Command questions and an army for Persia and Iraq

Because the Prime Minister wanted the new commanders in the Middle East to focus on defeating Rommel, he proposed a separate command for Persia and Iraq. He proposed that General Auchinleck be the commander. Auchinleck, himself, opposed the idea, as he felt that command over forces in Persia and Iraq belonged with the Middle East. Because General Auchinleck refused the command, General Maitland Wilson was appointed as commander. Auchinleck left the Middle East with Churchill's undiminished admiration, despite all the troubles. Auchinleck had been able to stop the Axis advance in the July battles and had thrown the Axis back on the defensive, with the British forces on the attack. Auchinleck had reported that the British would not be ready until mid-September, but in the event, the attack was not launched until 23 October. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History, which we have summarized here.

The air strength situation in the summer and fall 1942

As the American air presence built up in the Middle East, supplies of replacement aircraft to the British were not keeping pace with losses. 11 RAF fighter squadrons had been reduced to half-strength. 9 more squadrons had no aircraft. The British were receiving Kittyhawks and Baltimores from the United States, but not in numbers sufficient to make good the losses. The Merlin-engined Kittyhawks all went to American squadrons. The problem was exacerbated by the fact that the American squadrons were not ready for combat operations. There was plan to limit the RAF to just 65 squadrons and to have 24 American squadrons. Even if the RAF were reduced in strength, they still needed to replace obsolescent aircraft. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

Tanks shipped to the British forces in the Middle East

Tanks are the common factor in two tables in the Official History. One table gives tanks shipped to the Middle East from the UK in 1942, up until September:

January     60
February   143
March       74
April      264
May        113
June       179
July       114
August     254
September   34

This shows the tanks shipped to the Middle East from North America:

January     102
February    192
March       251
April        73
May          25
June          3
July         33
August      132
September   407

We don't know this, but we can only imagine that many of the 407 in September were M4 Sherman tanks. This information is from Vol.III of the Official History: The Mediterranean and Middle East.

General Montgomery takes command

General Montgomery addressed officers at the Army headquarters to inform them of his high-level plans and intentions and to start the process of building some enthusiasm. Montgomery intended to defend Egypt at El Alamein. The army would succeed there or die. Montgomery knew that a great influx of reinforcements was en route and that the army's circumstances would be completely changed. Montgomery planned to hit Rommel's army, and keep hitting them, until they were out of North Africa. The British and their allies would finally have the resources available to make that a reality. One of Montgomery's first acts was to bring the headquarters at Burg El Arab, where they would be close to the air force headquarters for better cooperation. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

The replacements: August 1942

After General Gott's death, the CIGS tapped Lt-General Bernard Law Montgomery to command the Eighth Army with General Alexander as his theater commander. Churchill's instructions to Alexander were to "take or destroy" the Axis army. All other activities were to be subordinated to that task. The policy was "no more retreats" and that the army would fight with the divisions kept intact. Given the static situation that the British found themselves in at the El Alamein line, General Montgomery was the man they needed to fight the coming battle. Montgomery was the master of the static battle on a fixed front. He was not the man to fight the fluid, mobile battle. The plan was to wait to fight until all the preparations were made, at least if Rommel permitted that to happen. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

Churchill gives Auchinleck guidance

On 12 July 1942, the Prime Minster, Winston Churchill informed General Auchinleck that there no available divisions that could be sent to the northern front by October. At this date, there still had to be negotiations with the Americans about future plans and dispositions. Churchill recommended beating Rommel as the best solution for now. The General Staff expected that the winter would postpone the threat in the north until spring 1943.

Churchill had long been an Auchinleck supporter. He had from early on encouraged him to take command of the army in the field. Auchinleck had always thought that taking command of the army would cause the overall theater command to suffer, so he kept looking for subordinates to fill in as proxies in the army command. By May 1942, Churchill had become increasingly irritated that Auchinleck would not step in and command the army when Churchill had urged him to do so. By the time of his visit to the Middle East in the fall of 1942, Churchill decided that new commanders were needed in the Middle East to fight Rommel. He would move Auchinleck to a different command in the area (Iraq and Persia). Churchill wanted General Brook, the CIGS, to theater commander, but he demurred. Instead, Harold Alexander was become theater commander with Lt-General Gott as the 8th Army commander. These plans were disrupted when General Gott was killed when a Bombay was intercepted by German fighters, was forced down, and destroyed. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

