The situation in Cyrenaica by 8 April 1941

The Australian Official History points out that in the course of 9 days from when the Germans attacked at Mersa Brega (they say Marsa Brega) they had beaten the British force that had been lightly holding the territory west of Tobruk. We have fairly recently read the Australian volume about the Greek campaign and the battle for Crete. We saw that General Wavell had lied to the Australian senior officers and to the Australian Prime Minister to get their agreement to send their troops to Greece. Wavell had stripped the force in North Africa to satisfy the demands of Churchill and his foreign secretary. My assessment was that Wavell was desperate to hold onto his command in the Mediterranean and Middle East, and he would do anything that Churchill asked, whether it made sense or not. The establishment view was that the Germans would not dare risk too large a force in Libya under the current conditions, so that the British could afford to send a substantial force with equipment to Greece. The primary accomplishment of the Greek campaign was to make friends with the people of Greece, as equipment and soldiers were lost in the process. The Australians marching south to embarkation ports were cheered by the Greek people, but the losses occurred nonetheless.

Rommel was not a cautious man. He lived infiltration tactics and practiced them when the opportunity presented itself. He was ready to take advantage of an opportunity that was presented, as it was what he would instinctively want to do. One criticism of Rommel was that by attacking when his orders were to stand pat, he caused the 7th Australian Division and the Polish Carpathian Brigade not to be sent to Greece.

The Official History remarks on the officers who watched the 6th Australian Division take Tobruk. One was Brigadier Morshead, later the commander of the 9th Australian Division. Another was Lt-Col. Cook, who was later put in charge of the base camp at Tobruk. The third was a naval officer, Lt-Cdr. Duff, who was appointed as naval officer in charge at Derna, and then was in charge of the vessels that carried supplies to Tobruk during the seige. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

The aftermath of the breakout at Mechili and the surrender

At the time of the breakout at Mechili and Major-General Gambier-Parry's surrender, there was a sand storm. The sand storm kept many people from initially knowing about the surrender. Word was passed between soldiers and many gradually learned about the surrender. By 8am, the fighting at Mechili had ended. Some 3,000 men were taken prisoner. Of these, there were 102 Australian soldiers captured. Even worse, a large number of vehicles were surrendered along with thirty days of supplies for the armored division. No one had taken the time to destroy the supply dump. There was really no excuse for surrendering at Mechili. The fact was that General Gambier-Parry had lost his nerve and used the excuse of the soft vehicles to give up the fight. The men of the 3rd Indian Motor Brigade and their associates, such as M-Battery of the 3rd RHA proved Rommel's dictum about breakouts by motorized troops to be true. The second breakout by Brigadier Vaughan's headquarters, and Eden and Rajendrasinjhi's squadrons, and Barlow's unit are examples of what could be done by well-disciplined troops that have bold leadership.

At the time that the breakout and surrender were happening at Mechili, the men at Acroma were in a sand storm. They half-expected to see Germans approaching, given what they knew. As the sky got light, some of the troops that were not in their forward positions now occupied them. Other men in positions worked at improving their situation. They had artillery backing. The 1st RHA had their guns pointing to the south, while the 51st Field Regiment had their guns pointing to the west. When General Morshead, the 9th Australian Division commander, visited Cyrenaica Command headquarters, he found that General Wavell had flown in with Major-General Lavarack, who was the newly-appointed commander of Cyrenaica Command. General Wavell told them that his plan was to hold Tobruk for two months. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

More about the breakout from Mechili on 8 April 1941

After the initial successful breakout from Mechili by many from the 3rd Indian Motor Brigade, the group that was left out when Brigadier Vaughan went back into Mechili eventually proceeded to El Adem. On going back in, they found the headquarters of the 2nd Royal Lancers. When the others that were to breakout from Mechili hesitated, Major-General Gambier-Parry ordered the 2nd Royal Lancers to cover the 2nd Armoured Division headquarters. Brigadier Vaughan had gotten back into Mechili and found General Gambier-Parry. He suggested that they breakout to the east according to the original plan. They turned around and started driving. They ran into heavy machine-gun fire almost immediately. General Gambier-Parry's reaction to this was to surrender. The battery of the 3rd RHA did not want to surrender and tried to proceed. The Indian cavalry were driving behind the artillerymen. The Indian cavalry commanders decided to change direction and break out to the west. They would spread out and charge the Germans on a wide front. Very few of the charging vehicles were hit and they drove through the German artillerymen. There was a wadi that lead to the west, but the smart ones stayed to the right and kept out of it. The wadi proved to be a trap from which almost no one escaped. Those that broke out this time drove out some 20 miles to the west. By early afternoon, they turned north. The group now had the 3rd RHA battery, some 90 engineers from the 4th Field Squadron, and Major Rajendrasinhji and his squadron, consisting now of about 60 men. By early on 9 April, they saw an enemy group driving along. They captured some 30 German and Italian soldiers in a supply column. They took them prisoners, but had to abandon some when their vehicles broke down. They eventually captured an German scout car. Finally, they saw armored cars and started to engage them and then stopped, as they were from the 11th Hussars. They followed them back to El Adem. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

More action after the German attack at Mechili, apparently on 8 April 1941

There had been two 2-pdr anti-tank guns in the rear-guard at Mechili. Both guns were eventually knocked out and only one crew member was not killed or wounded. The guns were being charged by German tanks when the situation got out of hand. After this, the biggest German tanks had reached the old Italian fort in the center of the position. The headquarters of the 2nd Royal Lancers had been established near the fort. We had seen that Brigadier Vaughan had successfully broken out from Mechili. When he stopped to observe the progress of others leaving Mechili, he found that the breakout had stopped. He got on the radio with General Gambier-Parry to find out what had happened. The general replied that the enemy fire had gotten so heavy, that it seemed impossible to take the soft vehicles out through the gunfire. Vaughan suggested that they break out in different direction.

When Brigadier Vaughan had ended his conversation with General Gambier-Parry, he told his associate that he was going back into Mechili to get his rear-guard out regardless of the others. This tells us a lot about the caliber of the man. Those who had broken out with Brigadier Vaughan who did not go back into Mechili were able to drive to El Adem. Brigadier Vaughan found General Gambier-Parry and suggested that they try to break out to the east. They started underway, but drew heavy fire. General Gambier-Parry's reaction at this point was to surrender, but Brigadier Vaughan being the man he was, drove onwards. M Battery of the 3rd. RHA were there, but did not want to surrender. Indian cavalry troops were following M Battery. Major Rajendrasinhji turned the breakout attempt around and they turned to the west. There were two squadrons of Indian cavalry. Not every vehicle in either squadron made the breakout attempt, but of those that went, very few were hit by enemy fire. The drove spread out wide and charged the Germans. They were driving at a German artillery unit. The Germans raised their hands in surrender. although the troops in the breakout just drove past them. This was at the point where some troops from one squadron got trapped in the wadi. Most did not, but of those who did, only one vehicle got out and escaped to Tobruk. The rest were eventually captured. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

The breakout attempt from Mechili on 7 April 1941

The plan for the breakout from Mechili led by the 3rd Indian Motor Brigade was planned to start at 6:15am on 7 April 1941. That did not happen because the cruiser tank that was planned to lead did not arrive. The 3rd Indian Motor Brigade commander waited to see if the tank would arrive for 15 minutes, so the sky was starting to get light. A squadron from the 18th Cavalry Regiment led the breakout. Some men got down and used bayonets against the German gunners and infantry. They got back on their trucks and then drove away. They lost 17 men in the fight. The plan had been for the 2nd Armoured Division headquarters to break out with the Indian troops as well. The cruiser tank finally arrived and move through the gap. The 3rd Indian Motor Brigade headquarters also followed. The cruiser tank was knocked out and the crew was killed.

Rommel had planned to attack by around 7am. As the breakout progressed, Rommel's attack started. The 3rd Indian Motor Brigade headquarters got out, but the others following were intimidated by the German attack and stopped. They should have kept driving. The wind picked up and made visibility poor. An anti-tank gun got into action and was getting hits until it was destroyed. Brigadier Vaughan called General Gambier-Parry on the radio. He heard that the fire was making further escape with soft vehicles too difficult. Brigader Vaughan decided to go back in and get his rearguard troops out of Mechili. The second breakout was made on a broad front. The trucks drove at the enemy at full speed. The German gunners put their hands up in surrender and the Indian troops drove by them. Some vehicles got caught in a wadi and most did not get out of it. The rest drove 20 miles towards the west before they made a turn to the north. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

Events continued to progress at Mechili on 7 April 1941

While Rommel had talked about attacking Mechili on 6 and 7 April 1941, by late on 7 April, he had not actually done anything. There were some movements, such as the Italians attacking the 2nd Lancers unsuccessfully. The two captured Italian 47mm anti-tank guns were used to fire at some enemy troops. That drew some artillery fire for a half and hour. One squadron of the 18th Cavalry Regiment arrived. They had exchanged fire with what must have been some German armored cars during their trip. Later on 7 April, Rommel made an another demand that the garrison at Mechili surrender, but they refused. After that, artillery commenced to fire at Mechili. For about an hour, they also took machine gun fire, but without any particular effect. A regular patrol from the 2nd Lancers was forced back into Mechili by German armored cars. Eventually, they withdrew, which allowed the 2nd Lancers to return to their accustomed position. Rommel was waiting all day long on 7 April for Olbrich to arrive from Msus. Rommel often used a Fiesler Storch for his personal reconnaissance missions. He did so late on 7 April, looking for Olbrich. Olbrich turned out to still be 30 miles away. More units had been straggling into the Mechili area, including some of the Italian Ariete Armored Division. By dark, a large part of the 5th Light Division arrived. Rommel now felt strong enough to attack in the morning.

The British were burdened with Michael Gambier-Parry as the commander at Mechili. He had been waiting in vain for reinforcements. Remember that he had arrived without any fighting forces, when he assumed command of the garrison. General Gambier-Parry had received orders to break out from Cyrenaica Command. He passed that news on to Brigadier Vaughan of the 3rd Indian Motor Brigade. They were to break out from Mechili in the morning. They should move at "daylight". The 3rd Indian Motor Brigade was ordered to head for El Adem. They were also to provide protection to the 2nd Armoured Division headquarters unit. The plan was for the 3rd Indian Motor Brigade to move as a box. The breakout was planned for 6:15am, while the sky was still dark. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

Back to Mechili late on 6 April 1941

Major-General Gambier-Parry only arrived at Mechili late on 6 April 1941. We are going back in time to see the end at Mechili. General Gambier-Parry held a meeting when he arrived to announce that he was taking command at Mechili. The commander of the 3rd Indian Motor Brigade, Brigadier Vaughan tried to tell Gambier-Parry that they were still relatively safe because the Germans lacked sufficient force to attack. The Germans were calling on them to surrender, but Brigadier Vaughan thought that they were trying to get access to the water at Mechili without having to fight. General Gambier-Parry only brought one battery of the 3rd RHA and had no other combatants with him. He thought that the rest of the 2nd Armoured Division would arrive late on 7 April. The British garrison at Mechili could see and enemy force go into a leaguer to the east during the afternoon on 6 April.

