Back to Jezzine from 6 July 1941

The 25th Australian Brigade had started to make progress at Jezzine while the battle for Damour was being fought. From 6 July 1941, the 2/31st Battalion moved north to Beit ed Dine. The 2/31st had advanced to Niha and beyond by early 7 July. The Cheshire Yeomanry was also active and had taken some French prisoners in Mrousti. They had talked with a Swiss member of the French Foreign Legion who told them that the French had withdrawn from Bater because of the intensity of the artillery fire. The current commander of the 25th Brigade, Brigadier Plant, ordered the left battalion group (because they included artillery) to take Beiqoun and Mazraat ech Chouf. One company was to take the commanding heights near Mazraat ech Chouf. The 2/25th Battalion with support from the 2/6th Field Regiment would move north. By 3pm on 8 July, they started to receive French artillery fire. They called in artillery support from the 2/6th Field Regiment. One platoon then was attacked by African troops. By 7pm, one platoon was in an exposed position and had taken casualties. The platoon was withdrawn, leaving the French in possession of the high ground. To the east, a company of the 2/31st Battalion was attacked twice on 8 July. Their losses left them with only 20 men. By 4:30, they were reinforced by an 18 man platoon from another hill. One company of the 2/25th Battalion tried to take Hill 1054 from the French. The attackers were left in exposed positions and were unable to move. Fortunately, some of the Pioneers came up in support. Men with Bren guns were able to take out three French machine guns. Artillery fire was called in. The guns fired for about 50 minutes and then the Australians charged the French with fixed bayonets. The French broke and ran. The French withdrew in confusion, but the Australians had lost communication with their artillery. Otherwise, they could have taken out the French vehicles. That withdrawal left the Australians on the heights at Mazraat ech Chouf. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

Near the coast on 11 July 1941 approaching Beirut

Early on 11 July 1941, French fire had slowed and stopped. Lt-Col. King ordered men to probe north from the roadblock. The men did not see any French forces, but they found that the French had merely allowed the probing men to pass through their lines and return without disturbing them. During the early afternoon, the French were active and present again. They also sent a tank squadron out along the sand dunes. This was just beyond the wireless antenna. Brigadier Savige, on hearing the news, told Lt-Col. King to stay in place in their current positions. Brigadier Savige was planning an attack for the morning of 12 July. At the same time, Brigadier Savige, commander of the 17th Australian Brigade, had ordered the 2/3rd Battalion to move forward onto the ridges that dominated the land near Aramoun. The land was so rough that supplying the forward troops with food was a problem. They survived on goat and also got horse meat from the local villagers. Hutchison's company, now of only about thirty men, came under French fire. They pulled back and set up a mortar that they used to fire back at the French machine guns. On the right, the 2/14th Battalion moved forward. They found four French 155mm guns and 200 rounds at Daqoun. They eventually moved forward to Ain Kaour. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

Greatly reduced Australian battalions on 9 and 10 July 1941 in Syria and Lebanon

During the afternoon of 9 July 1941, the 21st Australian Brigade was ordered to take "Abey and Kafr Matta" while the 17th Brigade was to advance on Beirut. When men from the 2/27th Battalion entered Abey and were near Daqoun, they found that the French had pulled back from the area. The 2/14th Battalion was to hold the area near Abey, Kafr Matta, along with Hill 903. They also were to block the road to Beirut. When Brigadier Savige, of the 17th Brigade, had moved north through Damour and made contact with Lt-Col. King of the 2/5th Battalion. Savige was unsure of what he should do next, and traveled to the 7th Division headquarters to get guidance. The 2/5th Battalion found themselves in a poor position, so he ordered a move north for about two miles. They reached their new position by 4:20am on 10 July. The 2/5th Battalion was by this time reduced to companies of 45 men or less. They had also moved so far that they were running short of phone wire for signals. Brigadier Savige arrived later in the morning of 10 July. He had Lt-Col. King move his men to the next ridge near Khalde. The 2/5th now had better artillery support. They were in company with the 2/5th Field Regiment and had a group of 6-inch howitzers from the British 7th Medium Regiment. The Australians had a fire plan for a new attack that would start at 3:30m on 10 July. They would have a barrage move forward of the advancing troops. They reached the French road block and block house. One platoon was held up by French mortar fire and machine guns. The 6th Cavalry came forward in support and had cleared the area in front of the road block. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The 6th Cavalry in action on 8 July 1941

On the morning of 8 July 1941, while the 2/16th Battalion was improving their situation on the ridges, more of the 6th Cavalry Regiment crossed the Damour River to join their other part. There were already three tanks (probably captured R-35's) on the north side. They were with two companies from the 2/2nd Pioneers. The Pioneers were now a mile north of the river. Progress had been halted by French fire and the threat of French 75mm guns covering the road. The squadron commander was angry about someone saying bad things about the cavalry being held up and ordered the three tanks forward, which was a bad idea. A tank came around the bend in the road and was hit by fire from a 75mm gun 300 yards away. A second tank came up in support. The damaged tank was set on fire. The crew abandoned the damaged tank and was picked up by the other tank. Lt. Macmeikan, of the 2/5th Field Regiment saw the gun flash and was able to knock it out by artillery fire. By 2pm, the decision was made to pull back and call in an artillery barrage. When the Pioneers pulled back, the French moved forward to be clear of the artillery fire. When the Pioneers attacked again during the night, they moved forward into part of the town. By morning on 9 July, the 6th Cavalry was able to drive through Damour. It was after this event that Brigadier Berryman had arrived and ordered men forward when he saw the situation. Brigadier Savige was put in charge to restore some order around Damour and beyond. During the afternoon on 9 July, men from the 2/27th found that the French had pulled out of Abey and Daqoun. In response, the 2/14th Battalion was ordered to move into Abey, Kafr Matta, and a hill between them. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official history.

After Damour fell on 9 July 1941

Once the Australians realized that the French had withdrawn from Damour and surrounding positions, they exploited the situation. By 7am on 9 July 1941, men from the 2/2nd Pioneer Battalion and the 2/16th Battalion met Captain Noonan's company from the 2/14th Battalion. This was on the northeast side of Damour. The 6th Cavalry and some Pioneers moved up to Karacol. The roadblock on the road to Beirut now was held by two companies from the 2/5th Battalion. A local Lebanese told someone on Brigadier Savige's staff that the French had pulled out of Abey. This was to the east. They sent word to General Allen, the 7th Australian Division commander of the situation.

Brigadier Berryman had arrived back in the west from Merdjayoun to resume his role as the 7th Division artillery commander. The commander of the 2/5th Field Regiment had driven north for 3-1/2 miles to a roadblock. Two tanks from the 6th Cavalry were held by the roadblock. Brigadier Berryman gave orders for continued movement to the north and informed the division headquarters of his actions. There was a situation now that the division commander had told the 17th Brigade not to advance until he issued orders. Men with guns from the 2/5th Field Regiment moved quickly north. The guns that were farthest north were around Karacol. They were drawn into a duel with French guns, firing over open sights. From this position, they were also able to shell the southern edge of Beirut. The situation was rather chaotic, and needed someone to bring the situation under control. That task was given to Brigadier Savige, of the 17th Brigade. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

8 July 1941 at Damour

The situation on 8 July 1941 near Damour was that the town was being threatened on three sides. There were three Australian battalions involved. The 2/5th blocked the road out of Damour to the north. On the northeastern side, the 2/14th Battalion was in position. Then there were the 2/2nd Pioneers "moving up from the south". Artillery support had to be carefully coordinated so as to not shoot at Australians while firing in support. At 5pm, Colonel Chapman brought orders from the division commander, General Allen, proposing that the 21st Brigade would have responsibility for "the area south of the Wadi Daqoun". Brigadier Savige's 17th Brigade would move north along the coast road. The 21st Brigade would move eastward towards Abey. By 7:30pm on 88 July, there were reports of French movement. This was to the north east. During the day on 8 July, two companies were near Damour on the east side. There was some concern that there might be a danger of accidentally firing on Australians.

8 July was a time spent by the 2/16th Battalion on the ridges at Mar Midhail and El Atiqa. They were gradually making themselves more secure. In the morning, three tanks from the 6th Cavalry (probably the captured French R-35 tanks) crossed the river. The 2/2Pioneers were moving north to a point about a mile north from the river. The French were still strong in the banana plantation. One tank caught by a French 75mm gun was knocked out. The 2/5th Field Regiment fired in support and knocked out the French gun. Brigadier Stevens decided to withdraw the men and call in artillery fire on the French. Some ground had been lost on the 8th, but during the night, the Pioneers took back what had been lost and were. A troop of the 6th Cavalry was able to drive through Damour by 4am and they had the town. They found that during the night, the French had withdrawn from where they had been fighting. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

with the 2/3rd Battalion from 8 July 1941 and with the 2/5th

We are now at daybreak on 8 July 1941 with the 2/3rd Battalion. They were on the Kheurbet el Biar ridge. They started to receive French artillery and mortar fire as the day got light. They could see French artillery in the distance, where the wadi cut the hill. By 6am, Captain Parbury could see Australians at Deir Mar Jorjos. At that news, the 2/3rd moved forward to the heights that they were to take. The commander ordered Porbury to tkane hill 569 on the right. He sent a platoon which came under machine gun fire. The Australians were tired and without water. They were able to move along and reached one knoll on the summit. They could see five French field guns some five hundred yards away. By late on the 9th, in the afternoon, they took the guns. They were then in the village.

Meanwhile, the 2/5th was at the wadi near Deir Mar Jorjos. This was just at midnight in the night of 7 to 8 July. The first men to arrive came under fire, but were able to take four 75mm guns and 8 machine guns. By 3am, they were in Deir Mar Jorjos. Just before En Naame, they took the high ground. From there some men entered the village and took "a French colonel of the Foreign Legion and his staff". By 8am, an artillery captain was able to get his 15 mile long wire into the village. That allowed the commander to speak with Brigadier Savige. By dawn on 8 July, they started to receive mortar fire. A small group was sent to take the bridge. There men with two Thompson sub-machine guns and a Bren gun. The bold attack caused the French to flee the bridge. When Lt-Col. King saw a French counterattack forming, he called in artillery fire, which broke the attack, so that the men all ran. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

Important actions from 7 July 1941 in the Damour battle

The 2/16th Battalion had a fairly quite day on 7 July 1941 in Lebanon. They found that the French had withdrawn from the El Atiqa ridge. The area had banana plantations and they were cleared. The engineers put a bridge over the river that allowed vehicles to cross. By afternoon, there were two companies of pioneers and three tanks in the plantation area.

