Wednesday, June 15, 2016

The Germans attack at Er Regima on 4 April 1941

As the Germans attacked the pass at Er Regima on 4 April 1941, the demolitions were fired. The explosion happened before the enemy had advanced to the mines. Part of the minefield exploded because of the detonations. Some of the stone sangars that had been built were knocked down as well. The demolitions were a signal, apparently, to the 20th Anti-Tank Company to withdraw. That was particularly unfortunate as the German light tanks were attacking. Just to make matters worse, there were four German armored cars that advanced up the unguarded wadi and were behind the Australians. They were stopped only by the Italian anti-tank ditch. Several light tanks had moved up as well. 18 Platoon was guarding the pass. Two more companies were on the right and left, but not close enough to help. As the German infantry advanced, the platoon fired their available weapons. The enemy took cover in response to the fire. A group of 18pdr guns from the 51st Field Regiment arrived. One gun knocked out a light tank. The gun was knocked out by another tank. The other three guns were also knocked out, but they had knocked out one more German light tank. One Australian fired on the tanks with the anti-tank rifle. Two remaining German tanks circled around and gradually forced the Australians to withdraw. General Morshead decided to move forward with withdrawing the 2/13th Battalion, now that they were under attack. He sent the carrier platoon forward to help the men being attacked. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

Monday, June 13, 2016

An uneasy day on 4 Apirl 1941 in Cyrenaica

In the area east of Benghazi, the men were feeling very uneasy about their situation. Cyrenaica Command was out of touch with reality. They had no idea of where the Germans were or what they were doing. General O'Connor had decided to keep the Australians on the escarpment to impeded any German advance. At the wadi at Er Regima, the three companies of the 2/13th Battalion. The battalion commanders had two battalions forward, one on the right and one on the left. They left an undefended gap in the middle. They third company was held in reserve. While they had been promised some 25pdr guns, all they had were four 4.5in howitzers. They also had a machine gun company. The day before, Hurricanes of the RAF flew out to the east from where they had been based. They flew out of an airfield at Benina, at the foot of the pass at Er Regima. There had been a great deal of traffic from units that were withdrawn from the west. They had heard explosions from the demolitions fired by various engineer units. All they could do is watch the road and wait for something to happen. On the afternoon of 4 April 1941, a column could be seen driving out of Benghazi towards their positions. The vehicles included tanks, armored cars, and troop-carrying trucks. There were two groups of tanks in line abreast heading for the pass. The howitzers and some captured Italian mortars fired on the tanks. They knocked out one light tank with a mortar round. They hit other tanks, but did not knock them out. The tanks withdrew, but the infantry dismounted in preparation for an assault. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

Wednesday, June 08, 2016

The British "out of touch" on 4 April 1941

By the middle of 4 April 1941, the commander of the 2nd Armoured Division did not know where the 3rd Armoured Brigade was located. The Australian commmander Morshead was under the impression that the commander of the 2nd Armoured Division was not that concerned about now knowing where the 3rd Armoured Brigade was. At a meeting, General Gambier-Parry said that he figured that the Germans had achieved their goal for now by taking Benghazi. He did not know how Rommel thought or operated. General O'Connor apparently agreed and wanted the 9th Australian Division to stop withdrawing. The division had two battalions on the first escarpment. A third battalion would hold a position east of Barce. They would be on the second escarpment. The British now had no idea about where the Germans and Italians were and what they were doing. They were out of contact on the ground and had lost air reconnaissance due to the units moving to the rear.

