On 30 April 1941, the situation at Tobruk changed

The position at Ras Medauuar was a critical point in the defenses of Tobruk. As the sun rose on 30 April 1941, dust from moving vehicles was observed from Ras Medauuar. The dust was seen in from Acroma. Eventually, some 100 vehicles were seen in transit. There were also about twenty armored vehicles moving on the escarpment. Once artillery fired on the armored vehicles, they retreated. British air reconnaissance reported vehicle movements around the perimeter and at Acroma. By 9am, observers on Ras Medauuar could see enemy infantry. The infantry had been on the trucks that had been seen. They moved up to within some 4,000 yards from the Tobruk perimeter. Major Fell at Ras Medauuar asked for artillery fire on the infantry. The artillerymen were uncertain that they could reach the infantry, but finally started firing a few rounds. The shells seemed to be falling short, from what could be seen. As the morning progressed, dust was blown up by a rising wind. As the infantry approached, they were seen to be Italians. Beyond the infantry, there was a great deal of dust, more than just from the wind.

The Tobruk defenders were used to seeing signs of an attack. The 2/24th Battalion was expecting to use the usual tactics to repel any attack. As the day progressed on 30 April, the only further action was 105mm artillery fire on Ras Medauuar. The men on the west side were attacked by dive bombers. The 2/23rd Battalion was busy planning a company-sized raid for 1 May. The onset of night seemed to be the end of action. As the day grew later, there was an increase in artillery fire on the western side. At 7:20pm, a report arrived at headquarters that the 2/24th Battalion was being dive-bombed. There were also reports of infantry about 1-1/2 miles from the wire. There were reports of more vehicles about two miles out from the wire. The dive bomber attack had been made by about 40 aircraft. One of them had crashed during the attack.

By 8pm, the entire fortress area could hear a heavy artillery bombardment. The attack was made against the 26th Brigade position. A "long-range gun" started firing on the air field. This was near the 9th Australian Division headquarters. The headquarters had an underground operations room cut out of rock. At about 8pm, the 24th Brigade reported an attack by about forty infantry. The activity seemed to have died down, until flares were reported along the perimeter wire. By about 11:20pm, there was an ominous report that the 2/24th Battalion had been penetrated and that the details were as yet unknown. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

29 April1941 with some of the men in Tobruk in new positions

The 2/24th Battalion had started relieving the 2/48th Battalion men as early as the afternoon of 28 April 1941. They day saw heavy enemy air activity, including dropping 150 bombs or more. Given the air attacks, the men expected a new ground attack, but there was none. The attacks were limited to heavy shelling of the inner defense line, the "Blue Line". The men of the 2/48th Battalion were moved back to the Blue Line defenses. The 2/48th Battalion now had other troops between them and the enemy. This was the first time for them since they had retreated from the escarpment above Benghazi.

The commander of the 2/24th Battalion was a Great War veteran and he did not like the shallow defenses. The men were put to work to dig deeper trenches and to build up the defensive position walls.

The 24th Battalion was a concern because they only had two battalions. The 2/25th Battalion was late in arriving from Australia. General Blamey took action and assigned the 2/32 Battalion to the 24th Brigade. The battalion had tried to embark on the ship Chakla at Mersa Matruh on 28 April. Because of bad weather, only one company had been able to board the ship. They arrived at Tobruk early on 29 April and were to be part of an ad hoc group of engineers and to hold a position leaving the harbor area.

Air reconnaissance on 29 April saw the continued movement of vehicles to the west, across the areas held by the 20th and 26th Brigades. The increased enemy air operations continued on 29 April. The enemy aircraft strafed and bombed artillery and infantry positions. During the morning, the 20th Brigade was heavily shelled. The 2/24th Company was attacked by air and took casualties. One company commander was wounded and was replaced. There was soon another air attack on the same area. A large bomber attack hit guns of the 1st RHA near El Adem and the road to Bardia. By 4:30pm, the harbor was heavily bombed and the ship Chakla was sunk. The next attack at about 5pm hit the 2/24th Battalion, but with no effect. At about 6pm, enemy ground forces moved in the direction of Ras el Medauuar, but turned back in the face of fire. Right before dusk, a dive bombing attack hit the rear of the 20th Brigade, causing casualties. The last action involved artillery fire on the 20th Brigade rear. After that, the action stopped. During the night, three lighters brought six infantry tanks, which were unloaded. The lighters carried back some of the captured German tanks. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

Major events in the Mediterranean and North African area from 27 April 1941

As the 22nd Guards Brigade and their Australian anti-tank guns withdrew, the German and Italian forces moved forward starting on 27 April 1941. All this was happening as the situation in Greece was at a critical stage. The navy was thoroughly occupied with withdrawing troops from Greece. All the artillery and heavy equipment was left behind. From Tobruk to the Egyptian frontier area, German and Italian forces moved forward "to the line Sidi Omar--Sidi Suleiman--and north to Musaid". They formed a defensive front and blocked the way to Halfaya Pass. They sent small groups out onto the coastal plain. The navy hoped to bombard them with a gunboat, the Aphis, but the weather was to bad for that to be possible.

Once the German and Italian forces had control of Halfaya Pass and the area surrounding it, the area to the east was more securely held. This allowed Rommel to concentrate his attention on Tobruk. The bulk of the 15th Armored Division was pulled back from the frontier. The 3rd Reconnaissance Unit stayed near the frontier along with a small group from the 15th Armored Division. The frontier area was held primarily by Italian forces. There was a battle group from the Ariete Division. There was also an infantry company from the Trento Division along with an artillery battery of 105mm guns. The main force, most of the Trento Division was located at Bardia.

By 29 April, most of the remaining troops were evacuated from Greece and shipped to Crete. Crete was going to be the next major campaign, although the prospects were bleak.

At Tobruk, the defenders expected an attack, probably from the west, although that was not certain. The Axis forces kept a distance from the defenders, so that there were no signs of where any attack might be coming. The Tobruk defenders needed air support and reconnaissance, but there was none. By 27 April, there was increased activity by Axis forces. An air raid hit the harbor as early as 6am. There were more air raids through the day. The defenders observed large numbers of enemy vehicles on the move from the south to the west. They seemed to be moving towards the usual route towards Acroma.

In the time given, over the previous week, the inner defenses had been improved. Much of these consisted of mine fields. The 26th Brigade held the 12 mile western sector. Not all of the defenses were actually held by troops. At the Wadi Sehel, the Indian cavalry regiment, the 18th Cavalry, held the perimeter defenses. They were next to the 2/23rd Battalion. They were next to the 2/48th Battalion, which had seen great success in heavy fighting. They had taken an amazing number of prisoners: 1,375 men. The 2/24th Battalion would relieve the 2/48th so that they could get some rest from the heavy action. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

Trouble is pending from 24 April 1941 and later at Tobruk and Halfaya Pass

The heavy anti-aircraft gun situation at Tobruk was something of a dilemma. Brigadier Slater's plan for harbor defense, the harbor barrage, was at odds with the lesson about fighting the guns at each site to defend themselves. The damaging raid on 27 April 1941 on the gun sites prompted new measures. The plan was to institute "camouflage, concealment, the construction of dummy positions and frequent changes of the defensive layout". The anti-aircraft gun brigade had a newly appointed officer to handle camouflage. One aspect was a construction project to build new gun sites. They also built dummy gun sites, with dummy guns, men, trucks, and ammunition dumps. During air raids, they exploded charges to make dummy sites look like they had firing guns. The existing gun sites had their defenses improved, including digging them deeper. Once these measures were added, losses from dive-bombing raids were greatly reduced.

About this same time, the situation near the frontier developed into a new crisis. During the German and Italian raids on 23 and 24 April near Fort Capuzzo, British prisoners were taken and interrogated. Based on information gathered, Rommel ordered the Herff Group to attack near the Egyptian frontier. The first move was taken near Capuzzo on 25 April. Support Group troops near Capuzzo were forced back towards Halfaya Pass, held by the 22nd Guards Brigade. Australian anti-tank gunners were providing support to the guardsmen. Bombing and strafing hit the pass late on 25 April. Herff's group attacked on the 26th. An Australian gunner fired high explosive shells at a German field gun and knocked it out. After darkness fell, the plan for withdrawal was put in effect. The 2/Scots Guards were holding a line "two miles west of Sidi Barrani". The men in the rear guards moved out from Halfaya Pass at 10:30pm. The rearguard at Salum left after midnight. Some of the Australian anti-tank gunners were assigned to the 2/Scots Guards. Some joined the battle group at Buq Buq named "Rushforce". Other Australian anti-tank gunners were spread out in various positions, including the Support Group headquarters, the 2/Coldstream Guards, 1/Durham Light Infantry, and the Free French Motor Infantry company. This is base on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

Air attacks on Tobruk becomes increasingly damaging from 24 April 1941 and onwards

The scale of air attacks on Tobruk were increasing and this prompted General Morshead to send a message to the Western Desert Force headquarters. The danger was that the scale of air attacks would make it difficult to use the harbor at Tobruk. Another issue was that the recent losses in aircraft based at Tobruk were not being replaced. Three aircraft had been lost on 23 April 1941, and this already had created a problem. The RAF reacted by deciding to withdraw the remaining two Hurricane fighters on 25 April. That would leave the two Lysander army cooperation aircraft without fighter protection. Tobruk relied on the Lysanders to spot for artillery.

We find that for all of the Western Desert Force, the RAF had only 13 Hurricanes and they could not afford to leave them in Tobruk, as they would likely be lost. The only benefit to Tobruk was that one flight of reconnaissance Hurricanes would continue to support Tobruk.

A sandstorm shut down operations at Tobruk on 26 April. The engineers kept working during the sandstorm to lay more mines, particularly ones that would fire on contact ("hair trigger"). Other engineers worked on the inner defensive minefield behind the Medauuar feature.

