The other three columns of the 5th Indian Brigade on 8 June 1941

The second column of the 5th Indian Brigade was a platoon from the Rajputana Rifiles. There was a famous railroad bridge at Chehab that T. E. Lawerence had tried to destroy in 1918. That was during Allenby's offensive. The bridge, or viaduct, still survived in 1941. The objective of the second column was to take the railroad viaduct and keep it from being destroyed. The platoon commander and one of his men crawled their way forward to the sentry post and shot the occupants. The other men in the platoon attacked the guard post that was on the bridge. Although explosive charges had been set, they were not exploded. The bridge was saved. At the same time, a company of Fusiliers took Fiq without much trouble. The other two columns of the 5th Indian Brigade, one led by the brigade commander, Brigadier Lloyd and the other by a Colonel, a battalion commander, had reached Deraa at 6am. They had surrounded the place and asked the defenders to surrender. They refused. Therefore, the artillery commenced firing at 7:30am. Two Indian battalions attacked and had taken the place by 8:30am. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The 5th Indian Brigade on 8 June 1941

The 5th Indian Brigade was on the extreme right (eastern) end of the attack into Syria. Like the other groups, the 5th Indian Brigade was divided into columns, rather than being concentrated. There were four columns. On the left were the 1/Royal Fusiliers, along with artillery and :"other troops". They were headed towards Kuneitra, which they approached by 5am on 8 June 1941. At Kafr Naffakh, the infantry dismounted and moved forward on foot. Two miles west of Kuneitra, the most forward troops took fire from a hill southwest of the town. They sent a French officer and a British officer forward. They said that they thought that some of the younger officers would like to join the Free French, but the commander wanted to fight. They eventually found that the defenders were a Senegalese battalion and six armoured cars. A French officer came out and informed the attackers that they would start firing at noon, which is what happened. The infantry attacked and took Tel Abou Nida. The next morning, on 9 June, the attackers found that the French had withdrawn during the night. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The 2/31st Battalion on the attack on 8 June 1941 in Syria

The 2/31st Australian Battalion was the leftmost battalion of the 25th Australian Brigade. They were to move forward with three of their companies on 8 June 1941 in Syria. Two companies would move past Khirbe. The third company would move up to Kafr Tibnite. They would cross the Litani bridge. The French defenders were in a strong position on heights and with a Crusader fort. The start time was 2am on 8 June. They had sent a Free French officer forward under a white flag to ask the defenders not to resist. They refused and started firing. The attackers were pinned down by fire by 4:30am. The battalion was stopped and located in the open where they were very vulnerable. There was a change of plans after these developments. The battalion commander decided that artillery and tanks would be needed. Three light tanks of the 6th Australian Cavalry Regiment came forward and attacked three machine gun nests, which stopped firing. Two tanks were knocked out and the third withdrew with the survivors. The attack had been stopped and no progress had been made by dark. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

Attacking Fort Khiam on 8 JUne 1941

As the 2/33rd Battalion moved north, they approached the village of Khiam. Guarding the village was a classic-looking fort. One company, that of Captain Ferguson, was stopped by fire from Khiam and Bmeriq. The battalion commander, Lt-Colonel Monaghan, ordered Captain Cotton, another company commander, to take the fort at Khiam. The French waited while the Australians moved forward and then started firing when they were about 300 yards away. The Australians were able to move forward to within fifty yards of the fort. A small group actually reached the wall of the fort. They climbed the fort's wall and jumped down.. The leader fired his sub-machine gun. A French machine gun on the other side of the fort returned fire and caused the men to have to go under cover. They sought cover in the fort's bastion, where some French men joined them, saying that they wanted to join De Gaulle's force. With some help from the men outside, the men inside made a hole in the wall. Captain Cotton wanted to attack through the hole in the fort, but the fort was so strongly defended, that he decided to wait for the next morning to attack again. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The 2/33rd Australian Battalion early on 8 June 1941 in Syria

