6 April 1941 at Mechili

Around midday on 6 April 1941, a squadron of the Long Range Desert Group commanded by Major Mitford arrived at Mechili. The squdadron was divided into two parts. The part commanded by Major Mitford captured the Italian officer in charge of several guns that were firing on the fort. That stopped the gunfire. The LRDG was to stay outside of Mechili and operate nearby. An unfortunate development was that the one 25-pounder gun at Mechili was sent off to join the 2nd Armoured Division. After all, the enemy force was not present in any numbers yet. Two aircraft that had taken off from the airfield near Mechili had flown south to the column that now included Rommel. They reported that there was a substantial force at Mechili. Rommel's first instinct was to push and attack. He sent Ponath off with ten vehicles towards Derna to get behind the British. He sent a lieutenant and his men off towards the track from Mechili to Derna. Rommel planned to concentrate the Africa Corps at Mechili. Rommel wanted to attack at Mechili by 3pm. 6 April was an important day. The campaign in Greece started on 6 April. The Germans invaded Greece that day. In Cyrenaica, Rommel's move against Mechili caused an order to withdraw from western Cyrenaica. They considered evacuating Tobruk, but Wavell ordered that Tobruk be held. Earlier on 6 April, a King's Dragoon Guards patrol drove towards Msus to investigate. They reported a large group moving east. They reported back to the headquarters and stayed in contact until they were forced to leave. Lt-General Neame, not knowing what was happening, left his headquarters to visit the 9th Australian Division and the 2nd Armoured Division. He met with Major General Morshead of the 9th Australian Division, and showed just how out of touch he was, as he was in denial that there was a big German push into western Cyrenaica. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

Mechili on 5th and 6th April 1941

On 5 April 1941, Mechili was held by the 3rd Indian Motor Brigade, commanded by Brigadier Vaughan. The brigade worked to improve the defenses during 5 April. Rommel's aide-de-camp, Lieutenant Schulz flew over Mechili in a Fiesler Storch during the afternoon. The 3rd Indian Motor Brigade saw a message asking for an artillery battery to be sent to them. Something about the message didn't seem authentic. Brigader Vaughan asked for the message to be sent again and asked them to use Major Eden's nickname. He was the battery commander. They never got a new message. They saw dust from vehicles driving from Tegender during the evening. Their field squadron, which had been at Tegender arrived. They had an encounter with a German group on the way. That night, there seemed to be a lot of activity on the edge of Mechili. At dawn, they saw some Very lights fired from the landing ground to the south. Some of the 2nd Lancers went to investigate, but the two planes that had landed left. They could see a column of vehicles south of Mechili. The brigade had patrols out that took prisoners. Two field guns started shelling the fort after 9am. Another gun from the northwest started firing. Some troops from the 11th Cavalry drove the gun off. By 11am, two trucks with infantry charged at the 11th Cavalry. They were on the road and were caught by an Australian anti-tank gun. They hit the trucks and caused the troops to leave the trucks and take cover. Two officers took a wrecker out to the knocked out trucks and took some prisoners. They got an Italian 47mm gun, a German officer, and some Italian soldiers. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

Major moves by Rommel early on 5 April 1941

Early on 5 April 1941, Rommel ordered a major mechanized force to advance on Msus from Antelat. A machine gun battalion moved from Soluch towards Msus. The RAF reconnaissance aircraft reported these movements to Cyrenaica Command. The mechanized force included the 5th Armored Regiment and forty tanks from the Ariete Division. They were accompanied by field artillery and anti-tank guns. When Lt-General Neame received the report of German forces east of Msus, he decided to withdraw on Derna. Major General Morshead was aware of what was transpiring and returned to his headquarters and issued orders for an immediate move to Derna. Cyrenaica Command was confused about what was happening. They first ordered the 9th Australian Division to stand fast and then decided to have them withdraw. The 1/KRRC thought that the Germans were not near Msus when they actually were. The machine gun battalion was also very close to Msus. The reality was that the Germans were not yet in Msus but were about to reach the place. About this time, Rommel was receiving erroneous air reconnaissance reports as well. Much of the Africa Corps was driving along the Trigh el Abd. During the night, Rommel tried driving the Trigh el Abd with his lights on and was bombed by British aircraft. He turned his lights off after that incident. Early on 5 April, the 3rd Indian Motor Brigade was fired on by Germans from a distance. The Indians were quickly able to drive them off. The German records do not record what unit was involved in attacking Mechili. During the day on 5 April, one 25pdr gun arrived, the only artillery that the 3rd Indian Motor Brigade had. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

Rommel on 4 and 5 April 1941 in Cyrenaica

Rommel had decided to retake Cyrenaica without letting the higher-level commanders know what he was doing. He was very cautious after his confrontation with General Gariboldi, where Rommel lied about receiving permission. On 4 April 1941, Rommel had dispatched multiple columns heading into the British rear. A battle group of motorcycles and artillery was on the Trigh el Abd. Rommel ordered them to push forward to Ben Gania and then to Mechili. He wanted the Italian armored division, the Ariete, to follow the motor cycle unit. He had assembled another even stronger force that would also travel to Ben Gania and then cut up to the coast at Tmimi. They were destined to attack Tobruk. This battle group was commanded by Lt-Colonel Schwerin. More of the 5th Light Division was to follow Schwerin's group. My noon on 4 April, Rommel rode to Benghazi. He wanted the 3rd Reconnaissance Unit to drive to Mechili by way of Er Regima. They were to wait until they were replaced in Benghazi by the troops from the Brescia Division. The reconnaissance unit was the force that hit the 2/13th Battalion at Er Regima. They had taken tank losses in the British minefield. The Italians had warned Rommel about the Trigh el Abd. Rommel had conducted a reconnaissance of the track and had decided it was passable. The 5th Light Division force struggled on the track. They had many vehicles break down and outrun their supply line. Schwerin's group got closer to Ben Gania, but had also run out of supplies. Rommel took to the air and flew over the scene. He though some of his men were east of Ben Gania, but they were probably men from the Long Range Desert Group. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

Events in Cyrenaica on 5 April 1941

The British forces were oblivious to what Rommel was planning and doing on 5 April 1941 in Cyrenaica. Lt-General Neame met with the 9th Australian Division commander on a track at about 11am. That was the first that the Australian knew about O'Connor not being in charge. For the Australian Morshead, he felt uncomfortable with the situation and wanted to be sure that when he received orders from O'Connor that they were to be obeyed. General Morshead told Neame about his defensive plans, and Neame approved of them. The 3rd Armoured Division managed to move to the El Abiar-Charruba track. The 2nd Armoured Division headquarters was on the move and drove to a position further east. The King's Dragoon Guards units that had been at Msus stayed in company with the 3rd Armoured Brigade as the brigade moved northwards. The 2nd Armoured Division headquarters was to move to Mechili. General Gambier-Parry asked for some anti-tank protection to be sent. The German air force was active and destroyed a 2nd Armoured Division supply dump. Cyrenaica Command had a problem in that they had no idea what Rommel was doing. We know now that what Rommel was doing was preparing to take Cyrenaica without his higher command learning what he was doing. His movements included sending part of the Brescia Division to Benghazi. This freed up the 3rd Reconnaissance Unit for action. Rommel intended to cut across the British rear with mobile forces. Rommel drove to Benghazi early on 5 April. He sent a strong force to Msus. They would travel by way of Antelat. The RAF had reconnaissance aircraft that spotted the Axis forces on the move and reported that to Generals Neame and O'Connor. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History. We highly recommand Barton Maugham's volume, Tobruk and El Alamein to students of the war in North Africa.

Defending the second escarpment in Cyrenaica on 5 April 1941

The commander of the 9th Australian Division, General Morshead, took responsibility for organizing the defense of the second escarpment in Cyrenaica on 5 April 1941. A composite organization consisting of most of the 2/48th Battalion had moved east on the road to Maddalena, and was guarding the pass. This was where the northern road from Barce runs up the escarpment. The 2/15th Battalion held the southern pass. This was to the east of Barce. The 2/17th Battalion set up a defensive position about three miles east of the 2/15th. The plan was for the 2/13th and 2/48th Battalions to move into positions behind the 2/48th and 2/15th Battalions. The 2/24th Battalion was to move to the Wadi Cuff. The engineers prepared demolitions to destroy the road that they had just built. The 2/13th Battalion was in position to the south of the Wadi Cuff. The 9th Australian Division was augmented by the 104th RHA, which was just added to the division. The Australians now had two British artillery regiments, the 104th RHA and the 51st Field Regiment. The Australians now also had another support group unit, the 1/KRRC. They would guard the left flank. Late on 4 April 1941, Cyrenaica Command received news of reinforcements being sent. They included part of the 11th Hussars, the reconnaissance unit of the 7th Armoured Division, the 1st RTR, the 18th Australian Brigade, and the 107th RHA. The 11th Hussars had 32 armored cars. The 1st RTR had 33 tanks. Early on 5 April, General Neame drove to visit the forward units. O'Connor was going to the Wadi Cuff to supervise the preparation of a defense. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

Nothing but confusion on 4 April 1941

General Wavell had left Lt-General Neame in command in Cyrenaica, with Richard O'Connor as just an advisor. When Neame heard about the attack on the 2/13th Battalion at Er Regima, he issued orders for pulling back from the lower escarpment. This was at about 8:30pm on 4 April 1941. The 9th Australian Division was to move to the escarpment at Barce and hold that until pressed by the enemy. He ordered the 2nd Armoured Division to withdraw to Tecnis, except for the forces at Msus. The forces there were to drive north to Charruba. These orders actually just confirmed the movements already underway. The 2nd Support Group moved by desert track to avoid tying up the road. As noted by the 2/17th Battalion, the roads were congested and "choked" by vehicles moving rapidly. The 2/24th Battalion was one of the last units to learn that they were to withdraw. They had refused a ride from a transport unit because they had not been authorized to withdraw. When they saw armored vehicles approaching, they blew their demolitions. They left a rearguard and then moved to Baracca. They finally got their orders to withdraw at 11pm. The commander of the 2/13th Field Company asked for the battalion to withdraw immediately, by foot, so he could destroy the bridge from Baracca to Barce. The battalion commander only was ready to withdraw at 3:15am. They had a few vehicles, so they packed men into those and withdrew. That allowed the engineers to carry out their demolitions. The 2/24th eventually met 20 trucks and were able to unpack the men and move more comfortably. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