At this point, Rommel realized that he did not have enough force to attack Mechili early on 7 April. He would have to wait until more units arrived.

Meanwhile, the Indian brigade and the 10th Battery decided to raid the enemy leaguer early on 7 April. One troop of Indian cavalry with the guns attempted an attack on the enemy, although they were unsuccessful. They did verify that the enemy were Germans and were alert. One gone was lost in the attempt. A enemy gun battery started firing around 11am. A warrant officer took a machine gun out to try and capture the guns, but they could not get close enough under cover to attack. They continued to take hits from the guns. Eventually, the Germans demanded that they surrender, which they refused to do. They finally got in radio contact with Cyrenaica Command. They were told that they could withdraw if they were surrounded. Later on 7 April, some Italians made a feeble attempt at an attack. They hit and Italian truck and took a second 47mm anti-tank gun. Now, they had a "section". This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

Later on 8 April 1941 after the actions at Derna

After leaving the Derna area, the 9th Australian Division occupied a position near Acroma. This was late in the afternoon of 8 April 1941. The 26th Brigade traveled from Tmimi to the Acroma area. Some of the Northumberland Fusiliers and the 51st Field Regiment acted as a rearguard for the brigade. In the process of moving, the 26th Brigade passed through the lines of the 20th Brigade near Gazala. Once they had completed their passage, the 20th Brigade was to move east from Gazala. The fact that the men of 20th Brigade had largely gone without sleep for 48 hours, if you can imagine it, that alone complicated the 20th Brigade movement. One of the 20th Brigade battalions had a diarist who noted that the drivers tended to fall asleep every time they stopped moving.

As the 9th Australian Division reached Acroma, they deployed with the 26th Brigade on the right, facing west, and with the 20th Brigade on the left. At this point, the 26th Brigade only had two battalions, the 2/13th and 2/48th. The 20th Brigade was fortunate to have the full three battalions. They had the 2/15th, 2/17th, and 2/24th Battalions. The division headquarters had moved inside the Tobruk fortress lines. A feature of the area where the 26th Brigade had occupied was a large, white house with the hand-painted name of an Australian beer. A sign of how fluid the situation was, was that Rommel used that white house as his headquarters very soon after 8 April. By late in the day, the remnants of the 2nd Armoured Division Support Group had arrived at Tobruk. The only Support Group unit that still existed but was not at Tobruk was the French Motor Battalion, which was at El Adem to add some strength at the place. The 1st/King's Royal Rifle Corps (1/KRRC) had also arrived at Tobruk. From here, we next will hop back in time to 6 April 1941 at Mechili, and see the sad end of the 2nd Armoured Division. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

Action with the Australians at Derna, Gazala, and Tobruk on 7 and 8 Aprl 1941

While the rearguards near Derna were being hard-pressed, 9th Australian Division troops were in action. This was on 7 and 8 April 1941. One of the Australian battalion commanders, Lt-Colonel Burrows, had arrived at Tmimi. This was near the sea, on the edge of an escarpment. When the first troops arrived, they found the five German armored cars. Men from the 2/28th Battalion had anti-tank rifles, so they used those to harass the Germans. At a fortunate time, two British cruiser tanks arrived. They moved up in support and the Germans wanted nothing to do with them. Lt-Col. Burrows was a up-front, hands-on leader, so he moved to a position near the road. He was armed with a Thompson sub-machine gun and had his pockets full of grenades. As men arrived from the west on the road, he positioned them to aid in the defense. When J Battery of the 3rd RHA arrived, they were a welcome addition. After them, the 51st Field Regiment drove up the road, and after them, the 104th RHA.

Some 25 miles to the east, at Gazala, a defensive position under the command of the 20th Brigade was established. They had two complete battalions and the rifle companies of the 2/15th Battalion. German armored cars were on the prowl during 8 April, but they did not approach closely during the afternoon. German reconnaissance units seem to have been probing the back areas, behind the mainly Australian defenses. As we mentioned, by early afternoon on 8 April, there were now two Australian brigades at Tobruk. Acting Cyrenaica Command leader, Brigadier Harding was located there, as we mentioned already, so General Morshead thought that he should pull the 9th Australian Division in close to Tobruk. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

Miscellaneous groups trying to escape past Derna on 7th and 8th April 1941

Supposedly responsible officers in Great Britain had sent tanks to North Africa that were at the end of their service life. Churchill, the prime minister, did not realize the condition of the tanks, and he took great risks to send the tanks by sea to North Africa. They tanks sent, because of bad behavior by senior officers in Britain, were close to useless. 28 of the tanks in the 5th RTR were lost because they were in bad condition and finally broke down, not from action with the enemy. The men of the 5th RTR were not the last unit to leave Derna. One group that was coming late were support troops from the armored division. They got left behind after Giovanni Berta. As they tried to move east, they kept finding that the engineers had already carried out demolitions. They were forced to keep clearing the road so that they could advance. They only reached Derna at 8pm on 7 April. They exchanged fire with the Germans and then were able to settle down for the night. They moved out early on 8 April, at 4am. Sadly, C Squadron of the 6th RTR was still to the west. They were chagrined to find Germans to their south. They had one tank left running, which finally broke down later that night.

The 9th Australian Division was fortunate, which had moved further east, had a much easier trip. Once they had left Martuba, Some of the men reached Tmimi, they had to deal with five German armored cars about 2,000 yards away. They initially were engaged with anti-tank rifles. Gradually, anti-tank and field guns arrived and were deployed. At the sight of the guns, the Germans held back. Further east, at Gazala, the 20th Brigade organized defenses. There were roving German armored cars, but they stayed out of range. When General Morshead arrived at Tobruk, he found two Australian brigades at the fortress. They were the 18th and 24th Brigades. Brigadier Wooten, of the 24th Brigade was directing the defense. Brigadier Harding, the acting Cyrenaica Command leader, was now at Tobruk. Morshead consulted with Harding and then ordered the Australians at Gazala to move east to Acroma. The 26h Brigade was a brigade group. By 5pm, they started the move from Tmimi to Acroma. By 7pm, the 20th Brigade started to withdraw from Gazala. Everyone had gone without sleep for a long period, so the withdrawal was not very smooth. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

The fight near Derna on 7 April 1941

The remnants of the 3rd Armoured Brigade had arrived near Derna on 7 April 1941. The two commanders, Lt-Col. Drew and Lt-Col.Petherick were looking for Brigadier Rimington, their commander and they did not know that he had been captured by Ponath's ambush. There were no tanks left from the 3rd Hussars. Their last tank broke down at Derna. The 5th RTR was reduced to four tanks by then. As they approached the airfield, they drew fire from the small fort. In the distance, they could see the King's Dragoon Guards in action. They met a platoon commander from the Tower Hamlets Rifles who were in the ruins of a small building. They went back to the pass to get help from rear-guard troops. By now, there was one company from the 1st/King's Royal Rifle Corps with some guns from the 3rd. RHA. Apparently, by 2:30pm, the remaining units of the 2nd Armoured Division drove through Derna. The pioneers fired the demolitions. There was some confusion caused by a staff officer from the 3rd Armoured Brigade who let the armored cars withdraw. Some other units also heard the withdrawal order and left some units unsupported. One company from the 1/KRRC were cut off and surrounded, but succeeded in escaping to a nearby wadi, where they were trying to keep from being discovered by the Germans. Lt-Col. Drew of the 5th RTR had assembled a small force. They found the Germans in control of the airfield. He had some infantry from the 1/KRRC, more infantry from the Tower Hamlets Rifles, some anti-tank guns from the 3rd RHA, and four tanks. By 4pm, the Germans moved to take the Derna pass. They attacked with armored cars, artillery, anti-tank guns, and motorized infantry. the British anti-tank guns hit the attackers hard and knocked out vehicles. The German machine guns, though, covered the road. At about 5:15pm, Lt-Col. Drew led and attack. The four tanks were knocked out, but the fifty-some vehicles raised a lot of dust which provided some cover. The attack was blunted and the men withdrew as possible. Those who escaped reached Tobruk later in the night. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

Action involving the withdrawing forces near Derna on 7 April 1941

Two fighter squadrons had been operating over the withdrawing forces up until 7 April 1941 and had been providing cover from German attacks. On the morning of 7 April, the German air force hit the columns on the roads. The 1st RHA had arrived at the Derna airfield around 10am. The plan was to reorganize the unit so that there was some organization instead of chaos. About the same time B Company of the 1/KRRC was trying to do the same thing nearby. Suddenly a group of German vehicles appeared from the south. They had one armored car, one gun, and three vans. Both artillery units got into action and engaged them. At almost the same time, one Australian anti-tank gun and a Bofors light AA gun also joined the fight. The enemy group withdrew in the face of the heavy fire. A company of Free French motorized troops arrived. The 1st RHA left a battery, but the main body moved on down the road. The 104th RHA arrived and got on the coast road. Most of the King's Dragoon Guards then arrived at the airfield. They left a squadron to provide protection for the airfield while the main group continued on down the road. Part of the 1/KRRC came towards the sound of the fire. Their rearguard fought the attacking Germans for several hours. Finally, the last seven cruiser tanks of the 5th RTR arrived and were trying to climb the escarpment. Three of the tanks broke down and were stripped for later destruction. One of their tanks blocked the road for quite a long time, causing a bottle neck. With them were some of the troops of the 3rd Hussars. All of their tanks had broken down on the trip. The remaining components of the 2nd Armoured Division had passed through Derna by 2:30pm. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History