The sandstorm died down on 27 April, which allowed the Germans to stage an attack on the heavy anti-aircraft guns with 24 dive bombers. They shot down one dive bomber, but four guns were temporarily disabled. The gun crews took losses, as well. The anti-aircraft commander, Brigadier Slater gathered information about the attack. He found that the initial attack was made by Ju-88's with a fighter escort. They got fire from the heavy anti-aircraft guns. They thought that the next stage was a dive bomber attack on the heavy anti-aircraft guns. Probably many more than fifty dive bombers attacked in groups of at least 12 planes. In some cases, they came out of the sun, so they were not seen before they struck. Two guns sites had guns in a "porcupine formation". These two sites took less damage and the guns were kept in action during the attacks. Two other sites fared worse. At one of the two sites, they had not even seen the dive bombers before they were hit. What they found was that the best thing to do was for the gun crews to continue to fight during the attacks and not dive for cover. We can see the situation by realizing that in the final 20 days of April 1941, Tobruk was attacked by 386 dive bombers during 21 incidents. The anti-aircraft gunners kept their nerve and fought their guns with success. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

New information and events from 24 April 1941

One result of the fighting on 24 April 1941 was that the British and Australians got information about enemy units besieging Tobruk. There had been a battle group called the Fabris unit involved in the fighting around Tobruk. That group had been replaced by a battalion from the Italian Trento Division. There were two regiments from the Brescia Division deployed on the west side of Tobruk. There were also units from the German 15th Armored Division present. they included the infantry regiment, one battery of artillery, and an engineer company.

The Medauuar area in Tobruk was an ongoing concern. After the fighting on the 24tg, the Australians worried that there would be a new effort to reoccupy the area where they had been driven from in the battle. Some reconnaissance proved that by 25 April, the area was still empty of enemy troops.

There were further patrol actions by the Australians on 25 April. Infantry from the 2/23rd Battalion drove enemy troops from the positions near the Derna road. The 2/23rd Battalion commander was intent on keeping the enemy at a distance of about 3,500 yards. He was afraid that if the enemy could establish themselves close, it might make his battalion more vulnerable. The area near the battalion had deep wadi's and escarpments. They relied upon the Indian cavalry regiment, the 18th Cavalry for information from their patrols. The word was that there were two posts that had been established. The northern post was found deserted, but the southern post had Germans working on defenses. An Australian patrol ahd surprised them, but were driven off in a fight.

The Australians responded with new a new patrol group. They were slowed by trying to bring mortars along. By the time they arrived at the southern position, the Germans were moving back. The Germans fired machine guns and artillery against the Australians. They did capture some enemy soldiers. They also attacked some enemy vehicles loaded with ammunition. Later, the 18th Cavalry captured an Italian officer and 32 men near the coast. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

The situation at Tobruk from 24 April 1941

The British Middle East Command's estimate of the Axis forces was that there would by two German armored divisions, the 5th Light Division and the 15th Armored Division. There would also be the Italian Ariete Armored Division and the Trento Mechanized Division. These would all be available by mid-June 1941, as the British intelligence estimate believed. The British Tiger Convoy would arrive at Alexandria, Egypt, by mid-May 1941. General Morshead, at Tobruk, was warned of the estimate.

After a pause in operations, the western side of Tobruk was attacked "at dawn" on 24 April. The start was a heavy artillery barrage that came down on the western defenses. The next move was a large number of infantry moving towards the defenses by 7am. The infantry were closely bunched, which made them good targets for artillery and machine guns. The forward Australian infantry had their Bren guns and Thompson sub-machine guns, which they freely used. One attack came in on the 2/23rd Battalion. British artillery fire was concentrated. Some attackers were pinned in place. Others moved quickly forward as a way to escape the artillery fire. The forward defenses replied with fire that stopped any further forward movement. The attackers were completely stopped by 8am. The Australians came forward to clean up pockets of infantry. By 9:45am, the last of the attackers could be seen in rapid retreat "over the skyline". That was the result of the attack on the right side.

On the left, the attack crossed the side of the Ras el Medauuar. They seem to have been Italians who were having to move over open ground. They encountered men of the 2/48th Battalion. About a company of men moved in between posts S1 and S3. The Australians were taking heavy fire, but British artillery was called in to support them. Following 20 minutes of firing, the Australians took in some 107 prisoners, which include Italian officers and some Germans. Some forty Italians were killed in the fight. Another fight at midday, involving 30 or 40 Germans, resulted in seven prisoners. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

The situation at Tobruk and the Egyptian frontier on 24 April 1941

The 22nd Guards Brigade, a familiar unit to those who have long studied the North African Campaign, was holding Halfaya pass. Gott's Support Group was operating in the area between Halfaya and Sidi Barrani. In the Support Group, you had units such as the 11th Hussars, the 7th Armoured Division reconnaissance unit. Colonel Herff was in command of the German units near Halfaya and the Egyptian border. The Support Group raided German transport near Fort Capuzzo and Sidi Aziz. This was a minor British operation, but the way Colonel Herff reported it to Rommel made it sound bigger than it was. Rommel was getting very anxious about the situation near Bardia and Salum. If they were lost, it would endanger the effort to attack Tobruk. At this point, Rommel was saying that their loss would cause the siege of Tobruk to be removed. The suggested solution was to use aircraft to carry reinforcements and supplies to Tobruk. They would need to use submarines near the coast between Tobruk and Salum.

General Halder decided to send General von Paulus to North Africa to talk to Rommel and to get a sense of the true situation. The staff did not trust Rommel and was at the point of losing confidence in him. This might seem strange, given Rommel's success, but you have to remember that this was in the lead up to the attack on Russia on 22 June 1941, and that knowledge was having an impact at the German Army Command. The problem was that the Germans did not know the true situation of the British and Australians, and thought that they were in a better position than they actually were.

There was concern in Tobruk about the defenses against air attack, because heavy losses had been taken on 21 April 1941 due to an attack by 24 German bombers with 21 fighters. The quay was damaged and two ships were sunk. Two more were disabled. British Hurricane fighters were able to shoot down four German aircraft. In response to the attack, the British anti-aircraft gun commander, Brigadier Slater, proposed to start using a barrage pattern of fire, rather than shooting at individual aircraft. On April 23, the barrage defense showed its effectiveness. This is base on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

Assessments of the fights on 22 April 1941 at Tobruk

The first assessment of the fights on 22 April 1941 came by the German radio on 23 April. The announcement said: "Yesterday morning, the British force besieged in Tobruk made a desperate attack, which was repulsed with terrific loss of men and material, while our own force is still incomplete." The Germans, Italians, British, and Australians all took in the report and reacted. Rommel and his ADC had visited the area where the fighting had occurred to see what they could find out about what had happened. When they arrived, everything was quiet, but then they realized that there was no Italian infantry to be found. There were only a few Italian artillery batteries without infantry support. They came to a rise that they climbed and then descended. At the bottom were a large number of discarded Italian Bersaglieri helmets. They realized that a complete Italian battalion had been captured by the Australians during the night.

Rommel then collected a scratch force from available troops to reoccupy the area that had lost the battalion. Rommel also sent a warning to the Italians that officers who showed cowardice in battle would be immediately executed.

Rommel started to think about what he would have done in the Australians and British situation. His concern was that British might practice some infiltration tactics and do a blitzkrieg attack on his rear, dislocating the forward forces. Part of the 15th Armored Division had now arrived near Tobruk. They were ordered to occupy a blocking position on the coast road about 18 miles west of Tobruk. They should also have a battle group near Acroma. The Italian battalion that had been lost must have been the Fabris Battalion. Rommel ordered a battalion from the Trento Division to move forward to the abandoned position. The Trento battalion had been planned to move to the Egyptian frontier. The Trento Division was to advance to the Salum area and attack. Colonel Herff, who had replaced Colonel Knabe, would command the attack at Salum. Rommel hoped to achieve enough success that some German units could be brought back to Tobruk for an attack. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

More raids on 22 April 1941 from Tobruk

While the company-sized raid from the 2/48th Battalion achieved success, another raid by a company from the 2/23rd Battalion was carried out. They were protected on the right by two troops from the 18th Cavalry, a survivor of the 3rd Indian Motor Brigade. The Indian cavalry group was commanded by Captain Barlow, who had been involved with the breakout from Mechili.

The Australians from the 2/23rd Battalion moved forward along a wadi. Enemy troops at the end of the wadi opened fire with machine guns that forced the Australians into a side wadi. They took heavy shelling and mortar fire in the side wadi. In a quick decision, the captain commanding the raid decided to attack across open ground. The enemy troops proved to be Italian. They opened fire but the attack by the Australians with bayonets and grenades broke into the Italian positions. The Italians surrendered in the face of the attack. With open ground covered by heavy gunfire, the Australians returned with about 40 Italian prisoners.

The 2/23rd raid was divided into two parts. We just saw the right hand portion of the raid. The left-hand group was moving south of the Derna road. They ran into a mixed battery of anti-tank and anti-aircraft guns. Beyond them were two batteries of artillery. Again, they were fighting Italian soldiers. The Italians had fired on Australians on an open slope. A flanking move with carriers got them within grenade range. After throwing grenades, they charged with bayonets. The Italians reacted by surrendering in the face of grenades and bayonets.

The left-hand group had a hard fight and took heavy casualties. 24 men, including Lieutenant Hutchinson, did not return from the raid. 22 men returned wounded. They had done good execution. They had hit an Italian company which lost 90 of its 100 men. The two columns from the 2/23rd Battalion had captured 87 men, some anti-aircraft guns, machine guns, and mortars. The 18th Cavalry conducted a reconnaissance mission and drove seven miles west without seeing any Germans or Italians.

Another raid, by the 20th Brigade, failed. They were a mixed force of tanks, infantry, and artillery. They started while it was still dark. When the sky got light, they found themselves under heavy artillery fire. They were forced to withdraw, losing one light tank to an anti-tank gun. Fortunately, they were will-supported by British artillery fire and were able to withdraw. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

Events on 20 to 22 April 1941 in the Mediterranean Theater

When Winston Churchill heard about the tank situation in North Africa, he decided to take a high-stakes gamble. He would send tanks to Alexandria, Egypt, through the Mediterranean Sea. He hoped that most of the tanks would arrive. The Navy had been very cautious about sending high-value convoys through the Mediterranean Sea, particularly with the increased German air threat. That threat was very real, as the losses later in April and May would show. In this case, the gamble succeeded, although with loss.

General Wavell was in Greece, as the resistance was collapsing. He ordered the troop withdrawal from Greece to get as many of the troops away as they could. The losses from the Greek campaign were predictable and could have been avoided by not going in to begin with. Anthony Eden had strongly urged that the British intervene in Greece, despite the certainty of failure. General Wavell had done his part to get the Australians to agree to the participate. The senior Australians realized the odds, but did their part when called upon.

At the same time, Rommel read the message from the German High Command about taking Tobruk. Rommel wanted to have the complete 15th Armored Division before making the attempt. The high-level commanders urged him to use more Italian forces, instead. Rommel felt that his most immediate need was more air support to protect the supply line to Libya. British attacks on the convoys were causing losses that were very damaging.