With the 3rd Indian Motor Brigade from 3 to 4 April 1941

The two generals, Neame and O'Connor on 3 April 1941 ordered the 3rd Indian Motor Brigade to move to Mechili. The brigade commander, Brigadier Vaughan had been looking at the escarpment at Barce when he was ordered to take his brigade to Mechili. One of the regiments, the 18th Cavalry was to stay at El Adem to guard the airfield. The brigade was to move at night to Tmimi. The 2/3rd Anti-Tank Regiment had been at El Adem. General Neame had originally intended for the anti-tank unit to be with the 9th Australian Division. They were moving towards Derna. They stopped at Gazala at night. When he arrived at Barce, he heard that he was to go to Mechili with the 3rd Indian Motor Brigade. They had heard that there were enemy units at Mechili, so they decided to move in fighting formation from Tmimi. The two Indian cavalry regiments each got an anti-tank battery. One of the battery commanders observed the Indian unit on the move and admired their formation-keeping abilities on the move. There was an airfield at Tmimi. The brigade left there at 10am. The force drove up to Mechili at 3:30pm. One Indian cavalry squadron was already at Mechili and had found no enemy present. That evening they were joined by M Battery of the 3rd RHA. The troops formed a perimeter around the Mechili fort. There was a rough landing ground south of the fort. The anti-tank guns were distributed between the units holding the perimeter. When General Neame finally received word of the German attack on the 2/13th Battalion, he issued orders to withdraw. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

Other action on 4 April 1941 in Cyrenaica

The 2/13th Battalion was fortunate to only have had 98 casualties, a number that included three officers, in the battle at Er Regima on 4 April 1941. Of those, five men were killed. The other unit engaged at Er Regima, the 51st Field Regiment, had one man killed and five "injured" as the Official History says. One of their officers was missing, possibly a prisoner.

The German attack on Er Regima was the only German action on 4 April. The German armored unit, the 5th Light Division, was held back. Their British counterparts, the 2nd Armoured Division, had a bad day on 4 April. A column of vehicles carrying fuel was attacked by German aircraft and the entire column was destroyed. They had met more vehicles with fuel and joined with them, but they were all lost. By evening, the 5th RTR was reduced to nine tanks. The 6th RTR only kept their best Italian tanks and scrapped the rest. They were now down to just nine tanks, as well. The 3rd Hussars, now "14 miles northeast of Msus", were also abandoned their worst tanks. To the south, A Squadron of the LRDG drove south to the Trigh el Abd. They then drove to Bir Ben Gania. They reported back that they had not seen any sign of the enemy forces. A German reconnaissance aircraft overflew them that evening.

While all this was happening, the 3rd Indian Motor Brigade moved to Mechili. The only building at Mechili was an old fort that was very weak. The importance of Mechili was the good water supply. The place had no other value. The 3rd Indian Motor had three completely motorized cavalry units. They only had small arms, apparently, but were highly mobile. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

Disaster at Er Regima and after from 4 April 1941

The 2/13th Battalion had the bad fortune to receive the German attack on 4 April 1941. The attack continued into the night after darkness had fallen. A company-sized group of Germans had quickly surrounded men. They mounted a bayonet charge and fired at the Germans. They ended up moving further into the mass of German troops. A few men managed to escape. A few men managed to get past the anti-tank ditch. The Germans responded by making use of a knocked out tank for cover and as a strong point. The battalion commander, Lt-Col. Burrows decided to withdraw to the second anti-tank ditch past the village. He hoped to meet the expected transport as it came up the road. As we have mentioned, the howitzers from the 51st Field Regiment fired their last ammunition and then withdrew. Some of the Germans had reached the ditch by the railroad station, so some men were sent to beat them back. Major Turner worked to organize the defense. There was a cross over the ditch east of the fort. The men set up a roadblock that they hoped would hold so that more of the battalion could pass through. Hill's company would act as a defense behind the ditch, while Lt-Col. Burrows organized men to hold a position further forward to give Hill's men time to setup their position. Burrows had expected transport to arrive at 7pm, but there was no sign of it. At 10:15pm, Burrows ordered everyone not in the blocking position to move to the east down the road. About a half hour later, the missing transport arrived. They were a company with Cypriot drivers. There were too few trucks, so the men were tightly packed in the vehicles, some even riding on a gun tractor. They passed through Barce, which was on fire. About ten miles past Barce, the men dismounted and dispersed, waiting for dawn. One platoon, back at Er Regima, had gotten free from the enemy, but had missed the battalion withdrawal. They went into the hills in the dark. On their own, they continued to move to the east. They never caught up with the others from their battalion. Two officers and 23 men reached Gazala. Only one man reached Tobruk to rejoin the battalion. The others were all captured by the Germans. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

Fighting at Er Regima on 4 April 1941

The situation at Er Regima on 4 April 1941 quickly deteriorated. Handley's company had German infiltration through their area. The battalion commander sent the carriers to the right flank. This was at the wadi to the north of the rail line. The battalion commander used what little transport he had to bring forward two platoons from A Company. They were supposed to back up one platoon, but ended up behind D Company, instead and were engaged. As organization was lost, Lt-Col. Burrows sent Major Turner to the battle area to try and gain control again. When the two platoons got into position, a German tank approached, but was knocked out by an anti-tank rifle. A private rushed the tank with his Bren gun, fired from the hip, and killed one German and captured the other two. The Bren was nominally a light machine gun, but Australians often picked them up and held them while they fired. The battalion commander now brought one company, not previously engaged, into the fort. They would be needed to cover the forward men as they pulled back. From Simmons platoon, they were caught by the Germans in old Italian sangers and only five men escaped. As the day got later, it was getting dark. The fighting closed in on the fort. The Australians were becoming overwhelmed by larger German numbers. British howitzers fired their remaining ammunition and retreated. The battalion commander decided to move back down the road and hope to meet approaching transport. Reinforcements in the form of two companies of the Royal Northumberland Fusiliers arrived along with an anti-tank company. They machine gunners had not been able to lay down fixed lines of fire, so they figured that they would be of little help. Lt-Col. Burrows had organized the men to be able to both block and to be in position to withdraw. The expected transport had not arrived. The battalion commander at that point had some men to block the road while the rest withdrew. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

The Germans attack at Er Regima on 4 April 1941

As the Germans attacked the pass at Er Regima on 4 April 1941, the demolitions were fired. The explosion happened before the enemy had advanced to the mines. Part of the minefield exploded because of the detonations. Some of the stone sangars that had been built were knocked down as well. The demolitions were a signal, apparently, to the 20th Anti-Tank Company to withdraw. That was particularly unfortunate as the German light tanks were attacking. Just to make matters worse, there were four German armored cars that advanced up the unguarded wadi and were behind the Australians. They were stopped only by the Italian anti-tank ditch. Several light tanks had moved up as well. 18 Platoon was guarding the pass. Two more companies were on the right and left, but not close enough to help. As the German infantry advanced, the platoon fired their available weapons. The enemy took cover in response to the fire. A group of 18pdr guns from the 51st Field Regiment arrived. One gun knocked out a light tank. The gun was knocked out by another tank. The other three guns were also knocked out, but they had knocked out one more German light tank. One Australian fired on the tanks with the anti-tank rifle. Two remaining German tanks circled around and gradually forced the Australians to withdraw. General Morshead decided to move forward with withdrawing the 2/13th Battalion, now that they were under attack. He sent the carrier platoon forward to help the men being attacked. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

An uneasy day on 4 Apirl 1941 in Cyrenaica

In the area east of Benghazi, the men were feeling very uneasy about their situation. Cyrenaica Command was out of touch with reality. They had no idea of where the Germans were or what they were doing. General O'Connor had decided to keep the Australians on the escarpment to impeded any German advance. At the wadi at Er Regima, the three companies of the 2/13th Battalion. The battalion commanders had two battalions forward, one on the right and one on the left. They left an undefended gap in the middle. They third company was held in reserve. While they had been promised some 25pdr guns, all they had were four 4.5in howitzers. They also had a machine gun company. The day before, Hurricanes of the RAF flew out to the east from where they had been based. They flew out of an airfield at Benina, at the foot of the pass at Er Regima. There had been a great deal of traffic from units that were withdrawn from the west. They had heard explosions from the demolitions fired by various engineer units. All they could do is watch the road and wait for something to happen. On the afternoon of 4 April 1941, a column could be seen driving out of Benghazi towards their positions. The vehicles included tanks, armored cars, and troop-carrying trucks. There were two groups of tanks in line abreast heading for the pass. The howitzers and some captured Italian mortars fired on the tanks. They knocked out one light tank with a mortar round. They hit other tanks, but did not knock them out. The tanks withdrew, but the infantry dismounted in preparation for an assault. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

The British "out of touch" on 4 April 1941

By the middle of 4 April 1941, the commander of the 2nd Armoured Division did not know where the 3rd Armoured Brigade was located. The Australian commmander Morshead was under the impression that the commander of the 2nd Armoured Division was not that concerned about now knowing where the 3rd Armoured Brigade was. At a meeting, General Gambier-Parry said that he figured that the Germans had achieved their goal for now by taking Benghazi. He did not know how Rommel thought or operated. General O'Connor apparently agreed and wanted the 9th Australian Division to stop withdrawing. The division had two battalions on the first escarpment. A third battalion would hold a position east of Barce. They would be on the second escarpment. The British now had no idea about where the Germans and Italians were and what they were doing. They were out of contact on the ground and had lost air reconnaissance due to the units moving to the rear.

The Australians were in a precarious position. They were not able to dig in on the escarpment. They were reduced to piling stones for cover. After the meeting, General Morshead visited the 20th Australian Brigade, only to find the commander was driving to the division headquarters. The 2/17th Battalion now had transport to move. They would move to the Barce pass. He also learned that the enemy was going to attack the 2/13th Battalion at Er Regima. This is based on the acount in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

The 3rd Armoured Brigade at Msus early on 4 April 1941

The two squadrons of the King's Dragoon Guards led the advance of the 3rd Armoured Brigade on Msus. They drove into Msus by abour 8:30am on 4 April 1941. The 3rd Armoured Brigade continued to lose tanks to breakdown as they moved. The 6th RTR only arrived by early afternoon. Part of the problem was that they lacked water to add to tank radiators. The Italian tanks in the 6th RTR particularly were bothered by this issue. As we have previously mentioned, they found a ration dump that had not been destroyed so they were temporarily resupplied with food. The German aircraft found them, dropped bombs and a flare to mark their presence. They found that all the fuel had been destroyed even though there were no Germans present. The armored brigade second-in-command was sent out to find more fuel north of Msus.

