Saturday, July 12, 2008

The Bf-109F threat (Me-109F)

The Bf-109F (the official history calls it the Me-109F) was present in enough strength in early 1942 that the fighter plane was causing problems for the British over the desert (as many problems as it was causing the Russians). British pilots tended to be under trained in the desert and they were not very accurate in firing. As part of the measures implemented to better counteract the Bf-109F, British pilots started "shadow firing", rather than firing at a towed drogue. Radar coverage had improved to better detect low-flying Bf-109F's and there were more ground observers equipped with radios. For more flexibility and to reduce the number of targets for the German planes, the British instituted patrols with 4 to 6 fighters. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

Sunday, July 06, 2008

The British air force in the Middle East


By Spring 1942, the British air strength was greatly strained by the military situation. They were especially short of trained aircrew. One of the ongoing complaints about the air crews in the Middle East was the lack of operational training. The Middle East needed reinforcements, but the home forces were so taxed that there was little available to send. Bomber Command was in such as state that there was only one pilot per heavy bomber at this date. The Air Ministry reacted negatively to Air Marshall Tedder's plea for more air crew for the Middle East, but they stretched enough to send some reinforcements.



An important piece of the plans for the upcoming land offensive was to have a stronger air strength available to both protect the troops and to attack the Axis forces on the ground and sea. A new fighter group headquarters, No.211 Group, was built from two wing headquarters. Group Captain K.B.B. Cross was the first commander. He had been a senior wing commander during the recent Crusader battle. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

Saturday, June 21, 2008

Richard O'Connor

I was reading the Wikipedia entry for General Sir Richard O'Connor, who beat the Italians in Operation Compass that took Cyrenaica from the Italians, starting from late 1940 and ending at Beda Fomm. What interested me was that O'Connor served under J.F.C. Fuller, as brigade major of the Experimental Brigade, from 1921 to 1935. General Fuller was an early advocate for the use of combined arms forces, including armour, artillery, infantry, and aircraft in support. O'Connor had this mysterious knowledge about mobile forces that I could not explain.

Wednesday, June 18, 2008

The Royal Air Force in the Desert from February to May 1942

The end of the Crusader Battle left the RAF to rebuild. They had suffered great losses in the battle during a transition period when some aircraft types were out of production while their replacements were slow in arriving. As the Hurricane I had lost its effectiveness, there were not many Hurricane IIs in the pipeline. This was the case for a number of aircraft:

Old Model Status New Model Status
Hawker Hurricane I outperformed Hawker Hurricane II slow in arriving
Curtis Tomahawk production ended Curtis Kittyhawk few arriving
Martin Maryland production ended Martin Baltimore few arriving,
needed modifications
Bristol Blenheim IV engine troubles Douglas Boston engine troubles


One positive move was the arrival of Consolidated Liberator and Handley Page Halifax heavy bombers in the Middle East. They were much more capable than the older Vickers Wellington medium bombers. They belonged to the original twin-engined heavy bomber category that had gradually become obsolescent. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

Monday, June 09, 2008

Malta and North Africa in May 1942

The Middle East commanders continued to obliviously send communications to Britain that greatly incensed the prime minister and the Chiefs of Staff. For example, on 9 May 1942, they stated that they thought that the loss of Malta would not be fatal to the position in North Africa, as long as the supply lines through the Indian Ocean remained open. The restated their opinion, which proved correct, that an attack without adequate force strength would result in the loss of the attackers. If there was no reserve, Egypt would be lost. They did acknowledge that the Axis forces seemed to be grouping for an attack on the Gazala line. The Middle East commanders thought that such an attack risked the loss of significant Axis strength and might even open the way to a successful counterattack. The Prime Minister would have none of it, however: "We are determined that Malta should not be allowed to fall without a battle being fought by your whole army for its retention". This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

