Victories on the ridge southwest of Damascus on 21 June 1941

Early on 21 June 1941, the acting 2/3rd commander, Major Stevenson, learned that the brigade commander wanted the battalion to capture Fort Goybet on the ridge southwest of Damascus. When Stevenson learned more about the situation, he determined to take Fort Weygand after Goybet fell. The artillery fire on Fort Goybet commenced on schedule, but ended ten minutes to early, by the Australian's watches. The attackers were concerned that there might be more artillery fire, so they attacked late. They tried throwing grenades through the gun slits. They realized that they would have to go through the gate to take the fort. They started firing on the fort when a French soldier came out with a white flag. They entered the gate and took 75 French troops, all Europeans, prisoner. This was at 10am. Weygand fell to a group of men from Mezze with sub-machine guns. There was still a small group of men at the roadblock on the road to Beirut. They held the block for twelve hours against tanks and armored cars. By 4pm, a platoon of Indian troops arrived. They had anti-tank rifles and took position above the roadblock. The French had tried attacking Mezze again, but they found Indian and Free French troops there who drove off the attackers. They instead took Fort Goybet and Sarrall, and the 2/3rd battalion headquarters. They also entered Fort Weygand. This was during the night of 20 to 21 June. The Australians found out eventually, that Damascus had fallen at about 11am. The successes to the southwest of Damascus. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

WIth the Australians on the ridge near Damascus on 21 June 1941

The company that had been holding the roadblock on the road to Beirut changed course. The commander, Parbury, thought that after daylight, he was in an untenable position. He decided to leave a platoon at the road, and the rest would climb the heights. The climb took two hours. A French armored car approached and they fired Bren guns at tbe car, which retreated. When they neared the top, they saw a fort and pill boxes. One pill box turned out to be empty. The fort started firing, so the men took cover. About this time, another company from the same battalion reached Fort Goybet. This was early on 21 June 1941, to the southwest of Damscus. Major Stevenson reached the 5th Indian Brigade Headquarters by 7am. He had been arranging for transport for the 2/3rd Battalion. Stevenson was the second-in-command for the battalion. He received word that the battalion headquarters had been captured. He was now the commander. They thought that Hutchison's ocmpany would be the only attackers, but they found Parbury and his company readying to attack as well. The plan was to fire artillery at the fort from 9am to 9:30am and then attack. The company headquarters personnel were being held in Fort Weygand, so that would attack that force after taking Goybet. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The Australians attack on 20 June 1941 towards the ridge southwest of Damascus

We would say that the Australians newly attacked to the 5th Indian Brigade were unfortunate to be under Brigadier Lloyd's command. In the early evening of 20 June 1941 the 2/3rd Battalion was to attack towards the fortified ridge to the southwest of Damascus. One company was to cut the road to Beirut from Damascus. There were also some Indian troops involved. The ridge had a collection of stone forts. The battalion headquarters had moved into Fort Sarrall. The French eventually took the fort, along with Lt-Col. Lamb. The company whose task was to cut the road to Beirut was successful, and set up a roadblock. They proceeded to stop and capture oncoming traffic. Surprisingly, there were still and officer and two soldiers from the Royal Fusiliers. They were sent back to the brigade headquarters, escorting prisoners. Early on 21 June 1941, the Australians prepared to attack Fort Goybet, which was strongly held. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The 5th Indian Brigade

I had been critical of General Wilson for interfering with the situation at Kuneitra, but I have changed my mind. The operations of the 5th Indian Brigade in June 1941 in Syria were so badly handled that at least General Wilson cared about their fate. He was too far removed from what was happening to know what to do, as his solution was to send more ammunition to the Royal Fusiliers at Kuneitra. What they needed, instead, were more troops, some field and anti-tank guns. The Fusiliers had been left isolated at Kuneitra, where they were overwhelmed by the Vichy French forces. A relief column was sent, but that was too late. The two Indian battalions were then sent off by Brigadier Lloyd to Mezze, where they were left without adequate strength and without artillery. They were captured by the French on 20 June 1941. Brigadier Lloyd seems to have had very poor judgment about what troops should be asked to do. Fortunately for the battle in Syria, General Evetts became involved and the fortunes of the troops involved became much more positive. General Evetts had been in the Middle East since at least the mid-1930's and knew the area and the people. This based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History

Events of 20 June 1941 in Syria

Brigadier Lloyd had hoped to be able to push through to relieve the Indian troops in Mezze on 20 June 1941. One column consisted of machine gunners and artillery, while a new column was formed from the 2/3rd Battalion (Australians) who had been added to augment the depleted 5th Indian Brigade. The Australians were to attack to the left of the road leading to Mezze. The situation in Mezze had deteriorated greatly. By the afternoon of 20 June, the French had been firing field artillery at point blank range at the Mezze House. By the time the Indian troops had repelled the attack, they ran out of ammunition. They could hear the firing of the relieving troops. They tried to ask for a ceasefire to recover wounded, but their white flag was interpreted by the French as a surrender flag and they rushed and captured the survivors. Brigadier Lloyd only learned of the situation later on 20 June. Brigadier Lloyd now ordered one company of the Australians to block the road leading from Damascus to Beirut. The others were to move to the ridge that was part of the Mount Hermon foothills. The French had fortified the ridge, so that would likely be an issue. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

Lt-Col. Blackburn's force - 20 June 1941 in Syria

General Evetts, the new commander in Eastern Syria on 20 June 1941 decided to send Lt-Col. Blackburn to join the Free French and get them moving towards Damascus. General Evetts' assessment was that the Free French were not mentally able to continue on their own. Lt-Col. Blackburn nominally had a battalion-sized force under his command, actually only had "one company (Captain Gordon's), one platoon of another company and five anti-tank guns". Blackburn moved forward to where Colonel Casseau's Free French troops were located at Jebel el Kelb. The Free French excuse had been that the Vichy French were better equipped, as they had tanks and armored cars. Colonel Casseau was impressed that Blackburn had anti-tank guns. Lt-Col. Blackburn got Colonel Casseau to agree to attack at 5pm. Lt-Col. Blackburn had his four platoons astride the road, ready to advance. He found that the French African troops would only advance as far as his machine-gunners, when they would stop. The machine-funners had to keep advancing to convince the Africans to advance more. By following this pattern, they were able to get the Free French African troops to advance three miles, almost to the outskirts of Damascus. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The new situation in Syria from 18 June 1941

The 5th Indian Brigade battalions were heavily engaged in battle at Mezze late on 18 June 1941. Also on 18 June, the 2/3rd Australian Battalion was boarding the train at Majdal, in Palestine. They were destined for Deraa in Syria. One of the battalion's companies had already been sent to Sidon, in Lebanon. They were survivors of the Greek and Crete battles, and more men were being taken. They were reduced to "21 officers and 385 men". The temperature was 130 degrees and the men were transported in cattle cars. They reached Khan Deinoun early on 20 June 1041. They were told that they were now in the 5th Indian Brigade. They were considered the "British battalion". They road on trucks to Mouadammiye. They were in position to the right of the Kuneitra road. They could hear the 1st Field Regiment battery firing. They were under Major Bourke's command and were part of the force hoping to relieve the two Indian battalions at Mezze. The dismal situation with the Free French on the road to Damscus was having an effect. The Free French were very unreliable and did not want to be fighting other Frenchmen. Part of the problem was that the Free French were mostly African colonials, with low marale. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The sacrifice of the 5th Indian Brigade was not in vain-plans change on 20 June 1941

One result of the 5th Indian Brigade advance to Mezze was that the plans for the campaign changed on 20 June 1941. General Evetts was the 6th Infantry Division commander. Interestingly enough, General Evetts was an old Middle Easterrn hand. He had commanded the 16th Infantry Brigade in Palestine from 1935 until 1939. This was during a period of unrest with the Arabs in revolt. On 19 June, he was appointed to command the attack on Damascus. He had all Australian, British, and Indian formations east of Merdjayoun under his command. He also had the Free French under his command, although they were considered to be not reliable. Once General Lavarack heard about having General Evetts and his men, he requested that he be given the 16th Brigade, rather than sending it to the coast for the advance on Beirut. General Wilson gave permission with the condition that the Damascus attack be concluded quickly. General Lavarack had his chief of staff consult with General Allen, of the 7th Australian Division, and asked if he could hold on with two brigades. He said that he could, so they diverted the 16th Brigade to the attack on Damascus. The deal was that once Damascus was taken, some of the force would be sent back to the coast for the attack on Beirut. By the end of 20 June, the force in the east consisted of the remnants of the 5th Indian Brigade and the 16th Brigade. There were also three more battalions that replaced the depleted 5th Indian Brigade units. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

French tanks in Syria in 1941

We asked the obvious question: "What sorts of tanks did the Vichy French have in Syria?" The French use of tanks against the Australians and the 5th Indian Brigade were a major factor in the counter-attack that destroyed the 5th Indian Brigade and held up the advance to Damascus. The Australian Official History has at least a partial answer. There were two tanks regiments, each equipped with 45 R-35 tanks. These were the Chasseurs d'Afrique. The armored cars that were involved were all locally-converted vehicles. There were some 150 armored cars, a few equipped with 37mm guns. Others just had machine guns. They were effective enough against the Australians, who had just carriers. The reference to the tanks is on page 358 of Greece, Crete and Syria, by Gavin Long. This is Volume II of the Australian Official History. Frank Cozens, in a forum post, suggests that there were some purpose-built French armored cars present, as well. He says that the armored vehicles were painted dark green. Chris Ellis, in Tanks of the World, shows a North African R-35 in olive green with the rail attachment for helping with crossing ditches and rough ground.