General Morshead was planning new attacks against the forces attacking Tobruk. The main attack would be by the 2/48th battalion, hoping to take "Carrier Hill" and capturing the nearby enemy force. Two adjacent battalions would also stage attacks. Preparations were made on 21 April for the attack by the 2/48th Battalion. The attack would be mounted by just one company, five carriers, three infantry tanks, and four anti-tank guns from the 3rd RHA. They had a forward artillery observer from the 51st Field Regiment. There was no artillery barrage planned, because they did not want to warn the force being attacked. The company from the 2/48th Battalion stepped off at 6:40am on 22 April 1941. They had air cover and a low-flying Westland Lysander to make noise to drown out the carrier and tank noise.

The Australian infantry caught the Italian infantry totally by surprise. The carriers fired on the enemy gun crews while the attack took place. The Italians initially fought in place. In the face of a bayonet charge, most of the Italians surrendered, although some continued to fight. One carrier was knocked out by an anti-tank round. They captured 368 Italian soldiers, including 16 officers. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

British forces at the frontier on 18 to 20 April 1941

What had been the 2nd Armoured Division Support Group was now organized into four columns. The columns, as of 18 to 20 April 1941, each had a battery of field guns, some motor infantry, and anti-tank guns. They may have had one or two of the two-pounder anti-tank guns. The group would eventually become the 7th Support Group, for the 7th Armoured Division. The British were short of tanks at this point of time.

The defenses at Mersa Matruh depended on Australian anti-tank guns. The commander of the 2/2 Anti-Tank Regiment, Lt-Col. Monaghan, was responsible for the anti-tank defense at Mersa Matruh. The forward defensive front had two battalions. They were deployed near Halfaya Pass and both had Australian anti-tank gun support.

Rommel went forward to see the Halfaya Pass area for himself and saw the light forces holding the area. His immediate reaction was to get ready to attack the defenders. Rommel ordered a battery of medium guns to the area and ordered the Italian Trento Division to move to Bardia by 23 April.

When British intelligence had recognized that there were elements of the 15th Armored Division near Halfaya Pass, General Wavell became very concerned. So far, they had been engaged with the 21st Light Division, equipped to a lower standard than a regular armored division. Wavell knew that the British had two under-strength armored regiments in Tobruk and one squadron of cruiser tanks at Mersa Matruh. He calculated that the Germans currently had 150 tanks in Libya.

Wavell's message to London got the Prime Minister's attention. Churchill resolved to send a fast convoy through the Mediterranean, despite the risks. The ships would carry 250 tanks. They had mostly infantry tanks that could be sent, but they would try and find cruiser tanks. They ended up sending the first 50 Crusader tanks off the production line. Due to that situation, they were very unreliable, but they were something, at least. The Tiger Convoy, as it was called, would carry 295 tanks, of which 67 were cruiser tanks. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

Reorganization at Tobruk about 19 April 1941

On 19 and 20 April 1941, the situation had stabilized such that there was time to reorganize the defense. The immediate crisis had subsided. The men were able to return to more routine work after being released from the heightened level of alert. The engineer were able to return to working in the inner defense line, "the Blue Line". The mines had been laid on 19 April, although there were still positions to be dug. The engineers also placed demolitions on all the fortress "plants and wells".

The defenders were reorganized to increase the available reserves. The Indian cavalry regiment (a survivor of the 3rd Indian Motor Brigade) now reported to Brigadier Tovell. They took possession of the area near the coast that had been held by the 2/24th Battalion. The 2nd/23rd Battalion sat astride the Derna Road. The 2/24th Battalion now became part of the fortress reserve force. General Morshead had an infantry company formed from Australian Army Service Corps men. They took over an area near the coast on the east side. That allowed the 2/43rd Battalion to also move into the reserve under the 24th Brigade.

The "grand plan" was to have each of the three brigades in the perimeter to have a reserve battalion. There was also the 9th Australian Division reserve with three infantry battalions and one pioneer battalion. General Morshead wanted a defense in depth.

The fortress armor was also reorganized. There had been four infantry tanks in Tobruk manned by the 4th RTR. They gave up their tanks to the 7th RTR when they arrived with a squadron of tanks. All light tanks now belonged to the 3rd Hussars. All cruiser tanks, now about 15 in number, were in the 1st RTR. They were grouped into two squadrons. They had the armored brigade headquarters with a new commander, Colonel Birks. He had the 7th RTR under his direct control. General Morshead was immediately impressed by Colonel Birks.

The Australians had evidence from diaries and from talking with prisoners that both the Italian and German troops were in poor morale and were low on food. They were dispirited by their heavy losses in the first attack on Tobruk. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

The need to halt to buy time on 18 April 1941

The Italian Supreme Command complained to the German High Command about the need to stop the advance to give time for reinforcing the existing units, to reorganize the remaining units, and to build up supplies. Rommel, in good infiltration-style, had tried to rush the attack to see if he could panic the Australians in Tobruk and get a low-cost win in the process. What Rommel found was that the Australians, with their British supporters, would not panic.

The German High Command and Hitler agreed with the Italians about the need to regroup and resupply. Even Rommel agreed to an extent. He wanted to build up the German forces in North Africa so that he could use them, not Italians, to attack Tobruk. The successful British destroyer attack had delayed the arrival of the 15th Armored Division. Now, they seemed likely to arrive in mid-May. What seemed to be the answer was to capture Tobruk.

In front of the 2/48th Battalion, tanks and other armored vehicles lay at wait, just beyond the perimeter wire. They fired on any movement that they noticed. The purpose was to allow their infantry to withdraw. They had been caught close to the wire and had to dig in to survive. However, more infantry congregated near the 2/48th Battalion and tried to push in on the right and center of the battalion. Fire from the 51st Field Regiment stopped the advance. In a reply, mortars and field guns were brought up close. The defenders took casualties from the fire. This seemed to portend a new attack, but one did not materialize. General Morshead considered using the 2/12th Battalion from the reserve and would have supported them with carriers and tanks from the 3rd Hussars and 5th Hussars. The proposed operation seemed to hazardous and was canceled. Fortunately, no enemy attack happened right then. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

The situation at Tobruk on 17 April 1941

One thing that happened after nightfall on 17 April 1941 was that the 2/48th Battalion brought in a German truck that had been hit by an anti-tank rifle. The truck had a trailer with a new type of anti-tank gun. We would suppose it was a 50mm PAK38 L60 gun. The gun was sent by air to "England", as the Australian historian wrote.

As a result of experience on 17 April, Australian engineers went out to check the minefield in front of the 2/48th Battalion, because they suspected that the Germans might have disabled mines. The effort was stopped by heavy mortar fire. At the wire, they then laid a new mine field and converted some of the existing mines to fire on contact, rather than under control.

Operations by the Ariete Division on 17 April had not gone well. The division was reduced to ten tanks of the one hundred with which they had started the campaign. They had the sort of losses that the 2nd Armoured Division had experienced. Worse yet, the Germans at one point mistook the Italian tanks for British and fired anti-tank guns at them. Rommel made the mistaken identification and ordered the German anti-tank guns to fire on them.

At this point, Rommel was feeling the effects of his extended lines of communication. On 17 April, Rommel had to have his supplies shipped by road from Tripoli. When they could get Benghazi back in operation as a port, they could cut the trip substantially.

Not only the supply situation, but the training and equipment of the Italian units led Rommel to suspend the attacks on Tobruk until he had accumulated greater strength. The current situation was such that he wanted more German forces prior to any further Tobruk attacks. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

The failed Italian attack on 16 and 17 April 1941

When Italian prisoners were questioned after they were captured, they told the Australians that they had expected to be supported by German tanks from the 5th Armored Regiment, but the German tanks did not appear. A German officer was attached to the attacking force to coordinate operations. Rommel apparently had ordered the armored battalion from the Ariete division to support the attacking infantry. The infantry pushed to the top of Hill 187 and stopped. They were shelled and then retreated to a wadi. The German staff officer described the Italian retreat as a "rout". He had several anti-tank guns and fired on a scout car and shot at Bren carriers. Afterwards, a senior Italian prisoner helped draft a flyer to be distributed to Italian troops the next day, encouraging then to surrender.

General Wavell, as out of touch as usual, sent a message urging an attack against the Germans at Salum. General Morshead declined to mount such an attack, as he was more concerned about defending the long perimeter at Tobruk.

important reinforcements arrived by ship on 16 April 1941. They were 12 infantry tanks manned by a squadron of the 7th Royal Tank Regiment. I think that the correct name of the unit is the 7th Battalion of the Royal Tank Regiment, although the name given is what they were ultimately called.

Overnight on 16-17 April 1941, the enemy guns heavily shelled the Australians. That seemed to indicate another attack on the 17th. General Morshead ordered the 2/1st Pioneer Battalion to act as infantry in his reserve force. The pioneers had been engaged in constructing a second line of defense.

An attack was launched as expected. It fell on the 2/48th Battalion in the west. The enemy infantry had been mounted on vehicles, but they got off and attacked on foot. The attack had some tank support. The tanks seemed to have been mostly Italian light tanks. By about 1pm, the tanks broke through the wire. The tanks had been there to support infantry, but the infantry attack failed under heavy British artillery fire. Anti-tank guns fired on the tanks, which then drove into the reserve company. Seven British cruiser tanks arrived and knocked out some of the Italians. The tank attack then had failed and only one tank escaped back through the wire. The defenders had knocked out five tanks, one of which was a medium tank (M13/40?).

More tanks and infantry hesitated to attack and stayed just outside the wire. Later in the evening, cruiser tanks from the 1st RTR, fought some 12 enemy tanks in the south. They knocked out three tanks with no loss to themselves. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

More action on 16 April 1941

The enemy force in the east took a defensive posture. The troops were the Knabe Group along with the Italian Montemurro Unit. They British expected an attack on Halfaya, but it did not happen. British ships fired on Bardia and caused the town to be abandoned contrary to Rommel's orders. The British on the frontier were effectively bothering the force at Salum to the extent that the force was drawn down to a patrol.