Sunday, June 01, 2008

The Chiefs of Staff and Prime Minister force premature action

The Prime Minister and Chiefs of Staff refused to acknowledge that the army in North Africa was seriously out-matched by the Axis forces in May 1942. They were back to the late 1940 mentality that thought that the army needed to go forward when needed, regardless of the consequences. Strategic factors outweighed the facts on the ground. General Auchinleck was also concerned about the situation in the Far East and was fully prepared to go in the defensive so that more forces could be sent East. The concern in Britain, though, was that Malta was very vulnerable and could be easily lost. They felt that such a loss would seriously compromise the entire Commonwealth defense posture. Therefore, the army had to attack soon to relieve the pressure on Malta and allow air forces to operate closer in support. Those in Britain also had reason to expect an Axis attack in North Africa in June and wanted to forestall that attack. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

Saturday, May 24, 2008

Early April 1942

Naturally, the decision to allow time for training the troops greatly angered the Prime Minister. He decided that his men who he had sent to the Middle East had simply not answered the arguments. Churchill assumed that he was correct and that the commanders in the Middle East were wrong! After accepting mid-May, the commanders in the Middle East decided that they could not commit to an attack, even at that date. All this had occurred very early in April 1942. By 9 April, the Chiefs of Staff had become very concerned about the safety of Ceylon, and ordered the Middle East to send further forces East. They were ordered "to send 30 Hurricane IIs, 20 Blenheim IVs and a squadron of Beaufort torpedo-bombers". When the Middle Eastern commanders inquired about the situation, they were warned that the Japanese could well threaten India and very soon. General Auchinleck's reaction was that under the circumstances, it would be foolhardy to risk and offensive in North Africa when the situation in the East was so grim. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

Saturday, April 26, 2008

The Prime Minister is angered

Churchill, as always, was pressing for a premature offensive in the desert. General Auchinleck presented the reasons why such a move would be risking disaster. Churchill, in fit of pique, wanted to bring Auchinleck back to Britain to confront him. Auchinleck argued that he did not want to be absent from the theater, as he did not want anyone but himself to be responsible for even a short period. In a compromise, Sir Stafford Cripps, who was travelling to India, was diverted to the Middle East to meet with Auchinleck and his commanders. The Vice-CIGS, General Nye, was also present. They met with Auchinleck and were convinced that he was correct. One factor ignored by the Prime Minister and others in Britain was the urgent need for training of raw troops. Churchill was extremely displeased, but he grudgingly accepted the date of mid-May 1942 for the offensive against Rommel's forces. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

Thursday, April 17, 2008

The Middle East was to be further stripped of forces

The Middle East was informed on 17 February 1942 that they would lose the 70th Division, which was to be sent to the Far East, in the face of Japanese advances. They were also warned that they were likely to lose the 9th Australian Division, as well. At the same time, Alan Brooke, the CIGS, warned General Auchinleck that a division in Iraq would be withdrawn to India. At best, one more division was would be sent from Britain to the Middle East before the fall of 1942. The Chiefs of Staff in London was ready to assume a defensive posture in the Middle East in order to stop the Japanese offensive in the Far East. In response, General Auchinleck replied that an offensive in the Western Desert prior to 1 June would put the entire enterprise in North Africa at risk. The one spot that the Chiefs of Staff were determined to protect was Malta. They were prepared to commit a considerable force to pass a convoy through with supplies and arms. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

Sunday, April 06, 2008

A shortage of Ordnance Workshops in the Middle East

One of the continual complaints in the Middle East from mid-1941 onwards was the long period required to return damaged tanks to action. Besides the inherent shortcomings of the Crusader and other tanks, a major factor was the scarcity of Ordnance Workshops. This shortage was acknowledged, but a series of events thwarted sending more to the Middle East. In October 1941, the commanders had decided that replacement drafts were more important than Ordnance Workshops, so they were bumped from several convoys. Only two were in transit by March 1942. Another workshop was blocked by the intended convoy being diverted to the Far East. The ongoing battle between the commanders and staff in Britain, who desired an attack as quickly as possible and the commanders and staff in the Middle East, who did not want to attack until they had prospect of success. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