We now hear from Cyrenaica Command. They sent a message saying that the main Axis column seemed to be heading for Benghazi. The task for the 2nd Armoured Division was to protect the flank of the 9th Australian Division. To do that, they should move to Mechili by the track from Ablar to Mechili. General O'Connor left the Cyrenaica Command headquarters to look for General Gambier-Parry and the 2nd Armoured Division headquarters. General Neame was also out from his headquarters, looking at the Wadi Cuff, which he thought would be a good position to occupy.

Both the 2nd Armoured Division and the 2nd Support Group were now at El Ablar and were close to the 9th Australian Division headquarters. Some of the support group was with the 3rd Armoured Brigade. The rest were spread out between Er Regima and El Ablar. Some more troops came through Er Regima and reported the flag of Italy now flew over Benghazi and that the Germans and Italians were in Benghazi. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

What was the truth? Rommel's orders and his situation on 3 April 1941

We think that the truth about Rommel's orders were that Hitler had ordered Rommel to go on the defensive and to not carry out any larger operations such as taking Tobruk. The 15th Panzer Division was under orders for North Africa. The High Command still did not want Rommel to make a major move in North Africa. The High Command knew information that Rommel did not, such as the plans for invading Russia. Operations were underway in Greece and there was the island of Crete to deal with. All that required air power that could not be spared to participate in extensive operations in North Africa.He seems to have lied about the orders that he received to General Gariboldi on 3 April 1941.

In any case, the demolitions carried out by the British and Australian engineers were so extensive that they brought the German advance to a halt. The participants were the 2nd Armoured Division engineers and the engineers of the 2/3rd Australian Field Company. The 5th Light Division reported that four days would be required to bring up fuel and refuel their tanks and vehicles. Rommel's reaction was to stop any movement and to have all available vehicles used to bring up "supplies and ammunition". The result was that the German advance was halted for the moment and the British were given a reprieve.

Early on 4 April 1941, the 3rd Armoured Brigade and other forces with Brigadier Rimington started to move towards Msus. Some fraction of the total were sent to El Abiar. The King's Dragoon Guards arrived at Msus by 8:30am and found food that they desperately needed. There was no sign of any Germans. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

With Rommel on 3 April 1941

By 3 April 1941, General Wavell was realizing that he needed to change plans to meet the threat from Rommel in the Western Desert. They would keep the 7th Australian Division and possibly change the plans for the 6th Australian Division. While this was happening, Rommel was making plans as well. In the afternoon of 3 April 1941, Rommel visited the most advanced troops from the Ariete Division. They were traveling from Agedabia to the Trigh el Abd. He found that the ground was firm and could be safely traveled. When he returned to his headquarters, he ordered the Ariete Division to send a detachment to travel the Trigh el Abd to Ben Gania. He also ordered them to check the track to Msus. By 4:45pm, Rommel received word that the British had left Magrun. He ordered the 3rd Reconnaissance Unit to travel the coast road to Magrun and then scout out the way beyond Magrun. Rommel drove forward to joint the reconnaissance unit. They heard that the British had left Benghazi, so he ordered his troops forward. They reached Benghazi before morning. By the time Rommel had returned to his headquarters, he found that he had to deal with General Gariboldi, who was unhappy about the recent moves. He wanted Rommel not to make any advances without consulting him. Rommel told General Gariboldi that he needed freedom of action, as he was a German general. Fortunately for Rommel, he received a message from German High Command giving him the freedom he needed. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

The initial moves on 4 April 1941

While the 9th Australian Division was involved in the moves to the second escarpment, transport was a problem. The solution was to take vehicles from units that had them to transport the battalions that lacked vehicles. One battalion, the 2/48th, from the 26th Brigade had just taken position at Baracca, which was on the lower escarpment, was to move to Maddalena. This is where the northern pass is located. The 2/15th Battalion from the 20th Brigade had been held in reserve. They were now to move east of Barce to the southern pass. The 9th Australian Division had been given the 1/Royal Fusiliers and the 24th Anti-Tank Company. They would move to El Abiar, which in the scheme of things, would allow the 2/15th Battalion move. By daylight on 4 April, the battalions were able to move. We remember that the 7th Armoured Division motor battalion, the 1/King's Royal Rifle Corps, was supplied by General Wavell to bolster the defenses. Being a motor battalion, they were able to immediate start their move and they arrived in position by 9am on 4 April 1941. A fifth 9th Australian Division company was gathering near El Abiar. They had been on the escarpment to the north of Er Regima. They had given up their transport to move other units, so they had to wait for more transport to arrive. Using first line transport from units that needed to move meant that other transport had to be found. An officer from the 9th Australian Division staff had to find the necessary transport. Another officer, Major Dodds, collected available transport at Barce. The unit movement was slowed due to this issue, so battalions that had given up their first-line transport to move other units had to sit until later in the afternoon on 4 April. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

Cyrenaica Command in confusion late on 3 April 1941

Almost the first thing that happened after General Wavell left Cyrenaica Command, a conference was held. This was late on 3 April 1941. Colonel Lloyd, of the 9th Australian Division, was at the conference representing his division. Decisions were being made without knowing any hard information. Communications were non-existent. They had no idea what was happening with the 2nd Armoured Division. They thought that there were 100 German vehicles at Msus, but an officer from the armored division artillery told Colonel Lloyd that the vehicles at Msus were the 3rd Armoured Brigade. At the meeting, they decided to pull back to a line from Wadi Derna to Mechili. They would pull out of most of Jebel Achdar and let the Germans advance. The 3rd Indian Motor Brigade was still at El Adem, but they would be ordered to move to Mechili. They would send the 2nd Armoured Brigade to join them at Mechili, so that they would have some artillery. B Squadron of the 2nd Royal Lancers was already at Mechili. They expected the 9th Australian Division to put two battalions east of Barce on the "second escarpment". The plan was that by defending the second escarpment, that they would enable a "general withdrawal" from the forward part of Cyrenaica. A 7th Armoured Division motor battalion arrived at Barce to help the 9th Australian Division. The division would do a staged withdrawal to Derna. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

The withdrawal in the midst of confusion on 3 and 4 April 1941

After the erroneous information about Er Regima was received, the 2nd Armoured Division wheeled vehicles headed for the Wadi Gattara. They would attempt to reach the plateau by crossing the escarpment. The vehicles were blocked at this point, although small groups made their way up the escarpment. Some of the 2nd Support Group did not receive the bad information and they were able to move through Er Regima. The Australian 2/13th Battalion held the pass and saw the support group vehicles passing through. More support group vehicles went to Tocra, held by the 26th Australian Brigade, and passed through there.

Brigadier Rimington, the 3rd Armoured Brigade commander, was still at Esc Sceleidima. Since the word about Er Regima being closed, he changed his orders to his brigade. He was out of communication with his division commander, so he decided to sit at Esc Sceleidima until he was back in communication. He ordered the 3rd Hussars to hold the east end of the pass. The 5th RTR and 6th RTR would hold the western end of the pass. There was a report of Germans approaching, but the vehicles were from the King's Dragoon Guards. Overnight, Brigadier Rimington decided to take his brigade to Msus in the morning. If the Germans were really there, he would fight them. During the night, the remains of the Tower Hamlets Rifles arrived at Esc Sceleidima. They were also joined by two squadrons from the King's Dragoon Guards. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

Late on 3 April 1941 in Cyrenaica

The supply dump at Msus was destroyed on the basis of wrong information late in the afternoon on 3 April 1941. There were no Germans near by or in Msus. The only unidentified vehicles were those of the Long Range Desert Group and armored cars of the King's Dragoon Guards. The RAF gave an erroneous reconnaissance report about some fifty German vehicles at Msus. The fifty was said to probably include tanks, which were no where near Msus. At 5pm, General Wavell left Cyrenaica Command Headquarters to return to his headquarters in Cairo. He left with wrong information about the situation. Instead of replacing General Neame with O'Connor, he left Neame in command with O'Connor as an advisor. That is what we had always heard was the case, and this explains it. It seemed that O'Connor was going to actually be in command, but that did not happen.

After the air reconnaissance report, General Gambier-Parry ordered the 3rd Amoured Brigade to move to Er Regima. The division had many wheeled vehicles, and these were largely moving towards Er Regima. The division headquarters was also moving and was crossing the Wadi Gattara. Typical of how badly things were going, a British aircraft dropped a message at the division headquarters. The message was from Cyrenaica Command from 10am that day. The message was wrong and out of date. The message told them to get east of the escarpment before moving to the Wadi Gattara do avoid a British minefield. The officers in the headquarters thought it meant that Er Regima was closed, which was not the case. The message caused confusion and disruption, as vehicles further north were diverted away from Er Regima. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

Confusion on the afternoon of 3 April 1941

With the 2nd Armoured Division headquarters issuing new orders while not knowing where its units were located, the situation descended into chaos. There were reports of Germans either heading for Msus or already there that were totally false at this point. The Tower Hamlets Rifles and artillery were sitting at Sidi Brahim and about a mile to the south. Only by 4pm did the 3rd Armoured Brigade receive new orders. The commander warned the 5th RTR and 3rd Hussars of an impending move to Msus. By this point, the 1st RTR and other units had scattered upon seeing units on the move and not having orders themselves. The situation was so bad that the 6th RTR, which was supposed to meet the Support Group did not know their location or even their radio frequency. The continued to sit at Esc Sceleidima. The rest of the armored brigade was still there, as well. While all this played out, the 2nd Armoured Division headquarters sent a message to Cyrenaica Command that they could not hold the escarpment because there was no route to send supplies. General Wavell was still at Cyrenaica Command, along with Generals O'Connor and Neame. In response, Cyrenaica Command, presumably from General Neame, but with knowledge of the others, ordered the armored division to withdraw by way of Er Regima. All this time, while they had reports of Germans either at Msus or heading there, the Long Range Desert Group was ordered use Msus as a base. Units moving towards Msus included the armored division recovery unit and an RAF ground unit. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