In the 2/27th Battalion's area, the action heated up into an intense battle. The French had moved on the east slope of Hill 560. One company was sent to push the French off the hill. Captain Lee's company came under heavy fire and was stopped. After midnight, into 8 July, they had pushed close to the French. They thought that by daylight, the French would surrender. The battle continued and Captain Lee's headquarters came under attack at Er Roumane. The battalion commander committed just about his entire force into the battle. When they took some French prisoners, they learned that the attackers were from the I/French Foreign Legion and one company from the 29th Algerians. The Algerians had been shipped in from France in a roundabout route that came through Greece. Lt.Col. Moten, the commander, made his way forward with an artillery observer. He arrived with the forward troops at 5am on 8 July. They discovered that the French had withdrawn in the night. The attacking Australians had considerable losses, so that companies were now platoon-size. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

Finally into Damour on 7 July 1941

One company from the 2/14th Battalion, that commanded by Captain Noonan, was on the north side of the Wadi Daqoun. They were almost into Damour, as they were just 400 yards from the town. From where they were, they could hear heavy firing on the south side of the wadi. However, Noonan's company was so far unopposed. Seemingly, they could just move into Damour any time that they wanted. Captain Noonan agreed that there would be benefits from moving into Damour. He was feeling cautious, though, and sat with his headquarters and one platoon in their position 400 yards from Damour. He let two platoons move into the town. They exchanged fire with some French troops as they moved into Damour. Some of the Australians moved into some stone buildings which would provide good cover. As tehy wainted, they saw ten European French troops moving along the street. The Australians waited until the French were very close and then killed or wounded all ten. By 4pm, Lieutenant Katekar's men, from the 2/27th Battalion, were pushing some Senegalese troops northward towards Damour. The first few men surrendered when the Australians shot at them. A little while later, there were about one hundred more on the hill, across from Captain Noonan's men. Sergeant Mott shouted at them and fired over their heads. The Senegalese troops ran for cover. The Australians soon had 92 prisoners. They could see more groups of Senegalese troops, but they could hear shots being fired in Damour, so they moved eastwards. Captain Noonan's men put the prisoners in one house and occupied others. There was no food. During the night, they could hear vehicles drive nearby. The French knew that they were in Damour, while their own artillerymen did not. As a result, they had to endure both Australian and French artillery fire. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

With Captain Arthur's company of the 2/14th Battalion on 7 July 1941

Captain Arthur's company of the 2/14th Battalion was on the south ridge of the Wadi Daqoun on 7 July 1941. His commander ordered him to take his men along the Daraya ridge. He was to take Hill 225. Hill 225 appeared to be a position that would dominate the town of Damour. At 400 yards from Hill 225, they were under machine gun fire. When Captain Arthur had requested mortar support, that was when he was sent two Vickers machine guns. As we have mentioned, they quickly found the range to the French and allowed the Australian infantry to advance. A group from the 2/27th Battalion arrived and attacked the French from the southwest. A runner from the 2/27th made contact with the Australian artillery observer and called in fire. The men from the 2/27th Battalion were able to move forward towards Hill 225. As the sun set, men from Captain Arthur's company caught two Frenchmen and 16 Senegalese and took them prisoner. There was fighting and the Australians took casualties, but by midnight on 7 to 8 July had taken Hill 225. They captured six machine guns and ten thousand rounds of ammunition and more. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

More action on 7 July 1941 with the 2/3rd, 2/5th, and 2/14th battalions

While Lt-Col. King of the 2/5th Battalion had hoped to wait until the next day to attack, Brigadier Savige decided that the men needed to move forward to Deir Mar Jorjos that night, rather than waiting. Three lines of men moved across the wadi, single file. They reformed into a more normal formation once they had crossed. As the sun was setting, the men moved across the Wadi Daqoun. They had to be careful crossing the steep slopes. The men were so tired that when they stopped to rest, the men fell asleep. The 2/5th moved through the position where the 2/3rd Battalion was located. Major Stevenson, commanding the 2/3rd Battalion wanted to stay in place, because he was concerned with the possibility of accidentally fighting the 2/5th Battalion in the dark.

All day long on 7 July 1941, the 2/14th Battalion was moving to the west, where they would move into Damour on the east side. They would make connection with the 2/2nd Pioneers. They advanced untii they were 400 yards from Damour and stopped for two hours. One company on the ridge to the south ran into French troops with machine guns. The commander had asked for mortars to fire in the machine guns, but got two Vickers machine guns from the 2/3rd Machine Gun Battalion. They quickly dominated the French guns so that the infantry was able to advance. Men from another Australian battalion, the 2/27th, attacked the French from the southwest. They had been pinned down by machine gun fire, but a runner had alerted an artillery observer, who called in fire on the French. By sunset on the 7th, the French defenses were starting to disintegrate. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

Near El Boum on 7 July 1941

The 2/3rd Battalion straggled into El Boum by about 8:30am, even though the first company arrived as early as 5:30am. The 2/3rd Battalion commander, Major Stevenson, had found the phone wire that they were following by climbing straight up the hill. The commander of the 2/5th Battalion, Lieutenant-Colonel King, would coordinate the two battalions. Stevenson only found King at 9:30am, so they could decide on a plan. The 2/5th Battalion only reached El Boum between 7:45am and 8:45am. A mule train arrived with the wireless equipment. King was able to communicate with Brigadier Savige and give him the current status. The battalions were able to move out by 10:30am in "diamond formation". Once Lt-Col. King arrived at the "start line", he decided that they should wait until the next day, 8 July, to attack, due to the amount of French machine gun fire. He hoped to call in artillery support against the French forces. Major Stevenson learned that there was a French battalion about an hour-and-half-march away on the right. They eventually saw about 100 men and mules arrive and start to unload. They held their fire until they were about 600 yards away. They then opened fire on the French and the mule train, and dispersed the men and mules that survived. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

More fighting at Damour on 6 July 1941

By the afternoon on 6 July 1941, the fighting near Damour continued. The French staged a series of attacks against the Australians. The Australians had multiple companies of infantry in the fight. They attacked Russell's company, of the 2/14th Battalion, and shouted as they attacked. The Australians were able to stop the attackers and left 20 men dead with no Australian casualties. The French attacked again, but were not as energetic. They were repulsed. There were now two companies in control of El Mourhira. When Brigadier Stevens learned of their success, he ordered the 2/14th less the companies at El Mourhira, to move out to a line north of Daraya. They arrived after midnight on the night of 6 to 7 July. They discussed whether the 17th Brigade should advance to El Boum. Brigadier Stevens cautioned against making such a move in daylight due to the accurate French artillery fire. The plan for the 17th Brigade seems to have been overly ambitious, even as modified. The men were to be heavily loaded, as they would travel over ground too difficult for mules. While the men were moving down to the river, they got rain. The rain made the rocks very slippery and difficult. Men slipped on their backs, down the rocks. The two 17th Brigade battalions were the 2/3rd and the 2/5th. The first men from the 2/3rd Battalion arrived at the Beit ed Dine road after 3am. On 7 July, they men were to follow signal wire to El Boum, but the men of the 2/3rd lost track of it in the dark. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

A fight in the moutains in the east along the Beit ed Dine road on 5 aand 6 July 1941

Two companies from the 2/14th Battalion moved forward late on 5 July 1941. They started at Kramdech. The infantry led the group. Behind them were the mules with mortars and bombs. Last were the signalers, reeling out telephone wire. Captain Russell's company moved across the ridges until they arrived at the Beit ed Dine road. The road, at this point, was cut into a ledge on the ridge side. This was where the men had piled up rocks to block the road. A lieutenant and 12 men were sent up a hill to see if the French were there. They came under fire from a French position in a low point between hills. They had two men captured and withdrew. Captain Russell then attacked, but the French rolled grenades down the hill and put a stop to the attack. By 8:30am on 6 July, three French armored cars drove up to within 200 yards of the stones and stopped. One car was attacked with a sticky bomb, but the bomb failed to stick. The bomb fell off and exploded. Still, the cars pulled back about a mile. The cars carried two-pounder-sized guns and they started firing. Presumably, they were 37mm guns. With the cars present, French infantry tried attacking the road block. A combination of small arms fire and mortars beat back the attack. Three attacks by Captain Russell's company ultimately took Hill 567. The battle continued. The French infantry were mostly Senegalese with French officers and senior enlisted. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

More action on 6 July 1941 in the battle for Damour in Lebanon

Lt-Colonel Moten, commander of the 2/27th Battalion, came to the river crossing. This was at about 1:30pm on 6 July 1941. He planned to establish his battalion headquarters at El Boum. They now had a phone line to El Boum, so Moten could talk with Captain Nichols, who had arrived at El Boum at 8am. By midnight, the 2/27th Battalion controlled the planned area. That would allow the 17th Brigade, commanded by Brigadier Savige, to block the road to the north from Damour. The rear company of the 2/27th, along with the remnants of the fourth company, were spread on a wide front, but were not as far towards Damour has had been hoped.

Another battle was fought at El Atiqa, starting at midnight on 5 to 6 July. There were three weakened companies of the 2/16th Battalion that were attacking. They were supported by an artillery barrage. They had to cross the river and move forward to the Beit ed Dine road. The French replied with their own artillery barrage. The plan included a frontal attack, which seems to be ill-considered. The advance was blocked and they were reduced to exchanging fire with the French. By night, the remnants of the 2/16th Battalion were on the El Atiqa ridge and were holding on to their position.