The Australians were in a precarious position. They were not able to dig in on the escarpment. They were reduced to piling stones for cover. After the meeting, General Morshead visited the 20th Australian Brigade, only to find the commander was driving to the division headquarters. The 2/17th Battalion now had transport to move. They would move to the Barce pass. He also learned that the enemy was going to attack the 2/13th Battalion at Er Regima. This is based on the acount in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

Monday, June 06, 2016

The 3rd Armoured Brigade at Msus early on 4 April 1941

The two squadrons of the King's Dragoon Guards led the advance of the 3rd Armoured Brigade on Msus. They drove into Msus by abour 8:30am on 4 April 1941. The 3rd Armoured Brigade continued to lose tanks to breakdown as they moved. The 6th RTR only arrived by early afternoon. Part of the problem was that they lacked water to add to tank radiators. The Italian tanks in the 6th RTR particularly were bothered by this issue. As we have previously mentioned, they found a ration dump that had not been destroyed so they were temporarily resupplied with food. The German aircraft found them, dropped bombs and a flare to mark their presence. They found that all the fuel had been destroyed even though there were no Germans present. The armored brigade second-in-command was sent out to find more fuel north of Msus.

We now hear from Cyrenaica Command. They sent a message saying that the main Axis column seemed to be heading for Benghazi. The task for the 2nd Armoured Division was to protect the flank of the 9th Australian Division. To do that, they should move to Mechili by the track from Ablar to Mechili. General O'Connor left the Cyrenaica Command headquarters to look for General Gambier-Parry and the 2nd Armoured Division headquarters. General Neame was also out from his headquarters, looking at the Wadi Cuff, which he thought would be a good position to occupy.

Both the 2nd Armoured Division and the 2nd Support Group were now at El Ablar and were close to the 9th Australian Division headquarters. Some of the support group was with the 3rd Armoured Brigade. The rest were spread out between Er Regima and El Ablar. Some more troops came through Er Regima and reported the flag of Italy now flew over Benghazi and that the Germans and Italians were in Benghazi. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

Wednesday, June 01, 2016

What was the truth? Rommel's orders and his situation on 3 April 1941

We think that the truth about Rommel's orders were that Hitler had ordered Rommel to go on the defensive and to not carry out any larger operations such as taking Tobruk. The 15th Panzer Division was under orders for North Africa. The High Command still did not want Rommel to make a major move in North Africa. The High Command knew information that Rommel did not, such as the plans for invading Russia. Operations were underway in Greece and there was the island of Crete to deal with. All that required air power that could not be spared to participate in extensive operations in North Africa.He seems to have lied about the orders that he received to General Gariboldi on 3 April 1941.

In any case, the demolitions carried out by the British and Australian engineers were so extensive that they brought the German advance to a halt. The participants were the 2nd Armoured Division engineers and the engineers of the 2/3rd Australian Field Company. The 5th Light Division reported that four days would be required to bring up fuel and refuel their tanks and vehicles. Rommel's reaction was to stop any movement and to have all available vehicles used to bring up "supplies and ammunition". The result was that the German advance was halted for the moment and the British were given a reprieve.

Early on 4 April 1941, the 3rd Armoured Brigade and other forces with Brigadier Rimington started to move towards Msus. Some fraction of the total were sent to El Abiar. The King's Dragoon Guards arrived at Msus by 8:30am and found food that they desperately needed. There was no sign of any Germans. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

Monday, May 30, 2016

With Rommel on 3 April 1941

By 3 April 1941, General Wavell was realizing that he needed to change plans to meet the threat from Rommel in the Western Desert. They would keep the 7th Australian Division and possibly change the plans for the 6th Australian Division. While this was happening, Rommel was making plans as well. In the afternoon of 3 April 1941, Rommel visited the most advanced troops from the Ariete Division. They were traveling from Agedabia to the Trigh el Abd. He found that the ground was firm and could be safely traveled. When he returned to his headquarters, he ordered the Ariete Division to send a detachment to travel the Trigh el Abd to Ben Gania. He also ordered them to check the track to Msus. By 4:45pm, Rommel received word that the British had left Magrun. He ordered the 3rd Reconnaissance Unit to travel the coast road to Magrun and then scout out the way beyond Magrun. Rommel drove forward to joint the reconnaissance unit. They heard that the British had left Benghazi, so he ordered his troops forward. They reached Benghazi before morning. By the time Rommel had returned to his headquarters, he found that he had to deal with General Gariboldi, who was unhappy about the recent moves. He wanted Rommel not to make any advances without consulting him. Rommel told General Gariboldi that he needed freedom of action, as he was a German general. Fortunately for Rommel, he received a message from German High Command giving him the freedom he needed. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