The 2nd Armoured Difvision becomes confused on 3 April 1941

After a meeting with the division commander at midday on 3 April 1941, the units of the 2nd Armoured Division became confused. The issue was that not everyone received new orders or even had any orders, and that the orders had changed once or more in the last day. One command was that the division would keep the enemy from the escarpment, north of Esc Sceleidima. As the meeting ended, they received a reconnaissance report from the RAF that enemy units were "approaching Msus from Antelat". The enemy was on the coast road and on the route from Agedabia. Cyrenaica Command also received a message from the armored division and got confused, thinking that the Germans were already in Msus, which they were not. The King's Dragoon Guards were near Antelat, the 6th RTR was moving towards Msus from Antelat. The 5th RTR had orders to intercept eight tanks moving north, which were actually the 6th RTR tanks. The problems seems to have been too many changes. The support group, along with the 6th RTR, was to hold the escarpment. The armored brigade was sent to Msus to fight the presumed enemy column. The support group had their orders, but the 3rd Armoured Brigade did not receive their orders. Some units without orders just followed other units in their movements. The armored division headquarters arrived at Cyrenaica Command and reported that the division would not be able to hold the escarpment. Cyrenaica Command then ordered a withdrawal by way of Er Regima. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

The situation deteriorates for the British on 3 April 1941 in Cyrenaica

Rommel received a message from General Gariboldi on 2 April 1941. The general had seen information that led him to correctly believe that Rommel was continuing to advance, despite that being contrary to his orders. Rommel was receiving reconnaissance reports about the British withdrawal, and he wanted to continue to push them. Early on 3 April 1941, the 6th RTR left Antelat in an odd direction, due to orders that they had received at 1am. They were now needed to move to Esc Sceleidima, where the escarpment is passable. They moved off to the southwest, and then returned to Antelat, now abandoned. They finally moved towards Esc Sceleidima, but were slowed by their M13/40 tanks continually overheating. After 8am, the rest of the 2nd Armoured Division moved towards Esc Sceleidima. The King's Dragoon Guards maintained scouts to the south. The 2nd Armoured Division had arrived at Esc Sceleidima by late morning. General Gambier-Parry held a conference for the division unit officers. They planned where units would be positioned. After the conference, they had a report from reconnaissance aircraft about a German column nearing Msus from Antelat. From this point, communications were less reliable and not all messages were received. Also the 2nd Armoured Division headquarters lost track of the division's units and they were headed for problems. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

More about the situation on 2 April 1941

As the Germans were advancing in early April 1941, the 9th Australian Division was lacking information. They were also not ready to fight. The right was held by the 26th Brigade, which only had the 2/24th Battalion. They had only obtained enough transport to move the 2/48th Battalion forward from Gazala. They arrived at Baracca at 5pm. By 3 April, they were ten miles from Tocra, near "an Italian settlement".

General Wavell felt compelled to visit Barce and the Cyrenaica Command headquarters. He was having one of those periodic exchanges with Churchill in London. Wavell had directed General Neame to keep his armor in being, even if that involved withdrawing from Benghazi. That got a negative response from the Prime Minister. Churchill had suggested bringing General O'Connor forward. In fact, Wavell decided to replace Neame with O'Connor. The situation was such that Neame being so far from the action, that he did not have effective control. One goal was to keep the 2nd Armoured Division concentrated, rather than to scatter the division. General Gambier-Parry was going to withdraw on El Ablar. The coast road had the disadvantage that the supply dump at Magrun was destroyed by the 2/3rd Australian Field Company. Neame was still in command and ordered demolitions at Benghazi in preparation for withdrawal. Demolition charges were exploded at Er Regima. They blew the minefield, as they expected, so they laid new anti-tank mines at the pass. On the morning of 3 April, Wavell and Neame met with General Morshead, of the 9th Australian Division, and passed on the news that O'Connor would arrive to take over Cyrenaica Command. O'Connor came by plane with Brigadier Combe. He landed at El Adem and sent word to the 3rd Indian Motor Brigade that they should be ready to send two regiments to Mechili. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

Tank fight in the afternoon of 2 April 1941

The 5th RTR was able to meet two trucks loaded with petrol. They were able to refuel from them. They were also able to make contact with the 3rd Armoured Brigade headquarters. They had nine tanks providing protection, and these saw enemy forces approaching with some 30 to 40 vehicles. They heard about the 3rd Hussars being in a fight and needing help. The battalion commander sent four tanks to support the 3rd Hussars. At the same time, the Tower Hamlets Rifles was being attacked with tanks. They were located to the west. British artillery fire allowed the Tower Hamlets to withdraw. German tanks got through the British guns, but did not pursue the withdrawing infantry. The nine tanks were now in a hull-down position behind a ridge. By 5:30pm on 2 April 1941, the 5th RTR was under attack by what proved to be the II/5th Armored Battalion (German). The 5th RTR now only had 14 tanks, after sending the four tanks to help the 3rd Hussars. In the tank battle, the British destroyed three German tanks, but lost five of their own. Another tank took damage, but was still operable. The German advance came with the sunset behind them. The 5th RTR was then able to withdraw back to the next ridge. The British were fortunate to have survived this battle, and the Germans were not very aggressive and could have destroyed the entire battalion. Upon hearing of this battle, General Gambier-Parry, the 2nd Armoured Division commander, ordered the division to move to Antelat. The move left the coast road to Benghazi without a blocker. Cyrenaica Command, commanding from the rear, was not aware of this situation. From 7pm until a 2am halt, the 5th RTR continued to withdraw. They were down to 12 tanks at that point. The rest of the division reached Antelat during the evening of 2 April, although the King's Dragoon Guards did not reach Antelat until 9am on 3 April. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

Rommel moves forward as the British withdraw in early April 1941

The British were withdrawing in the face of the German attack. The 2nd Support Group initially moved some 30 miles north of Agedabia. The 3rd Armoured Brigade was now east of Agedabia. They had two units forward. The 3rd Hussars were to the right while the 5th RTR was to the left. A squadron from the 6th RTR was guarding the rear of the 3rd Hussars. By 1pm, the 5th RTR could see German vehicles following them. The King's Dragoon Guards could see German armored cars moving towards Antelat. After seeing the British withdrawal, Rommel was compelled to take action. He ordered his division to attack Agedabia and take it. He also wanted the small port of Ez Zuetina. While the Germans were advancing, General Neame was trying to slow down the British withdrawal and stay in control. Neame was leaving the 2nd Armoured Division divided into two groups that were too far apart to support each other. General Gambier-Parry replied back to Neame that he should have the option to commit his armored brigade if an opportunity presented itself. General Neame was too far from events to know about what was happening. By now, the 3rd Armoured Brigade had only 22 cruiser tanks and 25 light tanks. The tanks were breaking down at a rate of about one per ten miles traveled. By 4pm, the 3rd Armoured Brigade was still moving back towards planned defensive position. The 5th RTR was slowed by having to stay with a composite battery from the 1st RHA, which could only move at 7 miles per hour. There was still a 6th RTR presence at Beda Fomm, where they had been waiting. They had about 40 Italian tanks. They were ordered to move forward to Antelat. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

The withdrawal on 31 March to 1 April 1941

The plan had been for the 2nd Armoured Division to move to the east and set up a new defensive position. The division, however, was too slow to move. At this point, the Germans were not following, however. The 2nd Support Group occupied a new position astride the coast road about 30 miles past Mersa Brega. The position had a marsh on the right, so that provided some protection. The armored brigade was on the left. The 3rd Hussars, with some artillery, tried to provide some protection to the withdrawal. By the morning of 1 April, the 5th RTR was down to 23 tanks. The armor was on the desert track to the east of the coast road. The King's Dragoon Guards were positioned towards the desert to watch for any German forces. General Neame visited General Gambier-Parry at Maaten el Baghlia. He ordered the armored division to withdraw towards Benghazi. By early afternoon, the withdrawal was in progress. General Neame had already ordered the troops at Benghazi to prepare demolitions at the harbor and to be ready for a withdrawal. Near Msus, troops from the 3rd Indian Motor Brigade encountered German troops. At a distance, they saw some strange vehicles. They might have been the Free French, but then they were recognized as enemy. They headed off to escape, and had a pursuer for some thirty miles. The acting commander of the 3rd Indian Motor Brigade sent out a group towards the reported enemy force, but did not hear any more for three days. By the start of 2 April, the support group saw German activity in front of them. They had carriers scouting. The Germans attacked with forty tanks with infantry. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

Mersa Brega falls on 31 March 1941

The German main force was moving on Mersa Brega by early afternoon on 31 March 1941. Cemetery Hill was hit hard by German dive bombers. That was followed by an attack by tanks and trucks with infantry. The British 25pdr battery and anti-tank guns fired on them and forced them to pull back. The British commander wanted to chase them, but ran out of time when the next attack came. This time, the attackers were all tanks and came close, but could not get past a sand ridge that was close to the British. They were fired on by British guns. Some tanks were knocked out and others were bogged down in the sand. There were two more dive bomber attacks late in the afternoon. By 5:30pm, German artillery was firing on the British positions. Infantry and tanks were moving forward with Rommel on the scene, deciding to attack to "the north of the coast road". By 6pm, the Germans were successful. By 7pm, they were in Mersa Brega. The 2nd Support Group was forced to withdraw from the position. They moved back about 8 miles. They had mounted a counter-attack before withdrawing, and had some success, but lost eight carriers. The defenders of Mersa Brega had lost 55 men. There was now nothing to stop Rommel from reaching Benghazi or Tobruk. During the night, the 2nd Support Group had moved back to a position about 20 miles in front of Agedabia. They expected a battle there the next day. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

