Discussions about augmenting the 7th Australian Division for the Syrian occupation in 1941

General Lavarack commanded the 7th Australian Division in May 1941. His division had been the garrison for Mersa Matruh prior to their inclusion for the Syrian occupation. The division only had two infantry brigades at this time, the 21st and the 25th. The division did have all three of its artillery regiments and had the 6th Australian Division's cavalry regiment, as the 7th Division cavalry regiment had been sent to Cyprus. General Blamey was in Cairo and still had some control over Australian forces. Most of the surviving 6th Australian Division battalions were still in Crete in May. Two battalions were in Palestine, though, so those were allocated to the 7th Division. The battalions were the 2/3rd abd 2/5th. On May 22, General Wilson informed General Lavarack that main objective of the force along the coast road would be Beirut. The British were going to use an elaborate deception scheme to try and hide their operations. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The force to occupy Syria in 1941

The primary unit that would attack and occupy Syria was the 7th Australian Division. Up until June 1941, the division had not seen combat. They had formed in April and May 1940 and then was primarily training. Since April 1941, the division had been at Mersa Matruh. They had been holding the fortress and improving the defences while under fairly constant air attack. The British liked to use brigades and battalions as independent units, so the 7th Australian Division had units removed and added over time. In May and June, the division only had two brigades, the 21st and the 25th. The 7th Australian Divisional Cavalry regiment was in Cyprus, so the 7th Division was given the 6th Australian Divisional Cavalry Regiment, who were veterans. The 6th Australian Division had been a victim of the policy of scattering units that continued into 1942. Only when Bernard Law Montgomery arrived on the scene was there a push to stop the practice. The other units that were to attack Syria were the 5th Indian Brigade, which had been involved in the campaign in East Africa, the Free French, along with some smaller units. The air force included fighters, bombers, and an Army Cooperation Squadron. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

What the Attackers Faced in Syria in 1941

General Wavell would have not wanted to attack Syria so soon after Greece and Crete. His forces were in disarray and Syria might have been a tough region to take. Syrla was a fairly large area, stretching for some 300 miles both north and south and east and west. The French forces in Syrla and Lebanon were larger and were better equipped than any force that Wavell could field. The would-be occupiers would have to deal with mountains and deserts. The French General Headquarters was located in Beirut, Lebanon. A railroad ran from Beirut through to Damascus, Syria. The British would have to decide if they would go north along the coast, of if they would try the mountain roads, or if they would cut across the desert.

The defenders had six regiments, including a Foreign Legion unit. There was another mixed regiment of colonial and metropolitan troops. There were also four regiments of African native troops. Of the cavalry, there were 9,000 men, some of which were mechanized and some where on horseback. As for artillery, they had 90 field and medium guns. There were about 10,000 troops from Syria and Lebanon, but they were thought to be unreliable. General Dentz was the overall commander, with a deputy commander. There were also three regional commanders at Damascus, Beirut, and Aleppo. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

Indecisive German Policy in the Middle East Squandered Some Opportunities

As we mentioned the initial German policy towards French North Africa was to disarm the colonial armies. Once they realized that would make more difficult resisting British occupation, they stopped the process. Later, when the Iraqi Arab Nationalist had asked Germany for help in revolting against the British occupation, they had ignored him. Only by January 1941 did they decided to help. The initial request was for weapons and gold. Even now, an Arab uprising will want to have both those things. Gold is important for buying participation. Once the revolt in Iraq had started independently, the Germans were still without any plan to be involved. The Germans finally sent a few plans to Iraq, but the commander of that flight was shot down by Iraqi anti-aircraft fire over Baghdad because they were not expected. The French finally sent a train with weapons to Iraq, but the revolt was already failing by then. The French in Syria did not really want to help, but had to make a token gesture for German consumption. The French in Syria were under Italian supervision under the Armistice, which the French disliked immensely. The French in Syria also greatly disliked the Germans who had conquered their country in 1940. They also disliked the British, who had been their competitor for influence and colonies in the Levant. The British were also thought to have failed the French in 1940. The Free French were considered to be disloyal to France by cooperating with the British. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