The Headquarters in Cairo sent Morshead a message early on 16 April warning him that there was intelligence of an impending attack on Tobruk. In response, General Morshead put the forces in Tobruk on alert. One of the things done were patrols sent outside the wire, looking for any sign of an attack. There seemed to be nothing happening in the south or east. Only in the west were there signs of a pending attack. One Australian group attacked Italians in a wadi. One Italian was killed and the other 97 men surrendered. There were more encounters. The 2/24th Battalion took six officers and 57 men. Another group took a Breda machine gun and eight men. Carriers that were active saw a battalion from Acroma getting close. The battalion received fire from the 51st Field Regiment and scattered. There were twelve tanks behind the battalion. They also were fired on and dispersed. When attacked, the battalion surrendered and was brought through a gap in the wire as prisoners. The tanks seemed to fire on the Italian prisoners. The tanks also engaged the Australian Bren carriers. By the time the day ended, the Australians had taken 803 men prisoner. That included one German officer and 25 Italian officers. The battalion was the 1st Battalion 62nd Regiment from the Trento Division. While the Italians had expected to be supported by German tanks, the supporting tanks seem to have been six Italian M13/40 tanks and 12 light tanks from the Ariete Division. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

Tobruk's artillery in April 1941 and other developments

Both Tobruk artillery commanders in April 1941 were British brigadiers. Brigadier Thompson commanded the field and anti-tank guns. He believed that the field artillery needed to be ready to fill the anti-tank role, so the guns were sited accordingly. Tobruk had 48 25pdr guns, 12-18pdrs, and 12-4.5in howitzers. Two field regiments supported the 20th Brigade in the south of Tobruk. The other two brigades each were supported by a field regiment.

Brigadier Slater commanded the anti-aircraft guns at Tobruk. He had "24 heavy and 60 light guns". There were four captured Italian heavy anti-aircraft guns while 43 of the 60 light guns were captured Italian. Their main duties were to provide anti-aircraft support to the Tobruk port. This was important because Tobruk being isolated, depended on supplies brought by sea. The Naval Inshore Squadron was now based on Tobruk. The squadron had been created during the initial campaign against the Italians.

For better or worse, Tobruk had captured Churchill's attention after the battle of 13 and 14 April 1941. Churchill was filled with suggestions about what Tobruk's defenders should do.

Rommel had hoped to stage another attack on 15 April, but the mainly Italian attack force was broken up by artillery fire and they abandoned their start positions. The Australians mopped up some 33 men hiding in a wadi. In another fight, Australians captured an Italian officer and 74 men. At about 5:30pm, another Italian attack had penetrated the wire. They had cleaned up the breach by 6:15pm. They captured 113 men, including two officers, and estimated that they had killed 250 men with artillery and automatic weapon fire. The number killed was probably an overestimate, but the number was still large. Troop movements seemed to indicate an attack against the 20th Brigade, but the attack did not happen.

On the night of 15-16 April 1941, four British destroyers from Malta attacked an Italian convoy heading for Africa. Three destroyers and five merchant ships were all sunk. The cargo was motor transport and tanks from the 15th Armored Division. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

Defending Tobruk from April 1941

General Morshead, the 9th Australian Division commander, was also the commander of Tobruk, after General Lavarack's departure on 14 April 1941. Before there were time to reorganize the men in Tobruk, there were about 35,700 men in Tobruk. Of that number, only about 24,000 were "combat troops". One of the first steps was to ship out unnecessary men and prisoners from the base area. Most of the 2nd Armoured Division were to be sent to Egypt.

The defense of Tobruk was based on aggessive principles. They would not allow any ground to be taken. They would patrol the no-mans-land at night. The defensive positions would be improved and increased in depth. They would keep reserves ready to counter-attack. They would build an inner defensive perimeter ("the Blue Line").

Only after General Lavarack left did the 18th Australian Brigade become under General Morshead's control. As soon as that happened, he had the 18th Brigade's engineers start work on the inner perimeter. As all this played out, General Morshead was constantly inspecting to be sure that his policies and plans were executed well.>/p>

General Morshead had his chief staff officer, Colonel Lloyd, the four Australian brigadiers, and two British artillery commanders. The 18th Btigade commander, Brigadier Wooten, was a professional soldier at the start of his career, when he had served at Gallipoli in the Great War. He left the service in 1923 and became a lawyer. He rejoined the army at the start of the second war. It was Brigadier Wooten who had captured Giarabub. The British artillery commanders, one for the field and anti-tank guns and one for the anti-aircraft guns were able men. The field artillery was sited so that it could be used for anti-tank fire. The defeat of the first German attack showed the wisdom of that policy. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

General Lavarack replaced by 14 April 1941

Major-General Lavarack was replaced after he had done well as commander of Cyrenaica Command. General Wavell had appointed him after Generals Neame and O'Connor had been captured in the wake of Rommel's attack. He had ended up withdrawing into Tobruk with the 9th Australian Division and had exercised command. In fact, General Lavarack was one of the most able Australian commanders in the war. He had been Chief of the General Staff at the start of the war, but had been out of the country at the time. When he returned, he found that he had been replaced. He also had the problem the General Blamey constantly worked to block any success for him. Blamey wanted to be the top Australian officer, and felt inferior to Lavarack, so he did everything he could to keep from being replaced by Lavarack.

After Wavell had decided to create the Western Desert Force, he appointed a British officer to command it, as it would have been extremely unusual not to have an Australian officer as the commander. As the situation subsequently played out, we would have to say that General Beresford-Peirse was an unfortunate choice. To General Wavell, he seemed a natural choice, because he had experience in the Western Desert. He was an artillery officer who was promoted to command the 4th Indian Division during Operation Compass, the campaign against Italy in 1940-1941. What he lacked was any experience with mechanized warfare. Part of the problem was that Winston Churchill was now involved in the Middle East situation and he took some extraordinary steps to affect the situation. At great risk, he shipped tanks to Egypt and then expected them to be immediately sent into battle. There was no consideration of the mechanical condition of the tanks that were shipped and the need for training on new equipment. Instead, Churchill pushed for immediate action and the tanks that were sent were largely squandered in the abortive Battleaxe, which had been preceded by Operation brevity. William Gott, the support group commander, was overly cautious and gave up most of the ground taken during Brevity. The next section we will cover will include the run up to and the execution of Operation Battleaxe. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

The failed attack: Rommel's miscalculation

Rommel was in denial about the reasons for the failed attack on Tobruk on 13 and 14 April 1941. Rommel blamed the commanders of the 5th Light Division for the failure. He said that they had failed to concentrate their force at the break through point. He said that they should have concentrated, broken through, attacked along the flanks, and then penetrated in depth. He said that if they had, then the artillery and Ariete Division could have followed. Rommel thought that if they had done that, they could have taken Tobruk on 14 or 15 April. The tactics that Rommel had written about after the fact were what he used to successfully take Tobruk in 1942.

The Australian historian disagreed with Rommel and placed the blame on Rommel and his belief that simply by acting boldly, they could overpower a defense that had low morale. The commander of the 5th Light Division did not believe that Rommel's plan would be successful. In the end, the plan failed due to the good morale and hard-fighting of the Australian infantry, the ability of the artillery to stand up to tanks and defeat them, and the anti-tank guns being available to fight the tanks. There is a photograph of Australian infantry posing with a knocked-out German Pzkw-III tank armed with a 50mm L42 gun. The picture included the commander of the 2/17th Battalion.

The fight against the Germans on 13 and 14 April was the last for General Lavarack, because Cyrenaica Command was dissolved and absorbed into the Western Desert Force. General Lavarack was to resume his duties as commander of the 7th Australian Division. In order to see action in the war, General Lavarack had taken a reduction in rank from Lieutenant-General to Major General, and had ended up commanding the newest Australian Division, which had to give up the 18th Brigade. The other reason that Lavarack was not made the commander of the Western Desert Force was because he was an Australian, and the command belonged to the British, instead. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

The German attack on Tobruk winds down on 14 April 1941

The retreat from Tobruk mixed infantry and tanks. While the tanks had towed in 88mm anti-aircraft guns and anti-tank guns, they were abandoned with the crews killed. There had also been Italian artillery that was also abandoned. The Australians fired on the infantry and tanks. The fire was heavy and caused some of the German infantry to hide in the anti-tank ditch. The infantry was eventually captured. Three German tanks stopped and hitched up 88mm guns, but the heavy artillery fire eventually caused them to leave them behind. The surviving German tanks were retreating by 7:30am. Some forty German dive bombers to bomb the harbor and town. Some attacked anti-aircraft guns. British fighters shot down two dive bombers while the anti-aircraft guns got four planes.

At the house near the attack path, there were about one hundred Germans hiding on a reverse slope. The house had been captured, but the men were a continuing problem. An Australian platoon attacked and succeeded in capturing 75 men, while there were casualties and some got away. The main battle ended by around 8:30am, but there were still pockets of resistance. Thirty Australian infantry attacked one group of Germans in a tank trap. They finally had two carriers and some mortars to aid them. They captured 87 men, some badly wounded, and captured many weapons.

Rommel's first attack on Tobruk failed completely. The Germans planned to attack at 6pm on 14 April, but decided to cancel. There had been an attempt to penetrate the perimeter again, but British artillery fire stopped the attack. In the attack that had been defeated, the Germans lost 150 killed and 250 men taken prisoner. Of the 38 tanks actually engaged in the attack, 17 were knocked out. The Tobruk defenders lost 26 killed and had 64 wounded.

Rommel had observed the attack from close to the perimeter, but he was forced to withdraw by British artillery fire. Rommel then drove over to the Italian Ariete Armored Division. By the time Rommel was back at his headquarters, he learned that the German tank force had returned from the attack. The division commander and tank regiment commander were yelled at by Rommel. He blamed them for not supporting the infantry and leaving them to be taken. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

German tanks inside Tobruk on 14 April 1941

Once the German tanks were inside the Tobruk perimeter, they moved eastwards towards the El Adem Road. From there, they turned north along the road and than stopped to wait for daylight. The German tanks fired tracers so that allowed the defenders to know their location. With that information, the 1st RHA fired on them. Where they had passed through the perimeter was kept under heavy fire to stop any non-tanks from getting through. When the Germans started firing near the headquarters post, Australians started sniping and killed the crews. As the day got lighter, the German machine guns were eventually silenced.

