28 and 39 May 1941 on Crete

While the troop movement to the south was underway, by 28 and 29 May 1941, the Royal Marine officer, General weston, was making preparations for the troop withdrawal. By the afternoon on 28 May, General Weston made arrangements for a group of men from the 2/4rd Field Regiment to be available to guide troops to the beach for embarkation. They had to climb from the top of the escarpment down to the beach to be ready. The plan worked and on the night of 28 May, they embarked 230 wounded and 800 British troops, including RAF, on four destroyers. At the same time, three cruisers and six destroyers were embarking the troops at Heraklion. Practically the entire group there was withdrawn. A force including four cruisers, some small, left Alexandria at 9pm on 28 May, heading for Sfakia. The plan was to embark more men on 29 May. Major General Evetts was to command the withdrawal, although he was new to the process and to Crete. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The Australian 2/7th Battalion, moving at night on the night of 28 and 29 May 1941 on Crete

On the night of 28 and 29 May 1941, the Australian Battalion, the 2/7th, was moving at night. They had a plan that they executed for what to do if a German reconnaissance aircraft dropped a flare. They had marched until they reached the Askifou plain. This was apparently just north of the village. They moved in sections along the side of the road. When a flare was dropped, the battalion commander blew his whistle, and the men were to lay face down off the road. The idea was to only show the empty road to the air, in the flare light. Afterwards, they resumed their march. Following them, the 2/8th Battalion marched towards Kerstes. They arrived there at about 5am on 29 May. Layforce came along behind and moved to Imvros, on the south side of the plain. The German mountain regiment that had captured A Battalion of Layforce waited all day on 28 May and planned to restart the pursuit in the morning of 29 May. The mountain division was still intent on cleaning up at Retimo, where they bagged the defenders. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The rearguard on the march south on 28 and 29 May 1941 on Crete

The Australian battalion, the 2/8th, arrived at Babali at about 2pm in the afternoon and took a defensive position with the commandos of Layforce. Once that happened, the 5th New Zealand Brigade Headquarters moved south to Vrises. They were accompanied by the 5th New Zealand Brigade and the Australians in the 2/7th Battalion, which had been in the rearguard. The Germans had reached Babali as early as 1:35pm and had started firing at Layforce troops. While the rearguard had seen air attacks, by this time, the Germns were concentrated against Heraklion. By later in the evening, the rearguard headed for Vrises. The 5th New Zealand Brigade and the rest of the 19th Australian Brigade were together at Vrises. The New Zealanders headed south, over a pass, starting at6pm. They were heading towards Syn Ammondari, which was a further 12 miles to the south. An unnecessary disruption happened when the engineers set off explosives to destroy the road before the rearguard had arrived. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The Germans on 27, 28, and 29 May 1941 on Crete

Even though the Germans knew of the British movement towards the south coast of Crete on 27 and 28 May 1941, General Ringel, the German commander, had two mountain regiments moving towards Retimo. One mountain regiment was pursuing the retreating British forces (British, Australian, and New Zealand). At Stilos, they had a hard fight and captured most of a battalion and destroyed two tanks. The battalion must have been A Battalion of commandos from Layforce. The regiment at Stilos was content to let the forces in front of him withdraw in the night, as the commander expected. General Ringel apparently expected a fight at Retimo, which is why he had two thirds of his mountain division moving in that direction. In fact, the commander at Retimo was ready to surrender in the face of overwhelming force. Only by 29 May was the 100th Mountain Regiment sent to chase the retreating force heading for the south coast. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

On the road: 28 May 1941, heading to the south on Crete

On 28 May 1941, the plan agreed upon was that after the 5th New Zealand Brigade headquarters reached the Babali Inn and Layforce, the 5th Brigade battalions and Brigadier Vasey's Australian would march south to Vrises, where the men would hide out during the hottest part of the afternoon. After the Australians of the 2/8th Battalion reached Babali, the 5th New Zealand Brigade headquarters moved south towards Vrises. The New Zealand battalions and the 2/7th Battalion then followed the headquarters to Vrises. The problem was that the Germans were fast approaching and attacked at Babali at 1:35pm. Layforce was under fire at Babali until dusk, but the German air attacks were diverted to the fight at Heraklion. By later in the evening, the rearguard withdrew towards Vrises. The troops rested at Vrises before moving onwards. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The airborne attack on Crete in 1941