Early on 7 April 1941 near Tmimi

One company of the Australian 2/48th Battalion reached Tmimi before the rest of the battalion. They moved into a defensive position about one thousand yards south of the road. The battalion's leading truck encountered three German vehicles in a small depression. They were German reconnaissance cars and they opened fire on the Australian truck. The Australian warrant officer in the truck was wounded. One man in the truck fired effectively on the Germans and killed two and wounded two more. There was a British cruiser tank moving through on the road at this time. The tank was ordered to the spot of the fight. The two German cars that had not been engaged drove off. They captured six men, of whom two died later. Soon, the commander of the 26th Btigade arrived at Tmimi. He took over the abandoned Cyrenaica Command headquarters. The rest of the 2/48th Battalion now arrived at Tmimi. The 1/Royal Northumberland Fusiliers and their commander arrived next. By now, the 2/13th Battalion had been ordered to move to Tmimi to support the 2/48th Battalion. Three other battalions were ordered on to Gazala. These were the 2/24th, 2/15th, and 2/17th Battalions. They were apparently part of the 20th Brigade and would set up a defensive position at Gazala. One thing that happened now was that Lt-Col. Marlon found the 2/15th Battalion headquarters unit. They were stopped on the inland track. There had been rifle on the road, but they had not arrived yet, which seemed strange. He finally became concerned that they might have taken the coast road and been caught in the ambush. While he was waiting, a German force drove up on them and attacked. They had four light anti-aircraft guns on Italian trucks and they engaged the German armored cars. Two of the guns were knocked out and caught fire. The other two fired all their ammunition. As they were trapped, the Australians surrendered. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

The 2nd Armoured Division and 9th Australian Division early on 7 April 1941

The units of the 2nd Armoured Division that were on the road to the east mostly stopped to rest during the night of 6 to 7 April 1941. The support group headquarters had stopped "off the inland track". They were near Giovanni Berta. The armored cars of the King's Dragoon Guards were stuck in traffic on the road to Derna. The 1st Royal Horse Artillery made a stop at 5am, on the way to Derna. One company of the 1/KRRC had stopped near them for breakfast. Another company was on the road through Derna. A third company and the headquarters were on the desert road to Mechili. There were other units on the road ahead of them. They included the 51st Field Regiment as well as a substantial part of the Northumberland Fusiliers. There was also "most of the 2/15th Battalion". There was also part of the Australian 26th Brigade. One the road to the east, there was the 2/17th Battalion, another 9th Australian Division battalion. They were headed for a road intersection, the one where the Mechili road connected to the Derna road. They eventually passed the battalion commander and his staff at breakfast and then the 2/15th Battalion headquarters. The 2/14th Battalion was still sitting at Martuba. The 2/48th Battalion and 2/24th Battalion were strung out on the road nearing Tmimi. Major Batten had already reached Tmimi and hoped to be directing the 2/48th Battalion into its assigned position. Major White, from Morshead's staff had already arrived and had some engineers and elements of the 2/48th Battalion already in place to man defenses with anti-tank rifles. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

Into 7 April 1941 in Cyrenaica

The British and Australian engineers carried out a very complete demolition program on 6 April 1941. They left a few watering spots near Maraua, but when the Germans came through, they found obstacles at every turn and large numbers of land mines. The Cyrenaica Command Headquarters arrived at Tmimi at about midnight on 6 to 7 April. Brigadier Harding on the staff was very worried because generals O'Connor and Neame were missing. They had, of course, been caught in Ponath's ambush near Derna. General Morshead arrived at Tmimi at about 4am. He and Harding figured out that the generals were probably German prisoners. Morshead and Brigadier Harding realized that they needed to make a plan for what to do next. They decided to withdraw to Gazala and create defenses. Gazala is where the escarpment reaches up to the plateau. They ordered the units at Mechili to withdraw to El Adem. The message was misaddressed, so that the Mechili garrison did not receive the orders. The Cyrenaica Command and 9th Australian Division headquarters were to withdraw immediately to Gazala.

There is the road that heads to Derna and then climbs to the pass to the east of the town. That road was packed with slowly moving vehicles. There was a long line, sometimes with three or four vehicles alongside each other. One company of the 1/KRRC was blocking the track from Mechili that came to Giovanni Berta. The Tower Hamlets Rifles were at the pass to the west of Derna. There was actually still a 3rd Armoured Brigade column approaching Derna, but with vehicles stretched back a long ways. Brigadier Rimington had an accident in the night with his command vehicle. He and his associate tried a shortcut and ran into Ponath's ambush where they were captured. At this point, Major-General Gambier-Parry was in Mechili, which was surrounded. Thhis is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

The engineers at work on 6 and 7 April 1941 in Cyrenaica

The author of Vol.III of the Australian Official History noted that no maps had been issued to the various commanders in the 9th Australian Division. One officer used a newspaper map that his wife had sent him. Cyrenaica Command eventually learned of the problem along in track by Ponath's group. They ordered the traffic control points to direct traffic along the main road towards Derna. The typical situation was that battalions were split and traveled by different routes to their destination. The 2/48th Battalion was heading towards Tmimi. Most of the battalion took the inland route, but the last group traveled through Derna. Something similar happened to the 2/15th Battalion.

While the battalions were traveling through the night, British and Australian engineers were at work. Brigadier Kisch was in control of the engineers who were carrying out demolitions. They were protected by the 1/KRRC. The engineers were being pressed to the limit. As the historian mentions, many had almost no sleep since 3 April 1941. The troop movements were happening during the night of 6 to 7 April 1941. The initial plan was for the Australian engineers to carry out all the demolition work. When Brigadier Kisch realized that the Australians needed help, he ordered two companies of Royal Engineers to help. Groups conducting the demolitions included the 9th Australian Division chief engineer, Lt-Col. Mann. There were also many engineer staff officers carrying out demolitions. Later in the night, Lt. Roach and his men, who had prepared the demolitions for Ain Mara "west of Derna" ran into Ponath's ambush and were captured by the Germans.

More engineers were busy on the northern route to the east. The pass at Tocra was blown at midnight. They left large craters blocking the road. Wadi Cuff was blown up after that. An Australian engineer unit blew "Cyrene and Apollonia" and took some British engineers with them who had not received the order to withdraw. Between 4am and 4:30am, the road to the east of Apollonia were blown. The demolitions continued through the morning of 7 April 1941. When 2nd Armoured Division troops had passed, more demolitions were carried out at Giovanni Berta. By noon, they blew the ammunition dump and a bridge at Ain Mara. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

Traffic, rumours, and things going badly later on 6 April 1941

The 9th Australian Division provosts arrived in the traffic area and attempted to impose some sort of order. At one point, a German battle group had blocked the crossroads where the Giovanni Berta, Martuba, Mechili, and Derna tracks intersected. The situation was so bad that soldiers of the 9th Australian Division pretty universally believed that the Germans had captured a British provost and then replaced him with a German who misdirected traffic. In retrospect, the best guess was that the German battle group had been Group Ponath. As we had noted, they proceeded to the "Rocknest" at Derna. The Australians believed that the probably mythical German provost had sent traffic towards the ambush near the "Rocknest". A liaison officer for the 9th Australian Division headquarters took the inland route later in the evening and noticed that the traffic control was bad and that all units had become intermixed.

Things took a turn for the worst when General Morshead had left generals O'Connor and Neame and Brigadier Combe left by the inland track. They took a wrong turn and ran into the German ambush. They were all captured. The writer of the Official History thought that Major Fell may have seen them make the turn. An Australian group with secret documents and ciphers also ran into the Germans. One man went around in back and "shot the German soldier". That enabled the men to get back into their truck and escape.

Later, some Australian engineers turned left and took the road to Derna. They saw the abandoned staff cars and trucks from what probably was Neame's vehicles. They attempted to pass the mass of vehicles, but took fire that stopped them. They waited until the sky started to lighten. They finally were able to escape and drove to Martuba, where they got medical attention for their wounded from the 2/13th Battalion medical officer. Another engineer group also ran into the ambush. A group of about30 men got away in trucks. They got back to the crossroads and arranged for someone to keep others from turning towards the ambush. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

More movements on 6 April 1941, later in the day

The southern route to the east taken by British and Australian troops was overloaded with vehicles and the road was breaking down under the load. The load grew as more vehicles crossed into the road from side roads. What had started as convoys were broken up due to the conditions. Where the roads joined and where the refueling stops, conditions were even worse. Upon reaching Giovanni Berta, the Australians left the paved road and took the desert route. The traffic on the road was reduced to about six miles an hour due to the heavy traffic and the deteriorating road surface. Traffic would be stopped as vehicles broke down or overheated.

The 2nd Armoured Division Support Group connected to the southern route from Tecasis. The 3rd Armoured Brigade and the armored cars of the King's Dragoon Guards joined from "the El Abiar-Maraua track". The brigade only had seven cruiser tanks and six light tanks. The 6th RTR with Italian tanks was out of touch and was heading up to the recently abandoned plateau. They could only travel very slowly.

The 2/24th Battalion was the last of the Australians to head east. The 9th Australian Division staff had trouble finding any transport to move the battalion. Some transport was provided by the 2/17th Battalion and from engineers. They had found 14 trucks and some of the unit's vehicles were able to move the entire 2/24th Battalion. The convoy was broken up at the intersections and only arrived at Tmimi in the morning in small groups.

Nothing was seen of the Germans that had blocked the road earlier on the 6th. They must have been Ponath's group. The group was very small and since his orders were to block the coast road at Derna, he continued onward towards that destination. They sheltered in the "Rocknest" caves and set up an ambush to protect those in the caves. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

Late on 6 April 1941 in Cyrenaica

After General O'Connor issued orders that affected the 3rd Armoured Brigade, Brigadier Rimington headed back to the brigade. They were located near the old fort near Tecnis. The brigade officers met and discussed the situation. They decided to travel back to Derna via Maraua and then to move up to Mechili. Brigadier Rimington had concerns about the state of the brigade, and whether they could get any tanks to Mechili, especially if they took the most direct route. They moved out right after 5pm. He sent a messenger apparently to Cyrenaica Command headquarters with word of their planned movements. Soon, General Morshead arrived and then General Neame returned.