When General Lavarack heard about the penetration, he went to General Morshead's headquarters so that he could be involved in decision-making. The British had cruiser and infantry tanks available in Tobruk. The cruiser tanks covered Pilastrano while the infantry tanks were near the junction of the Bardia Road and El Adem Road. The 3rd RHA with 2pdr anti-tank guns on portees engaed the German tanks. They got several tanks but also lost two portees with their guns. British 25pdr guns firing over open sights were deadly. They lacked anti-tank rounds, but their high explosive rounds knocked out five tanks as well as the Pzkw.IV, probably the battalion commander's tank. When some tanks tried to go around the flank, the Australian 2/3rd Anti-Tank Regiment engaged them. The II/5th Armored Battalion turned around and ran into the following I/5th Armored Battalion. When the German tanks ran to the east, they were engaged by the Australians of 2/3rd Anti-Tank Regiment. Australians attacked the Germans in the house they had taken. They were taken out, with 18 captured and 18 killed. They thought that a few men had escaped during the attack. At one point, the fighting was so intense that the German tanks turned around and made for the gap through which they had entered. British anti-tank gunners engaged the tanks. They were also engaged by the Australians of the 2/3rd Anti-Tank Regiment.

When the German tanks got back to the gap in the perimeter, they caught some Australians engaged in cleanup operations and captured some. In response, Australians fired Bren guns at the tanks and German infantry, allowing the Australians to escape. Some German tanks started to two the 88mm guns, but were fired on, so left them behind. A group of Germans were holding out near the house, but Australians attacked and ended up taking aboug 75 men prisoner. The battle had been won by 8:30am, but fighting continued to mop up remaining German resistance. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

The Germans attacked Tobruk on 13 April 1941

The German attack on Tobruk on 13 April 1941 was based on a sketchy map. They had decided to attack Post R.33, where the anti-tank ditch was very shallow due to rock. The ditch there was only about two feet-six inches. The post was about 2-1/2 miles west of the El Adem Road. German engineers were to make the attack. The attack was made at 11pm by about thirty infantry. They had "two small field guns, a mortar and eight machine guns". They first had to break the wire. They moved in and dug themselves in about 100 yards east of Post R.33. The post commander, a lieutenant, first returned the German fire. When that did not stop the Germans, he led an attack with bayonets. The Australians shouted and then attacked. The men in Post R.33 also shouted. The Australians threw grenades along with shouting and were into the Germans, who fled by then. The next wave of Germans also fled. The one wounded Australian, Jack Edmondson, fought despite his wounds. They carried him back to Post R.33, where he died the next morning.

Right after midnight, a German tank came forward to inspect. By 2:30am on 14 April, about 200 German infantry attacked near Post R.33 and broke through. British artillery fire was called in on the German attackers. The original Australian attack on the Germans had caused a change of plan. Australian infantry was called upon to attack the Germans. When the German tank attack happened, 200 rather than 300 men from the 8th Machine Gun Battalion went forward. At about 4am on 14 April, they saw German tanks near the El Adem Road. They drew artillery fire that seemed to be without effect. There were about forty tanks moving along the wire. The officer who was supposed to guide them to their destination got lost. They had gone in too far east and had to drive along the wire to the west. German guns opened up on the Australian defenses. These included 88mm anti-aircraft guns firing. Around 5:20am, German tanks towing anti-aircraft and anti-tank guns drove into the fortress. A troop of the 1st RHA fired on them. The tanks were organized in waves with the first fifteen towing the guns. British artillery fire was called in on one battalion headquarters with good effect. The tanks carried German machine gunners who were killed or wounded by the artillery fire. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

The German attack on Tobruk on 13 April 1941

The 8th Machine Gun Battalion was asked to attack and breach the anti-tank ditch protecting Tobruk. The attack was planned to start at 5pm on 13 April 1941. The Australians expected the attack to hit on the sector between posts R.30 to R.35. The attack commenced with artillery fire on the defending company. After that, the Germans opened up with small arms fire. An attack with infantry supported by tanks followed. Anti-tank gun fire from two regiments stopped the tank attack. Once it was dark, two German tanks drove along the anti-tank ditch, looking for a breach. There was indications that a larger attack might happen still, as there were some 300 vehicles grouped along the El Adem Road.

About this time, General Wavell sent General Morshead a message praising the defense of Tobruk and expressing confidence in their ability to hold out as long as necessary. Morshead passed the message on to the troops who were tasked to defend Tobruk and it was well-received. While all this was happening some Australian officers from Morshead's staff had arrived from Derna, having walked about 100 miles to the Tobruk perimeter. They had a good guide and one officer was good at finding water. There had been planning afoot to attempt a rescue of them from Derna, but they were able to make their way on their own.

During the night of 13-14 April, Australian units sent out patrols. They were looking, in part, for enemy positions. One patrol from the 2/43rd Battalion was surprised by Germans and took casualties. They had been careful to move silently and had worn soft hats. Near post R.33, a patrol brought back prisoners from the 8th Machine Gun Battalion. An Australian attack was planned for dawn on 14 April. The defense was aggressive enough that the Germans were lacking information about the defense and they had attacked at a less favorable position than if they were better informed. For example, the anti-tank ditch did not cover the entire perimeter. No ditch existed from posts R.11 to R.21. Rommel was focused on the El Adem Road, so he was a good distance from the vulnerable spot. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

Events on 12 and 13 April 1941 near Tobruk and the Egyptian frontier

Rommel had finally received two copies of maps from the Italians on 12 April 1941. He kept one set for himself and gave one to General Streich, the commander of the 5th Light Division. Rommel planned to attack Tobruk on 13 April 1941, using the 5th Light Division as the main attack force. The enemy forces were lining up with the Australian brigades that were defending Tobruk. The 24th Brigade had the Schwerin Group opposite them. The 5th Light Division would attack the 20th Brigade. The Italians sat on their left. The Ariete Armored Division was on their immediate left. One regiment of the Trento Mechanized Division was to their left. There was also the Brescia Division still blocking the Derna road.

At the same time, primarily German forces were pressing to the east from Tobruk. One thing that happened was that the Germans took Fort Capuzzo. By 4pm they took the barracks at Salum. There was some fighting between British and German troops and some Germans were taken prisoner. General Evetts, the commander of the 6th Division (eventually renamed the 70th Division) sent the 3rd/Coldstream Guards up to reinforce the Support Group at the Egyptian Frontier. we learned that the 11th Hussars, at this point in time, were equipped with Marmon-Herrington Mk.II armored cars. They were the vehicles built in South Africa. They were lightly armored and had machine guna and an anti-tank rifle. The Australian historian noted that what they needed on the frontier were British cruiser tanks.

13 April 1941 was Easter Sunday. The enemy forces at Tobruk were preparing for an attack. During the afternoon, General Lavarack was informed they would receive eight infantry tanks and four medium guns. The medium guns were 60 pounders. The appearance was that the 2/17th Battalion was to receive special German attention. The German plan was that Ponath's 8th Machine Gun Battalion would attack at 5pm. At that time, the Germans directed heavy artillery fire against the battalion. German machine guns commenced firing on the battalion. After that, tanks moved towards the perimeter, but were stopped by anti-tank gun fire. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

12 April 1941, expecting an attack on Tobruk

Enemy actions near Tobruk on 11 April 1941 seemed to indicate that they planned an attack the next morning. General Lavarack took the threat seriously and had the 18th Brigade moved to be closer to the area between the 20th and 24th Brigades. The 18th Brigade was loaded on on vehicles to move them to the intersection of the El Adem and Bardia roads. They were ready by the time the sky started to lighten. After seeing enemy tanks showing themselves, the Tobruk defenders realized that they needed to have their anti-tank guns forward. Keeping with the British practice of breaking up units for independent use, they sent a troop from the 3rd. RHA to support the area expected to be attacked, but they arrived too late.

When the day started on 12 April, the wind was blowing sand. One company of the 2/17th Battalion could see enemy troops about a quarter mile away. They were in good defensive positions. The company was reinforced by seven anti-tank guns from the 3rd RHA. Holes had been made in the wire, so men went out to repair them, while lying on their backs. A soldier with w Bren gun fired back at the enemy and covered the repairs. The Bren gunner was able to silence the enemy machine guns. As the threat subsided, the 18th Brigade was pulled back. General Lavarack had decided that it took too long to move the 18th Brigade, so he wanted the three battalions deployed at strategic sites.

One good thing was that the RAF was able to constantly hit the enemy troops despite their shortage of aircraft and the necessity to pull back from forward air fields. The men at Tobruk could not see the bombing raids, but the enemy were very aware of them. The German diary said that the British controlled the air over the area. The airfield at Tobruk hosted twelve Hurricane fighters. As of 12 April, the German air attacks on Tobruk grew in intensity.

There was a significant number of ships in the Tobruk harbor. They enemy assumed that they were preparing to evacuate the troops in Tobruk. During 12 April, enemy aircraft attacked the ships, but was not able to damage any, as they were being protected by heavy anti-aircraft fire. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

Events on 11 April 1941 at Salum, Halfaya Pass, and Tobruk

From early on 11 April 1941, Australian anti-tank guns were involved with backing British troops at Salum and Halfaya Pass. The Free French Motor Battalion had one company at Halfaya Pass, and they had a troop backing them. There were German and Italian forces headed east, towards the frontier, but were only south of Tobruk. A group from the 1/Durham Light Infantry had headed for Halfaya Pass, accompanied by an Australian anti-tank gun troop. The 1st/DLI group arrived at Halfaya Pass later in the morning. By 5pm, gun were pulled back and were repositioned along the coast road. By 10pm, British columns arrived from the desert at the "top of the pass". For the next several nights, Australian anti-tank guns were on patrol with British troops to the west.

At Toburk, General Morshead had issued his operational order that included brigades holding one battalion in reserved. They also were to start aggressive patrolling. At night, the Australians dominated the area between the fortress and the enemy troops. The Australian engineers were involved with laying mines and building anti-tank defenses.

Wavell's chief of staff was concerned about blockage of the Bardia road. He also was thinking about pulling tanks out of Tobruk for use on the Egyptian frontier. General Lavarack had replied back on the 12th that he would be looking for an opportunity for breaking the enemy hold on the Bardia road. He also argued that they needed the tanks in Tobruk, and could use more, due to the size of the perimeter. They had already lost two tanks on 10 April. Wavell had discussed the situation with General Blamey in Greece. He was open to adding one brigade at Tobruk, if it could be done. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

Problems with ad hoc formations on 10 and 11 Aprl 1941

The Australian anti-tank regiment, the 2/3rd Anti-Tank Regiment, was another victim of the British tendency to break up units and distribute their component parts. Two of the batteries had been at Mechili. They were mostly in Tobruk by 10 April 1941. Several sections had been lost in the collapse at Mechili, however. The 2/2nd Anti-Tank Regiment was experiencing the same sort of fragmentation. One troop headed to Sollum from Mersa Matruh. They were the anti-tank force with a column of troops from the 1/Durham Light Infantry. Major Argent's battery of the 2/3rd Anti-Tank Regiment reached Sollum and was told to report to the commander of the 22nd Guards Brigade. The plan in place at the time was to hold Sollum and Halfaya Pass for the next 36 hours and hold it "at all costs". The Australian historian notes that Major Argent's battery was still at the Egyptian frontier four months later.