There was concern that the French might attack along the Beit ed Dine road with armored cars and tanks. As early as 10pm on 5 July, Captain Nichols, commanding one company of the 2/27th Battalion, was in the woods located between the Damour tributary and Ed Dalimiye. Part of the 2/14th Battalion were at Kramdech by 8pm. Another company reached the Beit ed Dine road by 3:15am. They blocked with road with stones and waited for daylight. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The battle for Damour starts: from the night of 5 to 6 July 1941 in Lebanon

The men of the 21st Australian Brigade moved out at about midnight on the night of 4 to 6 July 1941. This was the start of the battle for Damour, in Lebanon. At 12:35pm, the artillery commenced their supporting fire. The ground that the men had to travel was extremely rough. One company from the 2/27th Battalion was in the lead on the narrow track that went down to the river crossing and then up to El Boum. The roughness of the ground meant that they needed to allow resting time along the way. The first platoon was that commanded by Lieutenant Sims, who had found the river crossing. They tried walking in the wadi, so that they would have cover from the French fire, but they decided that they would be safer back on the trail, despite the lack of cover. The wadi had too many places where men might fall. As there started to be light, they reached a barrier of concertina wire. They continued, trying not to be seen. They could hear the French firing. They fixed bayonets and charged into the village. The French were seen running from the attackers. They occupied the village and waited for more men to arrive.

The next company to move out was hit by accurate French artillery fire. Officers were killed and the company commander was wounded. That company needed to be reorganized under the leadership of Lieutenant Thomas. The men at El Boum had expected the second company at 7am. When they did not arrived, the spread out and advanced. By midnight on 6 July, the 2/27th Battalion had taken their objectives, so that the 17th Brigade could move forward. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The artillery plan for the attack at Damour in July 1941

The plan for the attack at Damour in in early July 1941 was comprehensive. The Australian division commander, General Allen, was able to request naval gunfire support for two days prior to the attack on the day of the attack. He also requested air support for the attack. The primary air role would be to protect the ground forces from French air attack. The Vichy French air force had proven itself to be a major factor. Were the French fighter aircraft superior to the British and Australian fighters involved? The French bombers had also proved themselves to be vert capable. The 21st Australian Brigade would attempt to turn the French flank and take out the foremost French forces. The artillery support would be primarily from field guns, but there was also a medium battery. The 17th Brigade was in place to continue the advance, if the initial attack was successful. The terrain for the attack would be very challenging. On the left was the ridge. Four battalions on the right would try to march through rough terrain where the men would have to carry all the loads. They might or might not be able to use mules. The attack would start during the night of 5 to 6 July 1941. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

Late in the game in Syria and Lebanon in early July 1941

By early July 1941, the British had accumulated five brigades in Iraq. With the 10th Indian Division now in Iraq, Major-General Slim, the commander, was put in charge of the troops in northern Iraq. At this point, General Wilson was back to issuing orders. General Clark, of Habforce, had orders to advance west to Homs so as to block the road to Tripoli on the coast. They should also advance to the southwest to Baalbek, which threatened Beirut. The 10th Indian Division was to threaten Aleppo. The 21st Indian Brigade was motorized and had the 13th Lancers, an armored car regiment. They were dependent on air support from an improvised squadron. They had twelve aircraft, four Hurricanes, four Gladiators, and four Blenheims. By 6 July, the French had shot down all the Hurricanes. The 10th Indian Division troops were operating in the north, near the Turkish border. Because of the French air attacks, the division was not able to reach Aleppo.

For the defense of Damour, to support Beirut, the French had two French Foreign Legion battalions. They were reduced in strength, as were the five Lebanese battalions. The British believed that the French artillery consisted of four 75mm batteries and two medium guns (probably 155mm). There were also some coast defense guns that might be a factor. Besides the force at Damour, there were two lines behind that at Khalde and then right before Beirut.

The orders for the attack were for the 21st Brigade to clear the enemy from the area south of the river, and then advance to a line from the river mouth to the east. The 17th Brigade would move up behind the 21st Brigade and be ready to move against any other French forces not near the 21st Brigade. The 25th Brigade would move towards Beit ed Dine. The Cheshire Yeomanry would be in the mountains further east. The Australians had their own artillery support. They had some 62 guns, including one medium battery. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

From 3 to 5 July in Syria and Lebanon

By 11:30am on 4 July 1941, the Pioneers attacked Mtoulle. They had taken fire, but by afternoon, they held the village, for that was what Mtoulle was. Before this, in the late afternoon of 3 July, an Australian company moved north and east towards Rharife. By the 5th, they had occupied Rharife. During the day on 4 July, the French could be seen withdrawing towards the northeast from Mtoulle. Brigadier Plant, of the 25th Australian Brigade, got his orders from General Allen to exploit the French withdrawal. By 5 July, the 2/31st Battalion, located east of the gorge, was scouting to the north along the road from Jezzine. To the west, the 2/25th was holding a line that included Rharife and Mtoulle. At a higher level, General Lavarack reacted by ordering the British 6th Division to increase their activity both at Damascus and Merdjayoun. He hoped that would indicate to the French that the division was going to attack. ON 3 July, the 6th Division had been situated with the 16th Brigade on the road to Beirut. The remains of the 5th Indian Brigade was holding a position north of Qatana. The 23rd Brigade was at Merdjayoun and Khiam. The 1/Royal Fusiliers (reconstituted) were in the forts near the Beirut road. They had the 9th Australian Cavalry in readiness to respond to any attacks. A yeomanry cavalry unit was on Mount Hermon, near Chebaa. 3 July also saw the French surrender at Palmyra. There were 165 men, mostly not French, as they were from the French Foreign Legion. Another group at T3 surrendered on 4 July. They had been sufficient to defend against a large force, mostly cavalry, for some twelve days. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The 25th Australian Brigade from 1 July 1941

On 1 July 1941, the 25th Brigade was holding not a line, but a line of posts. That implies that they had gaps in the front. They were located north of Jezzine and to the east. They were on the road that ran to the north from Jezzine, as well. Patrols were finding evidence that the French were withdrawing from some positions. They found that the French were defending Hasrout, which was on a road that ran do the east. The French had pulled out from what was just a track that led to Jleiliye. They also found that on the night of 2 July, the French had pulled back from Wadi Nagrat and were withdrawing on Beit ed Dine. Brigadier Stevens then decided to send two columns against Rharife. They were mixed battle groups, one from the 2/25th Battalion and the other from the 2/2nd Pioneers. They would converge on Hasrout and then move on Rharife. The Pioneers took casualties on 3 July. Because the company commander was wounded, they were delayed in moving into Jleiliye. The other company was still short of Mtoulle at the end of the day. For the 2/25th Battalion, the plan was for one company to take the town while the other company took the plateau above Hasrout. The terrain was extremely difficult. An Australian bayonet attack routed the defenders. One platoon took Hasrout and set up a road block. When they could see French troops readying for an attack, they called in artillery and forced them to withdraw. By about midday on 4 July, the Pioneers had taken Mtoulle and were in communication with the other column. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The plan for the Australian attack in early July 1941 in Lebanon

By late June 1941, Brigadier Stevens, of the 21st Australian Brigade, discussed the plans with General Allen for the attack in early July against the French in Lebanon. Stevens proposed that they form a box around Damour. The sea would be one side, the 21st Brigade would make two sides, and the 17th Brigade would add the fourth side, "the lid". The plan was for the 17th Brigade to go around the right flank of Damour to block the road that was the only exit. We had seen the 17th Brigade commander, Brigadier Savige, in Greece earlier in the year, in April. In a meeting on 2 July, they had decided to attack on either 5 or 6 July. The 2/2nd Pioneers (without two companies) would take part with the 21st Brigade. Brigadier Stevens was also given control of the 2/25th Battalion and the other two companies of the 2/2nd Pioneers in the east. The attack on Damour would have a large artillery force with 16 medium guns and 44 field guns. By 2 July, the force between Jezzine and the Mediterranean Sea had grown to nine battalions. That is somewhat deceiving,as many units were under strength. For example, the 2/16th Battalion had rifle companies of less than one hundred men. The 17th Brigade only had two battalions for the attacks, although they had but 300 men each. The only reassuring factor was the continuing number of French deserters that seemed to indicate that the French were in even worse shape. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

Looking for river crossing points near Damour in late June early July 1941

Brigadier Stevens of the 21st Australian Brigade wanted to find a suitable river crossing on the right of his position in Lebanon near Damour. This was during 30 June and 1 July 1941. Stevens wanted to avoid a direct attack, so he wanted to go around the eastern flank, if possible. Some Australians had scouted around the concrete bridge that was guarded by French sentries. One platoon, led by Lieutenant Sims, made an incursion across the river below the bridge. They had set out at 8pm on 1 July and returned at 6am on 3 July. These patrols from the 2/27th Battalion found a way to the El Mourhira hill. A company could make the trek in about four hours, they found. The 2/16th Battalion was on the left, and had looked for crossing points over the river. The French were more concerned about the left, and there was more fighting. They patrolled the area during the nights up to 5 July and gained information from French prisoners. Starting from 26 June, the navy came up in support and fired on French targets that had been identified. Brigadier Stevens had kept his battalions back so that they would avoid casualties from the French artillery fire. Brigadier Stevens had developed his plan over the course of feeling out the French positions. He was reinforced by a third battalion and then the 17th Brigade, commanded by Brigadier Savige, joined. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The Australian Situation in Late June 1941 in the Middle East

The Australian forces in the Middle East had been heavily depleted in the Greek, Crete, and now the Syrian/Lebanon campaigns. Brigadier Steven's 21st Brigade in Lebanon consisted of just two battalions, which were both under strength. In late June, they were trying to keep some pressure on the French with the units that they had. They were helped out by some Spanish deserters from the French Foreign Legion who brought mules with them. While Stevens was visiting Brigadier Berryman's headquarters, he met General Wavell, and told him that he was unable to get 3-inch mortar bombs, although British units were receiving them. Wavell took immediate action and had 320 bombs each per Australian battalion. They gradually received reinforcements from Palestine, but they were most committed to rebuilding the battalions lost in Crete, while battalions that had lost men in Greece and Crete were getting replacements for their losses.