Also at 5pm, the 2/13th Battalion received orders to move to Martuba. They did not realize that the Germans might be there when they arrived. The battalion commander and his adjutant reached Martuba at about 8:30pm. What they found was that those present had panicked and were heading to the east as fast as they could go. Lt-Col. Burrows let Cyrenaica Command know what they had found. His battalion reached Martuba and set up a defensive position. Give that the ground was very hard, they built cover by piling stones. There had been a German group that had blocked the road, but they seemed to have moved. Another German force was located south of Martuba and was still present. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

The 3rd Indian Motor Brigade

We are about to see the mettle of the troops of the 3rd Indian Motor Brigade. They were also fortunate to have a good commander in Brigadier Vaughan, who had been an Indian cavalry regiment commander. After the battle at Mechili, Rommmel praised them for their ability and their break-out from Mechili. They took losses, but being a fully-motorized unit, mounted in Fordson trucks, they were able to concentrate at the critical point and break loose from the enemy encirclement. The 2nd Armoured Division was not so fortunate, and Major-General Gambier-Parry surrendered, unlike the Indian brigade. The way to the east was blocked, but the western side was more open and presented the motor brigade an opportunity to escape the encirclement. They had a good commander, but the British did not provide any artillery for the brigade, so they were hobbled by that lack. Still, they ran through German artillery, where the crews put their hands up as they were overrun by the Indian cavalry. We are going to give the full details from the Australian Official History next week.

Later on 6 April 1941 in western Cyrenaica

Two separate situations were unfolding in western Cyrenaica later on 6 April 1941. First, the 9th Australian Division received orders to withdraw. Second, the enemy were closing in on Mechili. The order for the 9th Australian Division units to withdraw was issued at 4pm on 6 April. Some movement out started as soon as 5pm. About the time that the western-most units received the orders, German forces were coming in contact. One company of the 2/15th Battalion fired on a small German reconnaissance group at 4:15pm. All of the Germans were killed. By 5pm, another mixed German group consisting of a light tank, armored cars, and motorized infantry drove by the 2/48th Battalion, just as they had received the order to withdraw. The infantry dismounted and the situation looked to be difficult. Supporting machine gun fire my the Royal Northumberland Fusiliers kept the Germans from advancing and allowed the Australians to withdraw. The machine gunners took some casualties in the process. A written account gave the Australian attitude towards the situation. They thought that they were in a good position to defend against an attack, which they were abandoning instead of fighting.

By 5pm, the 3rd Indian Motor Brigade commander asked for help, as the force surrounding the brigade in Mechili was getting larger. Rommel was very unhappy with how the day had progressed on 6 April. He had hoped to have enough strength at Mechili to take the place, but instead, they were forced to sit and wait. Once the Fabris unit had arrived at Mechili later on 6 April, Rommel planned at attack at 7am on 7 April. The 3rd Armoured Brigade finally started to move out. The route chosen seemed likely to conflict with the 9th Australian Division withdrawal route. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

The afternoon of 6 April 1941 in Cyrenaica

When Lt-General Neame had left his headquarters, that left General O'Connor in charge. O'Connor had gone to the airfield to talk with reconnaissance pilots. When he returned to the headquarters, he issued orders for the 2nd Armoured Division to head for Mechili, which was threatened. The orders ended up not being implemented, however. The 2nd Support Group had been at Tacasis at 1pm. They got orders by radio to withdraw by the coast road, because of the enemy forces at Mechili. They believed that the orders came from Major-General Gambier-Parry's chief staff officer. While the armored division had ordered the 3rd Armoured Brigade to Mechili, Cyrenaica Command overrode those orders and told them to head for Maraua in the north. The 3rd Indian Motor Brigade received orders from Cyrenaica Command to send a petrol convoy to meet with the 2nd Armoured Division. Perhaps the Germans were listening to British communications because they expected the 2nd Armoured Division to head for Mechili. As the support group headed north, they met Neame. He ordered the support group to hold the "outpost line" that had been held by the 1/KRRC. O'Connor then ordered the 3rd Armoured Brigade to head for Mechili. About this time, O'Connor agreed to let the 9th Australian Division to withdraw to Gazala. Two battalions, the 2/13th and the 2/48th would hold some key points on the route to Gazala. The 1/KRRC was back to reporting to the Australians. Their task would be to cover the engineers as they demolished bridges and supply dumps. The Australians had to use improvised transport in their withdrawal. Brigadier Kisch, the British commander of Cyrenaica Command engineers suggested that the Australians withdraw by the inland road that had been improved, so they avoided possible bottleneck situations farther north. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

The situation takes a bad turn on 6 April 1941 in Cyrenaica

Lt-General Neame's decision to go and visit units on 6 April 1941 was a particularly poor choice. He left Lt-General O'Connor at the Cyrenaica Command headquarters while Neame was out of touch with events. He was able to visit the 9th Australian Division and then left to try and find the 2nd Armoured Division. This was at a time when Rommel and the German Africa Corps was on the move against the British forces. Neame did not realize what was happening. If he had, he would have stayed close to the headquarters so that he could be in touch with rapidly moving events. Major General Morshead, the 9th Australian Division commander believed that his division should pull back to Gazala, while Neame wanted them to pull forward to defend the escarpment. Almost immediately after Neame had left the 9th Australian Division headquarters, General O'Connor phoned to tell them that Mechili was being attacked and the division should prepare to withdraw to Derna.

The 2nd Armoured Division continued to be in a bad state. The 3rd Armoured Division continued to have problems. The brigade commander could not find his division commander. You had the 5th RTR firing by mistake on the 6th RTR. Later in the morning on 6 April, the 2nd Armoured Division was moving to the east towards Mechili. Later in the afternoon, the division headquarters continued to move towards Mechili, but the armored brigade and support group turned north towards Derna.

After General O'Connor had heard about the enemy movement towards Mechili, he went to the airfield to talk with returning pilots. This was at Derna. He heard that there were three enemy columns on the move. One column had left Msus, one had left Agedabia, and one near Gialo in the south. There was actually even more happening, because at Acroma, near Tobruk, they had seen Germans. The Indian 18th Cavalry drove off the enemy troops and captured some Italians. From them, they heard that there were more enemy troops moving forward. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

6 April 1941 at Mechili

Around midday on 6 April 1941, a squadron of the Long Range Desert Group commanded by Major Mitford arrived at Mechili. The squdadron was divided into two parts. The part commanded by Major Mitford captured the Italian officer in charge of several guns that were firing on the fort. That stopped the gunfire. The LRDG was to stay outside of Mechili and operate nearby. An unfortunate development was that the one 25-pounder gun at Mechili was sent off to join the 2nd Armoured Division. After all, the enemy force was not present in any numbers yet. Two aircraft that had taken off from the airfield near Mechili had flown south to the column that now included Rommel. They reported that there was a substantial force at Mechili. Rommel's first instinct was to push and attack. He sent Ponath off with ten vehicles towards Derna to get behind the British. He sent a lieutenant and his men off towards the track from Mechili to Derna. Rommel planned to concentrate the Africa Corps at Mechili. Rommel wanted to attack at Mechili by 3pm. 6 April was an important day. The campaign in Greece started on 6 April. The Germans invaded Greece that day. In Cyrenaica, Rommel's move against Mechili caused an order to withdraw from western Cyrenaica. They considered evacuating Tobruk, but Wavell ordered that Tobruk be held. Earlier on 6 April, a King's Dragoon Guards patrol drove towards Msus to investigate. They reported a large group moving east. They reported back to the headquarters and stayed in contact until they were forced to leave. Lt-General Neame, not knowing what was happening, left his headquarters to visit the 9th Australian Division and the 2nd Armoured Division. He met with Major General Morshead of the 9th Australian Division, and showed just how out of touch he was, as he was in denial that there was a big German push into western Cyrenaica. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

Mechili on 5th and 6th April 1941

On 5 April 1941, Mechili was held by the 3rd Indian Motor Brigade, commanded by Brigadier Vaughan. The brigade worked to improve the defenses during 5 April. Rommel's aide-de-camp, Lieutenant Schulz flew over Mechili in a Fiesler Storch during the afternoon. The 3rd Indian Motor Brigade saw a message asking for an artillery battery to be sent to them. Something about the message didn't seem authentic. Brigader Vaughan asked for the message to be sent again and asked them to use Major Eden's nickname. He was the battery commander. They never got a new message. They saw dust from vehicles driving from Tegender during the evening. Their field squadron, which had been at Tegender arrived. They had an encounter with a German group on the way. That night, there seemed to be a lot of activity on the edge of Mechili. At dawn, they saw some Very lights fired from the landing ground to the south. Some of the 2nd Lancers went to investigate, but the two planes that had landed left. They could see a column of vehicles south of Mechili. The brigade had patrols out that took prisoners. Two field guns started shelling the fort after 9am. Another gun from the northwest started firing. Some troops from the 11th Cavalry drove the gun off. By 11am, two trucks with infantry charged at the 11th Cavalry. They were on the road and were caught by an Australian anti-tank gun. They hit the trucks and caused the troops to leave the trucks and take cover. Two officers took a wrecker out to the knocked out trucks and took some prisoners. They got an Italian 47mm gun, a German officer, and some Italian soldiers. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

Major moves by Rommel early on 5 April 1941

Early on 5 April 1941, Rommel ordered a major mechanized force to advance on Msus from Antelat. A machine gun battalion moved from Soluch towards Msus. The RAF reconnaissance aircraft reported these movements to Cyrenaica Command. The mechanized force included the 5th Armored Regiment and forty tanks from the Ariete Division. They were accompanied by field artillery and anti-tank guns. When Lt-General Neame received the report of German forces east of Msus, he decided to withdraw on Derna. Major General Morshead was aware of what was transpiring and returned to his headquarters and issued orders for an immediate move to Derna. Cyrenaica Command was confused about what was happening. They first ordered the 9th Australian Division to stand fast and then decided to have them withdraw. The 1/KRRC thought that the Germans were not near Msus when they actually were. The machine gun battalion was also very close to Msus. The reality was that the Germans were not yet in Msus but were about to reach the place. About this time, Rommel was receiving erroneous air reconnaissance reports as well. Much of the Africa Corps was driving along the Trigh el Abd. During the night, Rommel tried driving the Trigh el Abd with his lights on and was bombed by British aircraft. He turned his lights off after that incident. Early on 5 April, the 3rd Indian Motor Brigade was fired on by Germans from a distance. The Indians were quickly able to drive them off. The German records do not record what unit was involved in attacking Mechili. During the day on 5 April, one 25pdr gun arrived, the only artillery that the 3rd Indian Motor Brigade had. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