Wednesday, May 25, 2016

The initial moves on 4 April 1941

While the 9th Australian Division was involved in the moves to the second escarpment, transport was a problem. The solution was to take vehicles from units that had them to transport the battalions that lacked vehicles. One battalion, the 2/48th, from the 26th Brigade had just taken position at Baracca, which was on the lower escarpment, was to move to Maddalena. This is where the northern pass is located. The 2/15th Battalion from the 20th Brigade had been held in reserve. They were now to move east of Barce to the southern pass. The 9th Australian Division had been given the 1/Royal Fusiliers and the 24th Anti-Tank Company. They would move to El Abiar, which in the scheme of things, would allow the 2/15th Battalion move. By daylight on 4 April, the battalions were able to move. We remember that the 7th Armoured Division motor battalion, the 1/King's Royal Rifle Corps, was supplied by General Wavell to bolster the defenses. Being a motor battalion, they were able to immediate start their move and they arrived in position by 9am on 4 April 1941. A fifth 9th Australian Division company was gathering near El Abiar. They had been on the escarpment to the north of Er Regima. They had given up their transport to move other units, so they had to wait for more transport to arrive. Using first line transport from units that needed to move meant that other transport had to be found. An officer from the 9th Australian Division staff had to find the necessary transport. Another officer, Major Dodds, collected available transport at Barce. The unit movement was slowed due to this issue, so battalions that had given up their first-line transport to move other units had to sit until later in the afternoon on 4 April. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

Tuesday, May 24, 2016

Cyrenaica Command in confusion late on 3 April 1941

Almost the first thing that happened after General Wavell left Cyrenaica Command, a conference was held. This was late on 3 April 1941. Colonel Lloyd, of the 9th Australian Division, was at the conference representing his division. Decisions were being made without knowing any hard information. Communications were non-existent. They had no idea what was happening with the 2nd Armoured Division. They thought that there were 100 German vehicles at Msus, but an officer from the armored division artillery told Colonel Lloyd that the vehicles at Msus were the 3rd Armoured Brigade. At the meeting, they decided to pull back to a line from Wadi Derna to Mechili. They would pull out of most of Jebel Achdar and let the Germans advance. The 3rd Indian Motor Brigade was still at El Adem, but they would be ordered to move to Mechili. They would send the 2nd Armoured Brigade to join them at Mechili, so that they would have some artillery. B Squadron of the 2nd Royal Lancers was already at Mechili. They expected the 9th Australian Division to put two battalions east of Barce on the "second escarpment". The plan was that by defending the second escarpment, that they would enable a "general withdrawal" from the forward part of Cyrenaica. A 7th Armoured Division motor battalion arrived at Barce to help the 9th Australian Division. The division would do a staged withdrawal to Derna. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

Wednesday, May 18, 2016

The withdrawal in the midst of confusion on 3 and 4 April 1941

After the erroneous information about Er Regima was received, the 2nd Armoured Division wheeled vehicles headed for the Wadi Gattara. They would attempt to reach the plateau by crossing the escarpment. The vehicles were blocked at this point, although small groups made their way up the escarpment. Some of the 2nd Support Group did not receive the bad information and they were able to move through Er Regima. The Australian 2/13th Battalion held the pass and saw the support group vehicles passing through. More support group vehicles went to Tocra, held by the 26th Australian Brigade, and passed through there.

Brigadier Rimington, the 3rd Armoured Brigade commander, was still at Esc Sceleidima. Since the word about Er Regima being closed, he changed his orders to his brigade. He was out of communication with his division commander, so he decided to sit at Esc Sceleidima until he was back in communication. He ordered the 3rd Hussars to hold the east end of the pass. The 5th RTR and 6th RTR would hold the western end of the pass. There was a report of Germans approaching, but the vehicles were from the King's Dragoon Guards. Overnight, Brigadier Rimington decided to take his brigade to Msus in the morning. If the Germans were really there, he would fight them. During the night, the remains of the Tower Hamlets Rifles arrived at Esc Sceleidima. They were also joined by two squadrons from the King's Dragoon Guards. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