The 21st Brigade kept pushing north. The only place where they had seen French troops was at the high point on the right that overlooked the Damour Gorge. Then on 27 June 1941, a patrol was fired on by machine guns from Hill 394 and took a casualty. By now, the Australians often received French artillery fire from north of the river at Damour. The commander of the 2/27th Battalion with a company commander, scouted around Hill 394. They thought that they might take the hill at night. They captured the hill after midnight. The men on the hill would hide during daylight on the side away from the French and would be on top at night. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

Brigadier Steven's plan for attacking to the north towards Beirut

When he would be allowed to move back to the offensive, Brigadier Stevens, commander of the Australian 21st Brigade had prepared a plan on 22 June 1941 to attack Damour. Taking Damour would put them in a position to move against Beirut. An important aspect of the plan was artillery fire directed against the French just to the north of the gorge. There was a ridge that ran from Es Saadiyate across to Es Seyar. This was about three miles north of the edge of the Australian positions,. At the time, he had two battalions. One would take Barja. The second battalion would move up the road to the "143 feature". That would give them a commanding position overlooking the Damour Valley. He needed another battalion to move north along the road. They would move over the mountains at El Haram and advance to El Labiye. They would be on a ridge that towered 800 feet above the ravine at Damour. Once that had been achieved, in two days, they could make a successful attack on the French at Damour. They would avoid what he considered to be a mistake at Sidon when they had become involved in a fight in the orange and banana groves. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

On 28 June 1941, a major reorganization in Syria and Lebanon

The focus in Lebanon and Syria would switch back to the coast and the western portion of the area. General Wilson had orders issued to focus in the west. The 7th Australian Division would add the 17th Brigade, which was actually understrength. The focus would be on Jezzine and the coast. Btigadier Savige commanded the 17th Australian Brigade. He would have his headquarters, two infantry battalions and the pioneer battalion. The British 6th Division, under General Evetts would have Merdjayoun and Damascus. The British 23rd Brigade would free up Australian units so that they could join the 7th Australian Division. The 6th Division would take a defensive posture. General Lavarack tried to take steps to control the Free French, so that operations on the coast would not be disturbed by anything that the Free French might do to the east. The French position at the Damour River was the main obstacle to moving north to take Beirut. There was a town named Damour, with a population of some 5,000 residents. General Dentz had spoke of fighting in the streets of Beirut, but informed opinion expected that the Vichy French would surrender if the city was taken. Having been left on his own for a while, Brigadier Stevens had prepared a plan for operations after they were allowed to move. The plan was later "amended", as more units were added to the offensive. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Offiicial History.

Glubb Pasha

I thought that we could find a picture of Major Glubb. The Wikipedia has a picture and information about John Gabot Glubb, who led the Arab Legion in Syria in 1941.

Action in the east of Syria from 30 June 1941

To the east of Damascus, the Free French had pushed quite a ways to the north. The Free French battalion at Nebek was attacked on 30 June 1941. The unit was the 2nd Free French Battalion along with "four British field guns and some anti-tank guns". The attack started with an artillery barrage at 4:55am. Forty minutes later, seven French tanks approached. Another seven tanks drove south down the road towards the village. They were driven off by the artillery. On the east, the seven tanks were joined by motorized infantry. The anti-tank guns and one field gun knocked out three tanks and drove off the rest. As the French infantry approached, the Free French attacked and "drove them off". The Free French lost eight men and killed forty Vichy French and took 11 men prisoner.

The fight at Palmyra had continued. On 29 June, the Vichy French had attacked and forced the Wiltshire Yeomanry from a ridge above Palmyra. They British at Palmyra had continued to experience heavy French air attack. 30 June saw the 1/Essex able to recapture part of the ridge. By 1 July, they could see the Vichy French pulling in troops to the inner defended area. Earlier, on 26 June, General Clark, commanding Habforce, turned Major Glubb and his Arabs loose to take "Seba Biyar and Sukhna. They took Seba Biyar on 28 June and then found Sukhna empty. The Arabs were reinforced by a squadron of the Household Cavalry. On 1 July, a column drove along the Deir el Zor road. Major Glubb's troops attacked and defeated them. The group proved to be one of the three French light desert companies. They had lost 11 men killed, six armored cars captured along with some 80 men. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

On to Chehim and Daraya on 27 June 1941

On 27 June 1941, after encountering two French armored cars with troops on board, Captain Marson's two companies were able to disable them with stick bombs. Sticky bombs had only recently become available, seemingly, because they might have helped in earlier encounters with French tanks and armored cars. After dealing with the cars, the Australians were able to call in artillery fire on the town. That caused two French cars packed with 25 men to leave, heading north-east. The people of the town gathered in the market square and "wailed". The Australians ordered them to return to their homes. They found that the road to Mazboud was clear. That allowed four carriers to travel to Chehim. There was no opposition until they reached Hasrout, after passing through Daraya. They felt like their position on the east was secured, so now the advance could proceed on the coast. They troops there had moved north so that they were in position to attack Damour.

Back at Jezzine, Brigadier Plant had decided to hit the two hills, 1284 and 1332, with heavy artillery fire. Hill 1284 was checked by a patrol from the 2/31st Battalion on the night of 28 and 28 June. They found the hill abandoned. The French hit the hill with heavy fire from mortars and machine guns, so the patrol had to abandon the place. On 29 June, two sections staged a mock attack. They again moved through Hill 1284 "on to 1332". Hill 1284 had received very heavy Australian artillery fire, which had caused it to be abandoned. That was a better approach than infantry attacks. The fortunes of the 25th Brigade, now under Brigadier Plant's command, improved greatly. There was now a great deal of aggressive patrolling. After having a great deal of success in the area near Jezzine, the 2/14th Battalion learned that they would be withdrawn and returned to their brigade on the coast as of 1 July. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The attention shifts to Beit ed Dine by 25 June 1941

The situation on 25 June 1941 in Lebanon was that the Australian 21st Brigade had pushed eight or nine miles north of Sidon on the coast. By 25 June, General Allen ordered the 2/25th Battalion to move east. The 21st Brigade move north also started on 25 June. Brigadier Stevens, the 21st Brigade commander, had ordered the 2/27th and 2/16th Battalions to move north "to the El Haram ridge". The 2/25th Battalion had only recently arrived at Sidon from Merdjayoun. Brigadier Stevens was concerned because the 6th Cavalry had seen Vichy French troops on the move. The move north to the Haram ridge only started late in the afternoon of 25 June. The men were on foot and the ground was rocky. They reached their objective between 11pm and 4am the next morning. The move by the 2/25th Battalion was augmented by an anti-tank gun and some engineers from the 2/6th Field Company. Brigadier Stevens' plan for the 2/25th was that when they reached Chehim, they would get an artillery observer. The observer would be able to call in artillery fire from "a troop of the 2/4th Field Regiment". The 2/25th Battalion had been depleted in the fighting at Merdjayoun, so one company was broken up and the men were distributed among the other three companies. In the night on 26 June, two companies moved east to a point just prior to reaching Mazboud. The ground was to rough for mules, so they had to leave their mortars at Mteriate. early on 27 June, Lieutenant Macaulay and a small group were fired on by a French armored car. They piled stones across the road and had the Bren gun in place. Two armored cars drove up from the east with many men on them. They outnumbered the Australians. Two men were captured while Lieutenant Macaulay and another man escaped. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

Back to the Lebanon coast with the Australian cavalry from 18 June 1941

General Lavarack had ordered the 21st Brigade, on the coast of Lebanon, to halt while problems to the east were handled. The Australians under Brigadier Stevens then were left to conduct operations with the cavalry. On 19 June, the 9th Australian Cavalry squadron had been sent out to find where the coast road had been mined and then move forward to Sebline. They had known of a road block, which they reached. They were fired on by a French anti-tank gun that knocked out the leading tank. A carrier moved forward, and a trooper fired on the anti-tank gun with an anti-tank rifle and put it out of action. They eventually moved forward to retrieve the disabled tank. Another cavalry troop had been firing and were able to hook up to the disabled tank and two it out. The cavalry called in artillery fire and drove off the French. They had left their gun behind. Australian infantry, of the 2/16th Battalion, moved forward and took Jadra, a village. They took some forty French prisoners. In the afternoon, the 2/27th Battalion moved further forward until they were near the "El Ouardiniye-Sebline-Kafr Maya area". On 20 June, the squadron of the 6th Australian Cavalry that had been active in operations during the attack on Lebanon now relieved the squadron of the 9th Cavalry. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

changes at Jezzine on 24 June 1941

On 24 June 1941, General Allen made a change in the command of the 25th Australian Infantry Brigade. We find that Brigadier Cox was too ill to continue in command and should have been in a hospital. Brigadier Plant was appointed as the new brigade commander. The brigade had two battalions: the 2/31st and the 2/14th. By the afternoon of 24 JUne 1941, when Brigadier Plant arrived, the men of both battalions were very tired. They had also taken many casualties were low in strength. The French that the Australians had been fighting were also tired. During the day on 24 June, as many as ten French Foreign Legion troops surrendered, complaining of the Australian artillery fire. General Allen advised Brigadier Plant not to continue infantry attacks on "the heights" and just use artillery to clear the ridge. Brigadier Plant was a veteran of Gallipoli in the Great War, and considered the area at Jezzine to be rougher than what he had seen at Gallipoli. General Allen's plan was to have a mobile column from the coast attack into the mountains. Once they could see how the French reacted, the 25th Brigade could move forward and join the 21st Brigade. The 21st Brigade had been halted to give the operations at Merdjayoun time to progress. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

A Bad Plan on 24 June 1941 For Attacking Hill 1284

For the attack on Hill 1284 on 24 June 1941, Australian soldiers were expected to climb a steep ridge, under fire, to attack a "small fortress". The French position had a six-foot rock wall. There was also a pill box. The area bounded by the wall had a diameter of fifty yards. Inside the wall were machine gun emplacements. The defenders seem to have been French Foreign Legion troops. One Australian platoon commanded by Lieutenant O'Day took two hours to climb "the rocky slope". The platoon only had 32 men. The Australians charged and took the pill box, which was manned by just two men. There was a fierce fight between O'Day's platoon and the French. after an hour of fighting, the Australians were running short of ammunition. At noon, the French attacked. The French fired a heavy mortar that was fired at possible hiding places between rocks. They also sent out a group of twenty men with sacks of grenades. The Australians drove the group back into the fort after shooting six men. Lieutenant O'Day realized that the survivors of his platoon needed to withdraw. The eventually reached the outposts of the 2/31st Battalion at 2pm. A small group of O'Day's platoon had been left behind, but they eventually were able to withdraw to the 2/31st Battalion positions. Of the 32 men who attacked, 18 had survived, unwounded. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The attack at Kharat on 22 June 1941