Rommel on 4 and 5 April 1941 in Cyrenaica

Rommel had decided to retake Cyrenaica without letting the higher-level commanders know what he was doing. He was very cautious after his confrontation with General Gariboldi, where Rommel lied about receiving permission. On 4 April 1941, Rommel had dispatched multiple columns heading into the British rear. A battle group of motorcycles and artillery was on the Trigh el Abd. Rommel ordered them to push forward to Ben Gania and then to Mechili. He wanted the Italian armored division, the Ariete, to follow the motor cycle unit. He had assembled another even stronger force that would also travel to Ben Gania and then cut up to the coast at Tmimi. They were destined to attack Tobruk. This battle group was commanded by Lt-Colonel Schwerin. More of the 5th Light Division was to follow Schwerin's group. My noon on 4 April, Rommel rode to Benghazi. He wanted the 3rd Reconnaissance Unit to drive to Mechili by way of Er Regima. They were to wait until they were replaced in Benghazi by the troops from the Brescia Division. The reconnaissance unit was the force that hit the 2/13th Battalion at Er Regima. They had taken tank losses in the British minefield. The Italians had warned Rommel about the Trigh el Abd. Rommel had conducted a reconnaissance of the track and had decided it was passable. The 5th Light Division force struggled on the track. They had many vehicles break down and outrun their supply line. Schwerin's group got closer to Ben Gania, but had also run out of supplies. Rommel took to the air and flew over the scene. He though some of his men were east of Ben Gania, but they were probably men from the Long Range Desert Group. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

Events in Cyrenaica on 5 April 1941

The British forces were oblivious to what Rommel was planning and doing on 5 April 1941 in Cyrenaica. Lt-General Neame met with the 9th Australian Division commander on a track at about 11am. That was the first that the Australian knew about O'Connor not being in charge. For the Australian Morshead, he felt uncomfortable with the situation and wanted to be sure that when he received orders from O'Connor that they were to be obeyed. General Morshead told Neame about his defensive plans, and Neame approved of them. The 3rd Armoured Division managed to move to the El Abiar-Charruba track. The 2nd Armoured Division headquarters was on the move and drove to a position further east. The King's Dragoon Guards units that had been at Msus stayed in company with the 3rd Armoured Brigade as the brigade moved northwards. The 2nd Armoured Division headquarters was to move to Mechili. General Gambier-Parry asked for some anti-tank protection to be sent. The German air force was active and destroyed a 2nd Armoured Division supply dump. Cyrenaica Command had a problem in that they had no idea what Rommel was doing. We know now that what Rommel was doing was preparing to take Cyrenaica without his higher command learning what he was doing. His movements included sending part of the Brescia Division to Benghazi. This freed up the 3rd Reconnaissance Unit for action. Rommel intended to cut across the British rear with mobile forces. Rommel drove to Benghazi early on 5 April. He sent a strong force to Msus. They would travel by way of Antelat. The RAF had reconnaissance aircraft that spotted the Axis forces on the move and reported that to Generals Neame and O'Connor. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History. We highly recommand Barton Maugham's volume, Tobruk and El Alamein to students of the war in North Africa.

Defending the second escarpment in Cyrenaica on 5 April 1941

The commander of the 9th Australian Division, General Morshead, took responsibility for organizing the defense of the second escarpment in Cyrenaica on 5 April 1941. A composite organization consisting of most of the 2/48th Battalion had moved east on the road to Maddalena, and was guarding the pass. This was where the northern road from Barce runs up the escarpment. The 2/15th Battalion held the southern pass. This was to the east of Barce. The 2/17th Battalion set up a defensive position about three miles east of the 2/15th. The plan was for the 2/13th and 2/48th Battalions to move into positions behind the 2/48th and 2/15th Battalions. The 2/24th Battalion was to move to the Wadi Cuff. The engineers prepared demolitions to destroy the road that they had just built. The 2/13th Battalion was in position to the south of the Wadi Cuff. The 9th Australian Division was augmented by the 104th RHA, which was just added to the division. The Australians now had two British artillery regiments, the 104th RHA and the 51st Field Regiment. The Australians now also had another support group unit, the 1/KRRC. They would guard the left flank. Late on 4 April 1941, Cyrenaica Command received news of reinforcements being sent. They included part of the 11th Hussars, the reconnaissance unit of the 7th Armoured Division, the 1st RTR, the 18th Australian Brigade, and the 107th RHA. The 11th Hussars had 32 armored cars. The 1st RTR had 33 tanks. Early on 5 April, General Neame drove to visit the forward units. O'Connor was going to the Wadi Cuff to supervise the preparation of a defense. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

Nothing but confusion on 4 April 1941

General Wavell had left Lt-General Neame in command in Cyrenaica, with Richard O'Connor as just an advisor. When Neame heard about the attack on the 2/13th Battalion at Er Regima, he issued orders for pulling back from the lower escarpment. This was at about 8:30pm on 4 April 1941. The 9th Australian Division was to move to the escarpment at Barce and hold that until pressed by the enemy. He ordered the 2nd Armoured Division to withdraw to Tecnis, except for the forces at Msus. The forces there were to drive north to Charruba. These orders actually just confirmed the movements already underway. The 2nd Support Group moved by desert track to avoid tying up the road. As noted by the 2/17th Battalion, the roads were congested and "choked" by vehicles moving rapidly. The 2/24th Battalion was one of the last units to learn that they were to withdraw. They had refused a ride from a transport unit because they had not been authorized to withdraw. When they saw armored vehicles approaching, they blew their demolitions. They left a rearguard and then moved to Baracca. They finally got their orders to withdraw at 11pm. The commander of the 2/13th Field Company asked for the battalion to withdraw immediately, by foot, so he could destroy the bridge from Baracca to Barce. The battalion commander only was ready to withdraw at 3:15am. They had a few vehicles, so they packed men into those and withdrew. That allowed the engineers to carry out their demolitions. The 2/24th eventually met 20 trucks and were able to unpack the men and move more comfortably. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

With the 3rd Indian Motor Brigade from 3 to 4 April 1941

The two generals, Neame and O'Connor on 3 April 1941 ordered the 3rd Indian Motor Brigade to move to Mechili. The brigade commander, Brigadier Vaughan had been looking at the escarpment at Barce when he was ordered to take his brigade to Mechili. One of the regiments, the 18th Cavalry was to stay at El Adem to guard the airfield. The brigade was to move at night to Tmimi. The 2/3rd Anti-Tank Regiment had been at El Adem. General Neame had originally intended for the anti-tank unit to be with the 9th Australian Division. They were moving towards Derna. They stopped at Gazala at night. When he arrived at Barce, he heard that he was to go to Mechili with the 3rd Indian Motor Brigade. They had heard that there were enemy units at Mechili, so they decided to move in fighting formation from Tmimi. The two Indian cavalry regiments each got an anti-tank battery. One of the battery commanders observed the Indian unit on the move and admired their formation-keeping abilities on the move. There was an airfield at Tmimi. The brigade left there at 10am. The force drove up to Mechili at 3:30pm. One Indian cavalry squadron was already at Mechili and had found no enemy present. That evening they were joined by M Battery of the 3rd RHA. The troops formed a perimeter around the Mechili fort. There was a rough landing ground south of the fort. The anti-tank guns were distributed between the units holding the perimeter. When General Neame finally received word of the German attack on the 2/13th Battalion, he issued orders to withdraw. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

Other action on 4 April 1941 in Cyrenaica

The 2/13th Battalion was fortunate to only have had 98 casualties, a number that included three officers, in the battle at Er Regima on 4 April 1941. Of those, five men were killed. The other unit engaged at Er Regima, the 51st Field Regiment, had one man killed and five "injured" as the Official History says. One of their officers was missing, possibly a prisoner.

The German attack on Er Regima was the only German action on 4 April. The German armored unit, the 5th Light Division, was held back. Their British counterparts, the 2nd Armoured Division, had a bad day on 4 April. A column of vehicles carrying fuel was attacked by German aircraft and the entire column was destroyed. They had met more vehicles with fuel and joined with them, but they were all lost. By evening, the 5th RTR was reduced to nine tanks. The 6th RTR only kept their best Italian tanks and scrapped the rest. They were now down to just nine tanks, as well. The 3rd Hussars, now "14 miles northeast of Msus", were also abandoned their worst tanks. To the south, A Squadron of the LRDG drove south to the Trigh el Abd. They then drove to Bir Ben Gania. They reported back that they had not seen any sign of the enemy forces. A German reconnaissance aircraft overflew them that evening.

While all this was happening, the 3rd Indian Motor Brigade moved to Mechili. The only building at Mechili was an old fort that was very weak. The importance of Mechili was the good water supply. The place had no other value. The 3rd Indian Motor had three completely motorized cavalry units. They only had small arms, apparently, but were highly mobile. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

Disaster at Er Regima and after from 4 April 1941

The 2/13th Battalion had the bad fortune to receive the German attack on 4 April 1941. The attack continued into the night after darkness had fallen. A company-sized group of Germans had quickly surrounded men. They mounted a bayonet charge and fired at the Germans. They ended up moving further into the mass of German troops. A few men managed to escape. A few men managed to get past the anti-tank ditch. The Germans responded by making use of a knocked out tank for cover and as a strong point. The battalion commander, Lt-Col. Burrows decided to withdraw to the second anti-tank ditch past the village. He hoped to meet the expected transport as it came up the road. As we have mentioned, the howitzers from the 51st Field Regiment fired their last ammunition and then withdrew. Some of the Germans had reached the ditch by the railroad station, so some men were sent to beat them back. Major Turner worked to organize the defense. There was a cross over the ditch east of the fort. The men set up a roadblock that they hoped would hold so that more of the battalion could pass through. Hill's company would act as a defense behind the ditch, while Lt-Col. Burrows organized men to hold a position further forward to give Hill's men time to setup their position. Burrows had expected transport to arrive at 7pm, but there was no sign of it. At 10:15pm, Burrows ordered everyone not in the blocking position to move to the east down the road. About a half hour later, the missing transport arrived. They were a company with Cypriot drivers. There were too few trucks, so the men were tightly packed in the vehicles, some even riding on a gun tractor. They passed through Barce, which was on fire. About ten miles past Barce, the men dismounted and dispersed, waiting for dawn. One platoon, back at Er Regima, had gotten free from the enemy, but had missed the battalion withdrawal. They went into the hills in the dark. On their own, they continued to move to the east. They never caught up with the others from their battalion. Two officers and 23 men reached Gazala. Only one man reached Tobruk to rejoin the battalion. The others were all captured by the Germans. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