Lt-Colonel Monaghan's battalion, the 2/33rd, ended up split into companies that had their individual objectives at the start of the invasion of Syria and Lebanon on 8 June 1941. Since we are talking about locations such as Kuneitra, we must be talking about Syria. Captain Bennett's company was sent off through the mountains to occupy Ferdisse. They were to cut the road just to the west. This was a move that did not immediately affect the current operations. Another company, that of Major Wright, was to take border posts and blow up the bridge to keep the French from being able to attack the flank of the column. They took Banias and blew the bridge by early afternoon on 8 June. Captain Cotton's company, further to the left, took more frontier posts. They moved off from Abd el Kamh at the start time of 2am. They reached their first French post by 3am. They lost one Australian in the fight, and the surviving 25 defenders surrendered. We should not be surprised that they were African, since this was a French colony. The defenders were largely Senegalese. One platoon from this company was to take a bridge, the Jisr Abou Zeble. This bridge was for the road from Naias to Merdjayoun. The bridge crossed the Hasbani. They took the bridge at about 4am. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The 25th Australian Brigade on the first day, 8 June 1941

The 25th Australian Brigade, commanded by Brigadier Cox, moved forward in two groups. They were to advance to Rayak and capture the place with the airfield. The right column was based on the 2/33rd Battalion. The column was actually mixed with cavalry and artillery as the main additions. Their initial objective was to cross the road from Kuneitra and block it. The left column, mainly consisting of the 1/31st Battalion. They were also a mixture of cavalry and artillery, with a little more. They were to advance to a line "from Merdjayoun to Nabatiye et Tahta". They were to hold that line against any attackers. There was apparently also British horsed cavalry in the strength of a squadron to their left. These were from the Cheshire Yeomanry. They were going to try and contact the 21st Australian Brigade at Habbouch. The 25th Brigade moved forward at 2am. These men wore steel helmets and either shorts or trousers. The 25th Brigade also had frontier posts to capture as part of the advance. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

Australians later in the day on 8 June 1941

When they encountered the 80 foot hold from a demolition, the leading troops from the Australian 2/16th Battalion manhandled their trucks over the hole. By 5pm 0n 8 June 1941, the troops had met the 2/14th Battalion on the coast road. One company from the 2/14th Battalion reached Tyre, where the civilians cheered their arrival. The 21st Brigade commander, Brigadier Stevens, reached the crossroads at Tyre before the 2/16th Battalion arrived. Briigadier Stevens had walked across the demolition at Iskanaroun. Cavalrynmen from the Cheshire were crossing the countryside "between Tibnine and Kafr Sir." By the end of 8 June, the Australians were in Tyre and had reached the French line at the Litani, where it was obvious that they intended to fight. Anyone who had thought that the Vichy French in Syria and Lebanon would collapse without much of a fight were obviously mistaken. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

With Brigadier Stevens of the 21st Brigade on 8 and 9 June 1941

By early on 8 June 1941, the 2/14th Battalion had moved up to the road demolition. They had the tanks from the 6th Australian Cavalry Regiment in company. The demolition had blown up a portion of the cliff about 100 feet long and 30 feet in depth. The engineers took until the next morning to repair the road. Brigadier Stevens arrived at the demolition at about 9:45am, riding in a carrier. At noontime, they managed to get an anti-tank gun across to where it could be towed by a captured French truck. Colonel Moten's column was only able to proceed the next morning. While the repair was underway, one company from the 2/14th Battalion crossed on foot. Further to the right, MacDonald's force followed that of Potts. They passed through Bennt Jbail on their way. Just before reaching Tibnine, they had to create a detour past a deep crater. They also had to clear a minefield that was part of the obstruction. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The Royal Dragoons in June 1941