One column from the Support Group encountered some enemy troops. Another enemy column (often mixed German-Italian troops) blocked the Bardia road east of Tobruk. The alternate spelling for Sollum is Salum, which is how the Australian historian refers to the place. Infantry and Australian anti-tank guns set up a defensive position at Halfaya, at the top of the pass.

On 11 April 1941, Rommel was directing operations at Tobruk. Colonel Schwerin took over command of General Prittwitz's group when he was killed. Elements of the 15th Panzer Division had started to arrive, so Rommel immediately directed some of them to move towards Salum. He had already sent the 3rd Reconnaissance Unit towards Salum. The 5th Panzer Regiment had been led to expect that when they attacked, the British would withdraw, which was just wishful thinking.

At Tobruk, General Morshead wanted each brigade to hold one battalion in reserve. The problem was that this was a great hardship due to the amount of perimeter each brigade held and the scarcity of forces. Tank and armored car units had to convert to infantry to aid in the defense. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

The Germans on the attack on 11 April 1941 at Tobruk

In the afternoon of 11 April 1941, the Australian 2/13th Battalion was attacked by infantry. They waited until the enemy got closer before they opened fire. They were supported by British machine-gunners. In response, the enemy "went to ground". When six trucks drove towards the Tobruk defenses, they were driven off by artillery fire from the 1st RHA and 104st RHA. Seven tanks started to move forward at Post R31 and were fired on by B/O Battery. NExt, enemy infantry was seen advancing on 2/13th Battalion. Fire from the 1st RHA stopped the advance. Tanks now moved forward. The tanks included Pzkw IV's, Italian M13/40's, and Italian light tanks. They did not break through, but moved off towards the 2/13th Battalion. Lt-Col. Crawford reported an attack that seemed to come through the defenses. The 1st RTR tanks were sent in response. The penetration report seemed to be false, so the tanks were sent towards where the enemy tanks had been last seen.

The Germsns found that the Australians were not so easily panicked as many soldiers had been in 1940. The German tanks had come up close to the Australians without serious harm, so the German infantry moved forward as well. Once the Germans had closed to some 500 yards, the defenders started firing. The only problem was that there were not many automatic weapons available or even men with guns who could see the enemy troops from posts. The 1st RTR tanks moved forward towards the El Adem road block. They ran into a group of ten enemy tanks and had a fight. The British lost two cruiser tanks, but knocked out a German tank, perhaps a Pzkw III, an M13/40, and three Italian light tanks. At this point, the enemy tanks pulled back. The Australians finally were able to bring mortars to bear. Patrols from the 2/17th Battalion found that the enemy infantry had withdrawn. During the night, several enemy tanks were near the 2/13th Battalion, looking for a way to cross into the fortress. Another group had approached with demolitions to try and get through the "anti-tank ditch and wire". The defenders could tell that the enemy forces were intent on surrounding Tobruk and breaking through.

At the frontier, the defenders were not prepared for a hard defense against advancing forces. They might well have tried to defend Halfaya Pass, to become famous during the Battleaxe offensive. Halfaya was only held by a Free French motor infantry company that was weak in strength. Gradually, more units arrived in the Sollum-Halfaya area. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

German activity near Tobruk on 11 April 1941

The night before the 11th, the 18th Cavalry had sent out a patrol of four small trucks to the west, looking down in the Derna road. They saw no sign of the Germans. That same time, a Support group column had an encounter with a German column about 12 miles west of Tobruk. What seems to be happening was that German columns headed into the desert from the coast road west of Tobruk. In "mid-morning" on 11 April 1941, on the right from the 20th Brigade, they saw a group of about fifty vehicles. Tobruk artillery fired on them and they scattered. The Australians sent out a platoon to look for the Germans. A report from the Support Group mentioned some forty tanks heading for El Adem from the south. The tanks came from an area where about 300 vehicles had been seen. The group of tanks split in two with one part heading east along the Trigh Capuzzo. The German intent seemed to be to completely surround Tobruk.

A little after noon, about ten tanks drove towards a post held by the 24th Brigade. They were engaged by guns from the 24th Anti-Tank Company. They succeeded in knocking out five tanks and drove off the rest. Near 1pm, 20 to 30 trucks drove up to Post R63 in the perimeter. They were engaged by the 104th RHA. The trucks were forced to withdraw. Other trucks drove towards the Bardia road. German infantry left their vehicles and attacked post R63. The Australians took casualties and the Germans sat astride the Bardia Road. Another fight took place between the 2/28th Battalion and the 2/43rd Battalion.

As he had been instructed, Brigadier Gott ordered the mobile portion of the Support Group to withdraw to the Egyptian frontier. He sent a message to General Lavarack, informing him of the move. The message used a code word that they had set for this occasion. The Support Group supply vehicles were trapped in Tobruk by the German moves. By 1pm, at about two miles east of Tobruk, the Germans brought infantry. They moved up to within a half-mile from Tobruk and started digging positions. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

Wavell's hand in the works at Tobruk on 10 to 11 April 1941

While General Lavarack had been commander of Cyrenaica Command, he found out through a visiting staff officer on 11 April 1941 from General Headquarters that Wavell had other plans in the works. Wavell intended to include what had been Cyrenaica Command into a new Western Desert Command. He affirmed the plan to defend Tobruk for two months. After that, he intended to go on the offensive against the Germans and Italians. General Lavarack replied with a request to get the rest of the 7th Australian Division in Tobruk to aid the defense.

Late on 10 April, General Lavarack put the 1st RTR under the control of General Morshead, but that did not amount to much since he would not be allowed to use the 1st RTR without General Lavarack's approval. 11 April 1941 was good Friday. The sandstorm that had been blowing on 10 April, earlier in the day had gradually stopped. 11 April proved to be better weather, as it was clear. Only a week had passed since the 9th Australian Division had been in contact with the Germans near Benghazi. The Australians defending the perimeter at Tobruk now had a good view of the situation. There would be the defenders on a perimeter in Tobruk, with a band of unoccupied land, with a surrounding German-Italian static line, rather World War One-like.

The Tobruk perimeter was at an elevation of 400 to 500 feet. The land was very arid. Every day, as the sun warmed the land and air, you would get a mirage effect. The only deviation was if there were clouds or dust storm. The mirages affected artillery, since guns could only be ranged by sight early or late in the day. Both sides were effected by the mirages and both Axis and British artillery would fire early and late in the day.

A system of perimeter posts were constructed. The outer line of posts were about 750 yards apart. There was a backing line that were about 500 yards apart. There was also an anti-tank ditch, but it was only partial. The uncompleted parts had concertina wire that did not seem to be very effective. This is baed on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

Attacks on Tobruk start and the Support Group is reorganized on 10 April 1941

A German-Italian attack near the Derna road became more intense on 10 April 1941. They did not try to cross the wadi, but set up on the far side. There were both Germans and elements of the Italian Brescia Division. The Italians had "machine-guns, mortars and light artillery". By early afternoon, the firing increased. The firing was heavy enough to keep the 2/24th Battalion from occupying their section of the perimeter. British field guns had received enough fire that they lost artillerymen killed and wounded and had to withdraw. On the Axis side, Major-General Prittwitz was killed. Working for Rommel was a dangerous occupation for German generals.

The Support Group sent a message about seeing forty tanks moving north-east towards Tobruk. About the same time, the German 3rd Reconnaissance Unit had an encounter with the Indian 18th Cavalry. They reached the perimeter near the 2/28th Battalion. Bush artillery with them fired and put rounds near the head of the column. The professionals of the 1st RHA opened fire and dispersed the Germans. German fire stopped a "British truck" trying to drive out by the El Adem road. Things quieted down until almost 1pm when artillerymen saw five German tanks.

During the early part of the afternoon, some Germans were driven off by small-arms fire from the 2/13th Battalion. In the west, though, Axis forces near the upper escarpment and dug in some machine guns that could fire on the perimeter. There were continued reports that the German strength in that area was increasing. Ten German tanks were also seen driving towards the south-east. Then British reconnaissance aircraft reported three columns of 200 vehicles each driving towards El Adem from Mechili. One of these columns had an encounter with Support Group troops at approximately 5pm. The RAF attacked a group there of about 150 vehicles. One battery of the 4th RHA opened fire and dispersed the group.

Meanwhile, Brigadier Gott reorganized the Support Group and put Lt-Col. Campbell, a famous figure in the desert fighting, in charge of an independent column operating between Tobruk and the frontier. These sorts of columns would become increasingly prevalent during campaign. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

10 April 1941 at Tobruk

General Lavarack had decided that what they would have to do is to "hold Tobruk against an encircling force". There was no possibility of stopping Rommel from advancing past Tobruk. The 9th Australian Division was now in Tobruk, as of 10 April 1941. Tobruk sent out patrols from the 1/King's Dragoon Guards and the 18th Lancers (Indian cavalry). One such patrol from the 18th Lancers drove out to the escarpment where they could see the Derna road.

Quite soon in the morning, a sand storm blew up and reduced visibility. The 10th was the worst day that the Australians had seen so far in the desert. The trenches quickly filled with sand, so the men stayed busy shoveling sand, only to see them refill again.

The perimeter being defended at Tobruk was some 28 miles long. The distance across was about 17 miles. The average radius of the circle was about 9 miles. The harbor at Tobruk was said to be the best in the part of North Africa that had been controlled by Italy. On 10 April, the harbor was partially blocked by some ships that had sank.

The perimeter was held by three Australian brigades, but only two battalions per brigade were in the line. Each brigade was backed by a field artillery regiment. The ultimate plan was to have central control of all the artillery in Tobruk, but until that was implemented, the regiments were brigade control.