Fighting at Er Regima on 4 April 1941

The situation at Er Regima on 4 April 1941 quickly deteriorated. Handley's company had German infiltration through their area. The battalion commander sent the carriers to the right flank. This was at the wadi to the north of the rail line. The battalion commander used what little transport he had to bring forward two platoons from A Company. They were supposed to back up one platoon, but ended up behind D Company, instead and were engaged. As organization was lost, Lt-Col. Burrows sent Major Turner to the battle area to try and gain control again. When the two platoons got into position, a German tank approached, but was knocked out by an anti-tank rifle. A private rushed the tank with his Bren gun, fired from the hip, and killed one German and captured the other two. The Bren was nominally a light machine gun, but Australians often picked them up and held them while they fired. The battalion commander now brought one company, not previously engaged, into the fort. They would be needed to cover the forward men as they pulled back. From Simmons platoon, they were caught by the Germans in old Italian sangers and only five men escaped. As the day got later, it was getting dark. The fighting closed in on the fort. The Australians were becoming overwhelmed by larger German numbers. British howitzers fired their remaining ammunition and retreated. The battalion commander decided to move back down the road and hope to meet approaching transport. Reinforcements in the form of two companies of the Royal Northumberland Fusiliers arrived along with an anti-tank company. They machine gunners had not been able to lay down fixed lines of fire, so they figured that they would be of little help. Lt-Col. Burrows had organized the men to be able to both block and to be in position to withdraw. The expected transport had not arrived. The battalion commander at that point had some men to block the road while the rest withdrew. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

The Germans attack at Er Regima on 4 April 1941

As the Germans attacked the pass at Er Regima on 4 April 1941, the demolitions were fired. The explosion happened before the enemy had advanced to the mines. Part of the minefield exploded because of the detonations. Some of the stone sangars that had been built were knocked down as well. The demolitions were a signal, apparently, to the 20th Anti-Tank Company to withdraw. That was particularly unfortunate as the German light tanks were attacking. Just to make matters worse, there were four German armored cars that advanced up the unguarded wadi and were behind the Australians. They were stopped only by the Italian anti-tank ditch. Several light tanks had moved up as well. 18 Platoon was guarding the pass. Two more companies were on the right and left, but not close enough to help. As the German infantry advanced, the platoon fired their available weapons. The enemy took cover in response to the fire. A group of 18pdr guns from the 51st Field Regiment arrived. One gun knocked out a light tank. The gun was knocked out by another tank. The other three guns were also knocked out, but they had knocked out one more German light tank. One Australian fired on the tanks with the anti-tank rifle. Two remaining German tanks circled around and gradually forced the Australians to withdraw. General Morshead decided to move forward with withdrawing the 2/13th Battalion, now that they were under attack. He sent the carrier platoon forward to help the men being attacked. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

An uneasy day on 4 Apirl 1941 in Cyrenaica

In the area east of Benghazi, the men were feeling very uneasy about their situation. Cyrenaica Command was out of touch with reality. They had no idea of where the Germans were or what they were doing. General O'Connor had decided to keep the Australians on the escarpment to impeded any German advance. At the wadi at Er Regima, the three companies of the 2/13th Battalion. The battalion commanders had two battalions forward, one on the right and one on the left. They left an undefended gap in the middle. They third company was held in reserve. While they had been promised some 25pdr guns, all they had were four 4.5in howitzers. They also had a machine gun company. The day before, Hurricanes of the RAF flew out to the east from where they had been based. They flew out of an airfield at Benina, at the foot of the pass at Er Regima. There had been a great deal of traffic from units that were withdrawn from the west. They had heard explosions from the demolitions fired by various engineer units. All they could do is watch the road and wait for something to happen. On the afternoon of 4 April 1941, a column could be seen driving out of Benghazi towards their positions. The vehicles included tanks, armored cars, and troop-carrying trucks. There were two groups of tanks in line abreast heading for the pass. The howitzers and some captured Italian mortars fired on the tanks. They knocked out one light tank with a mortar round. They hit other tanks, but did not knock them out. The tanks withdrew, but the infantry dismounted in preparation for an assault. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

The British "out of touch" on 4 April 1941

By the middle of 4 April 1941, the commander of the 2nd Armoured Division did not know where the 3rd Armoured Brigade was located. The Australian commmander Morshead was under the impression that the commander of the 2nd Armoured Division was not that concerned about now knowing where the 3rd Armoured Brigade was. At a meeting, General Gambier-Parry said that he figured that the Germans had achieved their goal for now by taking Benghazi. He did not know how Rommel thought or operated. General O'Connor apparently agreed and wanted the 9th Australian Division to stop withdrawing. The division had two battalions on the first escarpment. A third battalion would hold a position east of Barce. They would be on the second escarpment. The British now had no idea about where the Germans and Italians were and what they were doing. They were out of contact on the ground and had lost air reconnaissance due to the units moving to the rear.

The Australians were in a precarious position. They were not able to dig in on the escarpment. They were reduced to piling stones for cover. After the meeting, General Morshead visited the 20th Australian Brigade, only to find the commander was driving to the division headquarters. The 2/17th Battalion now had transport to move. They would move to the Barce pass. He also learned that the enemy was going to attack the 2/13th Battalion at Er Regima. This is based on the acount in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

The 3rd Armoured Brigade at Msus early on 4 April 1941

The two squadrons of the King's Dragoon Guards led the advance of the 3rd Armoured Brigade on Msus. They drove into Msus by abour 8:30am on 4 April 1941. The 3rd Armoured Brigade continued to lose tanks to breakdown as they moved. The 6th RTR only arrived by early afternoon. Part of the problem was that they lacked water to add to tank radiators. The Italian tanks in the 6th RTR particularly were bothered by this issue. As we have previously mentioned, they found a ration dump that had not been destroyed so they were temporarily resupplied with food. The German aircraft found them, dropped bombs and a flare to mark their presence. They found that all the fuel had been destroyed even though there were no Germans present. The armored brigade second-in-command was sent out to find more fuel north of Msus.

We now hear from Cyrenaica Command. They sent a message saying that the main Axis column seemed to be heading for Benghazi. The task for the 2nd Armoured Division was to protect the flank of the 9th Australian Division. To do that, they should move to Mechili by the track from Ablar to Mechili. General O'Connor left the Cyrenaica Command headquarters to look for General Gambier-Parry and the 2nd Armoured Division headquarters. General Neame was also out from his headquarters, looking at the Wadi Cuff, which he thought would be a good position to occupy.

Both the 2nd Armoured Division and the 2nd Support Group were now at El Ablar and were close to the 9th Australian Division headquarters. Some of the support group was with the 3rd Armoured Brigade. The rest were spread out between Er Regima and El Ablar. Some more troops came through Er Regima and reported the flag of Italy now flew over Benghazi and that the Germans and Italians were in Benghazi. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

What was the truth? Rommel's orders and his situation on 3 April 1941

We think that the truth about Rommel's orders were that Hitler had ordered Rommel to go on the defensive and to not carry out any larger operations such as taking Tobruk. The 15th Panzer Division was under orders for North Africa. The High Command still did not want Rommel to make a major move in North Africa. The High Command knew information that Rommel did not, such as the plans for invading Russia. Operations were underway in Greece and there was the island of Crete to deal with. All that required air power that could not be spared to participate in extensive operations in North Africa.He seems to have lied about the orders that he received to General Gariboldi on 3 April 1941.

In any case, the demolitions carried out by the British and Australian engineers were so extensive that they brought the German advance to a halt. The participants were the 2nd Armoured Division engineers and the engineers of the 2/3rd Australian Field Company. The 5th Light Division reported that four days would be required to bring up fuel and refuel their tanks and vehicles. Rommel's reaction was to stop any movement and to have all available vehicles used to bring up "supplies and ammunition". The result was that the German advance was halted for the moment and the British were given a reprieve.

Early on 4 April 1941, the 3rd Armoured Brigade and other forces with Brigadier Rimington started to move towards Msus. Some fraction of the total were sent to El Abiar. The King's Dragoon Guards arrived at Msus by 8:30am and found food that they desperately needed. There was no sign of any Germans. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

With Rommel on 3 April 1941

By 3 April 1941, General Wavell was realizing that he needed to change plans to meet the threat from Rommel in the Western Desert. They would keep the 7th Australian Division and possibly change the plans for the 6th Australian Division. While this was happening, Rommel was making plans as well. In the afternoon of 3 April 1941, Rommel visited the most advanced troops from the Ariete Division. They were traveling from Agedabia to the Trigh el Abd. He found that the ground was firm and could be safely traveled. When he returned to his headquarters, he ordered the Ariete Division to send a detachment to travel the Trigh el Abd to Ben Gania. He also ordered them to check the track to Msus. By 4:45pm, Rommel received word that the British had left Magrun. He ordered the 3rd Reconnaissance Unit to travel the coast road to Magrun and then scout out the way beyond Magrun. Rommel drove forward to joint the reconnaissance unit. They heard that the British had left Benghazi, so he ordered his troops forward. They reached Benghazi before morning. By the time Rommel had returned to his headquarters, he found that he had to deal with General Gariboldi, who was unhappy about the recent moves. He wanted Rommel not to make any advances without consulting him. Rommel told General Gariboldi that he needed freedom of action, as he was a German general. Fortunately for Rommel, he received a message from German High Command giving him the freedom he needed. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

The initial moves on 4 April 1941

While the 9th Australian Division was involved in the moves to the second escarpment, transport was a problem. The solution was to take vehicles from units that had them to transport the battalions that lacked vehicles. One battalion, the 2/48th, from the 26th Brigade had just taken position at Baracca, which was on the lower escarpment, was to move to Maddalena. This is where the northern pass is located. The 2/15th Battalion from the 20th Brigade had been held in reserve. They were now to move east of Barce to the southern pass. The 9th Australian Division had been given the 1/Royal Fusiliers and the 24th Anti-Tank Company. They would move to El Abiar, which in the scheme of things, would allow the 2/15th Battalion move. By daylight on 4 April, the battalions were able to move. We remember that the 7th Armoured Division motor battalion, the 1/King's Royal Rifle Corps, was supplied by General Wavell to bolster the defenses. Being a motor battalion, they were able to immediate start their move and they arrived in position by 9am on 4 April 1941. A fifth 9th Australian Division company was gathering near El Abiar. They had been on the escarpment to the north of Er Regima. They had given up their transport to move other units, so they had to wait for more transport to arrive. Using first line transport from units that needed to move meant that other transport had to be found. An officer from the 9th Australian Division staff had to find the necessary transport. Another officer, Major Dodds, collected available transport at Barce. The unit movement was slowed due to this issue, so battalions that had given up their first-line transport to move other units had to sit until later in the afternoon on 4 April. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