Monday, May 16, 2016

Late on 3 April 1941 in Cyrenaica

The supply dump at Msus was destroyed on the basis of wrong information late in the afternoon on 3 April 1941. There were no Germans near by or in Msus. The only unidentified vehicles were those of the Long Range Desert Group and armored cars of the King's Dragoon Guards. The RAF gave an erroneous reconnaissance report about some fifty German vehicles at Msus. The fifty was said to probably include tanks, which were no where near Msus. At 5pm, General Wavell left Cyrenaica Command Headquarters to return to his headquarters in Cairo. He left with wrong information about the situation. Instead of replacing General Neame with O'Connor, he left Neame in command with O'Connor as an advisor. That is what we had always heard was the case, and this explains it. It seemed that O'Connor was going to actually be in command, but that did not happen.

After the air reconnaissance report, General Gambier-Parry ordered the 3rd Amoured Brigade to move to Er Regima. The division had many wheeled vehicles, and these were largely moving towards Er Regima. The division headquarters was also moving and was crossing the Wadi Gattara. Typical of how badly things were going, a British aircraft dropped a message at the division headquarters. The message was from Cyrenaica Command from 10am that day. The message was wrong and out of date. The message told them to get east of the escarpment before moving to the Wadi Gattara do avoid a British minefield. The officers in the headquarters thought it meant that Er Regima was closed, which was not the case. The message caused confusion and disruption, as vehicles further north were diverted away from Er Regima. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

Wednesday, May 11, 2016

Confusion on the afternoon of 3 April 1941

With the 2nd Armoured Division headquarters issuing new orders while not knowing where its units were located, the situation descended into chaos. There were reports of Germans either heading for Msus or already there that were totally false at this point. The Tower Hamlets Rifles and artillery were sitting at Sidi Brahim and about a mile to the south. Only by 4pm did the 3rd Armoured Brigade receive new orders. The commander warned the 5th RTR and 3rd Hussars of an impending move to Msus. By this point, the 1st RTR and other units had scattered upon seeing units on the move and not having orders themselves. The situation was so bad that the 6th RTR, which was supposed to meet the Support Group did not know their location or even their radio frequency. The continued to sit at Esc Sceleidima. The rest of the armored brigade was still there, as well. While all this played out, the 2nd Armoured Division headquarters sent a message to Cyrenaica Command that they could not hold the escarpment because there was no route to send supplies. General Wavell was still at Cyrenaica Command, along with Generals O'Connor and Neame. In response, Cyrenaica Command, presumably from General Neame, but with knowledge of the others, ordered the armored division to withdraw by way of Er Regima. All this time, while they had reports of Germans either at Msus or heading there, the Long Range Desert Group was ordered use Msus as a base. Units moving towards Msus included the armored division recovery unit and an RAF ground unit. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

Tuesday, May 10, 2016

The 2nd Armoured Difvision becomes confused on 3 April 1941

After a meeting with the division commander at midday on 3 April 1941, the units of the 2nd Armoured Division became confused. The issue was that not everyone received new orders or even had any orders, and that the orders had changed once or more in the last day. One command was that the division would keep the enemy from the escarpment, north of Esc Sceleidima. As the meeting ended, they received a reconnaissance report from the RAF that enemy units were "approaching Msus from Antelat". The enemy was on the coast road and on the route from Agedabia. Cyrenaica Command also received a message from the armored division and got confused, thinking that the Germans were already in Msus, which they were not. The King's Dragoon Guards were near Antelat, the 6th RTR was moving towards Msus from Antelat. The 5th RTR had orders to intercept eight tanks moving north, which were actually the 6th RTR tanks. The problems seems to have been too many changes. The support group, along with the 6th RTR, was to hold the escarpment. The armored brigade was sent to Msus to fight the presumed enemy column. The support group had their orders, but the 3rd Armoured Brigade did not receive their orders. Some units without orders just followed other units in their movements. The armored division headquarters arrived at Cyrenaica Command and reported that the division would not be able to hold the escarpment. Cyrenaica Command then ordered a withdrawal by way of Er Regima. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