With our hindsight, we can see that the German airborne force was insufficient to achieve a successful attack on Crete. We might say that in May 1941, everyone was a novice at mounting large airborne attacks. Crete was an opportunity for the Germans to have analyzed the battle and learned from the battle so as to better be able to make airborne attacks in the future. Instead, the Germans were afraid to mount another attack of the scale of Crete. The Allies were the ones who learned from Crete and built and used effective airborne forces. They were first used on a large scale in the attack on Sicily in 1943 and then again at Normandy. In many ways, the attack on Normandy repeated some of the German mistakes from 1941. Making the assault at night was asking for trouble, and then they made little attempt to drop the paratroops on the planned locations. That was one of the major mistakes at Heraklion on 20 May 1941. Most of the German paratroops were dropped in the wrong locations. Those who were dropped onto defended areas with troops ready to respond took heavy losses, as paratroops in the air in daylight with a long drop time were easily killed. By late 1944, there was no excuse for the bad planning involved with Operation Market Garden, the "A bridge too far" operation at Arnhem.

The withdrawal to the south from Suda Bay on 28 May 1941

The 5th New Zealand Brigade let a group of Italian prisoners through on the road to the south. The prisoners were under a white flag. The brigade commander let them through on the road, although they only reached Stilos, where they were scattered by German mortar fire. The Australian, Brigadier Vasey, attended Brigadier Hargest's conference with his battalion commanders. The consensus was that they needed to start moving south that morning, 28 May 1941, rather than waiting for dark. They did not think that the men could fight all day and have a chance at marching all night. Brigadier Vasey agreed with the decision and offered the 2/7th Battalion as a rearguard for the movement. The 5th New Zealand Brigade Headquarters would move south and reinforce the point held by the commandos of Layforce. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

More thoughts on the defense of Maleme at Crete in 1941

When we review the events at the beginning of the German attack on Crete, we can see what seems to indicate a failure of command at the highest level. In the west, at Maleme in particular, there seems to have been an opportunity to defeat the initial attack. That the defense failed was due to the lack of experience or expertise of the New Zealand commanders on the spot and the lack of oversight by General Freyberg. Lt-Col. Andrew, who commanded the western-most battalion lost control of the situation and his battalion was beaten and driven from the battlefield. The other commanders were not even aware of what was happening at the time. The 5th New Zealand Brigade commander was a civilian without very much experience and was more of a political appointee. They were the commanders at the spot at Maleme, and the Germans applied sufficient force and resorted to operating Ju-52 transports from the beach and from dry river beds until they took control of the airfield at Maleme. Instead of knowing that the situation was in doubt and sending reinforcements, the higher commanders were slow to respond, and General Freyberg was particularly hands-off at this time. Only during the withdrawal to the south was General Freyberg very involved in operations. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History. There is apparently a book that criticizes General Freyberg's performance in the Battle for Crete.

28 May 1941, the force at Suda in route to the south

By early 28 May 1941, troops were heading south, hoping to be embarked eventually at Sfakia. General Freyberg had taken command of the troops that had been under General Weston's command. General Freyberg had a headquarters established at Akisfou, a plain. They hoped to embark as many as one thousand men that night and more on succeeding nights. On 28 May, there were still units within a half mile of Suda Bay. Early on 28 May, the rearguards were overwhelmed and surrounded. That was not a good sign for the plan. By 9am, the commanders on the scene decided to move out, as the men were not up to a day long fight and then a withdrawal. The Australian 2/8th Battalion arrived at Babali in the afternoon. The time was about 2pm. They were free from air attack, but the Germans were after the rearguard at Babali. By 9:15pm, they withdrew towards Vrises. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

Assessment of the German attack on Heraklion from 21 May to 29 May 1941

The German attack on Heraklion was based on a series of errors, both by the German High Command, and by the local commander. Heraklion was another case where paratroops were dropped onto a strongly defended area with trained troops waiting for the assault. That was an error by the High Command that happened in most paratroop attacks in Crete. The High Command also seriously underestimated the strength of the defending force. They also did not realize the danger to transport aircraft by ground fire, mostly from 40mm Bofors light anti-aircraft guns at Heraklion, but also 3 inch anti-aircraft guns. That caused heavy losses of transports in the first wave and caused the following waves to be understrength and delivered in small groups. The plan was also flawed in that the force was given too many objectives: the communications stie at Gurnes, the town of Heraklion, the airfield, and the protection on the west side. There was also the problem that Colonel Brauer did not concentrate his force and attack at a single point. Even after being reinforced, he was struggling to even concentrate his force. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The German overview for Heraklion in May 1941