The 5th Indian Brigade surrenders but the situation improves

The two battalions of the 5th Indian Brigade at Mezze were in deep trouble. Their 12 vehicles with the anti-tank guns had gotten ahead of the marching infantry and were lost. The men at Mezze had fought well, but they were attacked by tanks and had not way to fight them. The Indian troops were able to fight off the French infantry, but the tanks were a problem. They were also under constant artillery fire. One company that had become separated was forced to surrender by 4pm on 19 June 1941. The remaining men were fighting from Mezze House. They were out of food and were low on ammunition. It was at this point that Colonel Jones had sent the men to Lloyd to tell them of the situation. They arrived too late, early on 20 June. The 5th Indian Brigade had actually done better than the Free French. They had attacked on 19 June, but had made no progress. The Free French seem to have often been rather unreliable. The failure of the attack had left the French to concentrate on the 5th Indian Brigade, destroying the unit. The one result of the attack on Mezze was that the Vichy French had started to withdraw from Damascus. Men from the British 6th Infantry Division had arrived by 20 June, and their guns had repelled the Vichy tanks that had stopped the Free French from moving forward. When Brigadier Lloyd heard about the plight of the men at Mezze, he sent a relieving force. It was too late but they were stopped by French tanks. The relief force had included 1st Field Regiment, some Free French marines, and more Punjabi companies (all that remained). Big changes had a dramatic effect. General Lavarack requested that the 16th British Brigade be sent to the attack on Damascus, not for the advance on Beirut. The British general Evetts was given command of the attack on Damascus. They needed the attack to conclude quickly, so that troops could be diverted to taking Beirut. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

Brigadier Lloyd's plan on 18 June 1941

Brigadier Lloyd commanded the attack on the right of the British attack on Lebanon and Syria. The Vichy French had launched a counter-attack on his rear in an attempt to stop his advance on Damascus. On 18 June 1941, Brigadier Lloyd thought that the best plan would be to push on Damascus. That would counteract the attacks to the left. He had not received word that Kuneitra had been recaptured from the French, which would have confirmed that he was on the right track. The plan was for the Free French to move towards Kadem, which would threaten the south side of Damascus. The 5th Indian Brigade would move on the left through Kuneitra and on to the road between Beirut and Damascus, to cut the main road. A defensive group was formed of Free French Marines and two companies from the 5th Indian Brigade. They would be located "from Artouz to Jebel Madani". The big move was for the remaining two battalions of the 5th Indian Brigade to move forward. They would move to Mezze, take the place, and then form a defensive position. They were an all-Indian unit now. The Indians would move out at 8:30pm on 18 June. By 10pm, they were fired on by French artillery. There was a heavy fight, but the French post was disrupted so the men could move forward. The vehicles got ahead of the infantry and got in trouble, but the infantry continued on and were up to Mezze by 4:15am on 19 June. They attacked at 4:30am. The men then worked to set up defenses at Mezze. They made road blocks from "timber, stones and wire". All during 19 June, the French attacked. Colonel Jones sent men to let Brigadier Lloyd know their situation. They reached the headquarters at 5:30am on 20 June. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The Syrian Campaign plan and the progression in June 1941

General Wilson had decided to reorganize the attacking force in Syria and Lebanon as the campaign progressed in June 1941. When they reached the road between Beirut and Damascus, General Lavarack would become a corps commander and General Allen would become the 7th Australian Division commander. General Lavarack would then become the commander of operations in Syria and Lebanon. While they had not reached the road between the two cities, they still made the transfer so that someone below the level of General Wilson would have overall control of the campaign. General Wilson was situated in the King David Hotel in Jerusalem, not very close to the action in Syria and Lebanon. General Wilson was responsible for a larger area than Syria and Lebanon, as he had Palestine and Trans-Jordan, as well. General Lavarack had the 7th Australian Division, the 5th Indian Brigade, and the 1st Free French Division under his command. The only unit in Syria not under General Lavarack's command was "Habforce" from Iraq. The 16th British Brigade was included in the 7th Australian Division for this operation. On 18 June, General Wilson made a radio broadcast asking for General Dentz to withdraw from Damascus and made Damascus an "open city". This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The French counter-attack from 13 to 17 June 1941 in Syria and Lebanon

The commander of the Vichy French army, General Verdilhac, had wanted to disrupt to British attack on Lebanon and Syria, so he could be prepared to fight an expected British force from Iraq. The operation started with a reconnaissance operation in front of Nahr el Awaj. Some armored cars and motorized infantry moved out from Sassa. They probed Kuneitra, were fired upon, and then pulled back. The next step commenced on 14 June. General Verdilhac used 13 battalions, a strong force. He sent a column to take Kuneitra, if possible. They would then move forward to Banias and Bennt Jacub. Another column would take Ezraa and Sheikh Meskine. There were also three battalions in front of Damascus. Kuneitra fell and they captured some 470 prisoners. The group sent to Sanamein was deterred by the size of the defensive force and pulled back. Because of that, the French pulled back from Kuneitra, leaving a small force to hold the town.

While this was happening, Brigadier Lloyd continued to press towards Damascus in the east. General Verdhilhac sent two more battalions to reinforce the troops in front of Damascus. Two battalion commanders at Kiswe were sacked and replaced with stronger leaders. Colonel Keime was appointed at the new commander of the south Syria defenses. He replaced General Delhomme. The new battalions were moved near Artouz and Mezze.

A strong attack at Merdjayoun included three infantry battalions (two Algerian and one Tunisian). They were assisted by some twenty tanks. By 21 June, a French Foreign Legion battalion had been added. Their eastern flank was covered by cavalry. They oped to advance south of Fort Khiam and Khirbe. The eastern-most battalion was to move forward towards Banias.

The attack northward along the coast was halted by news of the French attacks to the east. General Lavarack had requested help from General Wilson. He was given a 16th Brigade battalion, the 2/King's Own, instead of the two Australian battalions that General Lavarack had requested. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The 25th Brigade holds at Jezzine on 17 June 1941

Brigadier Cox, of the 25th Australian Brigade, was determined to hold his ground at Jezzine. The brigade headquarters moved back to Kafr Houn. The brigade needed to be on the defensive, given the situation. The French made a battalion-sized attack on two Australian companies that were on high ground just to the east of the a road. The Australians consisted of Robson's company and Thomson's company. Thomson's company was able to stop the attack with heavy gunfire. The other company moved up to within 75 yards of the French. Two platoons charged with the support of the third and forced the French, actually mostly Senegalese, to surrender. The surviving troops were what surrendered. The Senegalese had been marched for some four days without adequate rest and food. Despite this setback, the French continued to attempt around the east. Another Australian company was sent forward, and with this reinforcement, the French were stopped by around 4pm. The Australians spent the rest of the day searching dead French soldiers for food and sent parties to collect wounded French soldiers and rendered aid. During the night, the French had fired on the Australians. By morning, one Australian company had attacked, but was stopped by heavy machine gun fire. The company commander and five other men were killed. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The failed attack on Merdjayoun on 16 and 17 June 1941

Brigadier Berryman, in command in the Merdjayoun area, hoped to retake the place on 17 June 1941. The 2/25th Battalion was now in the area. He would have them cross the river and attack from the northwest. One company from the 2/2nd Pioneer Battalion would attack from Qleaa. They would have another pioneer company ready to advance if they were successful. The Official History notes that the pioneers were ill-suited to fighting as infantry, as they were poorly equipped with infantry weapons. They had only been in North Africa and the Middle East since May and had only been employed doing engineer work. They plan for the attack now seems to be unrealistic for the available forces. The fort at Merdjayoun had walls so thick that 25-pounder shells could not damage them. After the dust settled, the pioneers had lost "27 killed, 46 wounded and 29 prisoners". The pioneers had run into strong opposition, including tanks. The 2/25th Battalion had to stop short of their position and there was no chance of a surprise attack. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

17 and 18 June 1941 in Syria

The Australian 2/3rd Machine Gun Battalion was performing important work, helping to hold back the Vichy French counterattack. One company of machine gunners, commanded by Captain Gordon had been sent towards Kuneitra, which had been taken by the French. During the morning of 17 June 1941, Captain Gordon learned that two battalions were on the way to support his company. The first battalion to arrive, the 2/Queen's, arrived by 5pm. The battalion commander was senior and he took command at the position. He planned an attack at 7pm. They attacked Kuneitra and retook the town. The town was littered with knocked out and overturned vehicles. Yet, after all that, the populace was trying to return to normal and there were shops open for business.

Meanwhile, at Sheikh Meskine, the force there was enduring hard fighting. Early on 18 June, a company attacked Ezraa, but the French attacked with tanks and the battalion commander was killed. A notable event happened when Major Hackett, "a young Australian serving in the British regular army" led and attack with a motley force of 100 men in trucks and took the town. They captured 168 prisoners. They also took various weapons. Hackett's men included Senegalese, 12 men from the Royal Fusiliers, several carriers, along with an anti-tank gun (certainly a 2pdr). This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

At Kuneitra again

Early on 17 June 1941, the machine gunners sent a force towards Kuneitra. They had General Wilson's order still in force to try and reinforce Kuneitra. They had a machine gun company, two armored cars from the Palestine police, and two two-pounder anti-tank guns. Kuneitra was some 25 miles away from the machine gun battalion. The force was commanded by Captain Gordon. He met an officer from the Fusiliers who had been at Kuneitra. Given the news about the French in Kuneitra. By 6am, they met another Fusiliers officer who gave more detailed information about the French force in Kuneitra. There were apparently still about 160 Fusiliers, including 17 officers. The machine gunners took a position on a ridge looking down on Kuneitra. They could see some French vehicles and troops. They started firing, hoping to draw the tanks into anti-tank gun range. Instead, the armored vehicles returned to Kuneitra and the cavalrymen dismounted. The Palestinian armored cars then moved towards the cavalry, which then "scattered". The machine gunners could see three tanks in the nearby town. They could also see artillery moving on the road. The guns turned out to be British and they drew French artillery fire. The British artillery fire then drove off the French tanks. The machine gunners then sent the armored cars to the British artillery position to let them know of their positions. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

More of the French counteracttack on 16 June 1941 in Syria and Lebanon

A French company attacked the Australians at Khiam fort in the afternoon of 16 June 1941. The attack was strong enough that the company that was attacked withdrew some 300 yards farther south. Another Australian company came up in support and they took a position in a ravine. The battalion commander then ordered them to fall back to a position about a mile-and-a-half farther south. On their left, there were some Royal Scots Greys cavalrymen, a company of the 2/5th Battalion, with a company of pioneers moving up to reinforce them. They had not been further challenged since the morning.