Kharat was a mountain that was occupied by the Australians near Jezzine in Lebanon. Brigadier Cox commanded the forces near Jezzine on 21 June 1941. He had just received reinforcements in the form of the 2/14th Battalion. He had planned an attack from Kharat on the night of 21 to 22 June. General Allen, now commanding the 7th Australian Division was concerned, when he heard of the plan, that there was no artillery support planned. That proved to be incorrect, but the concern and changes made caused the attack to be postponed to 22 June. The artillery fired their planned program. Two companies from the 2/14th were known to have started off as planned. The men of the 2/31st Battalion were concerned. The officers reported back to the battalion commander that they could not see anyone from the 2/14th Battalion. They eventually found out that the combination of fog and difficult terrain had kept the 2/14th Battalion companies from reaching the start line until the company commanders decided that it was too late to actually attack. The attack was postponed again to the next day. The end result was that by the end of 22 June, nothing had been achieved, except giving away their intentions to the French. The next night, the two Victorian companies stepped off at 1am. At 4am, the infantry fired two Very lights to signal to the artillery that they could start firing. The men moved down Kharat and immediately took casualties from French fire. In the end, a small group of survivors surrendered to Senegalese troops. The attack failed, as they men were expected to cross open country under fire and they were decimated in the process. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

Back to Jezzine from 20 June 1941 onwards

The 2/32st Battalion of Australians had taken losses over the period when they held on at Jezzine. This fight was in parallel to the long, hard-fought battle st Merdjayoun. The French had attacked the men at Jezzine on 17 and 18 June 1941. There were but two companies from the 2/31st holding on against the French. On there left was the Cheshire Yeomanry. The French were within rifle shot. There were two French Foreign Legion companies. There was also a Senegalese infantry battalion. They had some African cavalry mixed into the force. The Australians frequently had incoming artillery and mortar fire. The men had to be supplied with food, so parties were sent to the battalion headquarters store. While the French were harassing the Australians, they were not prepared to conduct another attack. On both sides, the men were too tired to do anything but hold their ground. To reinforce the men at Jezzine, the 2/14th Battalion was transported from the coast. They moved into a position on the right of the 2/31st Battalion. The men of the 2/14th were also very tired. The men were all from Vitoria on the southeast coast of Australia. Brigadier Cox decided to use his new unit to attack the French. The attack would start on the night of 21 and 22 June 1941. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The attack on Col's Ridge fails from 27 June 1941

The plan for Col's Ridge was to attack from the north. A Pioneer company moved forward at 2am on 27 June 1941. The Pioneers reached the creek at the base of the ridge. After 4am, a creeping artillery barrage was preceding the infantry. The barrage was moved forward 50 yards at a time. Three platoons were set to advance up the hill. Right before they reached their objective, they were fired on by machine guns and mortars. They were taking losses, but were able to rush to the knoll. One platoon was going to settle on the hill, when they saw a large force of French infantry in front and on the left. They could see French artillery about a mile in the distance. The incoming French fire was getting heavier, as the artillery barrage had stopped. Many officers were killed in by the heavy French fire. They could see a large attack forming on the left. The Australians were running low on ammunition. There were few survivors of the Australian attackers, perhaps as few as 12. Lt-Col. Monaghan realized that the attack had failed and he called in artillery fire to support the survivors. The men moved back to the starting line and formed a defensive position. There had been two French battalions defending the hill. They had withdrawn while the artillery barrage was fired, but then returned to their positions. In the dark, Staff Sergeant Peeler searched for Captain Camm's body. Peeler had earned a Victoria Cross in the Great War in 1917. During the next night, and on the next day, the 2/King's Own Royal Regiment relieved the front line companies of the Australian 2/33rd Battalion. The Australian rifle companies had been in action for the last three weeks. The companies were reduced to 50 to 65 men. The French had built up their force at Merdjayoun to five battalions. They included on Foreign legion, one Tunisian, and three Algerian battalions. By late on 29 June, Brigadier Berryman returned to his duties in charge of the 7th Australian Division artillery. He was replaced by Brigadier Galloway, who we know well from the Western Desert in Egypt. In June 1941, he commanded the British 23rd Brigade. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

Sucess at Merdjayoun and the surrounding area on 24 June 1041

Early on 24 June 1941, the Pioneers heard a great deal of noise, especially near the fort in Merdjayoun. A platoon moved forward and fired their weapons. There was no reply. They entered Merdjayoun, which was in shambles. The French had deliberately destroyed buildings and homes and destroyed goods in shops. There were many dead on the ground. Most were French. They found the Pioneers who had been lost on 17 June and buried them. On the right, a company was ordered to take Kheibe. They were able to enter Kheibe without any opposition, but then took mortar and machine gun fire from the northwest. General Wavell visited Brigadier Berryman's headquarters. While there, General Wavell that they should go on the offensive as soon as they could.

The picture shows General Allen, Brigadier Frank Berryman, and Brigadier Baxter-Cox.

In this spirit, Brigadier Berryman decided to attack Col's Ridge with a company of Pioneers. The attack was to hit the ridge from the north and roll up the French flank, if all went well. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

Events near Merdjayoun from 22 June 1941

They had named the Australian horsed cavalry, "the Kelly Gang". They made their first patrol during the night of 22 to 23 June 1941, in the "hills of the Anti-Lebanon". By this time, the 2/King's Own battalion was added to Brigadier Berryman's force near Merdjayoun. The 2/25th Battalion was put into reserve near the road from Sidon to Merdjayoun. Berryman's force was now operating as companies. The new plan was for a company of the 2/33rd to take the ridge "north of Khiam". Another company, this from the 2/King's Own, would take the ridge from. Two more companies of the 2/King's Own would take Ibeles Saki. The artillery and Pioneers would demonstrate to give the impression that they were going after Merdjayoun. The attack by the 2/33rd commenced at 4:30am. They were opposed by two Algerian companies that had heavy weapons and were dug in. There was hand-to-hand fighting. The Australians took some weapons and used them against the Algerians. About an hour later, there was a counter-attack, which was beaten back. The Algerians made three more attacks during the "afternoon and evening". There was more hand-to-hand fighting. The attack on the other ridge by the 2/King's Own had more trouble, as the British troops had less combat experience. Brigadier Berryman got personally involved. He devised a new fire plan for the artillery and sent a field gun forward for direct fire. The 2/King's Own attacked again at 4:30am on 24 June. The French troops seem to have withdrawn in the night, so the British troops entered Ibeles Saki by 9:30am. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The aftermath of the attack on Merdjayoun on 19 June 1941

Brigadier Berryman issued an order at 4:30pm on 19 June 1941 that could not be execute. He wanted to issue sticky bombs to the 2/2nd Pioneer Battalion and the 2/25th Battalion. There was not enough time to issue the sticky bombs. The idea was that there must just be five tanks at Merdjayoun, and they could be destroyed. After the tanks were knocked out, the pioneers would take the fort and then the town. The 2/25th Battalion was greatly depleted. The survivors were scattered. 25 men were known to have been killed and some sixty were wounded. However, there were another 73 men missing, of which many were found to have been killed or wounded. The French attacked at dusk and pushed back the Australians. Communications were lost, but some men were able to hold their ground. Eventually, the battalion was withdrawn to the Litani river. The French had made a strong defense and the tanks gave them an advantage that the Australians could not counter.

Brigadier Berryman proposed a new plan of attack. We have previously heard of "Route A" and "Route B". The Australian artillery dominated Route B, so Berryman decided to go after Route A. He would move guns to Ibeles Saki. The ground was very rough with rocks, so he hoped that would offer protection from the French tanks. Brigdier Berryman presented his plan to Generals Lavarack and Allen on 22 June. They gave their approval for the attack. The 2/33rd Battalion had been active on the eastern side. They were actively patrolling and found that Fort Khiam and the village had been abandoned as had Bmeriq. A new twist included horsed cavalry. We might recall that they had captured cavalry horses from the French. The 6th Cavalry was able to find men with suitable experience. They got packs and saddles from Palestine, so that the forty men and horses could function. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

Back to Merdjayoun from 19 June 1941

Brigadier Berryman, the artillery commander, was in charge of the attack on Merdjayoun. An attack that was launched on 17 June 1941 had failed. Brigadier Berryman made plans to attack on 19 June. He walked around the area and planned the artillery fire for the attack. The 2/33rd Battalion was on the right, "on the foothills of Hermon". The 6th Cavalry regiment was in the center. The force on the left was larger, as they would attack the town. All the groups now had anti-tank guns assigned. The left included the Royal Scots Greys, as well as the 2/2nd Pioneer Battalion, and a company from the 2/5th Battalion. The 2/25th Battalion was on the far left. The artillery commenced firing at the Merdjayoun fort at 4:20am. They then switched to the real first objective. The artillery fire was immediately answered by French guns. The infantry took losses from the return fire. The Australians were in among the houses, but then French tanks and armored cars moved in and disrupted the attack. The reserve platoons were then sent in, and they "drove off the tanks". The Australians found that their anti-tank rifles were ineffective against the French tanks (which we think were R-35's). By 4:30pm, the attack was spent. They could see more French armored vehicles advancing. They men involved thought that if they had more troops, they could have been more successful, but they had used all the available units. Berryman thought that if they could knock out the tanks with "sticky bombs", they might succeed, but the attackers to pull back. Merdjayound continued to be a problem because of the French tanks. The Australians had no effective counter to them so far. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The new plan for the force attacking Syria from Iraq in late June 1941

By 28 June 1941, the forces attacking Palmyra were still finding strong resistance. The 1/Essex battalion might have taken the chateau that day, but the defenders still were holding up further progress. The situation prompted the commanders to order the 10th Indian Division from Iraq to attack towards Aleppo. The 10th Indian Division was commanded by General Slim, later to become famous for his service in the Far East. One factor that we have not previously mentioned is that Germany had invaded Russia starting on 22 June 1941. In everyone's assessment, they assumed that the invasion removed any threat of Germany invading the Middle East beyond their fighting in the Western Desert in Libya and Egypt. General Wavell had reported to the CIGS about the situation and had said that he would have the force from Iraq bypass Palmyra and move on to Homs. He would order the Free French to advance to the road from Homs to Nebek. They would order the Australians to beat back the French forces at Merdjayoun. The British 16th Brigade would be sent to take Rayak. More reinforcements were sent from Egypt. This time it would be the 23rd Brigade, also from the 6th British Division, the same as the 16th Brigade. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