The German attack on 31 March 1941

The plan for the 2nd Armoured Division was to withdraw if they were attacked by the Germans. There were armored cars from the King's Dragoon Guards accompanied by four tanks from the 5th Royal Tank Regiment. There were just four cruiser tanks. The 2nd Support Group was at Mersa Brega. They planned to use motorized infantry and carriers to conduct patrols in front of the salt marshes. The armored cars and tanks hoped to ambush German tanks. Instead, they saw a group of German tanks, exchanged fire, took damage on one tank. The Germans appeared to be ready to encircle the patrol. In fact, the German force was of all arms, with artillery and infantry, as well as tanks. The British retreated with German tanks in pursuit. They again exchanged fire near El Agheila, in the middle of the sand dunes. The Germans then headed south, leaving the British to withdraw. The armored cars stayed there in the sand dunes to continue to report on events. The Germans reached Mersa Brega by 7:45am. The men at Cemetery Hill saw Germans to the southwest. They saw five German tanks and two trucks. Infantry had gotten off the trucks. There were some twenty to thirty Germans. By 9am, men of the Tower Hamlets saw the large German force approaching Mersa Brega. By 9:30am, the Germans were advancing. The motorized infantry of the Support Group pulled back, but left carriers scouting in front. By 10am, the Germans brought up a gun, accompanied by four tanks. They commenced firing and the British carriers had to pull back. The British still had artillery observers on Cemetery Hill. They directed fire on the advancing Germans. One carrier platoon stayed near the hill to give support. By 10:30am, the Germans were moving on Cemetery Hill. The 104th RHA fired on the Germans. The men from the hill pulled back to a ridge that crossed the road. The carriers stayed near the hill. They actually fired on tanks at some 300 yards. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

At the front in Cyrenaica on 30 March 1941

The forward units facing the Germans were all British units. The 2nd Armoured Division was finding that the Italian M13/40 tanks were unsatisfactory. After being driven for 10 or 12 miles, the engines overheated. Once they were driven and overheated, they needed time to cool. That meant that they could be driven 48 miles in a day. They had 68 tanks of all sorts that could be used, even if with problems. Not only the tank situation was an issue. They had never trained as a unit. They also lost their communications equipment, as it was all sent to Greece.

The units of the 2nd Armoured Division were in place at the front. The right was held by the 2nd Support Group, commanded by Brigadier Latham. They had eight miles of front within the Mersa Brega salt marshes. They had part of the Tower Hamlets Rifles, a company of the French Motor Battalion, and the 104th Royal Horse Artillery. There was a group on the cemetery hill. They were a company of the Tower Hamlets Rifles and two machine-gun sections. Another company of Tower Hamlets Rifles was "preparing a position in the rear". They were approximately one mile north of Agedabia.

On the left, there were about 5 miles of ground to the south from the road that could not be traveled by tanks. Behind this was the 3rd Armoured Brigade. The 3rd Hussars were forward with 26 tanks, a mix of Lt.Mk.VI and M13/40 tanks. They had an Australian anti-tank company with them. There was also the 5th RTR. They had two field artillery batteries and two light anti-aircraft guns with each of the regiments. Most of the 6th RTR was still at Beda Fomm. Armored cars from the King's Dragoon Guards were scouting in front of the tanks. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

Australian discipline on 31 March 1941

General Neame had seen General Morshead a stinging letter complaining about the lack of discipline in Australian troops. General Morshead thought that the letter had a distinct anti-Australian tone and was unfair. About 31 March 1941, General Morshead took steps to answer the letter from Neame. He was forwarding the letter to General Blamey, the head of the Australian forces (AIF). Morshead wondered why the British didn't arrest the Australians who were acting poorly. General Morshead ordered the men to place civilian towns and cities, and even camps, out-of-bounds. They reiterated plans for a system of passes to go to Benghazi or Barce on business. Post-war, General Neame had written complimentary words about the Australians serving near Benghazi.

At the same time, Rommel was concerned about the work of the 2nd Armoured Division preparing defenses that would be hard to attack if they waited for them to be completed. He decided that they had to attack with the small force that they had to prevent having to face stronger defenses. The Germans would use the 8th Machine Gun Battalion to relieve the 3rd Reconnaissance Unit for scouting. They planned to take Mersa Brega on 31 March 1941. They would take Gialo on 2 April. They planned a small airborne attack.

The main addition to the British force defending Cyrenaica was the 3rd Indian Motor Brigade, now with three battalions mounted in motor vehicles. They lacked any artillery, however. They also had "A" squadron of the Long Range Desert Group. They had reached Barce on 30 March. Other forces were added, including a machine gun company, a company of the French Motor Battalion, and one battery of anti-tank guns. The 5th RTR had also arrived, but on several dozen of the 52 cruiser tanks had reached the front. The rest had broken down on the way. The total tank strength of the 2nd Armoured Division was some 68 tanks of mixed types. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

29 March 1941

Interestingly, Libyan Arabs were allied with the British. There were some Libyan battalions holding locations in the rear. They did have a problem with Arabs pilfering telephone wire. The real problems were communications and the lack of motor transport. The division signals unit was back at Gazala. Things were so bad for communications that the Australians had to use civilian telephone wires. The lack of transport meant that only five of eight battalions were in position. The battalions in position were largely immobile. One battalion, the 2/48th, was sitting at Gazala, waiting to be able to move forward to the 26th Brigade area. The lack of transport left the 24th Brigade at Tobruk. On top of all that, General Neame sent General Morshead a letter complaining about the conduct of Australian troops. The allegations including looting and other forms of misconduct. The misconduct included drunken Australian soldiers. The Australians needed military police to crack down in the lack of discipline, but there were none. The only unit was left in the rear. General Morshead had asked to have the provost company brought forward, but the British had not responded. Undisciplined Australian soldiers running loose in the rear had become increasingly common and was giving the Australian army a bad name. Something needed to be done. We have seen that in June and July, 1941, the problem still existed, despite the good performance of Australian troops fighting the Vichy French. The British seem reluctant to arrest the Australians. General Morshead said that they needed to know who the offenders were so that they could be disciplined. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

General Neame's secret defense plan from 26 March 1941

On 26 March 1941, General Morshead received an instruction, a secret plan, about what to do if they were forced to withdraw from the lower escarpment. The main road to the north would be defended at the Wadi Cuff. This was the so-called "Valley of Caves". The other defensive point was the "pass east of Barce". The two defensive positions were quite far apart. They pointed out the problem that the line of communication "ran parallel to the front". If forced back further, the 9th Australian Division would try and hold the Wadi Derna.

They would plan to destroy any supplies in front of the positions that would be held. The British and Australian engineers were engaged in preparations for demolitions. The situation now had the 9th Australian Division separated from the 2nd Armoured Division by more than 100 miles. The Australians were left without any motor vehicles. They did not even have the capability for reconnaissance. The next day, 27 March 1941, General Neame that the two 7th Support Group motor battalions would be sent forward in support once they arrived in Cyrenaica. General Morshead requested that civilians be removed from the area where they expected to fight. The best that General Neame was ready to do would be to declare some "prohibited zones". When General Morshead and Colonel Lloyd, his chief of staff, visited the area to the south, they found it undefended. The 1/Royal Northumberland Fusiliers (short of one company) with an anti-tank company at Bir es Sultan. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

The 9th Australian Division in defense in late March 1941

With the most effective fighting force having been sent to Greece, the 9th Australian Division was left to hold the plateau east of Benghazi. To the east of Benghazi lay the port of Derna. The 26th Brigade was responsible for holding the right of the position. The 20th Brigade would hold the right side of the position. For artillery, the two brigades each had a "composite battery" of the 51st Field Regiment. Each battery had six old 18pdr guns and 6-4.5inch howitzers. They also had nine Italian 47mm anti-tank guns that would be fought on the back of trucks as "portees". For engineers, the 26th Brigade had the 2/13th Field Company (without one section). The 2/7th Field Company (also without one section) would operate with the 20th Brigade. The 20th Brigade commander was able to fly over the area that he would defend on 26 March. He then decided where his battalions would be positioned. The 2/17th Battalion would be on the right, on the north side. The 2/13th Battalion would be at Er Regima, a pass. The 2/15th Battalion would be on the left. Only by 28 March 1941, the 26th Brigade headquarters, the 2/24th Battalion, and "two companies of the 2/23rd Battalion" had arrived at the plateau from Gazala. The escarpment being held was 62 miles long and had three battalions. This was to the east of Benghazi. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

Events from 25 March 1941 in North Africa and Europe

The situation at Mersa Brega from 25 March 1941 was much more tenuous. The position was weaker than that at El Agheila. There was a hill that overlooked the area that was beyond the front line. Mersa Brega had the salt lakes that formed the natural barrier. The area was one that could be easily outflanked. There was the minefield that was now in place with the King's Dragoon Guards behind it. The 3rd Armoured Brigade was on th4e left flank. The King's Dragoon Guards kept a squadron on watch at Maaten Gheizel. There was concern that the Germans could mount a turning movement around the position. There were the sand storms on the 26th and 27th. There was a fight on 29 March between German armored cars and the British armored cars. One of the King's Dragoon Guards cars was knocked out in the fight. The British saw German tanks at El Agheila. They were also starting to experience German air attacks. One such attack destroyed a petrol train at Soluch.

This was a time where events in Europe were moving forward. The Yugoslav government had tried to side with the Axis, but was overthrown. The German response was to plan an attack on Yugoslavia and Greece. In Africa, General Platt's troops captured Keren, an Italian port. General Cunningham's forces captured Harar, the second city in Abyssinia. They had just recaptured British Somaliland. Then, in the Mediterranean Sea, the British fleet encountered the Italians off Cape Matapan and sank "four cruisers and three destroyers".