Wednesday, March 19, 2008

The British plan for an offensive in 1942

Because of the pressing need for the British to base aircraft in western Cyrenaica, a plan was prepared that envisioned a force of "three armoured divisions, two armoured brigade groups, one army tank brigade, and three infantry divisions" by mid-April 1942. This plan was made as early as February 1942. A tank superiority of 3:2 was needed to fight the Germans, due to the inferiority of the Crusader tank. There was increasing pressure from the staff in Britain to launch an early offensive, but the commanders in North Africa, including General Auchinleck resisted an attack before a superior tank force could be assembled. The goal was not just to take Cyrenaica but to advance into Tripolitania. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

Thursday, March 06, 2008

The plan with respect to Tobruk

In February 1942, General Auchinleck had told General Ritchie to do everything possible to keep Tobruk from capture. What General Auchinleck resolved not to do was to have a division in Tobruk and have the Axis forces surrounding the fortress. The intent was to withdraw to the frontier rather than allow a division to be tied down and put at risk. The commanders in chief concurred, apparently, at least in February. February to May would be spent in building up the tank forces for a new offensive that would reconquer the western Cyrenaican airfields. They were desperately needed to allow convoys to run to Malta and to operate against Axis shipping. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

Saturday, March 01, 2008

The plan to invade Malta in early 1942

Taking the island of Malta would have been a much more difficult task than taking Crete, a year before. While Crete was taken by airborne forces, Malta would require troops and equipment landed from sea. The first stage would have 8300 men landing on the island by landing craft. These initial troops would be supported by artillery and tanks also landed. Supplies and reinforcements would follow, also by sea. The Italian fleet would prevent British surface ships from reaching the island. There would also be a flotilla of German submarines to protect the attacking forces and to prevent reinforcements and supplies from reaching Malta. Germany would also supply Italy with "40,000 tons of oil fuel and 12,000 tons of aviation spirit". Three corps were allocated for the attack. The one Airborne Corps had one German and one Italian airborne division. Of the other two corps, one had two Italian divisions and the other would have three. Additional forces included six independent Italian battalions, "two tank battalions, some armoured cars, self-propelled artillery, motor-cyclists and ancillary units and a few German tanks". Between 370 and 470 tranport aircraft would carry the airborne forces. These would include 155 Italian SM.82's, the rest being German Ju-52's. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

Thursday, February 21, 2008

Rommel decides against attacking Malta

Back in March 1942, Rommel still thought that taking Malta soon should be a priority. He changed his mind, along with everyone else in authority on the Axis side. Field Marshal Kesselring had wanted to attack Malta early because he knew that the German air strength would be greatly reduced to meet other needs. The Italians knew that they would not be ready for an amphibious attack before July, so they opposed an early attack. By April, Rommel realized that he would need to attack in the desert before the British, who were planning to attack in May. Taking Tobruk was now the top priority for the Axis side. While the focus shifted to the western desert, a joint staff with Germans and Italians continued to plan for a later attack on Malta. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

Tuesday, February 12, 2008

Submarine losses in April and May 1942


One reason that the Axis convoys to North Africa were safer was that the British had lost three submarines. Two U-class submarines, the famous Upholder and the Urge were both lost in April 1942. Lt-Cdr Wanklyn's luck had run out when the Upholder was sunk by an Italian torpedo boat on 14 April. The Urge was lost without a trace after sailing from Malta on 27 April. The Official History suggests that she was mined. The third submarine, the Olympus, was mined a short distance from Malta on 8 May.



The Germans lost three submarines during May. A Lockheed Hudson from No.233 Squadron attacked U.573 and forced her into internment in Spain. A Consolidated Catalina from No.202 Squadron and the destroyers Wishart and Wrestler sank U.74 a day later. A Short Sunderland from the same squadron damaged a submarine late in May. U.568 was sunk by the destroyers Eridge, Hero, and Hurworth northeast of Tobruk. The air connection, in this case, was that a Blenheim from No.203 Squadron had sighted the submarine and alerted the destroyers.



