The rearguard withdraws while under attack

As the sun set on 18 April 1941, the 24th New Zealand Battalion was withdrawing as a German attack was mounted on the road to the Menexes Pass. The German force had tanks in the lead until they ran onto mines in the road. They were followed by motorized infantry. The infantry dismounted and attacked, but they were held up long enough for the 24th Battalion to withdraw. The Australian field guns withdrew by troops and left only some New Zealand artillery. They slipped away at about 11:30pm. They had arrived at Larisa by 3am. The 26th New Zealand Battalion had traveled to Larisa by rail, but the other two battalions traveled by road to Volos. All this occurred as Brigadier Savige's force had an adventure on 18 April. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The 6th New Zealand Brigade on the defence: 18 April 1941

By late morning on 18 April 1941, a German attack was underway against the positions held by the 6th New Zealand Brigade, south of Elasson. A combination of medium and field artillery was able to inflict damage on the advancing German tanks. At this time, the 6th Brigade was not attacked by air, except by one Stuka. The medium guns eventually had to withdraw after they fired off all of their remaining ammunition. Fortunately, the Australian field artillery was well-supplied with ammunition. This was due to the work of the 5th New Zealand Regiment's drivers who moved the entire ammunition dump from Ayios Dimitrios to the 6th Brigade's positions. The 2/3rd Australian regiment fired some 6,500 rounds at the Germans on 18 April. There was an abundance of targets with the artillery observers spotting the large groups of targets. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

6th New Zealand Brigade on 18 April 1941

The 6th New Zealand Brigade was deployed as a blocking force south of Elasson. They were across two roads that led to Larisa. The 25th Battalion was on the west side and the 24th Battalion was on the east. The 26th Battalion was in reserve. The brigade had heavy artillery support:

2/3rd Field Regiment   20-25pdrs
one troop 64th Medium Regiment
two groups of the 5th NZ [Field] Regiment   8-25pdrs (in the anti-tank role)
one battery of the 5th NZ [Field] Regiment in reserve at Domenikon  12-25pdr
7-2pdr anti-tank guns dug in and 4 mobile with the 25th Battalion

The 24th Battalion was in mountainous terrain with no artillery. They had performed demolitions and laid mines to aid the defence. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The rearguard units on 18 Apil 1941

There were three rearguard units that would have to withdraw through the Larisa bottleneck. The three were positioned on roads leading south. April 18 saw the New Zealand Divisional Cavalry, with anti-tank guns sitting on the junction of roads from Servia and Katerini. The illustrious Colonell Kippenberger, with a small contingent, were all that remained of the 4th New Zealand Brigade rearguard. One cavalry squadron had 2pdr guns on portees with their guns pointed up the roads. The men guarding the road from Katerini were surprised to see German tanks and motorcyclists coming down the road. They had assumed that demolitions would have delayed their advance. As they were being attacked repeatedly, the men finally withdrew behind the 6th New Zealand Brigade. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

Two battalions cut off

By 5:45pm on 18 April 1941, Brigadier Allen could tell that the 21st New Zealand Battalion and the 2/2 Australian Battalion were cut off by advancing Germans. Brigadier Allen had collected a large number of carriers from the various units in his brigade. He was extremely low in infantry strength, however. They had endured bombing and strafing through the day. There were five German tanks advancing up the road. They were met by 25pdr fire and two tanks were knocked out. They lost one gun and had to pull back. The men were forced to pull back to their trucks for a withdrawal. The withdrawal was covered by New Zealand armoured cars. The column ran into a German ambush and took casualties along the way. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

Things get dicey on 18 April 1941

The New Zealand 21st Battalion withdrew at about 11am on 18 April 1941. They left the Australian 2/2 Battalion to fend for themselves. They lost contact with General Macky during this period. The 2/2 Battalion had several hours where they were not hard-pressed by the Germans. By 3pm, the battalion was attacked on the ground and by air. They were being overrun by German tanks. There was a concurrent infantry attack on a different part of the defensive front. A mortar team of the 2/2 Battalion fired some 350 rounds on the advancing Germans. The unit was also able to mount heavy Bren gun fire which slowed the advance. The tanks, however, continued to move up the road. Two companies of the 2/2 were able to withdraw and reached their trucks, which transported them to the brigade headquarters. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

18 April 1941 in the Pinios Gorge

The units defending the Pinios Gorge on 18 April 1941 included the 21st Battalion, the 2/2 Battalion, and the 2/3rd Battalion. Early on 18 April, German troops could be seen advancing towards the defenders. It was apparent that the Germans were working their way around the left, trying to outflank the defenders. A platoon of carriers was sent out to intercept the Germans. The carriers came under heavy fire and were forced to withdraw. There was a great deal of mist in the morning that reduced visibility. A tank attack developed in front of the 21st Battalion. There were 2pdr anti-tank guns defending, but they were overrun by advancing tanks. By 11am, troops from the 21st Battalion (New Zealanders) had started to withdraw. The Australians were still able to hold on for the present. By 3pm, a bigger attack was mounted. The attack included about 35 aircraft that commenced bombing. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The fateful conference in Athens on 17 April 1941