The plan approved by General Lavarack was to attack at Merdjayoun to relieve some pressure at Khiam. General Lavarack not only approved Brigadier Berryman's plan, but gave he command of a greater number of troops. The new force included three battalions, 22 field guns, and cavalry (6th Australian and Royal Scots Greys). The French counterattack had gotten a quick response.

At Jezzine, in Lebanon, the 25th Brigade was attacked as well. The first movements were seen early in the day on 15 June. They could see trucks and horsed cavalry moving forward. The attackers also had some artillery. The first attack happened late on 15 June. The Australians were able to call in artillery fire sufficient to halt the attack and to cause the attackers to withdraw. Another group of French troops moved forward early on 16 June. The defenders knocked out French armored cars and took prisoners. French cavalry tried to attack along a northern road and lost almost all their men and horses to machine gun fire. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The other action in Syria on 15 and 16 June 1941

With the forces in the east threatening Damascus, Brigadier Lloyd had decided to press on despite the setbacks to the west, in his rear. On 15 June 1941, he had ordered the 5th Indian Brigade to move forward to Jebel Madani. That happened during the night. Early on 16 June, the Punjabi troops had taken the heights, from which they could see the skyline of Damascus, minarets and all. The distance was about nine miles. The Rajputana had been relieved by a Free French unit. That allowed them to pass through the lines and move forward along the Kuneitra road. They were about two miles to the south. The Free French Marines had moved up to them in support. They were faced by a heavy attack that included tanks and aircraft that caused many casualties. These moves had placed forces at Artouz, which was in the rear of the French forces at Kuneitra.

16 June saw a successful action in the Merdjayoun area. One company was ordered to withdraw from Hebbariye to the road from Bmeriq to Banias. The men at Fort Christofini were also ordered to withdraw. In the morning on 16 June, there was a battle against Circassian cavalry. The Australian troops circled the village at Rachaya el Fokhar. The men from the fort saw the fight from a distance and the commander ordered them down the hill into the flank of the French cavalry. They killed some fifty French cavalrymen and then took up defensive positions. They were eventually ordered to withdraw to Bmeriq. The one battalion had acquired 34 fine cavalry horses for their use. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

Later on 16 June 1941 near Kuneitra, Syria

At 1820 on 16 June 1941, a French officer drove up in an armored car to the Fusiliers battalion headquarters in Kunietra. He had a Fusiliers prisoner with him. He informed the surviving battalion commander that they were surrounded by a "vastly superior force of tanks and other armoured fighting vehicles". He hoped that they would surrender, because he did not like fighting the "Englishmen". After a half hour, the commander decided to surrender his 13 officers and 164 men that we previously mentioned. When the battalion commander walked over to the French officer, he saw 11 medium tanks nearby. Not all the battalion had been at Kuneitra. There was still one company which had approached Kuneitra with a 25-pounder gun. They approached from Kiswe, fired off what ammunition they had, and then withdrew. Late on 16 June, the machine gun battalion commander, Lt-Col Blackburn, had heard about the plight of the Fusiliers at Kuneitra. In a typically bizarre incident, an officer from General Wilson's headquarters had brought orders directly from Wilson to take ammunition to Kuneitra. General Wilson seems to have been totally out of touch with the situation, and had taken the initiative outside the chain of command. He must have thought that he was interfering to try and help, but the officers on the scene were in control of the situation and were taking steps to respond to the French attack. During 15 and 16 June 1941, Brigadier Lloyd was at Kiswe. The forces on the east side were within nine miles of Damascus and were going to take the risk to continue to menace the city and perhaps take it. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

Late on 15 June to early on 16 June 1941 in Lebanon and Syria

During the night of 15 June to 16 June 1941, General Lavarack made some changes to his troop deployments in response to the threatening French counterattack. General Lavarack had his Australians spread across some 37 miles in southern Lebanon and Syria. To cover that area, he had two infantry brigades with supporting troops. The French attack was a threat to the lines of communication for the 25th Australian Brigade on the right. He ordered a battalion, the 2/25th, the 2/5th Field Regiment and one troop from the 2/6th Field Regiment to move to Merdjayoun. They had been involved in operations at Jezzine. Jezzine was left with just the 2/31st Battalion to hold Jezzine. Brigadier Berryman was ordered to take command of the forces near Merdjayoun to mount a defense of the 25th Australian Brigade rear.

The 2/2nd Pioneer Battalion had been spread across a wide area working on repairing roads. The were ordered to guard the crossing over the Litani River and to set explosives for blowing the bridge if they were attacked. After a long night move, mostly by truck, the pioneers were very tired by the morning of 16 June. The machine-gunners of the 2/3rd Machine Gun Battalion had orders to guard the crossings over the Jordan River. The commander reached the bridge that already had British cavalry on horses on guard. During the night, some anti-tank guns arrived at the bridge. They were fully involved with preparing defenses.

Brigadier Berryman was at Jezzine when he received his new orders. He left Jezzine by 1am and was at the Litani River by 6:30am, where he met the 2/2nd Pioneers commander. He ordered the pioneer commander to move a company to the ridge "between Qleaa and Merdjayoun". The ridge already had the Royal Scots Greys, who he ordered to continue to hold where they were. At the same time, the French attacked Kuneitra. The Royal Fusiliers were at Kuneitra. They had some 570 British infantry. They had one 20mm Italian Breda gun. The French had some 1,500 infantry, "eleven tanks, ten armoured cars, and one or two field guns". The French had broken into Kuneitra by 6am. The surviving fusiliers were concentrated in three stone houses by 11:30am. By 7pm, the surviving fusiliers had surrendered to the French. They were 13 officers and 164 men. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The situation as of the night of 15 and 16 June 1941 in Syria and Lebanon

The British commanders who had planned the attack on Syria had decided to attack in spite of having what were inadequate forces. The attackers had been fortunate in the first days to have not met serious resistance, except near Merdjayoun. The Australians under General Lavarack's command had just the two brigades of infantry with supporting artillery, engineers, and cavalry. General Wilson ordered the 7th Australian Division to send "anti-tank guns and ammunition" to bolster the defenses at Kuneitra. He also diverted to Deraa the first battalion to arrive from the British 16th Brigade. The 7th Australian Division had very little left in way of reserves. There was the division headquarters, two machine gun companies, and the headquarters and one battery from an anti-tank regiment. There was also a pioneer battalion that had units spread across the Australian front doing "engineer work". WIth General Lavarack being responsible for some 37 miles of front, he deployed his meager reserves where he could. He sent the machine-gunners and the anti-tank battery to hold the "bridge of the daughters of Jacob" over the Jordan River, reminding us that we are in biblical lands. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The French counter-attack and disarray in response

When the Royal Scots Greys fled through Merdjayoun in headlong flight, they told the Australians that there were no more British troops to the north. That was actually not true. There were still "infantry, cavalry and artillery" forward that did not know about the withdrawal and panic. There was still a rearguard in place at Merdjayoun. There was an infantry company, some cavalry in carriers, and an anti-tank gun battery. The infantry scouted some 500 yards to the north and saw no French troops. They had been ordered to pull back at 2:45am and did so. They moved back to Qleaa to where some Staffordshire Yeomanry and Royal Scots Greys were in place. The Australian infantry were across the road. They saw their first French tanks at 10:30am on 16 June 1941. There were only two, and the anti-tank guns knocked out one and the other pulled back. By now, the company at the "Windy Corner" had pulled back to Khiam and had occupied the fort there. The 6th Cavalry had some Vickers machine guns set up at the nearby road junction.

The French counter-attack in the east had created major problems for the British forces attacking Syria in the east. While ordering his reserves forward, General Lavarack told Brigadier Berryman to take command of the troops at Merdjayoun. Brigadier Berryman was the 7th Australian Division artillery commander and was the most experienced Australian brigadier. Brigadier Berryman had been at Jezzine when he received his orders from General Lavarack. That had been around midnight on 15 June. While Brigadier Berryman had responsibility for the area west of the Litani river, he also made some moves to the esat, where the Royal Scots Greys were at Qleaa. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

Panic at Merdjayoun on 15 June 1941

at dusk on 15 June 1941, the French tanks moving on Merdjayoun had stopped. Not just the tanks, but the French attack in general had come to a stop. They would have been foolish to move tanks on mountainous roads in the dark. Still, there was panic among some troops near Merdjayoun with wild rumors of French tanks having broken through the position. The Royal Scots Greys, British cavalry, were among those affected. When some men of the Greys went to where their vehicle park and found that they were gone, the men panicked and they were out of control. This had been observed by an Australian artillery officer. Even the Australians got mixed up with the men in panic. There were four vehicles belonging to the 2/5th Field Regiment which got involved with the scramble of vehicles moving towards Metulla. They eventually received orders "to keep going and keep the roads clear". The "little convoy of four trucks" eventually was able to rejoin their unit after two days on the move. The field guns at Qleaa were eventually withdrawn after a harrowing experience after taking a wrong turn that led them over terraces. They were attacked by a French bomber that a Bofors gun shot down. They eventually the guns made their way to Metulla by dark. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The situation at Merdjayoun deteriorates on 15 June 1941

After the route to Captain Hodge's observation post was cut on 15 June 1941, under the French attack, he sent a gunner back to find out the situation. He returned to say that the Royal Scots Greys had withdrawn. Hodge's team was helped by a troop of carriers that crossed the Debbine Valley. The whole front near Medjayoun was now withdrawing in the face of the strong French attack. The 2/33rd commander, Lt-Col. Monaghan, ordered the cavalry commander, Onslow, to supervise the withdrawal of the forward troops. He also suggested to Colonel Todd, the commander of the Royal Scots Greys, that his men should hold the high ground to the immediate north of Merdjayoun. Monaghan's battalion would try and hold Khiam. He hoped to organize a counter-attack near Rachaya el Fokhar. A new unit, a company of the 2/5th Battaiion was operating under the command of the Royal Scots Greys. As the day got later on 15 June, the French were continuing to attack and make progress. The cavalry squadron on the Balate Ridge withdrew into Merdjayoun in the face of the French attack. Rumors were rife of a big French breakthrough with tanks and a collapse of the Australian position. Some troops panicked and fled without orders. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