Thursday, May 05, 2016

The situation deteriorates for the British on 3 April 1941 in Cyrenaica

Rommel received a message from General Gariboldi on 2 April 1941. The general had seen information that led him to correctly believe that Rommel was continuing to advance, despite that being contrary to his orders. Rommel was receiving reconnaissance reports about the British withdrawal, and he wanted to continue to push them. Early on 3 April 1941, the 6th RTR left Antelat in an odd direction, due to orders that they had received at 1am. They were now needed to move to Esc Sceleidima, where the escarpment is passable. They moved off to the southwest, and then returned to Antelat, now abandoned. They finally moved towards Esc Sceleidima, but were slowed by their M13/40 tanks continually overheating. After 8am, the rest of the 2nd Armoured Division moved towards Esc Sceleidima. The King's Dragoon Guards maintained scouts to the south. The 2nd Armoured Division had arrived at Esc Sceleidima by late morning. General Gambier-Parry held a conference for the division unit officers. They planned where units would be positioned. After the conference, they had a report from reconnaissance aircraft about a German column nearing Msus from Antelat. From this point, communications were less reliable and not all messages were received. Also the 2nd Armoured Division headquarters lost track of the division's units and they were headed for problems. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

Tuesday, May 03, 2016

More about the situation on 2 April 1941

As the Germans were advancing in early April 1941, the 9th Australian Division was lacking information. They were also not ready to fight. The right was held by the 26th Brigade, which only had the 2/24th Battalion. They had only obtained enough transport to move the 2/48th Battalion forward from Gazala. They arrived at Baracca at 5pm. By 3 April, they were ten miles from Tocra, near "an Italian settlement".

General Wavell felt compelled to visit Barce and the Cyrenaica Command headquarters. He was having one of those periodic exchanges with Churchill in London. Wavell had directed General Neame to keep his armor in being, even if that involved withdrawing from Benghazi. That got a negative response from the Prime Minister. Churchill had suggested bringing General O'Connor forward. In fact, Wavell decided to replace Neame with O'Connor. The situation was such that Neame being so far from the action, that he did not have effective control. One goal was to keep the 2nd Armoured Division concentrated, rather than to scatter the division. General Gambier-Parry was going to withdraw on El Ablar. The coast road had the disadvantage that the supply dump at Magrun was destroyed by the 2/3rd Australian Field Company. Neame was still in command and ordered demolitions at Benghazi in preparation for withdrawal. Demolition charges were exploded at Er Regima. They blew the minefield, as they expected, so they laid new anti-tank mines at the pass. On the morning of 3 April, Wavell and Neame met with General Morshead, of the 9th Australian Division, and passed on the news that O'Connor would arrive to take over Cyrenaica Command. O'Connor came by plane with Brigadier Combe. He landed at El Adem and sent word to the 3rd Indian Motor Brigade that they should be ready to send two regiments to Mechili. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

Wednesday, April 27, 2016

Tank fight in the afternoon of 2 April 1941

The 5th RTR was able to meet two trucks loaded with petrol. They were able to refuel from them. They were also able to make contact with the 3rd Armoured Brigade headquarters. They had nine tanks providing protection, and these saw enemy forces approaching with some 30 to 40 vehicles. They heard about the 3rd Hussars being in a fight and needing help. The battalion commander sent four tanks to support the 3rd Hussars. At the same time, the Tower Hamlets Rifles was being attacked with tanks. They were located to the west. British artillery fire allowed the Tower Hamlets to withdraw. German tanks got through the British guns, but did not pursue the withdrawing infantry. The nine tanks were now in a hull-down position behind a ridge. By 5:30pm on 2 April 1941, the 5th RTR was under attack by what proved to be the II/5th Armored Battalion (German). The 5th RTR now only had 14 tanks, after sending the four tanks to help the 3rd Hussars. In the tank battle, the British destroyed three German tanks, but lost five of their own. Another tank took damage, but was still operable. The German advance came with the sunset behind them. The 5th RTR was then able to withdraw back to the next ridge. The British were fortunate to have survived this battle, and the Germans were not very aggressive and could have destroyed the entire battalion. Upon hearing of this battle, General Gambier-Parry, the 2nd Armoured Division commander, ordered the division to move to Antelat. The move left the coast road to Benghazi without a blocker. Cyrenaica Command, commanding from the rear, was not aware of this situation. From 7pm until a 2am halt, the 5th RTR continued to withdraw. They were down to 12 tanks at that point. The rest of the division reached Antelat during the evening of 2 April, although the King's Dragoon Guards did not reach Antelat until 9am on 3 April. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