General Papagos had suggested that the British force exit Greece. General Wilson exchanged cables with Winston Churchill who stated that they should not stay in Greece against the wishes of the Greek government. General Wilson attended a meeting in Athens on 17 April 1941 where Mr. Koryzis told the King that he felt like he had failed the country. He then commited suicide. Churchill ordered on 18 April that they must both withdraw from Greece and keep on fighting in Libya. The battle in Libya had priority over the Greek operation, however. The island of Crete seemed to be a close location to which they could go after leaving Greece. The troops in the field were unaware of the events of 17 and 18 April, and they were fully occupied with resisting a German advance. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The rearguard at Domokos

Brigadier Lee's rearguard was gathered at Domokos on 17 April 1941. Two battalions arrived from the north: the 2/4th and 2/8th. the 2/8th still had 533 men, but with fewer weapons than they should have had. At least the men of the 2/1st Field Regiment arrived by train from Larisa. They had come back to Domokos to be with their guns. The 2/6th Battalion had arrived by train on 16 April. The British troops had been able to move under cover of rain and mist. Four of the seven brigades were at Domokos or Thermopylae. The others would be harder to safely move. Greek resistance seemed ready to cease by 18 April. The general consensus was that the Greeks liked the Germans and would like to work with them. By then, the Macedonian armies had dispersed. The remaining Epirus army was in dire straits. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

Brigadier Savige

Brigadier Savige's force, an augmented infantry brigade was left unsupported on the left flank. He had been directly under ANZAC Corps command, but by 18 April 1941, he was switched back under his division. He had thought that the best plan would be to sit where they were until the night of 18/19 April. Early on 18 April, Captain Grieve brought back orders from General Mackay to withdraw that night. The orders from Mackay had apparently been written without knowing that the armoured brigade had already withdrawn. Brigadier Savige informed Captaina Grieve that they would start withdrawing. He had already ordered his artillery to withdraw. He hoped to be near Larisa by 5pm. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

On 17 April 1941, the 5th New Zealand Brigade had been loaded onto trucks to move to Almiros. Their assigned road was so bad that General Mackay had them move on the Australian division's road. The withdrawal also commenced from the Servia Pass. Lt-Col. Howard Kippenberger commanded the rearguard. The artillery withdrew first and then the infantry. The demolitions effectively held up the German advance. Savige Force, to the left, was left to hold for too long. They would only get to start the withdrawal in the night of 17/18 April. They had the dubious protection of the 1st Armoured Brigade. By the afternoon of 17 April, there was no armoured brigade to provide cover. The road behind them was packed with vehicles, so any withdrawal would be difficult. Brigadier Savige only expected to be able to start a withdrawal on the night of 18/19 April. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The Pinios Gorge-17 April 1941

The battalions were prepared to defend against a German attack at the Pinios Gorge. The tracks ran along the north side of the gorge and the road was on the south side. The defenders included two Australian battalions and a New Zealand battalion. They had stretched out to prevent the Germans from going around the flank. The Official History notes, though, that if the New Zealanders were not able to hold, that the position could become untenable. The three battalions were included in Allen Force and were equipped with some anti-tank guns. By late on 17 April 1941, the men could see the first Germans on the ridge. The Germans were mountain troops and got into position where they were able to fire downwards on the New Zealanders. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The Victorian railwaymen

It was the 2/7th Battalion of the 17th Australian Brigade whose Greek train crew abandoned them. They had been heavily attacked near Larisa by German aircraft, and the Greek crew had more than they could handle. Fortunately, the 2/7th had some Victorian railwaymen in the battalion. The leader, Corporal Jock Taylor, along with Corporal Melville and Private Naismith stepped up to solve the situation. They fired up a train as a decoy, and then about 5oo yards away, they assembled a train to carry the battalion to relative safety. They were able to carry the 2/7th Battalion to Domokos. All this seems to have occurred during the night of 16 April 1941. The 17th was uneventful, as the British were executing a withdrawal plan that included demolishing roads and bridges behind them. The brigade was able to prepare defensive positions on 17 April so as to be ready for the expected German attack. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The withdrawal on 17 April 1941

The roads leading south were packed with vehicles, bumper-to-bumper. Men lay sleeping in the floor. There were a very few Greek vehicles. You were more likely to see donkeys with men riding or Greek cavalrymen on their horses. Early on 17 April 1941, there was rain, but it cleared later in the day and there were more German aircraft in the sky. The roads all ran through Larisa which was wrecked from a combination of earthquake and bombing. Not only were the roads clogged, but the railroads were having difficulties. The Greek railroad crews were abandoning trains due to fear of German aircraft. Australian railwaymen came forward and got a train assembled and moving with men from the 17th Australian Brigade. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