The successful defense at Heraklion disrupted the German plans for the attack on Crete. The German attack at Heraklion failed due to the combination of greatly underestimating the defending force, allocating too few resources, and then scattering what attacking force was provided. The grand German plan had been to take the town and port of Heraklion and the airfield, and then bring part of the 5th Mountain Division in by sea and by air. The small vessels that had been destined for Heraklion were turned back and returned to the Piraeus. What German forces that survived from the 1st Parachute Regiment at Heraklion were to prevent British aircraft from being able to operate from the airfield. After seeing British aircraft on the airfield on 23 and 24 May, General Student decided to send in reinforcements to try and take the airfield. To try and get the force on the ground safely, the reinforcing battalion-sized group was dropped to the west. They killed or captured a British platoon after landing. The commander, Major Schulz, directed his troops to take Apex Hill in the morning of 26 May and then beat off Greek attackers from Knossos. On 37 May, another improvised battalion was landed at Gurnes. The original commander was not ready to attack on 28 May, but the British were withdrawn by sea on the night of 28-29 May and left the airfield and town for the Germans. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

Losses on the way to Egypt from Heraklion: 1941

The first loss on the way to Egypt from Heraklion in late May 1941 was the destroyer Imperial. The Imperial had taken damage from what must have been a near-miss by a bomb. The crew and troops were moved to the destroyer Hotspur. The Imperial was then sunk by a torpedo. This was early on 29 May 1941. At 6am, about 100 German dive bombers attacked. Another destroyer, the Hereward, was damaged had to be beached while passing through Kaso Straight at the east end of Crete. The crew and troops were captured by the Germans. The two cruisers were hit by bombs. The Orion took three bomb hits and the Dido was hit by one bomb. There were 100 men killed and 200 wounded on the Orion. The Dido had 103 men from the Black Watch killed out of the 240 on board. The ships neared the Egyptian coast by 2pm and the bombing attacks stopped. They finally reached the shelter of Alexandria harbor by 9pm. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

Withdrawal from Heraklion

To get a message to General Freyberg, Brigadier Chappel, commander of the troops at Heraklion, had to send the message by way of Egypt. This was in the night of 26 and 27 May 1941. He stated that the Germans were in control of heights that commanded their position at Heraklion. The road to the south was controlled by the Germans, and more paratroops were being landed outside of his position. They were starting to run short of food and ammunition at Heraklion. He asked if they should try to break out to the west or south. He received a reply on 27 May that Crete was to be abandoned. He informed his commanders early on 28 May of the situation. The troops would be embarked at night. Early on 28 May, ships sailed from Alexandria, including the cruisers Orion, Ajax, and Dido with destroyers. Ajax was damaged and had to return to Alexandria. The rest arrived off Heraklion at 11:30pm. The destroyers entered the harbor in groups of four and embarked troops. Everyone was embarked but troops holding a road block at Khoudesion and those left at the aid station at Knossos. No attempt was made to inform or embark the Greek troops. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The situation becomes more intense at Heraklion from 26 May 1941

There was concern that the German moves were intended to cut off the troops at Heraklion to keep them from being able to move to the south. After all, it would be the Knossos road that would be the natural route to reach Pirgos in the south. There was actually cooperation between Australian and German medical staff where the Germans would put wounded Australians where they could be recovered and carried into the Australian position. There was frequent fighting near the village of Babali, where there were but twelve houses. The Germans would often raid there looking for food. There was a situation where there were Greek civilians fighting as guerrillas and killing Germans. The Germans, for their part, would retaliate and kill Greek civilians in retaliation. The German paratroopers seem to have been particularly atrocity-prone for some reason, perhaps due to training. The Germans would drop pamphlets making threats of violence in Greek and English. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The situation becomes more serious on 26 May 1941 at Heraklion

The Agylls were attacked early on 26 May 1941 by some 300 Germans. They were on Cemetery Ridge, just east of Heraklion. The situation was restored by the Leicesters, who attacked along the ridge. They had beat back the Germans, but took some heavy losses in the process. The Argylls became confused about the situation and started shooting at the Australians of the 2/4th Battalion. The Australian Intelligence sergeant made contact with the Argylls and corrected the situation. The Germans had moved onto Apex Hill and were between the 2/4th Battalion and Kesteven's platoon. Germans were on the move with some 500 moving through the Wadi and another 200 moving north toward the ridge. Kesteven had been ordered to fight his way out, if he encountered overwhelming force. Kesteven's platoon attacked the smallest German group, while moving down the rocky north face of the hill. Kesteven was among the wounded early in the fight. They charged the Germans and overcame them. They were able to reach the Black Watch and then to rejoin the 2/4th Battalion. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