-The attack on Palmyra on 21 June 1941

Habforce (I suppose that the Hab came from Habbaniyah) was to advance on Palmyra and take the place. This was the ruins of an ancient city. Habforce included British cavalry and Arab Legion troops. They started off on 21 June 1941 and hoped to take Palmyra that day. Generals Wavell and Auchinleck were involved in the planning. To the south of the old city was a "salt pan" said to be impassible. There were thought to be three companies in possession of Palmyra. Two were French Foreign Legion. One cavalry regiment would take the hills to the west. Another regiment would move until they could enter the ancient city from the north. The over-optimistic plans were disrupted by Vichy French air attacks on the force. They were also held up by machine gun fire on the southwest corner. The commander, Major-General Clark asks the command in Jerusalem for help. They needed air protection. What was sent were some nine Gladiator biplane fighters, but there was no way to maintain a protected air field, so they left the area. Air attacks continued to June 23 and 24, and many vehicles were destroyed. The situation was such that they were running short of supplies. Rebel Arabs and French armored cars waited for supply columns to arrive. One of the British commanders, Brigadier Kingstone, collapsed on 24 June. Major Gooch took command in his place. By 28 June, a British bombing attack hit the French and Tomahawk escorts from No.3 Squadron RAAF shot down six French bombers. 1/Essex took one strong point, the "chateau". The French defenders of Palmyra continued to hold out. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The aftermath of the attack on Jebel Mazar from 27 to 28 June 1941 and further operations

After having taken Jebel Mazar from the French, the subsequent loss by 28 June 1941 was very difficult. The forward artillery observer had lost some essential parts of his radio gear, so that he was not able to call in artillery fire in support. After this, the 16th Brigade, including the 2/3rd Battalion, was withdrawn to "a line from Deir Kanoun to Yafour". The very depleted "5th Indian Brigade was on the Col de Yafour". The French counterattack on Jebel Mazar had first been made by a company of Senegalese. They failed to dislodge the Australians. Two more companies of French colonial troops then attacked. They nearly reached the peak, but had to stop the attack. By morning, they discovered that the Australians had withdrawn and took a few prisoners. Habforce had hoped to stage an attack on Syria from Iraq, but they were stopped in a similar situation to Jebel Mazar. Hapforce had been freed up by the arrival of the 10th Indian Division. They were scattered through Iraq, but were a diverse group of units, where the 4th Cavalry Brigade was the strongest unit. By 18 June, 1941, the decision was made to send two of the Indian brigades from the 10th Indian Division into Syria. They had hoped to easily take Palmyra, but by 28 June, they were still stopped. There was the issue of French bombing attacks on the attackers and their vehicles. Also, the land was rugged and not easily crossed.

French counter-attack on Jebel Mazar

By 7am on 27 June 1941, the French commenced heavy fire from medium machine guns and field artillery on the Australians on Jebel Mazar. The French started sending groups of men to attack the hill. As the day went on, by afternoon, the situation got more intense. A captured Australian was sent to invite Captain Murchison and his men to surrender. He sent the man back, declining the offer. After 5pm, the French started another artillery attack. The mortars were more effective than the field guns, however. Murchison saw how the situation was developing and decided to hold on until dark and then withdraw, unless something changed. As they climbed down the mountain, they saw no sign of the rest of the battalion. They seemed to have all left. They eventually made their way to Yafour and occupied two large caves, where they slept. By day on 28 June, they found a truck from the Queen's battalion. The truck was used to transport the wounded, The rest made their way out on the next day, eventually joining up with the 2/3rd Battalion. It turned out that Hutchison's company had beaten off an atteck and then had withdrawn to the east. They met Major Stevenson with 16,000 rounds of ammunition that he had wanted to take to Murchison. Once Stevenson realized the situation, he ordered Hutchison to funcation as a rear-guard so that the Queen's and artillery could withdraw. After that they would pull back to Yafour. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

After taking Jebel Mazar on 27 JUne 1041

The Australians had taken Jebel Mazar by 4:30am on 27 June 1941. The sun was just rising, and they could start to see. They surveyed the area and saw that there were actually two high points on the peak. They put men on both. As Captain Murchison was inspecting the area, the French officer who had been the artillery observer stood up from a small trench. He started talking with Murchison in English. The Australians could see significant French forces to the west. An artillery observer was to join them on the peak, but had not arrived. The observer finally arrived at 7am but he had left his radio a thousand feet below. Murchison sent him down to get the radio, but he never returned. Later in the morning, more men arrived. Some of the attackers had lost their way in the dark, and only now were rejoining. They had also picked up more men along the way. Among them were a sergeant and 17 men from the Queen's battalion. The sergeant had been sent to take the ridge beyond Jebel Mazar, but the ridge was strongly held by a French battalion. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

Taking Jebel Mazar near Mount Hermon

By June 26, 1941, Brigadier Lomax had wanted to withdraw his battalions to a safe position and go into a defensive posture. Major Stevenson, of the 2/3rd Battalion asked to make another attempt to capture Jebel Mazar. The new company from Sidon, had 110 men. It was larger than the remnants of the other companies combined. They were given bad guiding by the unreliable Syrian, so they did not meet up with Hutchison's company when they started to climb. They attempted an attack on the morning of 26 June. They ran into heavy machine gun fire. Shortly after this, Captain Murchison, the commander of the fresh company, found the remnants of Hutchison's company. They combined into one group, by the time Brigadier Lomax had wanted them to withdraw. At about 7pm, a sentry saw the French making an attack. They forced the attackers back towards Hutchison, where they were caught by Bren gun fire. They were decimated, as they had been caught by surprise. The survivors escaped. By 1am on 27 June, the two groups combined and started climbing in "single file". The Australians had the advantage that they could see the French defenders in silhouette, while the Australians were in darkness. There was a quick fight, where the French were beaten. They rested for ten minutes and fell asleep on the rocks. They neared the summit, where they still had the advantage of stealth from the dark while the French were easily seen against light. They charged, took one machine gun, while the other started firing at 30 yards. They charged, fired a Very pistol round. The defenders were Africans, and they ran at the attack. They were under fire from machine guns located at some distance. They climbed another 400 yards, and were at the top. They made one final charge, yelling, and the French and Africans broke and ran. Murchison fired his Very pistol, to signal that they had won. When they saw the light from the flare, some French and Africans surrendered. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

On June 24 1941, the 2/3rd Battalion is further depleted

The 2/3rd Battalion, such as it was, was under the command of Brigadier Lomax of the 16th Brigade. Brigadier Lomax had Major Stevenson withdraw to Adsaya, except for one company. That company would join the Leicesters. However, Hutchison's company was ordered to take Jebel Mazar. Brigadier Lomax thought that the peak was unoccupied, which turned out not to be true. The company was sent by trucks to Yafour. The peak was 1,600 feet high and was a dominant feature. It is in familiar territory, as it is connected to Mount Hermon. We know that there were artillery observers on the heights. They were calling in artillery fire from remote locations, out of sight. The Australians headed out from Yafour at about 8:30pm. Their guide took them to a lesser high point, thinking that was where they were going. Hutchison realized the error, but they waited until morning to go further. By 8am, they tried to move, but were under machine gun fire and a heavy mortar. The fresh company from Sidon was released to rejoin the 2/3rd to help with the assault on Jebel Mazar. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The 2/3rd Battalion moves west on 24 June 1941

On 24 June 1941, at 5am, the 2/3rd Battalion moved off to the west in trucks, heading towards Beirut. The three carriers were in the lead, followed by their platoon with anti-tank weapons. Their resources were limited, as they only had an anti-tank rifle and a Very pistol. They also had a 2 inch mortar, it appears. The other two battalions from the 16th Brigade were to advance north towards the road on which they were traveling. As the neared the point where they expected to see a friendly battalion, they received artillery fire and then small-arms fire. They returned the fire, but then discovered they were exchanging fire with the Leicesters. Major Stevenson, commanding the 2/3rd Battalion met with the commander of the Leicesters. He agreed to help take the high ground held by the French. After that, the 2/3rd would be in reserve, holding the road block. The French were firing heavy artillery fire on the road, the heaviest that the 2/3rd had seen. The 2/3rd moved forward in a widely-dispersed formation, since they were under fire. On the south side, the platoon there took the hill that there was their objective. Two French tanks attacked them there. They fired the anti-tank rifle, the Very pistol, and the 2-inch mortar at close range with smoke bombs. They did not damage the tanks, but they caused them to retreat. The two field guns with the 2/3rd were knocked out, but they had fired on French cavalry and drove them away. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The situation south of Damascus on 22 and 23 June 1941

We find that Damascus was abandoned by the Vichy French by 21 June 1941 due to the cutting of the road to Beirut. There had been six colonial battalions in Damascus, including North Africans and Senegalese. Those troops had withdrawn to the west, through the mountains. They ended up around the Barada Gorge. That is north of the road from Damascus to Beirut. The French set up roadblocks at Qatana and Doummar. The French commander was concerned that his forces at Merdjayoun would get cut off by British movement up the road towards Beirut. The 2/3rd Battalion of Australians was now reduced to 21 officers and 320 men. General Evetts now commanded the forces in the east. He hoped to hold a line north of the road. Brigadier Lloyd met with Major Stevenson, who was now acting as 2/3rd Battalion commander. They decided to only patrol to the north and to hold the line with the forts. On the afternoon of 23 June, Brigadier Lloyd informed Major Stevenson that they were now part of the British 16th Brigade, not the 5th Indian Brigade. At this point, General Evetts may have nominally had a division, but only had three battalions with some remnants of the 5th Indian Brigade. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