Early in the morning, a German force could be seen driving towards Tobruk. They had seven light tanks, two companies from the machine gun battalion, and some field guns. They were apparently driving along the Derna road. They were immediately engaged by "bush artillery" and guns from the 51st Field Regiment. The Germans turned around, and then deployed their troops. Two platoons of British machine guns were called forward to engage the German troops. A few Germans turned to the south and then turned towards Tobruk, where they were engaged by another bush gun. Some German armored cars tried to find a way into Tobruk, but they were also engaged by bush guns. One of the guns was almost dangerous, but the other was more effective and was coached by a visiting senior British artillery officer. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

10 April 1941, Rommel wants to attack Tobruk

Rommel was driving to Tobruk early on 10 April 1941. He had left Mechili to move to what he thought was the next location to try and panic ther British. He found General Prittwitz and his group still on the road. After his experience so far in Cyrenaica, he thought that if they just pressed the British hard they would collapse. Rommel wanted the 3rd Reconnaissance Unit to outflank El Adem and for the 8th Machine Gun Battalion to stage a frontal attack with the Brescia Division. The potential frontal attackers had no artillery, as it had not arrived yet. The Australian historian points out that the Germans were to attack Tobruk without taking any time for reconnaissance and understanding the defenses. The Germans were not even able to immediately get a Tobruk map from the Italians. The initial contacts included taking fire from the British armored cars, finding "anti-tank obstacles" that were defended. Tobruk was not like the other encounters that the Germans had with the British forces. Tobruk was ready and well-defended.

General Lavarack sent a message to General Wavell telling him of his arrangements, and asked for the rest of the 7th Australian Division to be sent to Tobruk. Wavell was preparing for a trip to Greece where he would meet with General Blamey and explain to him why the 7th Australian Division was not sent to Greece. Before he left for Greece to meet with General Wilson and General Blamey, he sent a message to the Chiefs of Staff in London. He stated his resolve to hold Tobruk. Churchill had written a message exhorting him to hold Tobruk, so the message was not actually sent.

Early on 10 April, General Lavarack met with Brigadier Gott to talk about plans for using the Support Group. The Support Group, early on 10 April, was sitting at El Adem. El Adem was about to be hit by the approaching Axis forces, so this was a good topic for discussion. General Lavarack decided that rather than withdrawing to Tobruk, the Support Group, if threatened, should withdraw to the Egyptian Frontier. This would give the appearance of them scattering when attacked by Rommel's forces, but what could they do? This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

From 9 and 10 April 1941 at Tobruk

General Wavell suggested that the commanders at Tobruk reconnoiter the fortress to gain a better knowledge of the situation. The group consisted of General Lavarack, General Morshead, Brigadier Harding, and Brigadier Wooten. General Wavell had been under the mistaken impression that there was an inner line that could be defended. What the officers found was that the outer perimeter was the only defensive line that existed at Tobruk. There was no inner line. The conclusion drawn by General Lavarack was that they would have to hold the outer perimeter. They would decide where to locate the brigades. Later in the day, a large group of vehicles approached the Tobruk area. They were probing Acroma to see what was being held. Eventually, armored cars probed the area. Finally, artillery commenced firing and received replies from the Tobruk guns. During the 9th, more equipment arrived at Tobruk. They got the 51st Field Regiment, and four infantry tanks from the 4th RTR. During the night, the units near Acroma moved into Tobruk.

We find that this early in the campaign, Rommel was already setting up ad hoc battle groups taken from the German and Italian divisions. They had the 5th Light Division, the Italian Ariete armored division, and the Brescia Division. The Trento Division had started to arrive at Agedabia on this day. Already, elements of the 15th Panzer Division were to be sent to Africa earlier than had been planned. They had not been to arrive until May, but all that changed. During 9 April 1941, Rommel ordered his forces to approach Tobruk and to besiege the place. What Rommel wanted to do was to attack prior to the British having time to prepare their defenses. We find that on 9 April, General Wavell was planning a visit to Greece. He heard of General Lavarack's decisions about Tobruk, but did not immediately reply. General Wavell knew that General Blamey, the Australian general in Greece disapproved violently with the decision to hold the 7th Australian Division in North Africa, rather than sending it to Greece. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

Reinforcements and improving defenses on 8 April 1941

As well as defending Tobruk, more units were heading for the Egyptian-Libyan frontier on 8 April 1941. The 22nd Guards Brigade, a fixture in the desert, had two battalions at Mersa Matruh on 8 April 1941. The other battalion was moving forward to Sollum with light tanks from the 7th Hussars. Another one of the 6th Infantry Division's brigades was moving towards Mersa Matruh. The 6th Division was eventually renamed the 70th Division. The 4th Indian Division was being shipped to Egypt to augment the defenses. At some point, their commander was Frank Messervy, who fought in the desert against Rommel during the campaign.

Early on 8 April, the 9th Australian Division still had a large presence outside of Tobruk. There were troops near Acroma, watching the coast road, expecting to see Germans approaching. During the morning, they learned of the surrender at Mechili. The 9th Australian Division spent much of 8 April getting organized so that battalions were with the correct brigades. During the last several days, they had become jumbled. That put the 26th Brigade on the right, holding from the coast road to the Mediterranean coast. The 20th Brigade was in the south, watching the "open desert flank". On the eighth, the troops had a hot meal served for supper. The Germans did not challenge the British and Australians near Tobruk on 8 April. That is not to say that they were totally absent. There were German armored cars conducting reconnaissance.

When General Morshead heard that generals O'Connor and Neame were being held near Derna, he put together a group to attempt a rescue. The commander of the King's Dragoon Guards were concerned about Morshead's plan to use armored cars on the road at night, as he was concerned about the risks to them under those circumstances. He had nothing to worry about, it turns out, because the group was delayed at Gazala due to road demolition, so they could not get near Derna in the dark and had to turn back. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

The forces available to defend Tobruk from 8 April 1941

The forces available to General Lavarack to defend Tobruk were scattered and distributed as of 8 April 1941. General Lavarack at once decided how to organize the units that he had available. One group would be used to defend Tobruk. He put General Morshead in command and designated him as the Tobruk commander. He had assigned his own 9th Australian Division and its supporting troops. The division at this time had eight battalions. They had four British artillery regiments and a machine gun battalion, along with engineers. They were also assigned the 1st King's Dragoon Guards, the armored car unit. The second group would be under Brigadier Gott's command and would be mobile. He had most of the 11th Hussars and part of the 4th RHA. They would stay outside of Tobruk. The third group would be reserves, with the 18th Australian Brigade as its main unit. They would have some anti-tank guns and all the tanks that were present. This plan meant that the 18th Brigade would have to withdraw from its Tobruk defensive position. As of 8 April 1941, Lt-Col. Drew was appointed to command a new 3rd Armoured Brigade. From available tanks, they were equipped with 4 cruiser tanks and 18 light tanks. There were other mobile units, such as the French motor battalion, the 1st KRRC, and the remnants of the Tower Hamlets Rifles. The Indian 18th Cavalry were to enter Tobruk to support the 9th Australian Division. Brigadier Gott's men were to operate south of the coast road and would harass the advancing German and Italian troops. Since the 9th Australian Division had gone to Cyrenaica without artillery, they needed help forming a division artillery command. That task fell to Brigadier Thompson, recently arrived from Palestine. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

A temporary plan as of 9 April 1941

The arrangements that General Wavell put in place on 8 April 1941 were apparently viewed as being temporary. For the present, Wavell continued the existence of a Cyrenaica Command, but that was not to last. We find that Wavell viewed the collapse in the desert as mainly being due to the poor mechanical condition of the tanks in the 3rd Armoured Brigade. Wavell wrote that in a letter to General Blamey. The concept for the immediate future was to garrison Tobruk as a strong point and to gather mobile forces, such as a reconstituted support group under the command of Brigadier Gott, newly arrived to the scene. The 3rd Indian Motor Brigade was to be part of the mobile force, but the official history says that the brigade took heavy losses at Mechili. The description here made the brigade seem to have escaped, although parts of it were lost, such as the squadron caught in the wadi. We would blame Major-General Gambier-Parry and his sudden surrender as the cause of unnecessary losses at Mechili.

The forces available to General Lavarack on 9 April were two brigades at Acroma, with two artillery regiments and the machine gun battalion. In Tobruk were two more brigades, an artillery regiment, the support group remnants, the men of the 3rd Armoured Brigade, and miscellaneous anti-tank and anti-aircraft units. We believe that the 3rd Armoured Brigade was transformed into the 32nd Army Tank Brigade. A new artillery regiment was about to arrive by sea. The 1st RTR had just arrived. We heard that this was a makeshift regiment created out of available men and equipment. The 11th Hussars, from the 7th Armoured Division, was about to move up to El Adem from the Egyptian frontier. Further reinforcement for the reconstituted support group drove up the road from Egypt. A surviving unit from the 3rd Indian Motor Brigade, the 18th Cavalry Regiment, was located at El Adem. Over the next day, the surviving units of the 3rd Indian Motor Brigade that had broken out of Mechili arrived at El Adem. One squadron, commanded by Captain Barlow, arrived after driving from Mechili. This is based on the account in VOl.III of the Australian Official History.

Another look at Wavell's visit to Cyrenaica Command on 8 April 1941

Actually, during the evening of 7 April 1941, Wavell ordered the 22nd Guards brigade with artillery to head for the Egyptian frontier. Wavell asked for General Lavarack to join him earlier on 7 April. Wavell only then learned about the capture of Generals Neame and O'Connor, along with Brigadier Combe. Wavell met with Lavarack about noon on 7 April. Wavell asked him to take over Cyrenaica Command and asked if he would agree with diverting the 7th Australian Division to the desert from the planned move to Greece. Wavell at this point planned the flight to Tobruk. Wavell sent messages to London and Melbourne about the new plans for the 7th Australian Division and General Lavarack. Wavell's over-optimistic assessment of the German intentions were telling. He painted them as just a raid, he thought. As for Churchill, who was still the amateur soldier at heart, was suggesting ways to fight on in the desert. After all, the fortress at Tobruk had the Italian defenses and could be held.