Uncertainty in the Middle East

During the summer of 1942, the commanders in the Middle East became increasingly concerned about threats from the north against their position. The Germans might well blitz across Russia and down the east side of the Black Sea. The smaller countries like Iran (the British insisted on calling it Persia), Iraq, and Syria might throw their support to the Germans. The commanders had hoped to get a better intelligence assessment from Britain, but received none and, in fact, no guidance at all. In Britain, the War Office dismissed the idea that there was anything of substance to the concerns of those in the Middle East. The Middle East commanders worried that all their forces were engaged in the desert and that they had no defenses facing north. They were keenly aware of the forces that had been diverted to the Far East after December 1941, and had some vague hope that some of them might be pulled back to face the uncertain threat. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

High level meetings in July 1942

Winston Churchill was in negotiations with the Americans in July 1942, at a time when the British had no military successes. The Americans had been keen for a cross-channel invasion in 1942, but Churchill was able to dissuade them and to put in place plans more compatible with what he wanted to see happen. He was successful in getting the Americans to agree to a North African invasion and to postpone the cross-Channel invasion until the Allies were better prepared. The North African invasion was named "Torch" and was planned for 30 October 1942.

After these discussions, Churchill turned his attention to the Middle East. He had the sense that a change of leadership was needed in North Africa and the Mediterranean Theater. The British ought to have beaten Rommel in North African, and the generally held opinion was that with a better general, they would have. While Churchill was thinking of visiting the Middle East, he received an invitation from Stalin to visit Moscow. In the event, he made the trip on an American B-24 Liberator, an aircraft with the necessary range. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

The situation at the end of July 1942

General Auchinleck had persisted in attacks that always seem to end in disaster because he sensed that the Axis forces were close to the breaking point. Too much was being tried on an ad hoc basis, but Rommel agreed with Auchinleck's assessment that his forces were being pushed to the limit. General Auchinleck thought that the Italians were at the point of collapse, so he concentrated on attacking them. Rommel wrote on 17 July 1942 that the British were destroying Italian formations, one at a time. The Germans were too weak, however, to fight without the Italians. The Axis forces were fortunate to survive this period with their lines intact and it was a very close thing. The saving grace for the Axis was that the British operations were hastily mounted and without adequate preparation or planning. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

Tanks, anti-tank mines, and anti-tank guns

The Official History's assessment was that at the end of July 1942, the British had not figured how to use infantry and armour in cooperation, at least in a changed environment dominated by more powerful anti-tank guns (used offensively) and by widespread use of anti-tank mines. The British plans for the battles in July were formulated as if the old situation were still in place. That is, that infantry could attack and open up corridors for armour to advance into the enemy's rear area.

The situation had also changed in that Rommel had gone on the defensive, rather than being prepared to blitz to exploit British weakness. The land in the narrows between the Qattara Depression and the Mediterranean was fast being blocked by mines and barbed wire. Fortunately for the British, by November, they would be commanded by the master of the fixed-piece battle, Bernard Law Montgomery.

British special operations in support of the attack

An effort was made with British special forces (the SAS and the LRDG) against Axis airfields in the night of 26/27 July 1942. They estimated that they destroyed 30 aircraft in this raid. In addition, tank fire destroyed three German aircraft. It is unclear what Italian losses were. On 27 July, the British air force made a special effort to support the army. The operational tempo was starting reduce the available air strength, but the 27th was the biggest day in the last ten days (since 17 July). The effort was wasted in a sense, since the infantry was left unsupported by armour and decimated in the attack. The problem was that the widespread use of anti-tank mines that had not previously been a factor. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

The 69th Brigade comes to a bad end

Since the 69th Brigade had moved forward, starting at 1:30am, they were able to reach their objective with two battalions. As we know, they were lacking their planned anti-tank gun support. In the confused situation on the morning of 27 July 1942, the 2nd Armoured Brigade was not able to come forward in support. The Germans realized the exposed position of the 69th Brigade and attacked. The 6th Durham Light Infantry and the 5th East Yorks were overrun. The 2/28 Australian Battalion was supposed to be clearing mines, but they received heavy fire, so that they were not able to clear the way for the 50th RTR. The 50th RTR lost heavily and then the Australians were overrun as well. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

The operation starts to go wrong

A feature of Auchinleck-planned operations is that the timelines tended to be over-optimistic. The attack early on 27 July 1942 was no exception. The Australians had taken their objective by 3am. The 69th Brigade moved forward when they learned that progress had been made in clearing gaps in the minefields. Two of the brigade's battalions got through the gaps and reached their objective by 8am. Their anti-tank support did not come forward as was needed. Only a small detachment was near the forward infantry. After that, the situation deteriorated. Confusion reigned among the infantry that was supposed to clear gaps for tanks. That meant that the 2nd Armoured Brigade was not able to advance on the planned schedule. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