At the "Windy Corner" on 15 June 1941

One company of the Australian 2/33rd Battalion was at Route "A" near the Windy Corner. The road north of Merdjayoun, in Syria, during the attack on Syria and Lebanon, curves around the bottom of the Balate Ridge. When the road then turns back to the north, there is a divide into what they called routes "A" and "B". During the afternoon of 15 June 1941, French artillery opened fire on the company that was on Route "A" at the "Windy Corner". The company was under Major Onslow's command. He had two 6th Australian Cavalry squadrons. There were also other troops in the vicinity. They included a machine gun platoon, anti-tank guns, and a field artillery battery. The battery was to support the Royal Scots Greys, which were on the road to the north. Suddenly, at 3pm, they received French artillery fire. In a half hour, ten French tanks, fifty cavalry, and two infantry companies moved into the area. They set up machine guns. Starting at 4:30pm, the tanks attacked on both routes "A" and "B". The Australian anti-tank guns hit the leading tank. Two other tanks backed off, but fired on the machine guns. French troops on the heights started firing on the 2/5th, who were below them in elevation and about 1200 yards away. The French had made a stronger attack on Route "B", and had forced the Royal Scots Greys to withdraw back down the road, as they were attacked by French tanks. The tanks were fired on by artillery and the anti-tank guns. After four tanks were knocked out, they moved back around the curve, out of sight. At ROute "A", a large infantry attack took two of the Australian anti-tank guns. After another attack at Route "B", the guns there were pulled back out of danger. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

15 June 1941 near Merdjayoun

Captain Bennett commanded a company of the Australian 2/33rd Battalion. since the start of the campaign in Syria and Lebanon, Captain Bennett's company had spent much of the time near Merdjayoun. On 15 June 1941, they were moving north and "passed through Rachaya el Fokhar" as they moved towards Christofini. They heard from the local people that the French had been using a fort at Christofini. There had been fifty man groups moving in and out of the fort. They later learned enough to believe that the French had withdrawn earlier on the 15th after receiving artillery fire. Captain Bennett had decided to wait to move towards the fort until 16th.

Another company of the 2/33rd Battalion was moving towards Hebbariye. Major Buttrose commanded this company. They had donkeys to carry their "heavy weapons and ammunition". They quickly found that they donkeys could not handle the steep slopes, so the men had to carry the weapons and ammunition. They also reached Rachaya el Fokhar, where they met an Arab who spoke English and had lived in the United States. He told them he would guide them down the cliff face towards Hebbariye. They reached that village by 11:30am. They heard at 3pm from a "friendly Arab" that the French "knew where they were". Major Buttrose, in response, moved his company down below the village. That proved a wise move, because the French had started firing artillery at the area where they had been above the village. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official history.

Action at Kuneitra and Merdjayoun on 14 and 15 June 1941

A deserver from the Vichy French asserted that the French planned to attack Kuneitra on 15 June 1941 with two infantry battalions and tanks. In the face of what was happening, there were some shifting of command and units. A battle group was formed at Merdjayoun under the command of Lt-Col. Monaghan. He had his battalion, the 2/33rd, the 6th Australian Cavalry Regiment, an artillery battery, and some anti-tank guns and engineers. There were also the Royal Scots Greys and 2/2nd Pioneers under General Lavarack. The pioneers had their headquarters near the Litani River crossing. Lt-Col. Monaghan took the risk of sending three companies in a flanking attack on the advancing French forces near the foothills of Mount Hermon. At least some of the Australians knew the area well and were liked by the Syrian villagers, who were willing to give them information. There was a fort at Christofini that was occupied by French cavalry. One company planned to attack the fort on 16 June, although the French had likely abandoned the fort on 15 June. There was a concerted French attack north of Merdjayoun at the area named the "Windy Corner". Australian anti-tank guns were in action and knocked out the lead tank, which discouraged the others, causing them to pull back. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

Danger in the rear on 14 and 15 June 1941 in the east of Syria

Some 35 miles behind the front line on the road to Damascus on 14 and 15 June 1941, the commander, now Brigadier Lloyd, as we noted, was notified that on the afternoon of 14 June, two companies of Tunisian troops with armoured cars and artillery had driven out the Transjordan Frontier Force and had taken Ezraa. They were sitting on the road, as a blocking force. The Jordanians had moved to the "Ezraa-Sheikh Meskine" road. After that news, they heard of a French force moving on Kuneitra. Early on 15 June, this group had moved out from Sassa. The had forced back the advance group from the 1/Royal Fusiliers with a few armoured cars and carriers. There was grim news from 15 June that the Vichy French were sending a large force of infantry, tanks, and cavalry towards Kuneitra. The force of Free French and the Indian brigade had essentially bypassed this group on their advance towards Damascus. The bypassed force was now in position to threaten the rear of the troops moving towards Damascus. Brigadier Lloyd responded to the threat by dispatching a small battle group consisting of two Free French companies and some British artillery towards Sheikh Meskine. They were to hold the road near Sheikh Meskine. At noon on the 15th, Australian Tomahawks attacked Vichy French vehicles on the road also near Sheikh Meskine. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

15 June 1941 in the east, the French counter-attack

Early on 15 June 1941, the Indian troops attacked. The 3/1st Punjab Battalion and a company from the 1/Royal Fuisiliers, advanced on Kiswe, a village. There was a wide and deep anti-tank trench, so the men carried wooden ladders to help them cross. They had artillery support from the 1st Field Regiment. By 6am, the troops had crossed the wadi and were fighting in the gardens and houses. A company flanked the position and attacked from a different side. At 8:30am, the Indians had overcome the French. They were aided by catching the French relieving troops. Some of the weapons were already loaded on trucks. With momentum on their side, the Rajputana moved through the Punjabi and attacked the hill. On the left, the Free French marines and fusiliers took Moukelbe. They had fought four Vichy French battalions and had pushed them back. Another attack on the right had failed, though. The Free French had taken Jebel el Kelb, but they were stopped by fire from the flank. Way to the right, the cavalrymen were also stopped by artillery and tanks. Brigadier Lloyd got bad news, though, about an attack on their supply line. Behind them some 35 miles, On 14 June, an attack had driven out the Transjordan Frontier Force at Ezraa. This was on the railway and near the road. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

Attack in the east in Syria on 15 June 1941

With General Legentilhomme wounded and out of action, he had been replaced in the east of Syrla by Brigadier Lloyd, who had commanded the 5th Indian Brigade. Brigadier Lloyd's plan for 15 June 1941 was that the 5th Indian Brigade and a Free French Marine battalion would attack north along the west side of the road to Damascus. Assuming that they would succeed in capturing Moukelbe, Tel Kiswe, and the village of Kiswe, the Free French brigade would attack to the on the right and take Jebel Abou Atriz and Jebel Kelb. The French defenders were thought to be stronger than the attackers. There were Moroccan and Tunisian battalions near Kiswe. The defenders of Tel Kiswe and Moukelbe were two French Foreign Legion battalions. On the Free French side, there were problems with Senegalese troops and French Foreign Legion troops facing their own people in combat. The attack on the left started at 4:30am. The 1st Field Regiment fired in support and the Indian troops advanced across the wadi and into the village. An Indian company on the flank wheeled and caught the village from a different side. The Indians had taken the village by 8:30am. They were partly just lucky in that they had caught the French troops during the process of relieving troops. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The Vichy French forces attack in Syria and Lebanon on 14 to 15 June 1941

Along the Mediterranean coast, the Australians had advanced within thirty miles of Beirut. In the east, the attack at advanced to within 25 miles of Damascus. However, in between, near Merdjayoun, the attack had only moved forward some ten miles from the border. That left the French with a large area that intruded between the "British" forces. They were only nominally British, as there were mostly Australians, the 5th Indian Brigade, the Jordanians, and the Free French. The forces in before Damascus were in very strong positions. They had infantry positiones in an area where there were houses and gardens, with boulders along the Jebel el Kelb and Jebel Abou Atriz. That was on the east side of the road to Damascus. On the west side, there were the high ground at the Tel Kswe, Tel Afair, and Jevel Madani. This was an area with "lava boulders" that meant that wheeled and tracked vehicles were restricted to the roads.

With the Free French general, Legentilhomme wounded, Brigadier Lloyd was made commander in the east of the Free French and British force. A colonel, Colonel Jones, became the 5th Indian Brigade commander. Brigadier Lloyd planned an attack on 15 June, 1941, with the Free French marine battalion and the 5th Indian Brigade. The goal was to take "Moukelbe, Tel Kiswe, and the Kiswe village". This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

With the Free French on 12 and 13 June 1941 in Syria

Major-General Paul Legentilhomme commanded the Free French forces on the eastern portion of the Syrian Campaign. He was an old East African veteran, having been in French Somaliland and Eritrea. The Free French had continued to attack the Vichy defenses at Kiswe. There was a report that the Vichy French tanks were moving around their flank, General Legentilhomme had his troops hold their present positions on Jebel Maani and Jebel Badrane. Later in the day, the General was wounded. General Wilson weighed in on the situation with General Wavell and opined that there was not a counter-attack in progress. He did order the 5th Indian Brigade to be under the Free French command and left the protection of the rear to the Transjordan Frontier Force, which was a very small unit. Fortunately, the tanks sighted were Free French, so there was less reason to panic. When the 5th Indian Brigade commander saw the Vichy French defenses at Kiswe, he thought that the positions were so strong that they would need strong artillery support with a set-piece attack to take the place. He discussed the situation with the wounded General Legentilhomme and they agreed to wait until 15 June to attack Kiswe. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

Some perspective on the beginning of the campaign from 9 to 14 June 1941

From the beginning of the campaign in Syria and Lebanon from 9 June 1941, the air force had some success. At the start, the RAF was weaker than the Vichy French air force. The RAF had many responsibilities: close air support to the army, air protection to the navy offshore, offensive operations against the French on their airfields, attacking French ports, and attacks on fuel supplies. There were some early successes. No.3 Squadron RAAF caught six French aircraft on the ground at Rayak and damaged them. Blenheim day bombers attacked oil tanks at Beirut. No.3 Squadron, RAAF was equipped with American Tomahawk fighters. They were often providing air cover to the navy off of Lebanon. They shot down three of eight Ju-88's on 14 June.