Tuesday, April 26, 2016

Rommel moves forward as the British withdraw in early April 1941

The British were withdrawing in the face of the German attack. The 2nd Support Group initially moved some 30 miles north of Agedabia. The 3rd Armoured Brigade was now east of Agedabia. They had two units forward. The 3rd Hussars were to the right while the 5th RTR was to the left. A squadron from the 6th RTR was guarding the rear of the 3rd Hussars. By 1pm, the 5th RTR could see German vehicles following them. The King's Dragoon Guards could see German armored cars moving towards Antelat. After seeing the British withdrawal, Rommel was compelled to take action. He ordered his division to attack Agedabia and take it. He also wanted the small port of Ez Zuetina. While the Germans were advancing, General Neame was trying to slow down the British withdrawal and stay in control. Neame was leaving the 2nd Armoured Division divided into two groups that were too far apart to support each other. General Gambier-Parry replied back to Neame that he should have the option to commit his armored brigade if an opportunity presented itself. General Neame was too far from events to know about what was happening. By now, the 3rd Armoured Brigade had only 22 cruiser tanks and 25 light tanks. The tanks were breaking down at a rate of about one per ten miles traveled. By 4pm, the 3rd Armoured Brigade was still moving back towards planned defensive position. The 5th RTR was slowed by having to stay with a composite battery from the 1st RHA, which could only move at 7 miles per hour. There was still a 6th RTR presence at Beda Fomm, where they had been waiting. They had about 40 Italian tanks. They were ordered to move forward to Antelat. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

Wednesday, April 20, 2016

The withdrawal on 31 March to 1 April 1941

The plan had been for the 2nd Armoured Division to move to the east and set up a new defensive position. The division, however, was too slow to move. At this point, the Germans were not following, however. The 2nd Support Group occupied a new position astride the coast road about 30 miles past Mersa Brega. The position had a marsh on the right, so that provided some protection. The armored brigade was on the left. The 3rd Hussars, with some artillery, tried to provide some protection to the withdrawal. By the morning of 1 April, the 5th RTR was down to 23 tanks. The armor was on the desert track to the east of the coast road. The King's Dragoon Guards were positioned towards the desert to watch for any German forces. General Neame visited General Gambier-Parry at Maaten el Baghlia. He ordered the armored division to withdraw towards Benghazi. By early afternoon, the withdrawal was in progress. General Neame had already ordered the troops at Benghazi to prepare demolitions at the harbor and to be ready for a withdrawal. Near Msus, troops from the 3rd Indian Motor Brigade encountered German troops. At a distance, they saw some strange vehicles. They might have been the Free French, but then they were recognized as enemy. They headed off to escape, and had a pursuer for some thirty miles. The acting commander of the 3rd Indian Motor Brigade sent out a group towards the reported enemy force, but did not hear any more for three days. By the start of 2 April, the support group saw German activity in front of them. They had carriers scouting. The Germans attacked with forty tanks with infantry. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