24 to 26 May 1941 at Heraklion

Information had been received on 24 May 1941 at Heraklion that there were large numbers of Germans moving through the hills towards the east. The assumption was that they were preparing to attack Heraklion from the east. The defenders at Heraklion also learned that German transport aircraft were landing on the beach at Mallia. Mallia was on the coast, about fifteen miles east of Heraklion. Early on 25 May, the Germans attacked the town of Heraklion from the west. Heraklion was defended by "two companies of the York and Lancasters and one of the Leicesters". The lead troops of the Argyll and Sutherland reached the Heraklion defended area. The rest, about two companies, arrived on 25 May. They arrived on foot, having moved throough the hills. They were positioned in the line previously occupied by the Leicesters. The Leicesters that were then available became the reserve. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The bombing attack on Heraklion on 24 May 1941

As we saw, the British took over the defense of the town of Heraklion on 23 May 1941 after ordering the civilians to leave. The Greeks were no longer responsible for the defense of the town. The surviving Greek troops were organized into two one thousand man battalions. They were positioned around Arkhania. They were to protect the hospital at Knossos and hold the road and keep that open for traffic. Note that Arkhania is to the south of Heraklion, on the way to the south coast.

The bombing attack on Heraklion started early in the day and continued. That morning, more paratroops and supplies were dropped to the west by forty transport aircraft. They were caught in a battle between the 1/Argyll and Sutherland and Germans that were occupying the road. The British troops had taken losses and were forced to retreat. Still, during the day, a British truck convoy succeeded in passing to the south towards Ayia Deka where they were to build a landing ground for aircraft. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

Hurricanes at Heraklion on 23 May 1941

An attempt was made on 23 May 1941 to bring some Hurricane fighters to Heraklion so as to be able to attack the transport aircraft landing at Maleme. Six Hurricanes arrived at Heraklion, but it was a surprise and two were shot down by naval anti-aircraft guns. One landed at Heraklion while three returned to their base. Even later in the day, another six Hurricanes arrived, engaged the attacking bombers and then landed. Four of those that landed had their tail wheels damaged, so they were not operable. Meanwhile, the town of Heraklion was hit hard by a bombing raid. The Germans sent a message threatening to destroy the town if they did not surrender. The bombing raid had started fires on the dock where chemicals were stored. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

23 May 1941 at Heraklion

One feature of 23 May 1941 at Heraklion was that there was a great deal of German air activity. This included dropping bombs and strafing the British troops. The Germans were also busy dropping supplies to their troops on the ground. Since the Germans were in strong positions on the east side of the airfield, the supply drops were concentrated in that area. There was also a report that German transport aircraft were operating at a suitable location to the east of "East Ridge". Two companies from the Leicesters made a reconnaissance raid to the east. They reported that the Germans were weak, but heavily armed with machine guns. The defenders of the airfield at Heraklion worked at expanding the perimeter of their defended area. Also on 23 May, two Inf.Mk.II Matilda tanks arrived from the south coast. They were to proceed to Suda Bay. The only surviving Matilda at Heraklion, along with two field guns were sent on to Suda Bay by lighter. The Germans staged a destructive bombing raid on the town of Heraklion and demanded the surrender of the town. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

John Pendlebury, the archaeologist, at Heraklion on 22 May 1941

John Pendlebury was a British archaeologist who was working on reconstructing the bronze age on the island of Crete. During the war, he was apparently working for British intelligence. He had been in Britain for training from the outbreak of the war until May 1940, when he returned to Heraklion. He was near Heraklion during the initial attack on 20 May 1941. He spoke Greek like a native and was assimilated into Cretan society. With his Cretan companions, he was going to participate in an attack on German troops. Along the way, he fired on some Germans. There were Ju-87 divebombers overhead and John Pendlebury was shot in the chest. He was taken to a house. He was eventually treated by a German doctor, but some passing German paratroops took him outside and executed him. His body was eventually transported to the cemetary near Suda Bay. This is based on the account in the Wikipedia.