Attack on the heights southwest of Damascus on 22 June 1941

After resting overnight, a new attack commenced at 9am on the heights to the southwest of Damascus. Major Stevenson oversaw the operations of the 2/3rd Battalion. He was on Fort Goybet with a signaller. A company of Indian troops was on the right. One company moved across the gorge. They eventually reached the northern side of the gorge and climbed to the northern heights. The men on the southern heights were taking fire from the northern side from French machine guns and mortars. An Australian private with a Bren gun moved forward and shot the crews of three French machine guns. At one point, a man saw armored cars on the road that gave the impression that the French might be withdrawing along the road from the roadblock. On the left, there was another company, along with an Indian officer and 20 men. They had moved under cover and took two pinnacles. From there an artillery observer was able to call in fire on the French positions, while Bren gunners were able to fire at long range. There were some 400 men on the ridge south of the gorge. During the day on 22 June, French artillery fired on Mezze and caused casualties. Mezze was attacked by two tanks in the afternoon. They defenders had first thought that they were Free French, not Vichy. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

Brigadier Lloyd

Volume II of the Australian Official History mentions that the Brigadier Lloyd had "quickly won the admiration of the Australians". He was commander of the 5th Indian Brigade, which had been augmented by the 2/3rd Battalion of Australians in June 1941. In retrospect, we can see that Brigadier Lloyd's strategy for the attack on Damascus worked. General Evetts and the British troops were not a factor. The 2/3rd Battalion succeeded on the heights southwest of Damascus on 20 and 21 June 1941. The Indian troops and Free French marines were also ultimately successful at Mezze. Indian troops with the Free French marines had infiltrated into Mezze after the surrender of the two Indian battalions. The French apparently did not occupy Mezze, because they attacked and were driven off, with broken morale, according to a captured French account. When the 7th Chasseurs d'Afrique were repulsed, they turned their attention to the heights and the stone forts. They must have been very strong, although they did take the 2/3rd Battalion headquarters and commander. Two companies of the 2/3rd Battalion ultimately took the forts and freed the battalion commander and headquarters. The task of attacking the stone forts seemed like to much to ask of the two companies on the heights, but they were successful. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

Damascus falls on 21 June 1941

The Free French force commanded by Colonel Casseau on the road from Kiswe to Damascus had moved to the outskirts of Damascus in the morning of 21 June 1941. Troops in a barracks were firing on the Free French, so the Colonel sent a gun forward to start firing. The Australian machine gunners were on the right flank, protecting against any attacks. The Free French infantry were moving forward towards the city. Colonel Casseau sent two armored cars forward. In the opposite direction were a column of cars, with a white flag flying. Lt-Col. Blackburn accompanied Colonel Casseau. The city and police were surrendered, and a formal ceremony and luncheon were held. By 4pm, General Legentilhomme led a column of vehicles into Damascus and met with the cabinet. One company of the Australian machine gunners were ordered to move through the city and take position on the road to Homs. Troops of the 2/3rd Battalion were now split. There were still two companies on the heights to the southwest of Damascus. A third company had been formed and were at the roadblock on the road to Beirut. Brigadier Lloyd would have liked to attack immediately, but Major Stevenson asked that the men be fed and have some rest. They moved out the next morning. There were the Australians and a company of Indian troops. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

Victories on the ridge southwest of Damascus on 21 June 1941

Early on 21 June 1941, the acting 2/3rd commander, Major Stevenson, learned that the brigade commander wanted the battalion to capture Fort Goybet on the ridge southwest of Damascus. When Stevenson learned more about the situation, he determined to take Fort Weygand after Goybet fell. The artillery fire on Fort Goybet commenced on schedule, but ended ten minutes to early, by the Australian's watches. The attackers were concerned that there might be more artillery fire, so they attacked late. They tried throwing grenades through the gun slits. They realized that they would have to go through the gate to take the fort. They started firing on the fort when a French soldier came out with a white flag. They entered the gate and took 75 French troops, all Europeans, prisoner. This was at 10am. Weygand fell to a group of men from Mezze with sub-machine guns. There was still a small group of men at the roadblock on the road to Beirut. They held the block for twelve hours against tanks and armored cars. By 4pm, a platoon of Indian troops arrived. They had anti-tank rifles and took position above the roadblock. The French had tried attacking Mezze again, but they found Indian and Free French troops there who drove off the attackers. They instead took Fort Goybet and Sarrall, and the 2/3rd battalion headquarters. They also entered Fort Weygand. This was during the night of 20 to 21 June. The Australians found out eventually, that Damascus had fallen at about 11am. The successes to the southwest of Damascus. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

WIth the Australians on the ridge near Damascus on 21 June 1941

The company that had been holding the roadblock on the road to Beirut changed course. The commander, Parbury, thought that after daylight, he was in an untenable position. He decided to leave a platoon at the road, and the rest would climb the heights. The climb took two hours. A French armored car approached and they fired Bren guns at tbe car, which retreated. When they neared the top, they saw a fort and pill boxes. One pill box turned out to be empty. The fort started firing, so the men took cover. About this time, another company from the same battalion reached Fort Goybet. This was early on 21 June 1941, to the southwest of Damscus. Major Stevenson reached the 5th Indian Brigade Headquarters by 7am. He had been arranging for transport for the 2/3rd Battalion. Stevenson was the second-in-command for the battalion. He received word that the battalion headquarters had been captured. He was now the commander. They thought that Hutchison's ocmpany would be the only attackers, but they found Parbury and his company readying to attack as well. The plan was to fire artillery at the fort from 9am to 9:30am and then attack. The company headquarters personnel were being held in Fort Weygand, so that would attack that force after taking Goybet. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The Australians attack on 20 June 1941 towards the ridge southwest of Damascus

We would say that the Australians newly attacked to the 5th Indian Brigade were unfortunate to be under Brigadier Lloyd's command. In the early evening of 20 June 1941 the 2/3rd Battalion was to attack towards the fortified ridge to the southwest of Damascus. One company was to cut the road to Beirut from Damascus. There were also some Indian troops involved. The ridge had a collection of stone forts. The battalion headquarters had moved into Fort Sarrall. The French eventually took the fort, along with Lt-Col. Lamb. The company whose task was to cut the road to Beirut was successful, and set up a roadblock. They proceeded to stop and capture oncoming traffic. Surprisingly, there were still and officer and two soldiers from the Royal Fusiliers. They were sent back to the brigade headquarters, escorting prisoners. Early on 21 June 1941, the Australians prepared to attack Fort Goybet, which was strongly held. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The 5th Indian Brigade

I had been critical of General Wilson for interfering with the situation at Kuneitra, but I have changed my mind. The operations of the 5th Indian Brigade in June 1941 in Syria were so badly handled that at least General Wilson cared about their fate. He was too far removed from what was happening to know what to do, as his solution was to send more ammunition to the Royal Fusiliers at Kuneitra. What they needed, instead, were more troops, some field and anti-tank guns. The Fusiliers had been left isolated at Kuneitra, where they were overwhelmed by the Vichy French forces. A relief column was sent, but that was too late. The two Indian battalions were then sent off by Brigadier Lloyd to Mezze, where they were left without adequate strength and without artillery. They were captured by the French on 20 June 1941. Brigadier Lloyd seems to have had very poor judgment about what troops should be asked to do. Fortunately for the battle in Syria, General Evetts became involved and the fortunes of the troops involved became much more positive. General Evetts had been in the Middle East since at least the mid-1930's and knew the area and the people. This based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History

Events of 20 June 1941 in Syria

Brigadier Lloyd had hoped to be able to push through to relieve the Indian troops in Mezze on 20 June 1941. One column consisted of machine gunners and artillery, while a new column was formed from the 2/3rd Battalion (Australians) who had been added to augment the depleted 5th Indian Brigade. The Australians were to attack to the left of the road leading to Mezze. The situation in Mezze had deteriorated greatly. By the afternoon of 20 June, the French had been firing field artillery at point blank range at the Mezze House. By the time the Indian troops had repelled the attack, they ran out of ammunition. They could hear the firing of the relieving troops. They tried to ask for a ceasefire to recover wounded, but their white flag was interpreted by the French as a surrender flag and they rushed and captured the survivors. Brigadier Lloyd only learned of the situation later on 20 June. Brigadier Lloyd now ordered one company of the Australians to block the road leading from Damascus to Beirut. The others were to move to the ridge that was part of the Mount Hermon foothills. The French had fortified the ridge, so that would likely be an issue. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

Lt-Col. Blackburn's force - 20 June 1941 in Syria

General Evetts, the new commander in Eastern Syria on 20 June 1941 decided to send Lt-Col. Blackburn to join the Free French and get them moving towards Damascus. General Evetts' assessment was that the Free French were not mentally able to continue on their own. Lt-Col. Blackburn nominally had a battalion-sized force under his command, actually only had "one company (Captain Gordon's), one platoon of another company and five anti-tank guns". Blackburn moved forward to where Colonel Casseau's Free French troops were located at Jebel el Kelb. The Free French excuse had been that the Vichy French were better equipped, as they had tanks and armored cars. Colonel Casseau was impressed that Blackburn had anti-tank guns. Lt-Col. Blackburn got Colonel Casseau to agree to attack at 5pm. Lt-Col. Blackburn had his four platoons astride the road, ready to advance. He found that the French African troops would only advance as far as his machine-gunners, when they would stop. The machine-funners had to keep advancing to convince the Africans to advance more. By following this pattern, they were able to get the Free French African troops to advance three miles, almost to the outskirts of Damascus. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The new situation in Syria from 18 June 1941

The 5th Indian Brigade battalions were heavily engaged in battle at Mezze late on 18 June 1941. Also on 18 June, the 2/3rd Australian Battalion was boarding the train at Majdal, in Palestine. They were destined for Deraa in Syria. One of the battalion's companies had already been sent to Sidon, in Lebanon. They were survivors of the Greek and Crete battles, and more men were being taken. They were reduced to "21 officers and 385 men". The temperature was 130 degrees and the men were transported in cattle cars. They reached Khan Deinoun early on 20 June 1041. They were told that they were now in the 5th Indian Brigade. They were considered the "British battalion". They road on trucks to Mouadammiye. They were in position to the right of the Kuneitra road. They could hear the 1st Field Regiment battery firing. They were under Major Bourke's command and were part of the force hoping to relieve the two Indian battalions at Mezze. The dismal situation with the Free French on the road to Damscus was having an effect. The Free French were very unreliable and did not want to be fighting other Frenchmen. Part of the problem was that the Free French were mostly African colonials, with low marale. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The sacrifice of the 5th Indian Brigade was not in vain-plans change on 20 June 1941