Cyrenaica Command in confusion late on 3 April 1941

Almost the first thing that happened after General Wavell left Cyrenaica Command, a conference was held. This was late on 3 April 1941. Colonel Lloyd, of the 9th Australian Division, was at the conference representing his division. Decisions were being made without knowing any hard information. Communications were non-existent. They had no idea what was happening with the 2nd Armoured Division. They thought that there were 100 German vehicles at Msus, but an officer from the armored division artillery told Colonel Lloyd that the vehicles at Msus were the 3rd Armoured Brigade. At the meeting, they decided to pull back to a line from Wadi Derna to Mechili. They would pull out of most of Jebel Achdar and let the Germans advance. The 3rd Indian Motor Brigade was still at El Adem, but they would be ordered to move to Mechili. They would send the 2nd Armoured Brigade to join them at Mechili, so that they would have some artillery. B Squadron of the 2nd Royal Lancers was already at Mechili. They expected the 9th Australian Division to put two battalions east of Barce on the "second escarpment". The plan was that by defending the second escarpment, that they would enable a "general withdrawal" from the forward part of Cyrenaica. A 7th Armoured Division motor battalion arrived at Barce to help the 9th Australian Division. The division would do a staged withdrawal to Derna. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

The withdrawal in the midst of confusion on 3 and 4 April 1941

After the erroneous information about Er Regima was received, the 2nd Armoured Division wheeled vehicles headed for the Wadi Gattara. They would attempt to reach the plateau by crossing the escarpment. The vehicles were blocked at this point, although small groups made their way up the escarpment. Some of the 2nd Support Group did not receive the bad information and they were able to move through Er Regima. The Australian 2/13th Battalion held the pass and saw the support group vehicles passing through. More support group vehicles went to Tocra, held by the 26th Australian Brigade, and passed through there.

Brigadier Rimington, the 3rd Armoured Brigade commander, was still at Esc Sceleidima. Since the word about Er Regima being closed, he changed his orders to his brigade. He was out of communication with his division commander, so he decided to sit at Esc Sceleidima until he was back in communication. He ordered the 3rd Hussars to hold the east end of the pass. The 5th RTR and 6th RTR would hold the western end of the pass. There was a report of Germans approaching, but the vehicles were from the King's Dragoon Guards. Overnight, Brigadier Rimington decided to take his brigade to Msus in the morning. If the Germans were really there, he would fight them. During the night, the remains of the Tower Hamlets Rifles arrived at Esc Sceleidima. They were also joined by two squadrons from the King's Dragoon Guards. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

Late on 3 April 1941 in Cyrenaica

The supply dump at Msus was destroyed on the basis of wrong information late in the afternoon on 3 April 1941. There were no Germans near by or in Msus. The only unidentified vehicles were those of the Long Range Desert Group and armored cars of the King's Dragoon Guards. The RAF gave an erroneous reconnaissance report about some fifty German vehicles at Msus. The fifty was said to probably include tanks, which were no where near Msus. At 5pm, General Wavell left Cyrenaica Command Headquarters to return to his headquarters in Cairo. He left with wrong information about the situation. Instead of replacing General Neame with O'Connor, he left Neame in command with O'Connor as an advisor. That is what we had always heard was the case, and this explains it. It seemed that O'Connor was going to actually be in command, but that did not happen.

After the air reconnaissance report, General Gambier-Parry ordered the 3rd Amoured Brigade to move to Er Regima. The division had many wheeled vehicles, and these were largely moving towards Er Regima. The division headquarters was also moving and was crossing the Wadi Gattara. Typical of how badly things were going, a British aircraft dropped a message at the division headquarters. The message was from Cyrenaica Command from 10am that day. The message was wrong and out of date. The message told them to get east of the escarpment before moving to the Wadi Gattara do avoid a British minefield. The officers in the headquarters thought it meant that Er Regima was closed, which was not the case. The message caused confusion and disruption, as vehicles further north were diverted away from Er Regima. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

Confusion on the afternoon of 3 April 1941

With the 2nd Armoured Division headquarters issuing new orders while not knowing where its units were located, the situation descended into chaos. There were reports of Germans either heading for Msus or already there that were totally false at this point. The Tower Hamlets Rifles and artillery were sitting at Sidi Brahim and about a mile to the south. Only by 4pm did the 3rd Armoured Brigade receive new orders. The commander warned the 5th RTR and 3rd Hussars of an impending move to Msus. By this point, the 1st RTR and other units had scattered upon seeing units on the move and not having orders themselves. The situation was so bad that the 6th RTR, which was supposed to meet the Support Group did not know their location or even their radio frequency. The continued to sit at Esc Sceleidima. The rest of the armored brigade was still there, as well. While all this played out, the 2nd Armoured Division headquarters sent a message to Cyrenaica Command that they could not hold the escarpment because there was no route to send supplies. General Wavell was still at Cyrenaica Command, along with Generals O'Connor and Neame. In response, Cyrenaica Command, presumably from General Neame, but with knowledge of the others, ordered the armored division to withdraw by way of Er Regima. All this time, while they had reports of Germans either at Msus or heading there, the Long Range Desert Group was ordered use Msus as a base. Units moving towards Msus included the armored division recovery unit and an RAF ground unit. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

The 2nd Armoured Difvision becomes confused on 3 April 1941

After a meeting with the division commander at midday on 3 April 1941, the units of the 2nd Armoured Division became confused. The issue was that not everyone received new orders or even had any orders, and that the orders had changed once or more in the last day. One command was that the division would keep the enemy from the escarpment, north of Esc Sceleidima. As the meeting ended, they received a reconnaissance report from the RAF that enemy units were "approaching Msus from Antelat". The enemy was on the coast road and on the route from Agedabia. Cyrenaica Command also received a message from the armored division and got confused, thinking that the Germans were already in Msus, which they were not. The King's Dragoon Guards were near Antelat, the 6th RTR was moving towards Msus from Antelat. The 5th RTR had orders to intercept eight tanks moving north, which were actually the 6th RTR tanks. The problems seems to have been too many changes. The support group, along with the 6th RTR, was to hold the escarpment. The armored brigade was sent to Msus to fight the presumed enemy column. The support group had their orders, but the 3rd Armoured Brigade did not receive their orders. Some units without orders just followed other units in their movements. The armored division headquarters arrived at Cyrenaica Command and reported that the division would not be able to hold the escarpment. Cyrenaica Command then ordered a withdrawal by way of Er Regima. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

The situation deteriorates for the British on 3 April 1941 in Cyrenaica

Rommel received a message from General Gariboldi on 2 April 1941. The general had seen information that led him to correctly believe that Rommel was continuing to advance, despite that being contrary to his orders. Rommel was receiving reconnaissance reports about the British withdrawal, and he wanted to continue to push them. Early on 3 April 1941, the 6th RTR left Antelat in an odd direction, due to orders that they had received at 1am. They were now needed to move to Esc Sceleidima, where the escarpment is passable. They moved off to the southwest, and then returned to Antelat, now abandoned. They finally moved towards Esc Sceleidima, but were slowed by their M13/40 tanks continually overheating. After 8am, the rest of the 2nd Armoured Division moved towards Esc Sceleidima. The King's Dragoon Guards maintained scouts to the south. The 2nd Armoured Division had arrived at Esc Sceleidima by late morning. General Gambier-Parry held a conference for the division unit officers. They planned where units would be positioned. After the conference, they had a report from reconnaissance aircraft about a German column nearing Msus from Antelat. From this point, communications were less reliable and not all messages were received. Also the 2nd Armoured Division headquarters lost track of the division's units and they were headed for problems. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

More about the situation on 2 April 1941

As the Germans were advancing in early April 1941, the 9th Australian Division was lacking information. They were also not ready to fight. The right was held by the 26th Brigade, which only had the 2/24th Battalion. They had only obtained enough transport to move the 2/48th Battalion forward from Gazala. They arrived at Baracca at 5pm. By 3 April, they were ten miles from Tocra, near "an Italian settlement".

General Wavell felt compelled to visit Barce and the Cyrenaica Command headquarters. He was having one of those periodic exchanges with Churchill in London. Wavell had directed General Neame to keep his armor in being, even if that involved withdrawing from Benghazi. That got a negative response from the Prime Minister. Churchill had suggested bringing General O'Connor forward. In fact, Wavell decided to replace Neame with O'Connor. The situation was such that Neame being so far from the action, that he did not have effective control. One goal was to keep the 2nd Armoured Division concentrated, rather than to scatter the division. General Gambier-Parry was going to withdraw on El Ablar. The coast road had the disadvantage that the supply dump at Magrun was destroyed by the 2/3rd Australian Field Company. Neame was still in command and ordered demolitions at Benghazi in preparation for withdrawal. Demolition charges were exploded at Er Regima. They blew the minefield, as they expected, so they laid new anti-tank mines at the pass. On the morning of 3 April, Wavell and Neame met with General Morshead, of the 9th Australian Division, and passed on the news that O'Connor would arrive to take over Cyrenaica Command. O'Connor came by plane with Brigadier Combe. He landed at El Adem and sent word to the 3rd Indian Motor Brigade that they should be ready to send two regiments to Mechili. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

Tank fight in the afternoon of 2 April 1941

The 5th RTR was able to meet two trucks loaded with petrol. They were able to refuel from them. They were also able to make contact with the 3rd Armoured Brigade headquarters. They had nine tanks providing protection, and these saw enemy forces approaching with some 30 to 40 vehicles. They heard about the 3rd Hussars being in a fight and needing help. The battalion commander sent four tanks to support the 3rd Hussars. At the same time, the Tower Hamlets Rifles was being attacked with tanks. They were located to the west. British artillery fire allowed the Tower Hamlets to withdraw. German tanks got through the British guns, but did not pursue the withdrawing infantry. The nine tanks were now in a hull-down position behind a ridge. By 5:30pm on 2 April 1941, the 5th RTR was under attack by what proved to be the II/5th Armored Battalion (German). The 5th RTR now only had 14 tanks, after sending the four tanks to help the 3rd Hussars. In the tank battle, the British destroyed three German tanks, but lost five of their own. Another tank took damage, but was still operable. The German advance came with the sunset behind them. The 5th RTR was then able to withdraw back to the next ridge. The British were fortunate to have survived this battle, and the Germans were not very aggressive and could have destroyed the entire battalion. Upon hearing of this battle, General Gambier-Parry, the 2nd Armoured Division commander, ordered the division to move to Antelat. The move left the coast road to Benghazi without a blocker. Cyrenaica Command, commanding from the rear, was not aware of this situation. From 7pm until a 2am halt, the 5th RTR continued to withdraw. They were down to 12 tanks at that point. The rest of the division reached Antelat during the evening of 2 April, although the King's Dragoon Guards did not reach Antelat until 9am on 3 April. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

