moved on German orders to Kokkinia. Through May, the Germans kept the hospital in operation and allowed men to join as well as new patients. The hospital continued to function and treated wounded from Crete through May. The operation began to wind down by the fall and the unit was ultimately moved to Germany in December. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

Australiians had recaptured the quay at Kalamata late on 28 April 1941

There were so few weapons left at Kalamata late on 28 April 1941, only 70 Australians attached the Germans on the quay and took two field guns and captured 100 men. At this point, the ships that were close by could have come in and loaded up with troops. The navy inexplicably did not follow up with their usual initiative and bravery. The ships close by were commanded by an Australian captain, and he chose to sail off at 28 knots rather than make the attempt to get more troops off the quay or beach at Kalamata. The destroyer Hero and three K class destroyers came in and took off wounded and 300 other troops. The assessment of the author of the Australian official history is that the ships could have taken off most of the troops who were left at Kalamata if they had stayed close while the small German force was captured. This is based on the account in the Australian Official History.

More about the loss of the SS Slamat on 27 April 1941

A new ship named HMS Diamond was commissioned 70 years to the day after the destroyer Diamond was sunk during the withdrawal from Greece on 27 April 1941. The day was solemn for the Dutch, because a Royal Rotterdam Lloyd ship, the SS Slamat was also sunk on that day. The Slamat was employed as a troop ship and had embarked men from the beach in Greece during Operation Demon. The Slamat was caught some 60 miles north of Crete by Ju-88 and possibly Me-110 aircraft and was bombed and sunk. The destroyers Diamond and Wryneck rescued at least 700 men from the Slamat, but were eventually bombed and sunk as well. The total loss was 983 men killed from the three ships and embarked troops. The captain of the Slamat, Tjalling Luidinga, was killed during the attack. This is based on information from a Royal Navy webpage.

The situation nears collapse in Greece on 28 to 29 April 1941

The plan for the night of 28 to 29 April 1941 was to send a cruiser and four destroyers to pick up the New Zealand brigade at Monemvasia. They also planned to send two cruisers and six destroyers to take off the troops at Kalamata. Thres sloops were sent to Kithera to take off about 800 men who had gotten their by caique and landing craft. The men on Kithera were in fact taken off by Sloop and were taken to Suda Bay in Crete. As we have seen, the operation at Monemvasia was successfully executed, taking off the brigade and General Freyberg. The operation at Kalamata was broken up by advancing German troops who overran the 4th Hussars defending the perimeter. the two cruisers and the destroyers were approaching Kalamata for the withdrawal. Some men could have been withdrawn from the beach, but the captain of the Perth had understood that it was not possible, and withdrew, we now know, prematurely. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The game was up at Kalamata on 28 April 1941

After the night of 27 to 28 April 1941 and with no ships arriving to embark troops, they had run out of time. The delay in withdrawal was fatal, because that gave the Germans time to penetrate the British and Commonwealth positions in deep south Greece. A German column drove into Kalamata during the next night, 28 to 29 April. There was a a mixed group of troops in Kalamata. They included some New Zealanders, including Sergeant Jack Hinton. The Germans had set up two 15cm guns and had howitzers and several armoured cars. Someone ordered the men on the beach to take cover, but Jack Hinton charged the German guns with other New Zealanders and killed or drove off the gun crews. They had retreated to nearby houses. Jack Hinton smashed into a house and they bayoneted the occupants. They did the same at a second house. By now, a large German force had arrived at Kalamata and Jack Hinton was wounded in the abdomen and taken prisoner. He received a Victoria Cross for his actions that day. With the threat of bombing of the troops on the beach, a British officer surrendered the troops to the Germans. This is based on the account at ww2today.com.

The situation worsens over 27 and 28 April 1941

At the Argos beaches and at Kalamata there were men gathered in anticipation of being picked up by destroyers. There were 2,000 at the Argos beaches and the numbers were growing with the arrival of stragglers. There were a large number, some 8,000 troops, at Kalamata. Many of these were not British or Commonwealth troops, but were Cypriot, Greek, Middle Eastern base troops. There were even 300 of the 4th Hussars. Over the night of 27th and 28th April, there were no ships. There was still one New Zealand brigade left in Greece at Monemvasia. They were armed, but without artillery. The plan was to embark the brigade on the night of 28-29 April on warships. The cruiser Ajax and four destroyers embarked the brigade that night and brought off the troops, including General Freyberg. They also hoped to send two cruisers to Kalamata as well. The deep penetration of the Germans into the Pelopoppenese greatly complicated the situation. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