During the attack north with the 21st Australian Brigade, the 6th Australian Cavalry Regiment had two troops of armoured cars from the Royal Dragoons (variously called "the Royals" or the 1st, Royal Dragoons). We are interested in the "British" armoured cars during 1940 t0 1942, so we wondered what sort of armoured cars were employed. We noticed that one source said that the Royal Dragoons had equipped with Marmon-Herrington armoured cars in late 1940, but then had to pass them on to the 11th Hussars, the armoured car regiment of the 7th Armoured Division. The Royal Dragoons eventually were re-equipped later. In the Middle East, there had been the remnants of Rolls Royce armoured cars from the 1920's. They were based on a large touring car fitted with armour and a turret. Some of these were still in service in late 1940 and possibly into 1941. There were also a few Morris A.C.9 armoured cars in service as command cars. By June 1941, the remains of the old cars were gone, so it makes sense that the armoured car forces in Egypt and Palestine would have re-equipped with Marmon-Herrington cars. The Mk.III was a 1942 car, so what was most likely was that the Royal Dragoons in Syria would have had Marmon-Herrington Mk.II cars. They may also have had Dingo scout cars, based on what was suggested by one source. If you search for Royal Dragoons, you will find the web pages in question.

The 6th Australian Cavalry reach Tyre on 8 June 1941

A group of the 6th Australian Cavalry (the 6th Division divisional cavalry regiment) was led by Lieutenant Mills. They had been at Tibnine, which had an old Turkish castle. After learning that they would be welcome in Tyre and after being joined by two troops of armoured cars from the Royal Dragoons, they drove to Tyre. The cavalry group had 13 carriers as well as the armoured cars. As they neared Tyre, they could see British warships off the port that were being bombed by French aircraft. The ships had neared the coast at 6:45am and saw the road demolition at about 7am. Led by the armoured cars, the cavalry group reached a road block just south of Litani. The French defenders had field guns, anti-tank guns, and mortars. Two armoured cars were disabled by gunfire. The force had two field guns from the 2/4th Field Regiment, so they set up to return fire. The armoured cars were quickly damaged, so that only one remained operational. The 2/16th Battalion had sent out patrols that found that there seemed to be no French troops south of the river. As Brigadier Stevens, commanding the 21st Brigade was not hearing news about the road condition, he sent forward the 2/14th Battalion to the north, towards the demolition. That force included the tanks from the 6th Australian Cavalry regiment. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The advance on 8 June 1941 in Syria

By 2am, the main advance along the coast road had commenced. At 5am, they had reached the French outpost at Naquora. The Australians exchanged fire with the French. After firing a mortar bomb, the Australians charged and took the post. They also took the village just beyond the outpost. Brigadier Stevens, commander of the 21st Brigade, was mounted on a carrier so he could keep track of the action and communicate with the small units. At this point, Brigadier Stevens was unaware that the road had been blown ahead of him. The hill country to the east of the coast road was very difficult. The men who were to take the Labouna post were late due to their guide being lost. They reached Labouna about 5:30am and took the post. To the east, a company of the 2/14th took a village, Alma Chaab. The initial objective, the three outputs were in Australian hands by 7am on 8 June 1941. To the east, the 2/16th Battalion made progress. They were to attack Bennt Jbail, a village, and then take Ain Ebel, beyond. When they arrived at Ain Ebel, they found the place had been abandoned. Men of the 2/2nd Pioneer Battalion quickly built a road from the Palestine side up to the Syrian road at Aitaroun. By 4am, the Australians had moved into Syria. The mayor at Tibnine telephoned the mayor at Tyre and informed the Australians that they would be welcome in Tyre. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

A sharp fight in the morning on the first day of the attack on Syria and Lebanon in June 1941

Australians had thought that the road to the south of Ras el Bayada had demolition charges set. A few men were left to block the road from traffic from the north. The rest headed south, still looking for mines and demolition charges. At 5am, they were fired on from a strong point. The Australians charged the strong point and took it. The men left behind to block the road heard shots fired and arrived at the scene. Increasing numbers of French troops were drawn by the fighting. They were able to stop a machine gun from firing and took a mortar. One group put the mortar and a machine gun on the roof of the post and fired on traffic on the road. They were able to successfully deal with two armoured cars that appeared next. After that, twelve men on horseback approached. They scattered when they were fired upon. By 7am, they heard what they guessed to be a demolition charge that would have destroyed the road north. A small group was sent by car towards Iskandaroun. They were fired on and returned fire. At that point, the road was blown up. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The 21st Brigade attacks on 7 June 1941