Rommel moves forward as the British withdraw in early April 1941

The British were withdrawing in the face of the German attack. The 2nd Support Group initially moved some 30 miles north of Agedabia. The 3rd Armoured Brigade was now east of Agedabia. They had two units forward. The 3rd Hussars were to the right while the 5th RTR was to the left. A squadron from the 6th RTR was guarding the rear of the 3rd Hussars. By 1pm, the 5th RTR could see German vehicles following them. The King's Dragoon Guards could see German armored cars moving towards Antelat. After seeing the British withdrawal, Rommel was compelled to take action. He ordered his division to attack Agedabia and take it. He also wanted the small port of Ez Zuetina. While the Germans were advancing, General Neame was trying to slow down the British withdrawal and stay in control. Neame was leaving the 2nd Armoured Division divided into two groups that were too far apart to support each other. General Gambier-Parry replied back to Neame that he should have the option to commit his armored brigade if an opportunity presented itself. General Neame was too far from events to know about what was happening. By now, the 3rd Armoured Brigade had only 22 cruiser tanks and 25 light tanks. The tanks were breaking down at a rate of about one per ten miles traveled. By 4pm, the 3rd Armoured Brigade was still moving back towards planned defensive position. The 5th RTR was slowed by having to stay with a composite battery from the 1st RHA, which could only move at 7 miles per hour. There was still a 6th RTR presence at Beda Fomm, where they had been waiting. They had about 40 Italian tanks. They were ordered to move forward to Antelat. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

The withdrawal on 31 March to 1 April 1941

The plan had been for the 2nd Armoured Division to move to the east and set up a new defensive position. The division, however, was too slow to move. At this point, the Germans were not following, however. The 2nd Support Group occupied a new position astride the coast road about 30 miles past Mersa Brega. The position had a marsh on the right, so that provided some protection. The armored brigade was on the left. The 3rd Hussars, with some artillery, tried to provide some protection to the withdrawal. By the morning of 1 April, the 5th RTR was down to 23 tanks. The armor was on the desert track to the east of the coast road. The King's Dragoon Guards were positioned towards the desert to watch for any German forces. General Neame visited General Gambier-Parry at Maaten el Baghlia. He ordered the armored division to withdraw towards Benghazi. By early afternoon, the withdrawal was in progress. General Neame had already ordered the troops at Benghazi to prepare demolitions at the harbor and to be ready for a withdrawal. Near Msus, troops from the 3rd Indian Motor Brigade encountered German troops. At a distance, they saw some strange vehicles. They might have been the Free French, but then they were recognized as enemy. They headed off to escape, and had a pursuer for some thirty miles. The acting commander of the 3rd Indian Motor Brigade sent out a group towards the reported enemy force, but did not hear any more for three days. By the start of 2 April, the support group saw German activity in front of them. They had carriers scouting. The Germans attacked with forty tanks with infantry. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

Mersa Brega falls on 31 March 1941

The German main force was moving on Mersa Brega by early afternoon on 31 March 1941. Cemetery Hill was hit hard by German dive bombers. That was followed by an attack by tanks and trucks with infantry. The British 25pdr battery and anti-tank guns fired on them and forced them to pull back. The British commander wanted to chase them, but ran out of time when the next attack came. This time, the attackers were all tanks and came close, but could not get past a sand ridge that was close to the British. They were fired on by British guns. Some tanks were knocked out and others were bogged down in the sand. There were two more dive bomber attacks late in the afternoon. By 5:30pm, German artillery was firing on the British positions. Infantry and tanks were moving forward with Rommel on the scene, deciding to attack to "the north of the coast road". By 6pm, the Germans were successful. By 7pm, they were in Mersa Brega. The 2nd Support Group was forced to withdraw from the position. They moved back about 8 miles. They had mounted a counter-attack before withdrawing, and had some success, but lost eight carriers. The defenders of Mersa Brega had lost 55 men. There was now nothing to stop Rommel from reaching Benghazi or Tobruk. During the night, the 2nd Support Group had moved back to a position about 20 miles in front of Agedabia. They expected a battle there the next day. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

The German attack on 31 March 1941

The plan for the 2nd Armoured Division was to withdraw if they were attacked by the Germans. There were armored cars from the King's Dragoon Guards accompanied by four tanks from the 5th Royal Tank Regiment. There were just four cruiser tanks. The 2nd Support Group was at Mersa Brega. They planned to use motorized infantry and carriers to conduct patrols in front of the salt marshes. The armored cars and tanks hoped to ambush German tanks. Instead, they saw a group of German tanks, exchanged fire, took damage on one tank. The Germans appeared to be ready to encircle the patrol. In fact, the German force was of all arms, with artillery and infantry, as well as tanks. The British retreated with German tanks in pursuit. They again exchanged fire near El Agheila, in the middle of the sand dunes. The Germans then headed south, leaving the British to withdraw. The armored cars stayed there in the sand dunes to continue to report on events. The Germans reached Mersa Brega by 7:45am. The men at Cemetery Hill saw Germans to the southwest. They saw five German tanks and two trucks. Infantry had gotten off the trucks. There were some twenty to thirty Germans. By 9am, men of the Tower Hamlets saw the large German force approaching Mersa Brega. By 9:30am, the Germans were advancing. The motorized infantry of the Support Group pulled back, but left carriers scouting in front. By 10am, the Germans brought up a gun, accompanied by four tanks. They commenced firing and the British carriers had to pull back. The British still had artillery observers on Cemetery Hill. They directed fire on the advancing Germans. One carrier platoon stayed near the hill to give support. By 10:30am, the Germans were moving on Cemetery Hill. The 104th RHA fired on the Germans. The men from the hill pulled back to a ridge that crossed the road. The carriers stayed near the hill. They actually fired on tanks at some 300 yards. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

At the front in Cyrenaica on 30 March 1941

The forward units facing the Germans were all British units. The 2nd Armoured Division was finding that the Italian M13/40 tanks were unsatisfactory. After being driven for 10 or 12 miles, the engines overheated. Once they were driven and overheated, they needed time to cool. That meant that they could be driven 48 miles in a day. They had 68 tanks of all sorts that could be used, even if with problems. Not only the tank situation was an issue. They had never trained as a unit. They also lost their communications equipment, as it was all sent to Greece.

The units of the 2nd Armoured Division were in place at the front. The right was held by the 2nd Support Group, commanded by Brigadier Latham. They had eight miles of front within the Mersa Brega salt marshes. They had part of the Tower Hamlets Rifles, a company of the French Motor Battalion, and the 104th Royal Horse Artillery. There was a group on the cemetery hill. They were a company of the Tower Hamlets Rifles and two machine-gun sections. Another company of Tower Hamlets Rifles was "preparing a position in the rear". They were approximately one mile north of Agedabia.

On the left, there were about 5 miles of ground to the south from the road that could not be traveled by tanks. Behind this was the 3rd Armoured Brigade. The 3rd Hussars were forward with 26 tanks, a mix of Lt.Mk.VI and M13/40 tanks. They had an Australian anti-tank company with them. There was also the 5th RTR. They had two field artillery batteries and two light anti-aircraft guns with each of the regiments. Most of the 6th RTR was still at Beda Fomm. Armored cars from the King's Dragoon Guards were scouting in front of the tanks. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

Australian discipline on 31 March 1941

General Neame had seen General Morshead a stinging letter complaining about the lack of discipline in Australian troops. General Morshead thought that the letter had a distinct anti-Australian tone and was unfair. About 31 March 1941, General Morshead took steps to answer the letter from Neame. He was forwarding the letter to General Blamey, the head of the Australian forces (AIF). Morshead wondered why the British didn't arrest the Australians who were acting poorly. General Morshead ordered the men to place civilian towns and cities, and even camps, out-of-bounds. They reiterated plans for a system of passes to go to Benghazi or Barce on business. Post-war, General Neame had written complimentary words about the Australians serving near Benghazi.

At the same time, Rommel was concerned about the work of the 2nd Armoured Division preparing defenses that would be hard to attack if they waited for them to be completed. He decided that they had to attack with the small force that they had to prevent having to face stronger defenses. The Germans would use the 8th Machine Gun Battalion to relieve the 3rd Reconnaissance Unit for scouting. They planned to take Mersa Brega on 31 March 1941. They would take Gialo on 2 April. They planned a small airborne attack.

The main addition to the British force defending Cyrenaica was the 3rd Indian Motor Brigade, now with three battalions mounted in motor vehicles. They lacked any artillery, however. They also had "A" squadron of the Long Range Desert Group. They had reached Barce on 30 March. Other forces were added, including a machine gun company, a company of the French Motor Battalion, and one battery of anti-tank guns. The 5th RTR had also arrived, but on several dozen of the 52 cruiser tanks had reached the front. The rest had broken down on the way. The total tank strength of the 2nd Armoured Division was some 68 tanks of mixed types. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

29 March 1941

Interestingly, Libyan Arabs were allied with the British. There were some Libyan battalions holding locations in the rear. They did have a problem with Arabs pilfering telephone wire. The real problems were communications and the lack of motor transport. The division signals unit was back at Gazala. Things were so bad for communications that the Australians had to use civilian telephone wires. The lack of transport meant that only five of eight battalions were in position. The battalions in position were largely immobile. One battalion, the 2/48th, was sitting at Gazala, waiting to be able to move forward to the 26th Brigade area. The lack of transport left the 24th Brigade at Tobruk. On top of all that, General Neame sent General Morshead a letter complaining about the conduct of Australian troops. The allegations including looting and other forms of misconduct. The misconduct included drunken Australian soldiers. The Australians needed military police to crack down in the lack of discipline, but there were none. The only unit was left in the rear. General Morshead had asked to have the provost company brought forward, but the British had not responded. Undisciplined Australian soldiers running loose in the rear had become increasingly common and was giving the Australian army a bad name. Something needed to be done. We have seen that in June and July, 1941, the problem still existed, despite the good performance of Australian troops fighting the Vichy French. The British seem reluctant to arrest the Australians. General Morshead said that they needed to know who the offenders were so that they could be disciplined. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.