Given the strong French defence in Syria and Lebanon, the CIGS, General Dill, suggested to General Wavell that they divert forces from Iraq to Syria, and that they use bombers from Egypt. That was very much in line with what General Wavell already had decided. General Wavell told General Dill on 12 June that the attack was progressing slowly, but that was not unexpected, given the rough terrain and inadequate force employed. The 16th British Brigade was ordered to Syria to increase the force employed to approximately equal the strength of the French defenders. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

On taking Jezzine late on 14 June 1941

Lt-Col Porter had decided to push into Jezzine, since they were making good progress. As we had noted, he ordered the unengaged companies to move forward and into Jezzine. To reach Jezzine, the men had to move down a steep cliff that was terraced. Any French resistance had ceased, so they were able to enter Jezzine unopposed. They actually entered Jezzine at 8:30pm. The division artillery commander, Brigadier Berryman, moved into Jezzine with the first platoon. They residents of Jezzine welcomed the Australians and give them bread and water. They had wine and food to offer at the police station. The Australians moved past Jezzine to the high ground east of the town. They were astride the roads to the north and west. Probing Australian forces encountered French rearguards blocking the road. During the night, they sent a hot meal to the men. The 2/25th Battalion stayed at Jerme, as there was so little room in the route to Jezzine and in the vicinity. By 13 June, the Cheshire Yeomanry had reached Mazraat Koufra, but had not been able to move forward to Zhalta. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian official History.

Taking Jezzine on 14 June 1941

About three miles short of Jezzine, Lt-Col Porter, the commander of the 2/31st Battalion was shot through one thigh. Porter said that he could continue and attack with two companies. He was consulting with Brigadier Berryman, the artillery commander. They used a troop of guns and mortars in support of the attack. The hills were terraced in three foot steps, about ten feet wide. They had growing vines, the reason for being terraced. The attack commenced at 6pm. Porter had asked the machine gun platoon commander to let individual Vickers guns to fire independently, as they saw targets. When French machine guns started firing, they were immediately silenced. One infantryman slipped past one machine gun emplacement and killed the crew with rifle and bayonet. The men ran across the flat 100-yard area at the foot of the hill and then climbed to the top of the hill that dominated Jezzine. The men could see some French cavalrymen mounting their horses and then then riding off. They Australians fired on them. Two companies from the 2/31st had attacked. Lt-Col Porter then ordered the other two companies to move forward through the first two and to enter the town of Jezzine. As the men entered the town, they saw horses roaming the streets. They were the horses of French cavalrymen that had been killed, apparently. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

North from Merdjayoun from 12 to 14 June 1941

The bridge over the Litani to the southwest of Merdjayoun was finished on 12 June 1941 in the afternoon. Carriers were able to travel the road to the west to meet the 21st Australian Brigade on the coast. There was one road north from Merdjayoun to Jezzine. This was a winding road around mountains. A patrol from the Cheshire Yeomanry had probed north for about 500 yards and had found that the road was passable. Brigadier Cox's plan was to send the 2/31st Battalion, with cavalry, artillery and engineers up the road. The objective was Jezzine, but they would first move to the heights south of Rihane. From there, they would move forward to the Kafr Houn ridge. A road went Jezzine to Sidon so that they could connect with the 21st Brigade. One squadron from the Cheshire Yeomanry would move north to Zhalta. They would then be able to travel the road from Jezzine to Sidon. The entire 25th Australian Brigade would then follow the same route. Starting out at 9pm on 13 June, a column of the 2/31st Battalion with a cavalry troop in the lead headed out for Jezzine. The infantry were carried in British three-ton trucks. The road was narrow and they traveled without lights. There were tight turns that required excessive effort to get the trucks and guns through. Some vehicles turned at the Sidon road and had to be called back. Just before Jerme, an extremely sharp turn required the engineers to work for two hours so that the large trucks could pass. Finally at daybreak on 14 June, they reached Kafr Houn where local women cheered the arriving soldiers. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

General Lavarack's plan on 12 June 1941

General Lavarack really wanted to be making faster progress to the north. The area north of Merdjayoun seemed to be terrain that would aid a defender, so the General decided to join the 25th Brigade with the 21st at Sidon to push north along the coast. While the bridge over the Litani to the southwest of Merdjayoun had been blown, there was a large boulder in the middle of the river. That proved suitable for anchoring a bridge, so two sections were joined at the boulder to make a new bridge over the river. They would use the bridge in the run over to Sidon from Merdjayoun. The General would leave the 2/33rd Battalion to hold the Merdjayoun. They would also have the cavalry and an artillery battery. The cavalry would move to the northeast along two routes, "Route A" and "Route B". Route A was to the right and Route B was to the left. They were divided by "Col's Ridge". The cavalry was quickly halted by accurate artillery and gunfire. They realized that the French were in strong defensive positions and would be difficult to overcome. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

Taking Merdjayoun on 11 June 1941

On 11 June 1941, the Australian gunners had a sense that the French were staging a withdrawal. The commander of the 2/6th Field Regiment volunteered to go forward and negotiate with the French. Right before 1pm, he had not reached the fort, so he pulled back, knowing that the plan was for a barrage at 1pm. The artillery commanders agreed to cancel the planned barrage and tried to notify the advancing troops. The infantry was already advancing and reached the fort, which they found had been abandoned. The civilians living in Merdjayoun emerged from hiding and told the Australians that the French had withdrawn. The people living there were mostly Orthodox Christians. As the Australians entered the town, the residents raised the flag of Lebanon. The road north to Merdjayoun was mined, so the engineers were busy removing the mines. The more senior officers started to arrive. They included Brigadier Berryman, the artillery commander, General Allen and Brigadier Cox. By later on 11 June, the 2/25th Battalion was north of Ibeles. The other battalions were also far advanced. The 2/33rd was now north of Khiam. The third battalion, the 2/31st, was at Merdjayoun. In the afternoon of 11 June, the engineers had advanced to the bridge over the Litani river to the southwest of Merdjayoun. The bridge had been blown and a large crater had been blown in the road leading to the bridge. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official history.

Back to Merdjayoun from 10 to 11 June 1941

Merdjayoun is actually in southern Lebanon, although the Australian Official History calls it Syria. On 10 June 1941, an attack was made with artillery support. The 2/25th Battalion was to advance up the slopes to the Ibeles Saki plateau, but that was not possible. Instead, they swung to the north and occupied the village and took 12 pack mules. There were also weapons and ammunition. At this position, they interdicted the roads to the north of Merdjayoun. The attack received high-level attention, as General Lavarack, the current 7th Division commander and his planned successor, General Allen, were present at Brigadier Cox's brigade headquarters. They planned for the 2/31st Battalion to attack the ridge at Khirbe with the leading two companies. Once they did that, they would move forward to Merdjayoun. The barrage was commenced at 2:30am. The foremost men could see the abandoned French positions and could see men withdrawing ahead of them. The leading men moved past Qleaa and had moved forward to a cross-roads by 5am. The following companies had to fight French troops that had been bypassed by the leading companies. Khirbe was taken in a "sharp fight", where they took 56 French prisoners. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The French had made a major withdrawal: 15 June 1941 on the coast

After finding Sidon had been abandoned by the French on 15 June 1941, a component of the 9th Australian Cavalry scouted to the north. They had replaced the 6th Australian Cavalry on the coast. They realized that the French had withdrawn. Not very long after that, troops of the 2/16th Battalion moved into the town. The battalion actually marched through the town and advanced to the Wadi Abou Zare. The cavalry probing to the north found that north to Ras Nebi Younes were clear of French forces. To the east, along the east-west roads, they were clear to Salhiye, Jamliye, and Sebline. Even as the situation on the coast improved, the center and east had moved to a crisis situation. Still, we have trouble understanding why the coast could not have been exploited aggressively and the eastern fronts allowed to stall. The situation boded ill for a further advance up the coast, due to the desire to advance in the center and east. The narrative now switches back in time to 10 June 1941 at Merdjayoun and Khirbe. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

On the left wing at Sidon on 14 and 15 June 1941

In the area near Sidon, there was a building that the Australians called a monastery, but that was actually a military barracks. The 2/27th Battalion was moving on Sidon from 13 June 1941. Much of the action was due to the individual platoons, not even company-sized units. Sergeant Macpherson led one platoon of seventeen men. They were able to move forward and entered the village of Miyeoumiye from the east side. The French defenders were surprised to find the Australians among them and 24 surrendered. The Australians found forty pack mules, which the supposed meant that the French were planning on a withdrawal. The other two platoons of the company had failed in their attack. They had tried to advance into the face of machine gun fire from the supposed monastery. They had withdrawn during the night. The 2/16th Battalion was still south of Sidon on 14 June. Brigadier Stevens was personally involved and he called in artillery to stop a French attack that included tanks. There had been hard fighting on 13 and 14 June, seemingly to no effect, but by 15 June, they found that the French had withdrawn. They suspected that Sidon had also been abandoned. At 4pm on 15 June, Brigadier Stevens entered Sidon and took control. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

One Australian company is decimated at Sidon on 13 JUne 1941

Major Wain's company almost reached its objective at the Wadi Abou Zare, but they were out of touch with Horley's company and were vulnerable, so they pulled back. This was at Sidon on 13 June 1941. They pulled back south of Sidon into a safer position where they were in touch with their supporting company. Horley's company, on the right, when advancing, had been attacked by French tanks. The tanks were more aggressively handled and the Australians did not have any effective means of combating them. Horley was killed and his supporting company was dispersed into the hills. Eventually, with Captain Mackenzie in charge, the company was reduced to a sergeant and 17 men. They were eventually able to break free and reach the road. The tanks stayed away from the road because it was too open. The cavalry was sent to deal with the tanks and brought up a 25-pounder field gun and two anti-tank guns. They were at too long range for the anti-tank guns to be able to damage the tanks and one gun was knocked out. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The plan for taking Sidon on 13 June 1941

The plan was for the 2/16th Battalion to take the port city of Sidon. The battalion had been held in reserve for the last four days and now would see action. The plan was for the battalion to pass through the position held by the 2/27th Battalion and to move forward past the town of Sidon to a line two miles north of Sidon. Two companies of the battalion had moved up to Darb es Sim, but the battalion commander had lost touch with them, so they did not participate. A cavalry squadron would provide flank protection to the battalion during their advance. The attack commenced at 10am with artillery support from the 2/4th Field Regiment. The left company (they advanced with two companies forward) ran into machine gun posts south of Sidon. They outflanked them and the French withdrew. They eventually reached a point east of the center of Sidon, after seeing two French tanks that were timidly handled. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