One result of the 5th Indian Brigade advance to Mezze was that the plans for the campaign changed on 20 June 1941. General Evetts was the 6th Infantry Division commander. Interestingly enough, General Evetts was an old Middle Easterrn hand. He had commanded the 16th Infantry Brigade in Palestine from 1935 until 1939. This was during a period of unrest with the Arabs in revolt. On 19 June, he was appointed to command the attack on Damascus. He had all Australian, British, and Indian formations east of Merdjayoun under his command. He also had the Free French under his command, although they were considered to be not reliable. Once General Lavarack heard about having General Evetts and his men, he requested that he be given the 16th Brigade, rather than sending it to the coast for the advance on Beirut. General Wilson gave permission with the condition that the Damascus attack be concluded quickly. General Lavarack had his chief of staff consult with General Allen, of the 7th Australian Division, and asked if he could hold on with two brigades. He said that he could, so they diverted the 16th Brigade to the attack on Damascus. The deal was that once Damascus was taken, some of the force would be sent back to the coast for the attack on Beirut. By the end of 20 June, the force in the east consisted of the remnants of the 5th Indian Brigade and the 16th Brigade. There were also three more battalions that replaced the depleted 5th Indian Brigade units. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

French tanks in Syria in 1941

We asked the obvious question: "What sorts of tanks did the Vichy French have in Syria?" The French use of tanks against the Australians and the 5th Indian Brigade were a major factor in the counter-attack that destroyed the 5th Indian Brigade and held up the advance to Damascus. The Australian Official History has at least a partial answer. There were two tanks regiments, each equipped with 45 R-35 tanks. These were the Chasseurs d'Afrique. The armored cars that were involved were all locally-converted vehicles. There were some 150 armored cars, a few equipped with 37mm guns. Others just had machine guns. They were effective enough against the Australians, who had just carriers. The reference to the tanks is on page 358 of Greece, Crete and Syria, by Gavin Long. This is Volume II of the Australian Official History. Frank Cozens, in a forum post, suggests that there were some purpose-built French armored cars present, as well. He says that the armored vehicles were painted dark green. Chris Ellis, in Tanks of the World, shows a North African R-35 in olive green with the rail attachment for helping with crossing ditches and rough ground.

The 5th Indian Brigade surrenders but the situation improves

The two battalions of the 5th Indian Brigade at Mezze were in deep trouble. Their 12 vehicles with the anti-tank guns had gotten ahead of the marching infantry and were lost. The men at Mezze had fought well, but they were attacked by tanks and had not way to fight them. The Indian troops were able to fight off the French infantry, but the tanks were a problem. They were also under constant artillery fire. One company that had become separated was forced to surrender by 4pm on 19 June 1941. The remaining men were fighting from Mezze House. They were out of food and were low on ammunition. It was at this point that Colonel Jones had sent the men to Lloyd to tell them of the situation. They arrived too late, early on 20 June. The 5th Indian Brigade had actually done better than the Free French. They had attacked on 19 June, but had made no progress. The Free French seem to have often been rather unreliable. The failure of the attack had left the French to concentrate on the 5th Indian Brigade, destroying the unit. The one result of the attack on Mezze was that the Vichy French had started to withdraw from Damascus. Men from the British 6th Infantry Division had arrived by 20 June, and their guns had repelled the Vichy tanks that had stopped the Free French from moving forward. When Brigadier Lloyd heard about the plight of the men at Mezze, he sent a relieving force. It was too late but they were stopped by French tanks. The relief force had included 1st Field Regiment, some Free French marines, and more Punjabi companies (all that remained). Big changes had a dramatic effect. General Lavarack requested that the 16th British Brigade be sent to the attack on Damascus, not for the advance on Beirut. The British general Evetts was given command of the attack on Damascus. They needed the attack to conclude quickly, so that troops could be diverted to taking Beirut. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

Brigadier Lloyd's plan on 18 June 1941

Brigadier Lloyd commanded the attack on the right of the British attack on Lebanon and Syria. The Vichy French had launched a counter-attack on his rear in an attempt to stop his advance on Damascus. On 18 June 1941, Brigadier Lloyd thought that the best plan would be to push on Damascus. That would counteract the attacks to the left. He had not received word that Kuneitra had been recaptured from the French, which would have confirmed that he was on the right track. The plan was for the Free French to move towards Kadem, which would threaten the south side of Damascus. The 5th Indian Brigade would move on the left through Kuneitra and on to the road between Beirut and Damascus, to cut the main road. A defensive group was formed of Free French Marines and two companies from the 5th Indian Brigade. They would be located "from Artouz to Jebel Madani". The big move was for the remaining two battalions of the 5th Indian Brigade to move forward. They would move to Mezze, take the place, and then form a defensive position. They were an all-Indian unit now. The Indians would move out at 8:30pm on 18 June. By 10pm, they were fired on by French artillery. There was a heavy fight, but the French post was disrupted so the men could move forward. The vehicles got ahead of the infantry and got in trouble, but the infantry continued on and were up to Mezze by 4:15am on 19 June. They attacked at 4:30am. The men then worked to set up defenses at Mezze. They made road blocks from "timber, stones and wire". All during 19 June, the French attacked. Colonel Jones sent men to let Brigadier Lloyd know their situation. They reached the headquarters at 5:30am on 20 June. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The Syrian Campaign plan and the progression in June 1941

General Wilson had decided to reorganize the attacking force in Syria and Lebanon as the campaign progressed in June 1941. When they reached the road between Beirut and Damascus, General Lavarack would become a corps commander and General Allen would become the 7th Australian Division commander. General Lavarack would then become the commander of operations in Syria and Lebanon. While they had not reached the road between the two cities, they still made the transfer so that someone below the level of General Wilson would have overall control of the campaign. General Wilson was situated in the King David Hotel in Jerusalem, not very close to the action in Syria and Lebanon. General Wilson was responsible for a larger area than Syria and Lebanon, as he had Palestine and Trans-Jordan, as well. General Lavarack had the 7th Australian Division, the 5th Indian Brigade, and the 1st Free French Division under his command. The only unit in Syria not under General Lavarack's command was "Habforce" from Iraq. The 16th British Brigade was included in the 7th Australian Division for this operation. On 18 June, General Wilson made a radio broadcast asking for General Dentz to withdraw from Damascus and made Damascus an "open city". This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The French counter-attack from 13 to 17 June 1941 in Syria and Lebanon

The commander of the Vichy French army, General Verdilhac, had wanted to disrupt to British attack on Lebanon and Syria, so he could be prepared to fight an expected British force from Iraq. The operation started with a reconnaissance operation in front of Nahr el Awaj. Some armored cars and motorized infantry moved out from Sassa. They probed Kuneitra, were fired upon, and then pulled back. The next step commenced on 14 June. General Verdilhac used 13 battalions, a strong force. He sent a column to take Kuneitra, if possible. They would then move forward to Banias and Bennt Jacub. Another column would take Ezraa and Sheikh Meskine. There were also three battalions in front of Damascus. Kuneitra fell and they captured some 470 prisoners. The group sent to Sanamein was deterred by the size of the defensive force and pulled back. Because of that, the French pulled back from Kuneitra, leaving a small force to hold the town.

While this was happening, Brigadier Lloyd continued to press towards Damascus in the east. General Verdhilhac sent two more battalions to reinforce the troops in front of Damascus. Two battalion commanders at Kiswe were sacked and replaced with stronger leaders. Colonel Keime was appointed at the new commander of the south Syria defenses. He replaced General Delhomme. The new battalions were moved near Artouz and Mezze.

A strong attack at Merdjayoun included three infantry battalions (two Algerian and one Tunisian). They were assisted by some twenty tanks. By 21 June, a French Foreign Legion battalion had been added. Their eastern flank was covered by cavalry. They oped to advance south of Fort Khiam and Khirbe. The eastern-most battalion was to move forward towards Banias.

The attack northward along the coast was halted by news of the French attacks to the east. General Lavarack had requested help from General Wilson. He was given a 16th Brigade battalion, the 2/King's Own, instead of the two Australian battalions that General Lavarack had requested. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The 25th Brigade holds at Jezzine on 17 June 1941

Brigadier Cox, of the 25th Australian Brigade, was determined to hold his ground at Jezzine. The brigade headquarters moved back to Kafr Houn. The brigade needed to be on the defensive, given the situation. The French made a battalion-sized attack on two Australian companies that were on high ground just to the east of the a road. The Australians consisted of Robson's company and Thomson's company. Thomson's company was able to stop the attack with heavy gunfire. The other company moved up to within 75 yards of the French. Two platoons charged with the support of the third and forced the French, actually mostly Senegalese, to surrender. The surviving troops were what surrendered. The Senegalese had been marched for some four days without adequate rest and food. Despite this setback, the French continued to attempt around the east. Another Australian company was sent forward, and with this reinforcement, the French were stopped by around 4pm. The Australians spent the rest of the day searching dead French soldiers for food and sent parties to collect wounded French soldiers and rendered aid. During the night, the French had fired on the Australians. By morning, one Australian company had attacked, but was stopped by heavy machine gun fire. The company commander and five other men were killed. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The failed attack on Merdjayoun on 16 and 17 June 1941

Brigadier Berryman, in command in the Merdjayoun area, hoped to retake the place on 17 June 1941. The 2/25th Battalion was now in the area. He would have them cross the river and attack from the northwest. One company from the 2/2nd Pioneer Battalion would attack from Qleaa. They would have another pioneer company ready to advance if they were successful. The Official History notes that the pioneers were ill-suited to fighting as infantry, as they were poorly equipped with infantry weapons. They had only been in North Africa and the Middle East since May and had only been employed doing engineer work. They plan for the attack now seems to be unrealistic for the available forces. The fort at Merdjayoun had walls so thick that 25-pounder shells could not damage them. After the dust settled, the pioneers had lost "27 killed, 46 wounded and 29 prisoners". The pioneers had run into strong opposition, including tanks. The 2/25th Battalion had to stop short of their position and there was no chance of a surprise attack. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.