More news from Greece in late April 1941

On the night of 27 and 28 April 1941, no troops were embarked from the beaches in the Peloponnese. At this point, the transports, cruisers and destroyers were already at Alexandria. Fortunately, General Freyberg was still present and in command. The 6th New Zealand Brigade wsa at Miloi and Tripolis. General Freyberg ordered the brigade commander to wait until nightfall and then move quickly to Monemaasia. The 26th Battalion moved early and then the rest traveled at night. The next day, they moved to the defensive position at Monemvasia. Multiple plans were moving forward. The troops were told to collect caiques, in case they were needed for transportation out of Greece. At Navplion and Tolos, there were more troops, about 2,000, many without food. More stragglers were arriving, as the men knew that those ports had been places where men had been taken aboard ships. There was the problem of German aircraft strafing and bombing during the day. A rearguard that included 200 men from the 3rd RTR was organized. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The Armoured Brigade on 27 April 1941

On 27 April 1941, there were the armoured brigade commander and about 800 men still holding out at Rafina. This was the remnants of an elite group of men. They were pure infantry at this point, because they had destroyed their guns, perhaps prematurely. The men that remained were from the Rangers, the anti-tank artillerymen, and the New Zealand Divisional Cavalry. Early on 27 April, German aircraft had flown over, but had not seen the men. Some of the anti-tank gunners took a caique in the harbour that might take 250 men. The rest were sent to Porto Rafti, where there was an embarkation planned for that night. Fortunately, at the last minute, the destroyer Havock approached Rafina from Porto Rafti and embarked the 800 men. By 4am on 28 April, the Havock had sailed for Crete. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The British army and navy in 1941

I don't understand the reasons, but in 1941, the British Royal Navy was an extremely proficient and professional service, while the British army had serious problems. There are many potential explanations. There was the friction between the regular British army and the British Indian Army. Many of the commanders in 1940 to 1941 were Indian army trained. There was also the obtuse influence of the mechanization clique in the British army. They thought that they were trying to modernize the army, but they didn't understand how tanks and armoured cars were best employed. The German army had a good understanding and doctrine and they beat everyone in their path up through the end of 1941, although Russia was proving to be too much for them. The Australian and New Zealander commanders and men were much better prepared for war than the British. On the other hand, the British forces in North Africa in 1940 to early 1941 were trained to a very good state and were well led. Their reward was to be dismantled by General Wavell.

I have never liked Bernard Law Montgomery, but I have come to appreciate what he accomplished. He took the British and Commonwealth forces in the Mediterranean theater and reformed them into a force that could win battles. He really did not have time to make the transformation prior to the Second Alamein, so they had a much harder time than a Montgomery army would have in 1943 or 1944.

The cruisers were workhorses

Eight cruisers with eight six-inch guns had been built in the early to mid-1930's. There were the five Leander class ships (Achilles, Ajax, Leander, Neptune, and Orion, and the three Amphion class ships, all sold to Australia as the Hobart, Perth, and Sydney. The Neptune was the only ship of the first group lost, but two of the three ships transferred to Australia were lost. The Hobart was the sole survivor. All of the ships had a designed speed of 32.5 knots. The Achilles and Ajax were best known for their part in the Battle of the River Plate in 1939.

As we saw, the Leander class cruiser Ajax evacuated some 2,500 troops from Porto Rafti on 27 April 1941. The cruisers had sufficient space to carry several thousand men, when necessary. Orion and Perth both embarked troops from Tolos on the night of 26-27 April. Earlier that night, the two cruisers and loaded men at Navplion. Great risks were taken, as the ships only sailed at 4am, which was dangerously close to dawn. Earlier, the Perth had helped bring Australian reinforcements to Greece.

Vice-Admiral Pridham Wippell had been a cruiser squadron commander in March 1941. His ships included the Orion, Ajax, and Perth, along with the larger cruiser Gloucester. His squadron fought in the Battle of Cape Matapan on 28 March 1941, not that long before the withdrawal (just about a month). Of the ships, three were lost in the war. The Neptune was lost in the Mediterranean Sea in late 1941. The Sydney was lost in the Indian Ocean fighting the German auxiliary cruiser Cormorant. The Perth was involved in the Southwest Pacific, fighting the Japanese, where she survived the Battle of the Java Sea, but was sunk at the Battle of the Sunda Strait.

A D-Day post

This is a deviation from our current thread, in honor of the men who invaded France on 6 June 1944. In 1997, I saw a History Channel documentary/dramatization of D-Day and the immediate days following. Lord Lovat was prominently featured in the movie. Simon Fraser, Lord Lovat, was a prominent commando leader in World War Two, at least up to the Normandy Invasion. There is a good picture of him with some of the men of the 4th Commando at Newhaven, after the Dieppe Raid in August 1942. The commandos were a rough looking lot, but then what would you expect? Lord Lovat, of course, has the hero and natural leader look. At Dieppe, Lord Lovat was an acting Lieutenant-Colonel. The 4th Commando was to stage two landings about six miles west of Dieppe to neutralize a coastal artillery battery. The 4th Commando included fifty American Rangers, men of approximately the same caliber as the British commandos. Foreshadowing the Rangers at Normandy, the 4th Commando scaled the cliffs and destroyed the battery of six 15cm guns. Their success was the only good thing that happened in the Dieppe Raid. This is based on Wikipedia information which we believe to be largely correct.