The men of the 7th Australian Division were very much aware that they were untested in battle and needed to prove themselves. We look first at the 21st Brigade on the first day of the attack on Syria and Lebanon. During the day on 7 June 1941, Brigadier Stevens learned that the commandos would not be able to land on 8 June due to the expected weather. Later in the evening, some four hours before the official start, the first Australians crossed the border. They were wearing rubber footwear to help silence their passage. There were men from the 2/14th Battalion and from the 2/6th Field Company. They cut the phone wire that would have alerted the men who would have set off the demolition charges. Their guides, who were Australian and Palestinians, took them to "a Jewish farming colony at Hanita." After they ate a meal, the men crossed the frontier. The hills were very overgrown with thorns and rough. The sky was dark with clouds to help cover their movements. By 3:30am, one group reached the point where charges were expected to be found. The men checked the bridges and culverts, but did not find any mines. A small group blocked the road while the others went south looking for explosives. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

Run up to the attack on Syria and Lebanon in June 1941

The units that were to attack Syria and Lebanon moved into position on the nights of 5th and 6th June and 6th and 7th June 1941. The Australian Official History described the situation as being like the Germans, moving forward in secrecy, ready to attack a peaceful frontier. So far in the second war and never in the first war did British soldiers do such a thing. One group was hidden under olive trees in a grove. They were careful to only move vehicles by road, if at all, and to sweep the tire marks from view where they were under cover. Typical of the level of thinking from General Wilson's staff was a suggestion to change the shape of the Australian hat to hide that they were Australians. That was described as dismal failure of a measure, because the French knew very well who they were fighting. They were up against Australians, primarily. June 7 was spent relaxing, under cover to pass the time. The attack would commence before midnight and the men switched from their comfortable clothes to what they would wear to fight. There was skepticism about the idea that the French would fold when attacked. That was wishful thinking motivated by politics, not reality. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

General Wilson's strategy for the attack on Syria and Lebanon

The Australian Official History says that by dividing his force into three columns for the attack on Syria and Lebanon, General Wilson assured thatnone of the attacks would have overwhelming strength to achieve a major success. We don't understand why General Wilson was put in charge, except that he was a favorite of Churchill for reasons that we have not yet understood. General Wilson also had bought into the idea that the Vichy French would collapse when attacked, which was not the case. They had a history with Churchill, since at least the attack on Mers el Kebir in July 1940, and they were ready to resist any attempt to occupy Syria and Lebanon. In retrospect, a strong resistance should have been expected, but there were politics involved that kept leaders from thinking clearly. A multi-front attack was appropriate if there had been a real possibility that the defenders would collapse when attacked, but that was very unlikely. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The plan for the 25th Australian Brigade's advance into what must have been Lebanon in June 1941

The plan for the 25th Australian Brigade was to move north towards Metulla. The brigade would start from the road to Dafna. They would take the outputs along the high ground that overlooked the road. After that, they would occupy a line including towns like Chebaa and Nabatije et Tahta. Having done that, the brigade would divide into two columns of combined arms. One would move through Hasbaya. The other would move along the Litani gorge and then to Zahle. The expectation is that the left column would move faster and turn to the right, cutting off the defenders of a defile that would be difficult to attack from the front. The plan then envisioned the right column would be able to move north and across the Damascus road and then take the Rayak airfield. The attackers would start under cover of darkness, but then would be exposed. There was the overoptimistic expectation from the British that the French resistance would collapse and they would not have a hard fight. There were some reasons to be concerned, however, including the fact that the French had a strong tank force. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The plan for the 21st Australian Brigade in June 1941