This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

Monday, February 11, 2008

Some analysis

From what we have seen so far in 1942, following the Japanese attacks in the Far East, the British and Commonwealth forces were stretched to the breaking point. We can say with hindsight that the Middle East was stripped down too far and the British paid dearly during the spring and summer, because of that. The situation in the Pacific was stabilized not by the force of arms on the ground but because of naval successes at the Coral Sea and the Battle of Midway. The battle that was spread across 1942 into 1943 in the Solomons was what finally wore down the Japanese enough that the Allies were able to go on the offensive. Because of that overreaction, which is understandable but regrettable, North Africa was almost lost. Another factor as the Axis air superiority, partly due to their geographical advantage in Cyrenaica and partly due to better aircraft in the Bf-109f. More Spitfire V's had to be sent to the Mediterranean theater to restore the situation in the air. The great influx of American-built aircraft also helped, even when the fighter aircraft were inferior, initially. It was only when the P-51B's entered service that there was a better aircraft available.

Saturday, February 02, 2008

British naval operations in May 1942

After the destruction of three of four of Captain Poland's destroyers, no further surface operaations could be mounted from Alexandria in May 1942. The destroyer division had been attacked by several waves of aircraft, mostly Ju-88 divebombers, but also some He-111's. The Ju-88's were based at Heraklion and had just completed training in anti-shipping operations. In mid-May, the Italians had mounted another "human torpedo" attack, but this one was ineffective. Meanwhile, submarine operations continued unabated, but submarine losses rose on both sides. The submarine ace Lt-Commander Wanklyn and the Upholder were lost in May to an Italian torpedo boat. One factor would ease the dire British naval situation. The Germans were forced to shift combat aircraft to Russia in increasing numbers. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

Sunday, January 27, 2008

Admiral Harwood arrives in the Mediterranean

A replacement for Admiral Cunningham finally arrived on 20 May 1942. The new commander was Admiral Sir Henry Harwood, the commander of the cruisers that fought the Admiral Graf Spee in 1939. Admiral Harwood agreed with the commanders that what was needed were long range aircraft with endurance sufficient to allow them to find Axis convoys at sea so that they could be attacked. Just between 1 April and 13 April, there had been 26 convoys that passed east of Malta. Only five were seen by reconnaissance aircraft soon enough to allow them to be intercepted. Admiral Harwood wanted 12 Consolidated Liberators for this role, but they were not available for this sort of role. In early May, a destroyer force from Alexandria was almost wiped out by air attack while they stalked a convoy. They put to sea on 10 May, but where attacked by air on 11 May. Only the Jervis eventually returned to Alexandria, while the other three destroyers, the Lively, Kipling, and Jackal, were all sunk. The Jackal was torpedoed by the Jervis after an attempt was made to tow the ship. The Jackal had a fire in one boiler room that could not be extinguished, so the decision was made to torpedo the ship so that the lone survivor might escape back to Alexandria. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

Saturday, January 12, 2008

The war against Axis shipping to North Africa in April and May 1942

With Malta being so heavily bombed, all anti-shipping sorties had stopped by April and into May 1942. Because of this, the Axis forces were able to ship supplies in relative safety during this period. In all of April and May 1942, only 13 German Italian merchant ships were sunk in the Mediterranean Sea, and all but one of these were due to British submarines. A large number of RAF anti-shipping sorties were flown in April and May, but the 750 sorties only sank one ship. The German air superiority over the Mediterranean, coupled with the Axis advance to Gazala meant that less of the Mediterranean could be searched for targets by the British aircraft. One disastrous attack mounted on 14 April 1942 cost the RAF five Beauforts and one Blenheim with no targets sunk. By the middle of May, 2,500 tons of supplies reached Benghazi every day. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

Friday, January 11, 2008

Status and some idle thoughts

In case you had figured this out, I have a situation going that is leaving me with little time to write. I would hope that I will eventually have more time again. My plan includes acquiring more of the Official History books from the war in North Africa, if not other theaters, as well. I would summarize those and comment on them, as well as books such as Harry Klein's Springboks in Armour: The South African Armoured Cars in World War Two. I also would like to acquire some more of the basic source books for the war in North Africa, as well as more information about British armoured fighting vehicles, if not German, French, Italian, American, and Russian.

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