General Wavell issued orders to General Neame to concentrate on keeping his force in being and not being concerned about holding ground. The situation got Churchill's attention. Churchill knew something about the German methods and that they might well push forward if there was nothing to stop them. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

A fight at El Agheila on 24 March 1941

The night of 23 to 24 March 1941 was when a small group of troops were sitting to the west of El Agheila. They were a troop from the King's Dragoon Guards and a platoon of motorized infantry. They also had an anti-tank gun. They were about a thousand yard west of the fort at El Agheila. The plan was for another troop from the King's Dragoon Guards to patrol to the south and report it clear. That was a spot 12 miles to the south. They also planned to have some field artillery in support west of El Agheila. When the infantry approached the fort, they realized that it was occupied and there were shots fired. Guns at the fort opened fire on the motorized infantry and they could see tanks moving from the south. They succeeded in knocking out one armored car, but the gun crew took losses. They saw some ten tanks and 20 vehicles just east of the fort. They saw the Italian flag hoisted at the El Agheila fort. In response to the German presence at El Agheila, the King's Dragoon Guards pulled back to Mersa Brega. The Australian Official History noted that Rommel was left in control of the entrance to Cyrenaica from Tripolitania. The 1st RHA diary is quoted: "This rather altered arrangements". Two German tanks had been damaged by mines at El Agheila. German ground forces stayed in the vicinity of El Agheila, but they were now using the landing ground at El Agheila for operations. The plan was for Mersa Brega to be defended by one infantry battalion and one company of motorized infantry. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

Rommel and infiltration tactics

The British were totally unprepared to deal with Rommmel and infiltration tactics. We believe that Rommel was addicted to infiltration tactics because he had had so much success with him. He was a natural practitioner. He wrote his book based on his experience with infiltration in the Great War. The situation in western Cyrenaica was well-suited for their use. There were no actual lines, just open land. Rommel could just drive off into the British rear and could look for opportunities to cause trouble. The British had taken no precautions to protect themselves, so Rommel captured three generals and other officers by catching them by surprise. He bagged General Neame, the commander of British forces in Cyrenaica, General Richard O'Connor, the victor over the Italians, and General Gambier-Parry, the 2nd Armoured Division commander. Rommel had planned to attack on 24 March 1941, the day after he arrived back in Libya. He had 90 medium tanks (mostly Pzkw-III and some Pzkw-IV) tanks, and 45 light tanks (mostly Pzkw II and some Pzkw-I). He already had a greater tank strength than the British. The initial attack was to be launched by the 3rd Reconnaissance Battalion with one tank company. The attack was set for the same time as the British had planned to move one platoon west of El Agheila. When the British platoon moved forward on 24 March 1941, they found the Germans had taken position in the fort. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

The situation on 20 March 1941 in Cyrenaica

The British and Australians were left with the original plan for defending Cyrenaica on 20 March 1941. Generals Neame and Gambier-Parry had acted to keep a permanent presence at the fort at El Agheila. They had the 1st King's Dragoon Guards forward. They were "two miles east of Marsa Brega with a squadron to the south at Bir el Ginn". There were some Australian light anti-aircraft guns and anti-tank guns (very few), and some British light anti-aircraft guns. They patroled with one armored car and one anti-tank gun. From 20 March, one platoon of motorized infantry would stay at the El Agheila fort at night. The infantry actually was to the south so that they could watch for a German approach. They also had a plan to ambush approaching Germans. Early on 23 March, they surprised some Germans. The anti-tank guns managed to knock out three German vehicles. They had surprised a larger force with armored cars, tanks, and field guns. The Germans had intelligence that the experienced divisions had been replaced by much less experienced units. Rommel flew to Germany to consult with the "German High Command". He planned a larger attack on 24 March 1941. Rommel was asking for more forces to be sent, but the current plan was only for the 15th Panzer Division to be sent in May. The high command was thinking about all their plans and was not particularly ready for Rommel to do anything to large that might interfere. In late March, both the British and Germans were using dummy tanks to give an illusion of strength. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The British knew that they were in trouble in late March and early April 1941 in Cyrenaica

General Neame, who was the commander for Cyrenaica, was very unhappy with the arrangements that were in place to defend against a German attack. He recognized an immediate need for more motor transport, since without it, the 2nd Armoured Division was very immobile. The tank situation was poor, due to the mechanical condition of what they had. General Neame had a wish list that included a squadron of infantry tanks (Matilda II's), two companies of motor transport, more signals men and equipment, another cruiser tank regiment, a motor infantry battalion, more artillery of all types, and air support. He also noted that what he would really like would be a motorized infantry division to replace the 9th Australian Division, which would train near Tobruk. General Wavell replied that all that was available would be the 3rd Indian Motor Brigade, with just two battalions, and some more transport. Neame's backup plan was to place supply dumps in western Cyrenaica, so that the armored division would have available supplies close to their positions. The priority for the 2nd Armoured Division was to hold onto Mersa Brega. They continued to rely upon intelligence estimates that put any German advance into early April 1941. The 9th Australian Division would try to hold the area east of Benghazi. They would let the Germans onto the plain, but try to hold the escarpment area to contain them. The new British plan was to avoid an armored battle, rather than trying to fight one that they might well lose. The main question was if they should try to block the Germans at El Agheila or at Mersa Brega. El Agheila did have a fort that was some 25 miles to the southwest from Mersa Brega. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

Movements from 22 March 1941 to strengthen the 9th Australian Division and the 2nd Armoured Division

The 2/13th Battalion was to move by night to the area east of Benghazi, but the transport missed the meeting point, so they ended up traveling by day. They had been the target of air attacks which were ineffective. An artillery regiment was moving up to join the 9th Australian Division. Another, the 104th RHA moved forward to the 2nd Support Group. The 9th Australian Division got their engineers back, after they had been assigned to Cyrenaica Command since the middle of January 1941. Most of the 26th Australian Brigade moved up to Gazala. The Australian Official History criticizes the armored regiment arrangements with the captured Italian tanks and worn-out cruisers and light tanks. This meant that when the Germans attacked, the tanks were not really ready for action. The most reliable armored vehicles were the Marmon-Herrington Mk.II armored cars. The Official History says that their suspension was unequal to the strain of desert travel. They were only lightly armed, however. They had a Vickers machine gun, a Bren gun, and a 0.55-inch Boyes anti-tank rifle. The German armored cars were greatly superior to the British cars (manufactured in South Africa). The KDG diarist credited them with a 37mm gun, but in fact, they only had a 20mm gun and a machine gun. The Germans had the large eight-wheeled cars with faceted armor and the smaller four-wheeled cars with a 20mm gun that also had faceted armor. The situation in the air meant that the British were also out-matched. The Germans already had 90 fighters and 80 bombers in North Africa by late March 1941. We have seen that on 20 March 1941, the 2nd Armoured Division became responsible for the forward defense in Cyrenaica while the 9th Australian Division was pulled back. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

They expected an attack from the Germans in March 1941

General Morshead, the 9th Australian Division commander, made a presentation to General Wavell and General Dill, the CIGS. That presentation was well-received and had immediate effect. There was much concern about a coming German attack. The most positive thing happening at this time was the capture of the Giarabub oasis by the 18th Indian Brigade on 21 March 1941. General Wavell had instructed General Neame to fight a delaying battle and not to become involved in a fight. General Wavell was even ready to abandon Benghazi rather than have forces trapped and captured. At this time, on 20 March, Major-General Gambier-Parry had arrived to take charge of the 2nd Armoured Division and the area forward. The 2nd Armoured Division Support Group would replace the 20th Australian Brigade. They would move at night. A single battalion, the 1/Tower Hamlets Rifles was driven from Benghazi on 22 March and the Australian 20th Brigade was driven back to the area east of Benghazi at that time. There was an understandable effort to increase the strength of both the 9th Australian Division and the British 2nd Armoured Division. Oddly enough, the 5th RTR had been sitting at El Adem. They were finally ordered forward where they should already have been located. They were equipped with A.9 and A.10 Cruiser tanks, the only ones not sent to Greece. The problem is that they were to be driven forward. Later, they would have had tank transporters and could have gone that way, but this early, they didn't exist so they were breaking tracks. The 3rd Hussars were also in bad mechanical shape with about 30 Light Mk.VIb tanks (we think). The hope was that they could give the 6th RTR one light tank squadron and two M13/40 tank squadrons. The 3rd Hussars would have two light tank squadrons and one M13/40 squadron. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

On the border in March 1941

The British-Australian force near El Agheila in March 1941 was short of strength. There was the light tank regiment with Lt.Mk.VIb's (we think). There was the King's Dragoon Guards with Marmon-Herrington Mk.II armored cars. Their best weapon was the 0.55-inch anti-tank rifle. There was the Australian infantry brigade that had just arrived. There was the 6th RTR that was just getting captured Italian M13/40 tanks. The anti-tank guns they had were 9-2pdr and 6-Breda anti-tank guns. There were also 16-Bofors 40mm Light AA guns. They also had 3-Breda Light AA guns. There were no British or Australian troops west of El Agheila and none actually holding the place. The KDG went up to the fort at El Agheila in the morning and left at night. What few vehicles they had were breaking down due to overuse and lack of parts. Due to bombing at Benghazi, they were reduced to relying on road transport from Tobruk for their supplies. The length of the drive included half during the day with bombing attacks. The signals equipment was provided by stealing or taking from dumps of Italian equipment. They were short of essential items, even mortars and anti-tank guns. General Morshead worried about leaving the 20th Brigade where they were. He proposed moving them to the Benghazi-Barce area. When General Morshead had written his letter about the situation, he was called in for a meeting with General Dill, the CIGS, and General Wavell, the theater commander. They met near Beda Fomm. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

The battlefield in North Africa 1940-1942

The area that contained the combat in North Africa stretched from the salt marshes near El Agheila in the west to the Qattara Depression that lay to the south of El Alamein. All the major operations stayed within 50 miles of the Mediterranean coast. To the south lay some prominent oases, like Siwa, Gialo, Giarabub, and also Kufra. In the east, there was the railway that ran to Mersa Matruh from further east in Egypt. The railroad was eventually extended to Tobruk. Otherwise, all supply ran on the coast road. The escarpment was a prominent feature in the landscape. In the western part of Egypt lay the Halfaya Pass. The road climbed from the coastal area to the plateau. In Libya, you had the plateau running from Bardia to Gazala. They would all become familiar names in the war in the western desert, as it was called. General Morshead realized that he faced a complete German armored division and they might well take advantage of the light forces in the west to mount an attack. For the first half of March 1941, we saw a process of German, British, and Australian forces probing each other to try and gain information. The 9th Australian Division was found to be short of signals equipment, as the forces going to Greece had been given priority. There was a need, however, so soldiers found ways of making unauthorized acquisition of the needed equipment, including things like wire, phones, and more. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