The 21st Australian Brigade was to move north along the coast as well as inland. The planners expected that demolitions by the defenders would greatly interfere with the planned operation. To attempt to prevent demolitions, infantry and engineers were sent north along the coastal road towards Iskandaroun. At the same time, a British commando battalion would be landed north of Litani. The commando battalion commander, Lt-Colonel Pedder was killed in action on 9 June 1941. Another possibility were roads that ran along the border, one to the south and one to the north. Some twenty miles to the east of the coast, the two roads came within a thousand yards of each other. If they could cross to the northern road, they would have an open route to Tyre. The 21st Brigade commander decided to seize French block houses that formed a barrier near the frontier. He also planned to build a road to the northern road that paralleled the border. The best of the battalions, the 2/16th, would be the core of a column that would travel the inland route towards Tyre. The 2/14th Battalion was to capture the French posts on the border. A column consisting of the 2/27th Battalion, light tanks, and engineers would attempt to move north on the coast road. If that was blocked they would move east and follow the other column north. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The 7th Australian Division brigades in June 1941

The commander of the 21st Australian Infantry brigade had been found by General Lavarack from the 6th Australian Division in 1940. Brigadier Stevens had served in the Great War and in the militia until 1935. He had specialized in signals and had been in charge of the 6th Division signals organization in 1940 when he had been selected to form the 21st Brigade. In 1935, Brigadier Stevens had been appointed as a battalion commander, out of the militia. He had as long as nine months to train his brigade prior to the operation in Syria and Lebanon. His counterpart, Brigadier Baxter-Cox had only been appointed to the 25th Brigade in March 1941. Brigadier Baxter-Cox was an architect who had stayed involved with the militia after the Great War. He had been a 2nd Lieutenant in 1918 prior to the end of the war. He had been a militia brigade commander prior to being selected to form the 2/16th Battalion in 1940. The third brigade was an add-on to the 7th Australian Division. This was the 5th Indian Brigade, commanded by Brigadier Lloyd. He had recent experience in the Western Desert and in the Abyssinian campaign. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

Generals Lavarack and Blamey

For some reason, the reason for which is unclear, General Thomas Blamey had developed a dislike for General John Lavarack. General Lavarack had been commissioned as an officer in 1905, while Blamey had been commissioned in 1906. Blamey was eventually promoted to Field Marshal, but he had a checkered history. He had left the army and had become a police commissioner, where he had been involved with a scandal. He had apparently kept involved with the militia and eventually commanded the 2nd Australian Imperial Force and the I Australian Corps. General Blamey seems to have been politically astute, but had questionable judgment. He kept getting by, due to his political connections. General Lavarack had stayed in the regular army until he finally had tired of Blamey's campaign against him and retired. We are somewhat surprised that General Blamey had let General Lavarack be promoted to command the I Australian Corps during the Syria and Lebanon Campaign. By all accounts, General Lavarack was a very good officer and held senior staff positions, including as Chief of the General Staff in Australia, which made him commander of the Australian Army. Political interests in Australia wanted to not spend money on the army and would have relied on the Royal Navy based in singapore for protection. December 8, 1941 showed that General Lavarack was correct in his belief that the Australian army needed to be strong enough to repel and Japanese invasion. This is based on the account in the Wikipedia.

General Lavarack

Promoting General Lavarack to command the I Australian Corps was a reasonable thing to do. He was a Lieutenant-General, although to get a command in the war, he had accepted command of the 7th Australian Division as a Major-General. He had previously been the Chief of the Australian General Staff, so he had experience as very senior officer. General Lavarack had been commander of the force in the Western Desert, but had been replaced by General Beresford-Peirse, who was junior to him. General Lavarack had a more experienced staff than that of the 6th Australian Division. The brigade commanders in the 7th Division would be operating independently, off in separate directions, so their role was very important. Brigadier Stevens had been a signal corps officer, and had been in the militia pre-war. General Lavarack had been selected Stevens from the 6th Division in 1940 to form the 21st Brigade. He was very junior and had been a 22 year old subaltern in 1918. He was the youngest Australian brigadier. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.