Moving north on the coastal plain on 12 June 1941

The Australian 21st Brigade was moving north along the coast towards Sidon, which they reached by late 12 June 1941. Brigadier Stevens had sent two field guns forward in support, in case any more tanks appeared. They ended up in a duel with French guns "over open sights". Brigadier Stevens was involved and was slightly wounded by a shell fragment. Late in the day on 12 June, the Australians were strafed by French aircraft and took casualties. The Australians wanted to negotiate with the French to spare Sidon from a battle. Instead, the French artillery commenced firing. The Australians returned the fire. The town was overlooking a harbor dating from Phoenician times. The town had some 12,000 people in close quarters. North and south of the town were fruit trees. The orchard were contained with nine-foot walls. The Australians were impressed by the beauty of the place, as it was the nicest that they had seen so far. Brigadier Stevens decided to let the 2/16th Battalion take Sidon from the French. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The 2/27th Battalion assumes the advance-guard role on 12 June 1941 in Syria

The 2/14th Battalion Adjutant suggested to the 2/27th Battalion commander that they could move to the east and out-flank the French position. One company moved through difficult terrain in the hills to the east. Another company moved through Adeisse and then forward to Hassaniye and Maameriye. They took some forty prisoners and some mortars and machine guns. Right on the coast, while this was happening, artillery fire forced the French tanks to pull back. The carriers of the 2/27th Battalion moved along the beach and outflanked the bridge defenders. They took about sixty prisoners and were able to hold the bridge until a platoon arrived after crossing the hills. They eventually took more prisoners, so that they held 200 French soldiers. A flank attack had worked much better than a frontal assault, which makes sense. By nightfall on the 12th, the cavalry and carriers of the 2/27th Battalion had advanced another three miles to the north. They had moved through Rhaziye and only stopped when they were fired on by artillery. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The 2/14th Battalion moving north along the coast road on 11 June 1941

The Australian 2/14th Battalion followed the cavalry north along the coast road in Syria on mid-morning of 11 June 1941. The French had left a modest rear-guard which had been dealt with by the cavalry. There was little opposition to the 2/14th Battalion, except to the right of the road. They had "killed nine and captured forty-five" French troops. They contiued north "through Es Sakiye, Sarafend and Khan Saada". In the process, they had taken almost 100 prisoners. With the cavalry scouting ahead, they noticed that there were five tanks and machine gun nests "in the Wadi Zaharini". This seems to have been the next position that the French had decided to defend. The plan was for the 2/14th to continue to move north and to cut the road to Merdjayoun. By 6:15pm, six French tanks advanced towards the leading men from the 2/14th Battalion. They had been stopped already by heavy machine gun and mortar fire. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

With the cavalry on 11 June 1941 in Syria

Early on 11 June 1941, the 2/14th Battalion and the cavalry squadron received orders to resume the forward move. The cavalry were able to move to the juncture of the coast road with the road to Es Sakiye. At that location, there were French tanks with supporting anti-tank guns. The cavalry commander, Lt. Mills ordered his three light tanks to shelter behind a ridge. He moved forward with some carriers. He and some men dismounted and moved to a position that dominated the French. The Australians had an anti-tank rifle and they started firing at the tanks and the anti-tank guns. The tanks withdrew in the face of the fire. They then fired at the anti-tank gun and crew. The gun was over the road cutting. Lt. Mills then went forward but then encountered some French troops who had dug in for protection. Mills' sub-machine gun had jammed. There was another group, though, and Cramp attacked them and then both groups of French troops surrendered. They had captured 45 men from the French Foreign Legion, machine guns, mortars, and the two anti-tank guns. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

On the coast, early on 11 June 1941 in Syria

As we mentioned, a house caught fire and was burning due to gasoline burning. That lit up the scene and made advancing without being seen very difficult. This was early on 11 June 1941 on the coast with the 2/27th Battalion from the Australian 21st Brigade. One company, with the battalion commander following, went around the right end of the French position, taking care to stay out of the light from the fire. They had expected to find another company there, but did not. They were around the French, so they were able to push deeper to the objective and beyond. The other companies from the 2/27th Battalion turned out to be held up by French fire from positions on either side of the coast road. The company on the right that had swung around the French position was ordered to take a position above the road to block a French escape. With the morning and dawn, the French surrendered and the battalion commander, Lt-Col. Moten, was able to walk south to his other companies. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

Attack at night in the coastal sector in Syria on 10 June 1941

The 21st Australian Brigade was moving up the coast in Syria and Lebanon to the north. The 2/27th Battalion was ordered to attack at midnight on the night of 10 and 11 June 1941. The battalion had moved north along the road to a point "just south of Adloun and Innsariye". There was an artillery barrage for a half an hour. One company was to the right of the road and the other was on the road and to the left. The men encountered heavy gunfire from both sides of the road and took casualties. Someone tossed a grenade into a building that ignited gasoline. The fire lit up the scene and the right company turned towards the fire. A patrol on the left noticed eight light tanks warming up their engines. This news caused Brigadier Stevens to order some artillery to move forward. They guns arrived with Brigadier Stevens and the artillery regiment commander. They fired 12 rounds at a stone house where they found four dead French soldiers. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The Vichy French response in Syria in early June 1941

The Vichy French army commander in Syria in June 1941 was General Verdlhac. Free French forces had made a rapid advance on Damascus, and the general was concerned that they had gotten so close. General Verdilhac decided to fight at Nahr el Awaj. He positioned the 6th Chasseurs d'Afrique and a Foreign Legion unit there to defend the position. The 6th Chasseurs d'Afrique were equipped with tanks, and the II/6th Foreign Legion were among the best troops. By 11 June, he had added the 7th Chasseurs d'Afrique and I/6th Foreign Legion. The defense at the Litani river included part of a regiment, with Algerian companies and some Foreign Legion troops. In the north, the best troops and most French tanks were "between Mount Hermon and the desert". There were also some Tunisian troops near the Jebel Druze. This defense had proved to be fairly effective. The center British advance was stopped. The advance along the coast had done better, but it was obvious that the attackers would have to fight their way north. On the right, the Free French had been stopped, so they were being augmented by the 5th Indian Brigade, which had been providing a rear-guard. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

One the desert flank in Syria on 9, 10, and 11 June 1941

In the east of the attack on 9 June 1941 were the 5th Indian Brigade, British horse cavalry, and the Free French under General Legentilhomme. The 5th Indian Brigade, under Brigadier Lloyd, had moved forward to Sheikh Meskine. They were followed by the cavalry. There was an area covered by boulders of volcanic origin. By 10 June, the cavalry arrived at Najha. This was on the Nahr el Awaj. They took some French prisoners there. A French force of infantry from Senegal with tanks and armoured cars stood in their path. They dropped back some six miles to a place that was defensible. The French attacked on 11 June, but were stopped by the anti-tank gun.

The Free French also had Senegalese troops. They advanced through Sheikh Meskine on 9 June. The leading troops were marines and Senegalese. They had a battery of artillery from the 1st Field Regiment from the 5th Indian Brigade. They also had a troop of light anti-aircraft guns. By the end of 9 June, the Free French were in Deinoun and Deir Ali and were in sight of the Vichy outposts. The Free French waited for reinforcement during 10 June. They attacked Kiswe on 11 June. The defenders were Moroccans equal in strength to the attackers. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

Captain Bennett's company on 10, 11, 12, and 13 June 1941 in Syria

Captain Bennett's company of the 2/33rd Battalion spent 10 June 1941 trying to hold their position. His battalion was still four miles away from his position. The first attack was by a company-sized French unit that came along the road from Hasbaya. They made three attacks. The first was at 10am, the second at the middle of the day, and the last at 4pm. At the same time as the last attack, some fifty French cavalrymen on horseback attacks the company's rear, back at Ferdisse. This attack was also turned back. Early on 11 June, the French took Ferdisse, leaving the Australians without a water supply. The French commander sent a Syrian who said that the French commander wanted to talk with him. Bennett told the Syrian that the French commander could visit him at his headquarters "under escort". They didn't hear back about the proposal. By 12 June, the company was still surrounded. Bennett decided to fall back on his company, after night fell. Captain Bennett and his headquarters had reached the battalion headquarters at night on 13 June. His three platoons had arrived earlier in the day. The company's only losses were the six wounded men and stretcher bearer taken at Ferdisse. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

Captain Bennett's company from the 2/33rd Battalion on 9 and 10 june 1941 in Syria

At the start of the invasion of Syria on 9 June 1941, a company of the 2/33rd Battalion was sent through the hills to take Ferdisse. The planners greatly underestimated the time that would be needed to travel. They thought that the company could be in Hebbarliye in four hours. The actual travel time was 24 hours. Even in 1941, there were Syrians near the village who had lived in America and who spoke English. There had been French cavalry there, but they were unaware that the Australians were nearby. By 8am on 9 June 1941, Bennett took his company towards Ferdisse. He was to put his company across the road to the west. When they reached Ferdisse, they took machine gun fire. Bennett ordered one platoon as a rear-guard in Hebbarliye. As they reached Ferdisse, they saw French soldiers leaving with machine guns on pack mules. He then proceeded to occupy the road according to the plan. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

10 June 1941: A Test of Strength

Brigadier Berryman asked if the cavalry could test the enemy's strength. The test was planned for Colonel Porter's front. A small force of one light tank and six carriers were to move forward towards Khirbe to draw French fire. Three carriers would move forward along the road until there was suitable ground to deploy. The other group of three carriers would be on their right and deploy. The light tank was in a hull-down position to offer support to the carriers. The tank was located near an artillery observation post that would call in support. The carriers on the right reached the foot of the hill where Khirbe was located. The carriers on the left ran into trouble as they drew fire from a French anti-tank gun and machine guns when they attempted to deploy. The leader of the carriers on the left had a track blown off by a mortar bomb. The men ran for a low stone wall, hoping to take cover. Australian artillery fire was called in and knocked out the anti-tank gun. The leader of the right group of carriers went forward to rescue the men trapped behind the wall. The carriers had been heavily hit in the fighting so that only two were undamaged. Brigadier Cox had wanted them to support an infantry attack at 2am, but finally relented and released the carriers from that duty at 9pm. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