Monday, April 18, 2016

Mersa Brega falls on 31 March 1941

The German main force was moving on Mersa Brega by early afternoon on 31 March 1941. Cemetery Hill was hit hard by German dive bombers. That was followed by an attack by tanks and trucks with infantry. The British 25pdr battery and anti-tank guns fired on them and forced them to pull back. The British commander wanted to chase them, but ran out of time when the next attack came. This time, the attackers were all tanks and came close, but could not get past a sand ridge that was close to the British. They were fired on by British guns. Some tanks were knocked out and others were bogged down in the sand. There were two more dive bomber attacks late in the afternoon. By 5:30pm, German artillery was firing on the British positions. Infantry and tanks were moving forward with Rommel on the scene, deciding to attack to "the north of the coast road". By 6pm, the Germans were successful. By 7pm, they were in Mersa Brega. The 2nd Support Group was forced to withdraw from the position. They moved back about 8 miles. They had mounted a counter-attack before withdrawing, and had some success, but lost eight carriers. The defenders of Mersa Brega had lost 55 men. There was now nothing to stop Rommel from reaching Benghazi or Tobruk. During the night, the 2nd Support Group had moved back to a position about 20 miles in front of Agedabia. They expected a battle there the next day. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

Thursday, April 14, 2016

The German attack on 31 March 1941

The plan for the 2nd Armoured Division was to withdraw if they were attacked by the Germans. There were armored cars from the King's Dragoon Guards accompanied by four tanks from the 5th Royal Tank Regiment. There were just four cruiser tanks. The 2nd Support Group was at Mersa Brega. They planned to use motorized infantry and carriers to conduct patrols in front of the salt marshes. The armored cars and tanks hoped to ambush German tanks. Instead, they saw a group of German tanks, exchanged fire, took damage on one tank. The Germans appeared to be ready to encircle the patrol. In fact, the German force was of all arms, with artillery and infantry, as well as tanks. The British retreated with German tanks in pursuit. They again exchanged fire near El Agheila, in the middle of the sand dunes. The Germans then headed south, leaving the British to withdraw. The armored cars stayed there in the sand dunes to continue to report on events. The Germans reached Mersa Brega by 7:45am. The men at Cemetery Hill saw Germans to the southwest. They saw five German tanks and two trucks. Infantry had gotten off the trucks. There were some twenty to thirty Germans. By 9am, men of the Tower Hamlets saw the large German force approaching Mersa Brega. By 9:30am, the Germans were advancing. The motorized infantry of the Support Group pulled back, but left carriers scouting in front. By 10am, the Germans brought up a gun, accompanied by four tanks. They commenced firing and the British carriers had to pull back. The British still had artillery observers on Cemetery Hill. They directed fire on the advancing Germans. One carrier platoon stayed near the hill to give support. By 10:30am, the Germans were moving on Cemetery Hill. The 104th RHA fired on the Germans. The men from the hill pulled back to a ridge that crossed the road. The carriers stayed near the hill. They actually fired on tanks at some 300 yards. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

Monday, April 11, 2016

At the front in Cyrenaica on 30 March 1941

The forward units facing the Germans were all British units. The 2nd Armoured Division was finding that the Italian M13/40 tanks were unsatisfactory. After being driven for 10 or 12 miles, the engines overheated. Once they were driven and overheated, they needed time to cool. That meant that they could be driven 48 miles in a day. They had 68 tanks of all sorts that could be used, even if with problems. Not only the tank situation was an issue. They had never trained as a unit. They also lost their communications equipment, as it was all sent to Greece.

The units of the 2nd Armoured Division were in place at the front. The right was held by the 2nd Support Group, commanded by Brigadier Latham. They had eight miles of front within the Mersa Brega salt marshes. They had part of the Tower Hamlets Rifles, a company of the French Motor Battalion, and the 104th Royal Horse Artillery. There was a group on the cemetery hill. They were a company of the Tower Hamlets Rifles and two machine-gun sections. Another company of Tower Hamlets Rifles was "preparing a position in the rear". They were approximately one mile north of Agedabia.

On the left, there were about 5 miles of ground to the south from the road that could not be traveled by tanks. Behind this was the 3rd Armoured Brigade. The 3rd Hussars were forward with 26 tanks, a mix of Lt.Mk.VI and M13/40 tanks. They had an Australian anti-tank company with them. There was also the 5th RTR. They had two field artillery batteries and two light anti-aircraft guns with each of the regiments. Most of the 6th RTR was still at Beda Fomm. Armored cars from the King's Dragoon Guards were scouting in front of the tanks. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

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