One last attempt to break the Axis front

General Auchinleck planned one last attack to attempt to break the Axis front at El Alamein. The attack was planned for 26 July 1942 and would be mounted in the north. 30th Corps was augmented by the 1st Armoured Division (without the 22nd Armoured Brigade), the 4th Light Armoured Brigade, and the 69th Infantry Brigade. The 13th Corps would hold and make a feint on tbeir front. The attack would start on the night of 26/27 July 1942. The South Africans would lift mines and mark a path through the minefield. At 1am, the 24th Australian Brigade would advance and take one end of the Miteirya Ridge. At that point, the 69th Infantry Brigade would move forward through the minefield gap. They would be followed by the 2nd Armoured Brigade and the 4th Light Armoured Brigade. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

30th Corps, now an infantry corps

The odd situation in the British army in the desert included the fact that the 13th Corps and 30th Corps had switched roles. The 30th Corps had contained the armoured divisions, while the 13th Corps had the infantry divisions. Now, it was the 30th Corps that had the infantry. The 9th Australian Division, now in 30th Corps, attacked early on 22 July 1942. The division consisted of the 24th and 26th Brigades. The Australians were successful in the first phase of the attack, taking the ridge at Tell el Makh Khad. The second phase of the attack started at 7pm, when the 24th Australian Brigade. The 50th RTR was intended to act in support, but ended up operating independently, as they were not trained in infantry support. As darkness fell, they had lost 23 tanks and withdrew as planned. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

The 2nd Armoured Brigade tries to intervene

An effort was made to bring the 2nd Armoured Brigade into action in support of the 23rd Armoured Brigade and the New Zealanders. This meant clearing a path through minefields so that the tanks could more forward. Finally, at 5pm, the 9th Lancers and 6th RTR were able to roll. They almost immediately came under artillery fire and anti-tank gun fire. They lost five tanks that burnt and others were hit. General Gatehouse had already been wounded, so the acting commander, Brigadier Fisher called off the attack. By the time the regiments had backed out, the brigade had lost 21 tanks. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

The 161st Indian Motor Brigade attacks

On the night of 20/21 July 1942, the attacking 161st Indian Motor Brigade also ran into problems, much as the New Zealanders had. Their northern flank was protected by the 2nd Regiment Botha. The brigade had somewhat mixed results, but the 1/1st Punjab regiment took 190 prisoners. In fact, the enemy defenders were shaken by this attack. By 8am, the two regiments of the 23rd Armoured Brigade had arrived in support. The 40th RTR quickly lost 17 tanks to mines and anti-tank guns. 15 tanks succeeded in reaching the objective, but without support, they were rapidly knocked out. The 15 was reduced to five effective tanks. The 46th RTR had a similar experience. All together, the brigade had 40 tanks knocked out and 47 others damaged. After the 21st Panzer Division attacked at 11am, the brigade was ordered to withdraw. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

Another disaster for the New Zealanders

In the attack on 21 July 1942, the 6th New Zealand Brigade captured their objective, although some vehicles and troops got lost in the dark. General Inglis was chagrined to hear that his troops were in danger from German tanks. In the event, the brigade was overrun, Brigadier Clifton was captured, and almost 700 men were lost. Brigadier Clifton succeeded in escaping, after pretending to be a private. Again, the New Zealanders were not properly supported by British armour. In this battle, two 2nd Armoured Brigade regiments had tried to come to the New Zealanders' assistance, but one ran afoul of a minefield while the other was held up by the usual aggressive use of anti-tank guns by the Germans. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

Trouble for the 1st Armoured Division on 18 July 1942

Harassing air attacks would trouble both sides involved in the battles at El Alamein in July 1942. An air attack on 18 July wounded the 1st Armoured Division commander, General Lumsden, and Brigadier Raymond Briggs, one of his armoured brigade commanders. A desert veteran, Major-General Gatehouse, was called forward to command the 1st Armoured Division. General Gatehouse only arrived at the front in the evening of 20 July, when plans had already formulated for his division's role in the coming attack. Sadly, the 1st Armoured Division would again be too late coming to the aid of New Zealanders left exposed to German attack. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

The planned attack on 21 July 1942

Grand plans were made on 19 July 1942 to attack on 21 July. Very elaborate instructions were given to 13th Corps to break through and to push to the west. The main attack would come at Deir el Shein and Deir el Abyad with a secondary attack in the south. General Auchinleck fully expected to bust the Axis front open and to be able to exploit to the west. The 13th and 30th Corps had reversed their previous roles, as 30th Corps was given a static task with the 13th Corps being in the mobile role. The air attack would being with Wellingtons and Albacores during the night of 21st to 22nd July. In the morning, a there would be a very large attack with light bombers and fighter-bombers. The fatal flaw was to give important assignments to inexperienced units and that insufficient time was allowed for the initial operations. There was also an over-optimistic assessment of British ability to overcome Axis minefields. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.