The Germans are established in Libya in February to March 1941

On 19 February 1941, the German force in Libya was named the "Africa Corps". A few days before, the first elements of the X Air Corps arrived in Libya. They had 60 dive bombers and 20 twin-engined fighters (Bf-110). They would also have support from German aircraft based in Sicily. By late February, the first units of the 5th Light Division were at the landmark that the British called the Marble Arch. That position was about 40 miles from El Agheila. The Italian divisions were spread out with the Savona Division in Tripoli. There were also the two infantry divisions, the Bologna and Pavia divisions. There were also the Ariete Armored Division and the Brescia Infantry Division. With the Free French force from Chad taking Kufra oasis, Rommel decided to move forward. The Germans prepared a position west of El Agheila. By 11 March, the tanks from the 5th Light Division were unloaded from ships in Tripoli. By 13 March, Rommel established his headquarters at Sirte. He ordered his troops to move to Marada, which the British had not occupied. The British were left with a minimal force facing the Germans and Italians in the west of Cyrenaica. The area included the fine Italian road from Tripoli to the Egyptian border. The operations from 1940 until 1943 all were within the confines of the coastal region. A prominent escarpment played an important role in operations during this period. At the east was the Qattara Depression, south of El Alamein. To the west were the salt marshes at El Agheila. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

The situation in Libya in February to March 1941

In February 1941, Marshal Gariboldi had become the Italian commander-in-chief in Libya. Theoretically, Gariboldi commanded Rommel, but Rommel operated independently of higher authority. He had learned to operate with a lot of initiative in the Great War, when he was a keen practitioner of the new form of warfare that almost won the war for Germany. Infiltration came close to salvaging the war for Germany. Once Rommel had learned how infiltration tactics were used, he became a keen practitioner. He found in France in May 1940 that they worked with mechanized forces as well as they had with infantry. The British found out that Rommel was to be the German commander in Libya on 8 March 1941. When the Germans landed in Libya, they were not very well prepared for what they faced. They were forced to learn "on-the-job" and adapt to the new conditions. The Germans were forced to modify their equipment for the unexpected aspects of operation in the North African theater, with sand, heat, and rocks. Rommel had visited Rome on 11 February to consult with his allies. Rommel arrived in Tripoli on the next day. The first German units to arrive were an anti-tank battalion and a reconnaissance battalion. Rommel vowed to take immediate command at the front and start pushing against the British. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

A German force for North Africa in early 1941

By early March 1941, General Wavell knew that the German plan was to send two armored divisions to North Africa (Libya). He was telling people that due to shipping limitations and the upcoming hot weather that he did not expect the German force to be a concern until late summer. The British did not bother to warn the Australian government about the new threat to the 9th Australian Division. The British were focused on Greece, which from the beginning, seemed like a mistake. Anthony Eden had pushed for the Greek expedition for political reasons, not because it was a good, military idea.

The first German division to be sent to North Africa was an improvised light motorized division, the 5th Light Division. The division had been formed with a nucleus from the 3rd Panzer Division. The initial plan was for a unit similar to a British armored division support group, but the plan was changed to something more like an armored division. The division would have two armored battalions created with light and medium tanks. Hitler decided early in the process to send a complete armored division in addition, later in the process. Rommel was appointed commander on 6 February 1941. Convoys started sailing from Italy bound for Tripoli. There had been a concern that the British might advance to Tripoli and create a problem for disembarking the new division. The British stopped their advance a the frontier between Cyrenaica and Tripolitania, so that was not an issue.

As for the Italians, they had four weak infantry divisions of six battalions each, all of them lacking artillery. There was also the 132nd Ariete Armored Division. The Ariete Division had some 80 tanks, but no anti-tank guns. The 102nd Trento Motorized Division was being shipped into Tripoli, but was still partly in transit.

The 5th Light Division would have tanks, infantry, artillery, anti-tank, and some anti-aircraft artillery. There would be 150 tanks, many of them being Pzkw III or IV medium tanks. The anti-tank guns would include both the 50mm PAK38 and 88mm guns. The German armored cars included some of the 8-wheeled type that were much stronger than the Marmon-Herrington Mk.II's of the King's Dragoon Guards. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

Elements of the 9th Australian Division at the front in March 1941

From 9 March 1941, elements of the 9th Australian Division moved up to Mersa Brega, near the edge of the frontier from Tripolitania and Cyrenaica. The 2/15th Battalion was the farthest west. They were about a half-mile northeast of Mersa Brega. As far as ten miles further east, the 2/17th Battalion had moved into position. The third battalion of the 20th Brigade was at Beda Fomm. There was the one company back at Barce. The 9th Division headquarters had moved to Bir el Tombia. There was only the one 9th Australian Division brigade in Cyrenaica. The other two brigades were still in Palestine. The forward troops were still supported by the 16th Anti-Tank Company. They had moved forward in February to support the 3rd Armoured Brigade. Another unit that stayed in position during the other movements was the 2/1st Pioneer Battalion. The battalion headquarters was back at Derna, while there were men scattered doing road repair work. There was also the 2/4th Field Company with the 9th Australian Division engineers. One early sign that all was not well was that back on 24 February 1941, that a patrol was ambushed by a German patrol near el Agheila. The Germans had tanks, armored cars, and motorcycles. The Germans took three prisoners, including the commander of the anti-tank gun detachment. By early March, General Wavell realized that there were two new Italian divisions and a German mechanized force in place that could be a threat. Wavell characteristically hoped that the lack of transport and water would limit what the new forces could accomplish. That was based on ignorance of how Rommel and German mechanized forces operated. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

The 3rd Armoured Brigade and 2nd Support Group in March 1941

The apparent British hope was that nothing would happen in Cyrenaica while they launched the Greek campaign. The 3rd Armoured Brigade had three units: the 3rd Hussars, the 6th RTR, and the 5th RTR. Most of the brigade was located at El Adem. The 5th RTR had old cruiser tanks. We believe them to have been A.9 Cruiser Mk.I and A.10 Cruiser Mk.II tanks. They lasted until the Crusader Battle in December. The 6th RTR was to be equipped with captured Italian M13/40 tanks. One squadron was actually at Beda Fomm being reequipped. The plan was to send the rest of the unit to Beda Fomm to get their Italian tanks. Remember that we are talking about March 1941. As we already mentioned, the 3rd Hussars had antiquated light tanks. While there was a newer version, the Light Mk.VIC with a 15mm Besa gun, like the Humber armored car, we believe that the 3rd Hussars had the older Light Mk.VIB tanks with a 0.50in machine gun. As for the 2nd Armoured Division Support Group, they were short of motorized infantry and artillery. They did have two Free French motorized companies as well as the 1/Tower Hamlets Rifles. The Tower Hamlets were very small for a unit that was nominally a battalion. They could field some 250 men to fight. The Support Group also had very little artillery. They had one anti-tank battery, for example. The field artillery was late to arrive. The 51st Field Regiment and the 104st RHA arrived very late in March 1941. The 51st Field Regiment was equipped with Great War vintage artillery. They had 18pdr guns and 4.5inch Howitzers, some of which were under repair. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

The 9th Australian Division relieves the 6th Australian Division in early March 1941

The 6th Australian Division was destined for the Greek operation. That meant that their forward troops in Cyrenaica would be replaced. The 17th Brigade, commanded by Brigadier Savige would be replaced by the 20th Brigade. There was one company of the 2/13th Battalion that was left at Barce so that they could protect the Cyrenaica Command headquarters. The rest of the 2/13th Battalion was positioned at Beda Fomm. The rest of the brigade drove through territory still occupied by Italian colonists. They were headed for Agedabia. At 8th March, the 9th Australian Division headquarters was at Tobruk. General Morshead had gone ahead to Cyrenaica Command headquarters. He was temporarily in charge of the forces in the western portion of Cyrenaica. General Morshead heard from General Neame that the plan was for the 2nd Armoured Division to take responsibility for the forces on the frontier as of 19 March 1941. At that point, General Morshead was supposed to move to Gazala. Mersa Brega, the small place in the sand and marshes, was vulnerable to being out-flanked from the south. The 3rd Armoured Brigade had the 3rd Hussars with 32 Light Mk.VIB tanks to protect the flank. The 6th RTR was being equipped with captured Italian M13/40 tanks at Beda Fomm. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

An unfortunate situation in February 1941

General Blamey's desire to send the best Australian troops to Greece meant that the Western Desert was left in a difficult situation. The 9th Australian Division had the most newly-recruited troops and were about to face the Germans. The 20th and 26th Brigades had been taken from the 7th Australian Division, which was their home unit. The Australian Official History mentions that the 18th Brigade wore their 6th Australian Division patches through the rest of the war. Division identity was a meaningful thing, and the former 7th Division brigades had thought that they had lost their better organization and had been moved to a higher numbered division, the 9th. A meeting was held on 26 February where the reorganization was said to be "temporary". The men had been "trained to fight", but their leaders were not yet trained to lead. The 20th Brigade was the first 9th Australian Division brigade to move west. They were mainly moved by train to Mersa Matruh. By 4 March, they had reached Tobruk. Two days later, they were west of Derna. They had passed Benghazi on 8 March. Not much later, the 20th Brigade arrived at Agedabia to take over from the 17th Australian Brigade. The plan was for the 2nd Armoured Division headquarters to be in charge at Agedabia, but they were not in place yet. The 17th Brigade was still in place at Marsa Brega, a name with which we are very familiar, being long-time students of the North African campaign. Marsa Brega had sand dunes, "rolling ground", and marshes. That seems rather unexpected for desert terrain. Brigadier Rimington and the 3rd Armoured Brigade were to protect the area south of Marsa Brega from attack. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

Events in early 1941 as the Greek operation started

Events moved faster in early 1941 as the Greek campaign commenced. After General Wynter's illness, the 18th Brigade commander, Brigadier Morshead, was appointed as 9th Australian Division commander. Lt-Colonel Wooten became 18th Brigade commander in Morshead's place. Wooten became a brigadier and Morshead became a Major-General.

Much of the action for Greece started in February 1941. General Wavell informed General Blamey of the plans for Greece right before Anthony Eden and General Sir John Dill arrived in Cairo to start negotiations with the Greek Government. The Greek Government had agreed to a British expedition on 24 February. General Blamey had gotten his way on sending the 6th Australian Division to Greece and kept the 9th Australian Division in Libya. Almost immediately, elements of the 2nd Armoured Division started the process of replacing the 7th Armoured Division in Cyrenaica, the portion of Libya that the British had taken. Lt-General Neame replaced General Wilson as the Cyrenaica Command commanding officer. Neame had been the 4th Indian Division commander from February 1940. In August 1940, he had been appointed as GOC of Palestine and Transjordan. He had wanted to command in the campaign against Italy in late 1940 until early 1941, but had to watch the successful campaign.