By the time that Generals Wavell and Lavarack arrived at Tobruk, it was 10am on 8 April. The sandstorm that was affecting Mechili also was affecting Tobruk. Wavell met with the Cyrenaica Command staff, including Brigadier Harding. During this time, General Morshead arrived at Tobruk. This was when Wavell announced his estimate that they should be prepared to defend Tobruk for two months. Wavell asked General Lavarack to prepare a plan to withdraw from Tobruk, if he found it not possible to continue to hold the fortress. When Wavell was ready to leave Tobruk, is when he found the aircraft was having mechanical problems. He finally left only to have the plane crash in the desert. FOrtunately for all, a patrol found Wavell and took him to Sollum. They had a close brush with losing the Middle East theater commander as well as the other senior officers in Cyrenaica. Wavell was still hoping at this point that Rommel would not be the threat that he showed hiimself to be. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

High level moves with respect to Greece and Libya in early April 1941

With General Wavell's new orders for the 7th Australian Division, the Chief of the Australian General Staff had become involved. When he ordered the 18th Brigade to Tobruk, General Wavell had sent a message to General Sturdee, informing him. When General Blamey heard of the moves by General Wavell, he was upset, because he was involved in making the Greek Campaign work. The Greek Campaign needed the 7th Australian Division to give them enough strength to have a chance of success. Once the Australian government learned of Wavell's new plan, they contacted General Blamey for his opinion on the subject. The Australian government was opposed to the change in plans. General Wavell's plans were announced at the meeting in Cairo that included Anthony Eden. Anthony Eden was very nervous during the meeting and was drumming the table with his fingers. After all, Anthony Eden was the proponent of intervening in Greece and here Wavell was announcing a move that would undermine the Greek operation. He would send the bulk of the 7th Australian Division to Mersa Matruh, not Greece, as we mentioned, while the 18th Australian Brigade was sent to Tobruk. He also was going to move the 6th Division to the Western Desert. The division had been in the Nile Delta, training for a projected attack on the island of Rhodes. He also announced the appointment of General Lavarack as commander in Cyrenaica, replacing General Neame, who was now a German prisoner. General Blamey considered General Lavarack a professional rival, and when he had a chance, he would place obstacles in General Lavarack's path. General Wavell flew to Tobruk late on 8 October with General Lavarack. When Wavell tried to leave, he had aircraft problems. He was finally able to take off, but his aircraft went down in the desert with engine problems. The plane was wrecked and Wavell was out of contact. For some six hours, Wavell was down in the desert near Sollum. Fortunately, a patrol found them and took them to Sollum (the history calls it Solum). Wavell was eventually flown from Sollum in a Westland Lysander. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

Increasing defenses in Cyrenaica in early April 1941

A few Italian field guns left at Tobruk were repaired and refurbished. The Australian infantry were trained in the use of the guns by the men of the Nottinghamshire Sherwood Rangers, who manned the coast defense guns at Tobruk. The 2/28th Battalion received five Italian 75mm guns that were manned by a platoon. The Sherwood Rangers were a converted unit, but they eventually became an armored regiment, much later.

General Wavell was fully engaged in reinforcing Cyrenaica in the face of the German threat. By 7 April 1941, the 18th Australian Brigade arrived, mostly by sea, although some troops came by road. The brigade commander, Brigadier Wooten, was appointed to command the forces in Tobruk. One of his battalion commanders acted as the brigade commander. The plan was to occupy the defenses around the entire place. This was in progress on 8 April when Generals Wavell and Lavarack arrived at Tobruk by air. The reinforcements that General Wavell had allocated for Cyrenaica were on the way. They included the 1st RTR, an improvised unit with 11 cruiser tanks and 15 light tanks. There was the 107th RHA, the 14th Light AA Regiment, and the 11th Hussars from the 7th Armoured Division. The rest of the 3rd RHA, which already had one battery in Cyrenaica, was also allocated. A larger development was that the 7th Australian Division would not go to Greece, but would go the the desert, instead. General Wavell almost typically ordered the change for the 7th Australian Division without consulting General Blamey, the senior Australian officer.

By 6 April 1941, the situation in the Mediterranean theater had become worse. The Germans were attacking in Greece, Mechili was surrounded and the 9th Australian Division was withdrawing. At a major meeting that included Wavell and Anthony Eden, Wavell announced that they must defend Tobruk. They would send the 7th Australian Division to Mersa Matruh (although the 18th Brigade went to Tobruk). This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

Tobruk from the capture in late January 1941 to early April

As we mentioned, Major-General Morshead (then a brigadier) was at Tobruk when the 6th Australian Division attacked and captured the place from the Italians in late January 1941. After the capture, Morshead was able to inspect the fortress area. When he knew that the 9th Australian Division would have to withdraw into Tobruk after the fall of Mechili and the German pressure, General Morshead was well-prepared with knowledge of the Tobruk area.

After the fall, Lt-Col. Cook was put in charge of the building the base there. Fairly quickly, after the initial area commander was withdrawn to Palestine, Cook became the area commander, as well. Early on, Cook had a newsletter published every day to hand out to the fortress occupants. Colonel Cook had become concerned about the local rumor mill and decided that the thing to do was to publish a newsletter. The newsletter was the work of Sergeant Williams and was called the Tobruk Truth.

From mid-March 1941, Australian brigades arrived at Tobruk. The first was the 26th Btigade and was followed by the 24th Brigade, which only had two battalions. By March 25th, the 26th Brigade left Tobruk to join the 9th Australian Division and the 24th Brigade took over the defense. One feature of the defense was the so-called "bush artillery", captured Italian guns manned by infantrymen who were not trained as artillerymen. They found that most Italian artillery at Tobruk were either damaged or had been exposed to weather so long that they were unusable. The Australians cheated and disobeyed General Neame's orders by bringing large numbers of Italian 47mm anti-tank guns from Bardia. The history says "40mm", but the Italian guns were all 47mm. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

The situation in Cyrenaica by 8 April 1941

The Australian Official History points out that in the course of 9 days from when the Germans attacked at Mersa Brega (they say Marsa Brega) they had beaten the British force that had been lightly holding the territory west of Tobruk. We have fairly recently read the Australian volume about the Greek campaign and the battle for Crete. We saw that General Wavell had lied to the Australian senior officers and to the Australian Prime Minister to get their agreement to send their troops to Greece. Wavell had stripped the force in North Africa to satisfy the demands of Churchill and his foreign secretary. My assessment was that Wavell was desperate to hold onto his command in the Mediterranean and Middle East, and he would do anything that Churchill asked, whether it made sense or not. The establishment view was that the Germans would not dare risk too large a force in Libya under the current conditions, so that the British could afford to send a substantial force with equipment to Greece. The primary accomplishment of the Greek campaign was to make friends with the people of Greece, as equipment and soldiers were lost in the process. The Australians marching south to embarkation ports were cheered by the Greek people, but the losses occurred nonetheless.

Rommel was not a cautious man. He lived infiltration tactics and practiced them when the opportunity presented itself. He was ready to take advantage of an opportunity that was presented, as it was what he would instinctively want to do. One criticism of Rommel was that by attacking when his orders were to stand pat, he caused the 7th Australian Division and the Polish Carpathian Brigade not to be sent to Greece.

The Official History remarks on the officers who watched the 6th Australian Division take Tobruk. One was Brigadier Morshead, later the commander of the 9th Australian Division. Another was Lt-Col. Cook, who was later put in charge of the base camp at Tobruk. The third was a naval officer, Lt-Cdr. Duff, who was appointed as naval officer in charge at Derna, and then was in charge of the vessels that carried supplies to Tobruk during the seige. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

The aftermath of the breakout at Mechili and the surrender

At the time of the breakout at Mechili and Major-General Gambier-Parry's surrender, there was a sand storm. The sand storm kept many people from initially knowing about the surrender. Word was passed between soldiers and many gradually learned about the surrender. By 8am, the fighting at Mechili had ended. Some 3,000 men were taken prisoner. Of these, there were 102 Australian soldiers captured. Even worse, a large number of vehicles were surrendered along with thirty days of supplies for the armored division. No one had taken the time to destroy the supply dump. There was really no excuse for surrendering at Mechili. The fact was that General Gambier-Parry had lost his nerve and used the excuse of the soft vehicles to give up the fight. The men of the 3rd Indian Motor Brigade and their associates, such as M-Battery of the 3rd RHA proved Rommel's dictum about breakouts by motorized troops to be true. The second breakout by Brigadier Vaughan's headquarters, and Eden and Rajendrasinjhi's squadrons, and Barlow's unit are examples of what could be done by well-disciplined troops that have bold leadership.

At the time that the breakout and surrender were happening at Mechili, the men at Acroma were in a sand storm. They half-expected to see Germans approaching, given what they knew. As the sky got light, some of the troops that were not in their forward positions now occupied them. Other men in positions worked at improving their situation. They had artillery backing. The 1st RHA had their guns pointing to the south, while the 51st Field Regiment had their guns pointing to the west. When General Morshead, the 9th Australian Division commander, visited Cyrenaica Command headquarters, he found that General Wavell had flown in with Major-General Lavarack, who was the newly-appointed commander of Cyrenaica Command. General Wavell told them that his plan was to hold Tobruk for two months. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

More about the breakout from Mechili on 8 April 1941

After the initial successful breakout from Mechili by many from the 3rd Indian Motor Brigade, the group that was left out when Brigadier Vaughan went back into Mechili eventually proceeded to El Adem. On going back in, they found the headquarters of the 2nd Royal Lancers. When the others that were to breakout from Mechili hesitated, Major-General Gambier-Parry ordered the 2nd Royal Lancers to cover the 2nd Armoured Division headquarters. Brigadier Vaughan had gotten back into Mechili and found General Gambier-Parry. He suggested that they breakout to the east according to the original plan. They turned around and started driving. They ran into heavy machine-gun fire almost immediately. General Gambier-Parry's reaction to this was to surrender. The battery of the 3rd RHA did not want to surrender and tried to proceed. The Indian cavalry were driving behind the artillerymen. The Indian cavalry commanders decided to change direction and break out to the west. They would spread out and charge the Germans on a wide front. Very few of the charging vehicles were hit and they drove through the German artillerymen. There was a wadi that lead to the west, but the smart ones stayed to the right and kept out of it. The wadi proved to be a trap from which almost no one escaped. Those that broke out this time drove out some 20 miles to the west. By early afternoon, they turned north. The group now had the 3rd RHA battery, some 90 engineers from the 4th Field Squadron, and Major Rajendrasinhji and his squadron, consisting now of about 60 men. By early on 9 April, they saw an enemy group driving along. They captured some 30 German and Italian soldiers in a supply column. They took them prisoners, but had to abandon some when their vehicles broke down. They eventually captured an German scout car. Finally, they saw armored cars and started to engage them and then stopped, as they were from the 11th Hussars. They followed them back to El Adem. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.