By 16 April 1941, the Greeks were ready to surrender

The Greek generals had been asking the Prime Minister to give up the fight. By 16 April 1941, the Bishop of Yannina made the same request of Mr. Koryzis. By 15 April, General Wavell had warned General Wilson that they should prepare to retreat further. At this point, the only place to go was to board the ships and leave Greece. The British and Commonwealth troops were in Thessaly on 17 April, where it was rainy and the skies were filled with marauding German aircraft. There were often conflicts on the roads between the supply vehicles carried supplies forward and the troop-carrying vehicles trying to withdraw. Since 14 April, the Germans had been firing in the trucks with machine guns from aircraft. The men had become extremely nervous and at the first sign of aircraft, they would jump off the vehicles to the roadside. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The Armoured Brigade

General Wilson's staff had ordered the 1st Armoured Brigade to withdraw over a mountain road that no one knew anything about. The road turned out to be so rough, that most of the brigades remaining tanks broke tracks and had to be abandoned. They could easily have allowed the brigade to travel on the main road, but chose not to let them do so. The brigade had originally been planned to cover Brigadier Savige's withdrawal, but he was just left with a small contingent while the remnants of the brigade tried to withdraw over the mountain road. Sadly, this was symptomatic of how General Wilson's command functioned. The entire campaign was ill-considered and driven by politics to begin with. The British should never have gone into Greece, but Anthony Eden, Churchill's foreign minister, decided that they needed to aid Greece and try and pull Yugoslavia to the British cause. The entire enterprise was a disaster and nearly cost the British North Africa. This is some commentary in addition to information from Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The NZ protective force

General Freyberg was concerned about the security of his forces while they were withdrawing from the Servia and Olympus passes. As a precaution, he established a force under the command of Lt-Col. Duff to cover the withdrawing units from the two passes. Colonel Duff's force included anti-tank guns, machine guns, and carriers. That measure was put in place, but an attempt to use the armoured brigade to cover Brigadier Savige's withdrawal misfired due to General Wilson already having issued orders to the brigade. He had ordered the brigade to withdraw over rough mountain roads. That had the effective of causing most of the available tanks to break down in route due to track failures. That was a constant danger with the early British cruiser and light tanks used by the 1st Armoured Brigade. That was what Robert Crisp mentioned in his book, Brazen Chariots, about the abortive and failed Greek campaign. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The 4th NZ Brigade on 16 April 1941

The 16th of April 1941 saw a determined New Zealand fight on the left where the Maori's repelled a German attack, with the help of artillery. When the sky cleared, they could see a German column stretching far off into the distance. New Zealand artillery fire called in by the observer that broke the attack. The was the 4th NZ Brigade with the 23rd Battalion on the right in a heavy mist. By late afternoon, they were being pressed hard, but reinforcements helped them block the attack. German mountain troops had threatened to overrun the Maori's, but in the end, they held. As darkness fell, they were to withdraw south along the road, although they were late in starting. The other two battalions of the brigade were able to stage a more orderly withdrawal according to plan. In the mountainous terrain, they had to abandon their nine 2pdr anti-tank guns. They tipped these over and they fell into a ravine. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official history.

The dispositions late on 16 April 1941

On the left, the 5th Panzer Division, with a detachment from the 9th Panzer Division were pushing down towards the Aliakmon River and then south towards the Pinios. The 1st Armoured Brigade was withdrawing ahead of them, and was not south of the Aliakmon River. To their right, the main body of the 9th Panzer Division was attacking the 4th New Zealand Brigade at Servia. Near the coast, to their right, the 2nd Panzer Division was attacking the 5th New Zealand Brigade. Further south, right on the coast, the 6th Mountain Division, with a portion of the 2nd Panzer Division, was attacking the 21st Battalion near Rapsani. The NZ Division HQ and the ANZAC Corps HQ were still at Elasson,. Far to the southwest, Savige Force was still holding Kalabaka. The 6th Australian Division HQ was far to the southeast, at Larisa. This was to be a difficult period in the face of attack by armoured forces and experienced mountain troops. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

Elaborate plans were made to withdraw to Thermopylae

Generals Mackay and Freyberg were to closely coordinate the withdrawal from the north to Thermopylae. At the beginning, the 5th NZ Brigade was on the north slope of Mount Olympus. This was some twenty miles from where "Allen Force" was to move toT the south bank of the Pinios. The 4th NZ Brigade was to leave the Servia Pass the same night (17/18 April 1941) that the 5th NZ Brigade was to leave Olympus. The 6th NZ Brfgade was to leave Elasson in the night of 18/19 April. Savige and Allen, and the 1st Armoured Brigade all had to be moved south in the process of withdrawing. One concern was that some of the trails might provide a route to German mountain troops to outflank them. As early as the night of 15/16 April, the New Zealanders broke up a German attack and destroyed two tanks and 14 other vehicles. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.