General Blamey announced a reorganization of Australian forces on 26 February 1941. The result was that the 9th Australian Division had three brigades, the 20th, 24th, and 26th Brigades. They got their three field regiments and an anti-tank regiment. The 9th Australian Division then had to move quickly to arrive in the Western Desert, as the 6th Australian Division was to go to Greece and needed to be relieved. The 24th Brigade was short, as they only had two complete battalions. The third battalion was still at Darwin in Australia, and would not arrive until April, according to the plan. This is baed on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

The 9th Australian Division formed

The two Australian brigades in England in 1940 were the 18th and 25th Australian infantry brigades. The Official History calls them two of the first-enlisted and best-trained of the Australian brigades. General Blamey criticized the decision to combine these brigades with newly formed units. The 8th Australian Division, to be sent to Singapore, lost the 24th Brigade to the 9th Division. They also lost the 2/3rd Anti-Tank Regiment and field companies to the 9th Division. The 8th Australian Division units were still in Australia in late 1940, but at least they existed. Major-General Wynter, then in England, was appointed as commander of the 9th Australian Division on 23 October 1940. He left England by sea in mid-November 1940. He left the convoy at Capetown and went by air to Cairo. He formed the division headquarters in Palestine on 24 December. They division only had two field regiments and one field company of engineers at first. Even as the units sailed, the division composition changed. When the 25th Brigade arrived in March 1941, it had been reassigned to the 7th Australian Division. General Wynter had to be replaced after he had fallen ill. He was replaced by Brigadier Morshead, who had been the 18th Brigade commander. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

Decisions in early 1941 for Greece and Libya

General Wavell, the theater commander in the Mediterranean and the Middle East thought that they would have until May 1941 before they would have to defend against Germans. They did not realize that Rommel would act sooner, even before his commanders were ready. The original plan was to retain the 6th Australian Division in Libya, as they were there best Australian infantry division. They would send the 7th and 9th Australian Divisions to Greece. General Blamey got involved and was able to change the plan, so that the 6th Australian Division went to Greece. General Blamey was concerned that the Greek campaign was so hazardous that they needed their best troops for the mission. The 9th Australian Division ended up being left in Libya on the defensive. The division was formed on 23 September 1940. Most of the units that comprised the 9th Australian Division had been formed for other purposes. There were two Australian brigades in England at this time, and they would be used for the new 9th Australian Division. The division's artillery was found by taking the I Australian Corps field regiments and converting the one medium regiment to field guns. They would form the third brigade in Australia and ship it to the Middle East, along with the other supporting units. Vol.III of the Australian Official History is primarily about the adventures of the 9th Australian Division in 1941 and 1942. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

Taking chances in early 1941 in the Western Desert

While embarking on Churchill's and the War Cabinet's latest adventure, General Wavell was ready to take extreme chances with the defense of North Africa. He would lose his bet, in the event. There were many complications. The 2nd Armoured Division had recently lost its commander. Major-General Tilly had died suddenly after arriving in the Middle East. He was replaced by Major-General Michael Gambier-Parry, who had been in Greece. He was to become a prisoner of war, along with some notable officers from the campaign against Italy. As we have noted, the 2nd Armoured Division was split into two parts. As the Official History notes, the best part was sent to Greece. The Western Desert defense was left to one weak armored brigade and one-and-a-half motorized infantry battalions. The one infantry division was "static". The 2nd Armoured Division brigades had only two tank battalions or regiments in each. We have the situation where you had the 3rd Battalion of the Royal Tank Regiment and the 3rd Hussars, a cavalry regiment. They were the same sort of unit, in practice, but with different sorts of names. General Wavell's idea for adding strength to the brigade left in Libya was to create the 6th Battalion of the RTR (usually called the 6th RTR). The unit would be equipped with captured Italian tanks, probably M13/40 tanks. Although not mentioned, the 6th Australian Cavalry Regiment received a mix of Italian M11/39 and M13/40 tanks. There is a picture that shows them with large, white Kangaroos painted on them. The decision was made to add the 3rd Indian Motor Btigade to the forces in Libya when they had completed their training. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

The commanders in Britain and the Middle East were indulging in wishful thinking in February to March 1941

When the 2nd Armoured Division arrived in the Middle East, the commander, Major-General Tilly, remarked that the division's cruiser tanks had worn out tracks and engines. General Wavell's reaction to that information was that perhaps, they would do better in the desert than they would have somewhere else. Of course, the British in the Middle East lacked tank transporters, vehicles that were later considered to be essential. The Germans had to demonstrate their utility before the British could learn. The British were trying to get by with as little effort and expense as possible, yet try to take on large responsibilities. The British solved their tank problem by shipping them to Greece, where they broke down in the mountains. Given the current operations, there were the New Zealand Division, the three Australian Divisions (the 6th, 7th, and 9th), one British division (the 6th, eventually renamed the 70th), and the Polish Carpathian Brigade. For the divisions, they were short of artillery and other supporting arms. Wavell sent the best armor to Greece and kept the worst in the Western Desert. Of course, Churchill and the War Cabinet were driving events, so they were ultimately responsible for the results. Wavell was a man desperate to hold onto his position as the theater commander, so he did whatever was asked, whether it was a good idea or not. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

The strategic situation in the Mediterranean Sea in late 1940 and early 1941

From the German perspective, plans were in flux. They had backed off from any attempt to invade Great Britain from the continent in late 1940. They also decided to forego an attack to take Gibraltar and seal the Mediterranean from the west. The biggest decision made in December 1940 was the decision to prepare to invade Russia. At the same time, Hitler decided to occupy Greece and Yugoslavia. Germany was limited to opportunistic changes to plans based on the current situation. One fateful decision was to send a German force to North Africa to retrieve the situation in the Western Desert where the Italians had been pushed back by a successful British offensive. They only hoped to hold Tripolitania and possibly to advance to Benghazi.

Fortunate for the Germans and Italians, Churchill had decided to send forces to Greece, which would have the affect of jeopardizing the recent gains in Cyrenaica in Libya. Before that happened, the forces available included the 7th Armoured Division and the 6th Australian Division in the Western Desert. Of the rest, the largest group was in Egypt, in the process of formation: the 2nd Armoured DIvision, the 6th British Division, the New Zealand Division, and the Polish brigade. Also in Palestine were the 7th Australian Division and the 9th Australian Division. They were still incomplete with more troops still in transit. The rest were in East Africa. Two Indian divisions were in Eritrea, the 4th and 5th. The 1st South African Division and two African divisions were in Italian east Africa.

The armoured divisions were both weakened. The 7th Armoured Division had been expended in the attack on Libya. They were not capable of operations without being refreshed. The 2nd Armoured Division was weak and still being formed. The British had tank problems in late 1940 and early 1941. The tanks that they had tended to be in poor mechanical condition. The commander of the 2nd Armoured Division had complained to General Wavell on his arrival of the poor mechanical condition of his cruiser tanks. This is baaed on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

The Tobruk and El Alamein volume of the Australian Official History

The Tobruk and El Alamein volume covers a long period, from March 1941 until December 1942. The second volume overlaps with this volume, in that it covered the Greek campaign, the battle for the island of Crete, and then the campaign in Syria and Lebanon against the Vichy French. Much of this volume involves the 9th Australian Division, from forming the unit until the division left the Middle East. This volume was published in 1965, so this was a period when anti-war fever was at a peak and some Australians apparently criticized publishing an official history about war. That attitude misses the point, though, because official histories chronicle the operations conducted by men, fighting against an enemy that needed to be beaten. The Australian volumes generally look in greater detail about operations than the British official history. That makes the Australian volumes more valuable, because they are a great learning tool that is available to us. They also describe the achievements and, yes, failures of men struggling in adversity. In this case, we know the outcome, and that it was successful. The author of this volume, Barton Maugham, was a veteran who served in the Western Desert, "mainly in the 2/13th Battalion". As we have said, Chester Wilmot was the intended author of this volume, but he died before he could start. Barton Maugham started the volume in 1955. Writing the volume was apparently a ten-year task. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

Finishing Volume II of the Australian Official History

We are now concluding the summary of Volume II of the Australian Official History for the Army in World War II. The author, Gavin Long, says that the Australian Army (the Australian Imperial Force) had shown itself to have grown into an army that was as capable as a long-term, "regular service" force. They were volunteers, as there were no draftees in the army. The Australian units had developed an esprit de corps as the natural result of experience in combat in a variety of campaigns. They had fought in the Western Desert, in Greece, Crete, and in Syria and Lebanon. They had gained the respect of their opponents, at least in Syria.

The force was caught by surprise by the Japanese attack on 8 December 1941, and the men were slow to realize that they might be headed to the Far East. They had shown that there was some wisdom in fighting against the Axis powers, where ever they might be, as they were potential threats to the Australian homeland. They had gained valuable combat experience that would help them in future battles, both in the Middle East and the Far East. We will be moving on to Volume III of the Australian Official History, about Tobruk and El Alamein. The plan had been for Chester Wilmot to write the volume, but Barton Maugham was the eventual author.

Knowledgeable Censors in North Africa in 1941

The Australian Official History suggests that the best censor is someone trained as an intelligence officer who has extensive newspaper experience. Apparently, the British censors lacked both sorts of experience. They were said to have been open to pressure by the large British newspapers. General Blamey's intelligence officer, Lt-Colonel Rogers, had stepped in and had set up a censor for Australian news in Cairo. His choice was Major Fenton, who had experience since 1939 in intelligence and had been a "senior newspaperman" before the war.

Australian news that would benefit the army needed to be aware of Australian issues. There were times when the best solution might be to provide a soldier's name to the press or his Australian state. The concern was to help the news consumers in Australia while not revealing information that would help the enemy. They also did not want someone who lacked Australian experience saying something that would offend people in Australia. South Africa had this sort of problem due to their racial setup and with anti-war activists.

One lesson that is still highly relevant is that a spokesperson needs to know what is being planned and what is really happening. One important goal is to not be seen as either ignorant or as someone being dishonest. In either case, the actual situation might be that the senior officers had not seen fit to share important information or had not trusted the spokesperson with the plans or events on the ground. Another issue was that the powers-that-be in London wanted to describe New Zealand, Australian, and South African troops as "British Imperial troops". The Australians were able to defeat that practice during the Syrian campaign. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.