9 and 10 June 1941 with the 25th Australian Brigade

By later in the day on 9 June 1941, the situation for the 25th Australian Brigade, commanded by Brigadier Cox, was going to be difficult. The French were in strongly defended positions, while the Australians were on open ground without a lot of cover. Not only that, but after 11pm on 9 June, the moon was lighting up the area. All the Australians had were light tanks, which could not advance against the French anti-tank guns. The French even had stone markers set up to help French aim their guns, as they were a known position. General Lavarack became involved and took control of the artillery. A key French position in the defense was Fort Merdjayoun. General Lavarack had seen how a strong artillery barrage had helped take Fort Khiam, and he hoped that the same could be done for Fort Merdjayoun. The General wanted time for preparation, so he set the attack for 11 June. The artillery commander, Berryman, had suggested that they send a light tank and carriers forward to draw French fire. The Australian artillery was ready to fire in support as they drew French fire. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

Sergeant Davis and his partrol eventually return on 8 June 1941

By about 5am on 8 June 1941, Sergeant Davis decided to climb a nearby hill that would command the bridge over the Litani from the west side. He had his patrol and four French prisoners. They had taken five rifles and a machine gun. Davis hoped to hold the hill until his battalion got closer and then he would attack. This was early in the Australian attack on Syria and there was increasing firing and movements. The French civilians were moving north from the attack. There were French troops moving south to the battle. The French moved some men to the east of the river to deter Davis and his men. Gradually, more troops arrived and moved onto the overlooking heights near the bridge. The French blew the small bridge at 3pm and the main bridge at 4pm. Davis and his men were too few to interfere. An Australian soldier carrying an anti-tank rifle appeared. He had been at Khirbe the previous night and was lost, trying to find his unit. He had been hit on his head and was disoriented. They sent him downstream to find a place to cross the river. As it got dark, Davis and his men moved to a hill. In the morning, they crossed the river and headed south. After more adventures, including finding the corporal who had been hit on the head, they reached their battalion headquarters. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

Sergeant Davis and his patrol

The commander of the Australian 2/31st Battalion first heard the story about Sergeant Davis and his patrol on the morning of 9 June 1941. Davis and his men only returned later on 9 June. Sergeant Davis had been sent out in the night of 7 June to reach the bridge over the Litani river and keep the bridge from being demolished. Davis moved out from Metulla. There was Davis and eight men, two of whom were Palestinian guides. The moved through the hills and found a phone line and cut it. A Palestinian guide accidentally shot himself in the hip, but he told that he wanted to keep moving forward. There was a large bridge and a smaller bridge over the river. They reached the smaller bridge by 4:30am. They heard a dog bark and then saw a French sentry walk out to the road. The Australians first thought to take the sentry by force without shooting, but then the sentry loaded his rifle and pointed it at them. He fired at them and missed and was answered by the Australians and was wounded. Davis and his men rushed the guard house and took two soldiers in their pajamas. They found the wire to the demolition charges and cut it. After doing that, they tossed the charges and the wire into the river below. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

Problems in the east of Syria from 8 June 1941

The 21st Brigade was winning their battle along the coast road on 10 June 1941, but to the east, the 25th Brigade was blocked. Interestingly enough, British horsed cavalry was at Kafr Sir and connected with the Australians at Qasmiye. In the east, at Merdjayoun, the 25th Brigade was being reinforced to try and take the place. General Lavarack was concerned and offered more troops to Brigadier Cox. On 9 June, after a heavy barrage, a company had entered Fort Khiam, after it had been abandoned. The 2/31st Battalion was stopped by French artillery fire. The shelling set fire to haystacks and forced the battalion to pull back. The artillery fire was coming from Khirbe and guns sited to the west. Early on 9 June, Sergeant Davis and his patrol were to try and save the bridge over the Litani near Merdjayoun. They succeeded in taking the bridge and removing the detonators. A large French force came up and by the afternoon, they had destroyed the small bridge and then the large bridge. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

North along the coast from the Litani on 10 June 1941

On 10 June 1941, one troop of carriers from the 6th Australian Cavalry had turned towards Imsar. They ran into some fifty French troops (not North African). The cavalrymen fired several machine gun bursts at them and some surrendered while others ran. They went after the rest of the group from Kafr Badda, but could not follow them into the rocky hills. The carriers from the cavalry then drove on to Imsar. They were informed by the village headman that the French had left the previous night. Despite what the cavalry had seen, east of the coast road, the two Australian battalions were fighting and taking casualties. At El Ouasta, there were troops with 13 machine guns that were enfilading the 2/16th Battalion. To counter them, ships offshore fired on them, along with field artillery, and caused the French to have to retreat. By late on 10 June, the Australians were able to move north to a line "southwest of Adloun." This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

10 June 1941 with the 2/27th Battalion in Syria

The plan for 10 June 1941 was for the 2/27th Battalion to move north along the road. Carriers from the 6th Cavalry would scout ahead. The 2/16th Battalion would move through the hills and clear opposition. Farther from the coast, the Cheshire reached Kafr Sir on 10 June after a short fight. The carriers moved north across the bridge at about 6am. A troop was ordered to move towards Imsar while most moved north along the main road. The carriers on the main road chased off some French Spahis with pack mules. They were then attacked by French armoured cars. The anti-tank rifles on the carriers were able to repel the armoured cars. They reached the vicinity of Adloun by 10am. They were fired on by some light French guns. They saw two tanks and then found that there were four abandoned French tanks. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The night of 9 to 10 June 1941 at the Litani

The large artillery barrage, which started at 9:30pm on 9 June 1941, lasted a half an hour. As many as 960 rounds were fired, and it was largely wasted, due to the earlier successes. After the firing ceased, Captain Horsely and his men moved back into the ground that they had captured. They were on the right, while a company from the 2/27th Battalion was on the left. The men from the 2/27th crossed the river in turns, in the one folding boat that was available. Two platoons had a stiff fight against machine guns and mortars. They won the fight and took "a company of Algerians". In the process, 20 commandos were set free. Beyond the river, there were caves dug into the cliff wall. They discovered "large quantities of food, weapons and ammunition". During the night, the 2/6h Field Company put a bridge over the river, east of the stone bridge that had been blown. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

On the north bank o of the Litani on the evening of 9 June 1941

In the evening of 9 June 1941, Brigadier Stevens, of the 21st Brigade, ordered an operation to bridge the Litani river with folding boats. He did not have good communications with the troops on the north bank, and did not realized just how successful they had been. There were men from the 2/16th Battalion on the north bank. Captain Horley had pushed to within 500 yards of a building they called "the barracks". Captain Horley had personally led an attack the overcame a French machine gun emplacement. In the process of the successful attack to the north, they had taken some 70 French prisoners. The problem was that they had lost the ability to communicate with the south bank. They knew that there was a planned barrage. They had withdrawn to a safer position, but then they started receiving fire from British ships, so they had to withdraw further back. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

Comments on the commando operation in Syria on 9 June 1941

The commando operation in support of the Australians on 9 June 1941 went very badly. The Australian Official History commented that while the commandos had bad luck, the operation was not well planned. There was no coordination between the Australian commander, Brigadier Stevens, and Colonel Pedder prior to the operation. They had a brief meeting in Nazareth, and that was all. The commando group had gone ashore about one-and-a-half miles north of the Litani River. They landed in a ill-chosen position that was well-defended. The result was Colonel Pedder and several more officers were killed. One group of commandos was captured by the French. Another group of commandos took some prisoners and then moved south to find the Australians. Another group that landed farther north was captured on 10 June at Alteniye. The commandos immediately to the north of the Australians had been badly shot up and had lost many men on the beach to artillery and machine gun fire. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

With the Commandos at the Litani on 9 June 1941

Lt-Col Keyes and his commandos had succeeded in advancing to the Litani river. This was on 9 June 1941. Some Australians from the 2/16th Battalion were ordered to carry boats to the commandos. They were in a poor location and were taking heavy fire. They lost as many as a quarter of the commandos and the Australians. They were only able to transport one boat to the river. Two loads of commandos and Australians were able to cross the river. By noon, they had taken a French defensive position that had protected the river and captured about 35 men. In a few hours, the commandos and one platoon of Australians were across the river. Captain Longworth, of the 2/4th Field Regiment eventually was able to contact his unit. He found out that an attack was planned for 9:30pm. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

Some success at the Litani river on 9 June 1941

After elements of the 2/16th Australian Battalion had crossed the Litani river on 9 June 1941, the company commander asked for artillery support. Communications were easier, as a signalman had put telephone lines across the river. The 2/4th Field Regiment had an observation post well-placed for observing the situation. After some concerted fire on the enemy positions, the platoons on the north side of the river were able to attack. They had six 25 pounders firing in support. The men had to advance over a plowed field with no cover. They had to cut wire, but eventually overran positions held by Algerian troops. For their efforts, they killed 30 troops, captured 38, and took 11 machine guns. The next step had Australians going left on the ridge. With artillery support again, they captured 12 men, a 75mm field gun, and two machine guns. One prisoner boasted that a "fresh company" of Algerians was "on the next ridge". So, at about 4pm, the Australians prepared to be attacked. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

Across the Litani river on 9 June 1941

At the Litani river, the Australians decided to tie a line to the boat and use that to haul it across the river. That actually worked. The first boatload made it to the north side and fanned out. The French were firing mortar bombs at the men on the south bank and caused casualties. There was bamboo along the river and the men pushed through the bamboo to the orchard beyond. They eventually got fifty men across and held about 400 yards. The next step was to put seventy men from Horley's company across. These men were all from MacDonald's 2/16th Battalion. To support their troops on the ground, the Vichy French destroyers Guépard and Valmy closed in and fired on the Australians. They were answered by the 2/4th Field Regiment and the destroyers sought cover with smoke and withdrew. Some British destroyers found the French destroyers off Sidon in the afternoon and exchanged fire. The British destroyer Janus was damaged while the faster French destroyers escaped. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The Litani bridge and commandos on 8 and 9 June 1941

The original plan for 8 June 1941 was for a commando unit to land behind the bridge over the Litani river. They hoped to keep the bridge from being demolished. There was an immediate problem with this plan. The commando unit had set sail from Port Said on the amphibious transport Glengyle. The Glengyle carried landing craft on davits like boats. The Glengyle had arrived off the beach early on 8 June, but the captain could see that there was a heavy surf and he was concerned that the landing craft would not be able to make the beach without capsizing. The new plan was for the commandos to try again on 9 June. If the Australian were able to take the bridge prior to that, they would fire very lights to warn the commandos. If the commandos were not able to get ashore on 9 June, the 2/16th Battalion would launch an attack towards the bridge. The commandos got ashore, but in the wrong spot. They must have triggered the bridge being blown. Right before the 2/16th Battalion would attack, they were notified that the bridge had already been blown. The alternate plan was to use boats to cross the river. Given the defense of the river and the swift current, the new plan was to carry a rope across and use it to pull the boats across the river. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

Politics behind the invasion of Syria and Lebanon on 8 June 1941

Some in the British and Free French camp hoped to win in Syria and Lebanon through the use of politics rather than force. On 8 June 1941, the British ambassador to Egypt, along with General Catroux of the Free French, broadcast radio messages to the people of Lebanon and Syria. They offered them freedom from the French in exchange for their cooperation against the Vichy and German forces. They promised a treaty negotiation to formalize that promise. The situation in Syria and Lebanon was such that the Vichy forces outnumbered the Australian, Indian, and Free French forces. The Vichy French had their 18 battalions of good quality against nine British, Australian, and Indian battalions. There were also six Free French battalions, but the Australian Official History thought that they were "of doubtful quality". Apparently Churchill had expected that this campaign could be won by political moves, which proved to be mistaken. Much of 1941 was filled with miscalculations by the British prime minister and he lurched from disaster to disaster. One of the few bright spots of 1941 was the sinking of the Bismarck, after the Bismarck had sunk the Hood and damaged the Prince of Wales. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The French forces on 8 June 1941

The Australian Official History lists the French forces defending Syria and Lebanon on 8 June 1941. There were elements of seven infantry regiments:

6th Foreign Legion
1st Moroccan
16th Tunisian
17th Senegalese
22nd Algerian
24th Colonial
29th Algerian

There were 18 battalions from the seven regiments. Four of these were French Foreign Legion. The tank contingent were 45 Renault R-35 tanks from each of two regiments of the Chasseurs d'Afrique (90 tanks total). There were also about 150 locally-converted armoured cars with machine guns and some with 37mm guns. As for artillery, there were 30 batteries. There were also some Levantine troops that the Official History regarded as being unreliable. On 8 June 1941, on the coast, were some Algerian Spahis and other troops. More Algerians were located at Khirbe and Khiam. Some Senegalese, along with tanks and armoured cars, were located at Banias and to the east. One battalion had been at Sheikh Meskine and another at Kuneitra. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The Indian Brigade in Syria by 9 June 1941

After taking the town of Deraa by 9:30am, the 4/6th Rajputana Rifles proceeded to Sheikh Meskine, arriving there late in the afternoon. They had been attacked on the way by both armoured cars and by aircraft. They made a perfunctory attack on the town, but were repulsed. They did manage to take some high ground to the west that overlooked the town by late afternoon. They found that the French had left in the night, as was becoming common. They had taken Sheikh Meskine and Ezraa without having to fight after the French withdrawal. That allowed the Free French to pass through at 10am on their way to Damascus. The 5th Indian Brigade had captured some 30 officers and 300 men. They were left to sit and hold the area that they had taken. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The other three columns of the 5th Indian Brigade on 8 June 1941

The second column of the 5th Indian Brigade was a platoon from the Rajputana Rifiles. There was a famous railroad bridge at Chehab that T. E. Lawerence had tried to destroy in 1918. That was during Allenby's offensive. The bridge, or viaduct, still survived in 1941. The objective of the second column was to take the railroad viaduct and keep it from being destroyed. The platoon commander and one of his men crawled their way forward to the sentry post and shot the occupants. The other men in the platoon attacked the guard post that was on the bridge. Although explosive charges had been set, they were not exploded. The bridge was saved. At the same time, a company of Fusiliers took Fiq without much trouble. The other two columns of the 5th Indian Brigade, one led by the brigade commander, Brigadier Lloyd and the other by a Colonel, a battalion commander, had reached Deraa at 6am. They had surrounded the place and asked the defenders to surrender. They refused. Therefore, the artillery commenced firing at 7:30am. Two Indian battalions attacked and had taken the place by 8:30am. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The 5th Indian Brigade on 8 June 1941

The 5th Indian Brigade was on the extreme right (eastern) end of the attack into Syria. Like the other groups, the 5th Indian Brigade was divided into columns, rather than being concentrated. There were four columns. On the left were the 1/Royal Fusiliers, along with artillery and :"other troops". They were headed towards Kuneitra, which they approached by 5am on 8 June 1941. At Kafr Naffakh, the infantry dismounted and moved forward on foot. Two miles west of Kuneitra, the most forward troops took fire from a hill southwest of the town. They sent a French officer and a British officer forward. They said that they thought that some of the younger officers would like to join the Free French, but the commander wanted to fight. They eventually found that the defenders were a Senegalese battalion and six armoured cars. A French officer came out and informed the attackers that they would start firing at noon, which is what happened. The infantry attacked and took Tel Abou Nida. The next morning, on 9 June, the attackers found that the French had withdrawn during the night. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The 2/31st Battalion on the attack on 8 June 1941 in Syria

The 2/31st Australian Battalion was the leftmost battalion of the 25th Australian Brigade. They were to move forward with three of their companies on 8 June 1941 in Syria. Two companies would move past Khirbe. The third company would move up to Kafr Tibnite. They would cross the Litani bridge. The French defenders were in a strong position on heights and with a Crusader fort. The start time was 2am on 8 June. They had sent a Free French officer forward under a white flag to ask the defenders not to resist. They refused and started firing. The attackers were pinned down by fire by 4:30am. The battalion was stopped and located in the open where they were very vulnerable. There was a change of plans after these developments. The battalion commander decided that artillery and tanks would be needed. Three light tanks of the 6th Australian Cavalry Regiment came forward and attacked three machine gun nests, which stopped firing. Two tanks were knocked out and the third withdrew with the survivors. The attack had been stopped and no progress had been made by dark. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

Attacking Fort Khiam on 8 JUne 1941

As the 2/33rd Battalion moved north, they approached the village of Khiam. Guarding the village was a classic-looking fort. One company, that of Captain Ferguson, was stopped by fire from Khiam and Bmeriq. The battalion commander, Lt-Colonel Monaghan, ordered Captain Cotton, another company commander, to take the fort at Khiam. The French waited while the Australians moved forward and then started firing when they were about 300 yards away. The Australians were able to move forward to within fifty yards of the fort. A small group actually reached the wall of the fort. They climbed the fort's wall and jumped down.. The leader fired his sub-machine gun. A French machine gun on the other side of the fort returned fire and caused the men to have to go under cover. They sought cover in the fort's bastion, where some French men joined them, saying that they wanted to join De Gaulle's force. With some help from the men outside, the men inside made a hole in the wall. Captain Cotton wanted to attack through the hole in the fort, but the fort was so strongly defended, that he decided to wait for the next morning to attack again. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The 2/33rd Australian Battalion early on 8 June 1941 in Syria

Lt-Colonel Monaghan's battalion, the 2/33rd, ended up split into companies that had their individual objectives at the start of the invasion of Syria and Lebanon on 8 June 1941. Since we are talking about locations such as Kuneitra, we must be talking about Syria. Captain Bennett's company was sent off through the mountains to occupy Ferdisse. They were to cut the road just to the west. This was a move that did not immediately affect the current operations. Another company, that of Major Wright, was to take border posts and blow up the bridge to keep the French from being able to attack the flank of the column. They took Banias and blew the bridge by early afternoon on 8 June. Captain Cotton's company, further to the left, took more frontier posts. They moved off from Abd el Kamh at the start time of 2am. They reached their first French post by 3am. They lost one Australian in the fight, and the surviving 25 defenders surrendered. We should not be surprised that they were African, since this was a French colony. The defenders were largely Senegalese. One platoon from this company was to take a bridge, the Jisr Abou Zeble. This bridge was for the road from Naias to Merdjayoun. The bridge crossed the Hasbani. They took the bridge at about 4am. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The 25th Australian Brigade on the first day, 8 June 1941

The 25th Australian Brigade, commanded by Brigadier Cox, moved forward in two groups. They were to advance to Rayak and capture the place with the airfield. The right column was based on the 2/33rd Battalion. The column was actually mixed with cavalry and artillery as the main additions. Their initial objective was to cross the road from Kuneitra and block it. The left column, mainly consisting of the 1/31st Battalion. They were also a mixture of cavalry and artillery, with a little more. They were to advance to a line "from Merdjayoun to Nabatiye et Tahta". They were to hold that line against any attackers. There was apparently also British horsed cavalry in the strength of a squadron to their left. These were from the Cheshire Yeomanry. They were going to try and contact the 21st Australian Brigade at Habbouch. The 25th Brigade moved forward at 2am. These men wore steel helmets and either shorts or trousers. The 25th Brigade also had frontier posts to capture as part of the advance. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

Australians later in the day on 8 June 1941

When they encountered the 80 foot hold from a demolition, the leading troops from the Australian 2/16th Battalion manhandled their trucks over the hole. By 5pm 0n 8 June 1941, the troops had met the 2/14th Battalion on the coast road. One company from the 2/14th Battalion reached Tyre, where the civilians cheered their arrival. The 21st Brigade commander, Brigadier Stevens, reached the crossroads at Tyre before the 2/16th Battalion arrived. Briigadier Stevens had walked across the demolition at Iskanaroun. Cavalrynmen from the Cheshire were crossing the countryside "between Tibnine and Kafr Sir." By the end of 8 June, the Australians were in Tyre and had reached the French line at the Litani, where it was obvious that they intended to fight. Anyone who had thought that the Vichy French in Syria and Lebanon would collapse without much of a fight were obviously mistaken. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.