German action with respect to Syria in early June 1941

The Germans decided to pull out of Syria any overt presence. Disguised German intelligence officers would be the only Germans to stay in Syria. General Keitel had passed this information on to the Italians on 2 June 1941. The German plan was to keep from giving the British any excuse to attack Syria and to foment discontent between the Vichy French and the British. The Vichy French government had ordered General Dentz to fight any British attempt to occupy Syria. At his trial after the war, General Dentz argued that he had to resist the British invasion to keep from giving the Germans any reason to move into the French colonies and the continental Vichy France. The case was that the British pretext for invading Syria was to keep Syria out of German hands, but by the time of the invasion, German policy was to withdraw from Syria and not offer any reason for the British to invade. A mistaken German policy after the Armistice in 1940 had been to disarm the French colonial armies. They later regretted that plan as they could see that the only way to keep the British out was if the French colonial forces were strong enough to resist invasion. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

General Dentz was not on board with helping the Germans in May and June 1941

The key person involved with the Germans in May and June 1941 was none other than Admiral Darlan. General Dentz, the commander in Syria, had assured the British in April that he had the airfields guarded and they would not let the Germans use them. However, on 6 May, Admiral Darlan had ordered that the Germans should be allowed to use the airfields. During the fighting in Iraq, as many as 120 German aircraft passed through Syria, going to Iraq and returning from there. General Dentz had been doing the best he could to thwart the aid to the rebels in Iraq. He had sent a small number of artillery pieces without sights and had send old machine guns. By the end of May, the failure of the rebellion in Iraq was obvious. By 6 June, the Germans were gone from Syria. The Americans were informed of this fact. It seems strange to have the Americans involved, but they were. The Germans were also concerned that the British would have a pretext for occupying Syria, and ordered the aircraft and men to be withdrawn. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

More about the Darlan Agreement about Syria in May 1941

Admiral Darlan, the Vichy Foreign Minister, had signed an agreement that would give aid to Germany and the efforts in Iraq to create trouble for the British. One particularly inflammatory move was to agree to sell three quarters of the military equipment in Syria at the armistice. The sale would be to Iraq to equip the rebel forces that were in opposition to British rule. We already mentioned that German and Italian aircraft would be able to use Syrian airfields and be refueled. The German aircraft would be allowed to operate out of the airfield at Aleppo and would be permitted to use Syrian ports and railroad facilities. France would be allowed to send artillery to Syria along with heavy anti-aircraft batteries. They would also be permitted to send more troops to Syria. Marshal Petain was informed that the Darlan agreement would cause trouble with America and the British. In early June, Marshal Petain ordered a reappraisal of Vichy relations with Germany. France, of course, did not know about the pending German invasion of Russia which would have a great impact on the military situation in North Africa. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The Australian War Memorial on the Start of the Syrian Campaign

There is some interesting coverage of the start of the Syrian campaign on the Australian War Memorial web site. The campaign started on 7 June 1941 and apparently ended on 11 July. The Australians involved were primarily from the 7th Australian Division. The goal of the attack was to occupy Syria, which was under the control of the Vichy French government. There was increasing concern that the French were allowing the Germans to use Syrian territory, particularly to support the uprising in Iraq. The campaign planned to occupy not only Syria but also Lebanon. What was already at work, however, was that the Germans were concentrated on the attack on Russia, from 22 June, and did not want to be tied up in the Eastern Mediterranean area. Oddly enough, the British commander was General Wilson, who we know from his handling of the Greek campaign (or mishandling). Two Australian brigades were involved. One was the 21st Brigade, located in Palestine, and the other was the 25th Brigade, which had as its objective, and airfield at Rayak. An British Indian unit, the 5th Indian Brigade along with the Free French were to head for Damascus. One of the air units involved was from the RAAF. This is based on the account on the Australian War Memorial web site.

German interest in Syria

The situation in Syria was that the Germans were more concerned about keeping Syria from being occupied by the British than actually moving in forces from Germany. After the armistice in 1940, Italy was given the responsibility for monitoring French colonial forces. They would determine the size and encourage the reduction in strength. One problem with that was that the French North African and Middle East territories were more vulnerable to British attack. By late 1940, the French army in Syria was reduced to about 28,000 men. Hitler got involved with the policy making and recognized that the best way to keep the Free French and British out of Syria would be for the Vichy French to increase their forces. One possibility would have been to bring in some ten thousand Moroccan troops. The immediate problem with that was being able to transport them to Syria. Admiral Darlan, who was the French Foreign Minister in May and June 1941, met with German officials in Paris. There, Admiral Darlan agreed to make arms available to the Iraqi rebels and to allow German and Italian aircraft passage through Syria to Iraq. The Germans made promises to the Vichy government that is they defended the colonies against the Free French and British, they would able to keep them after the war, assuming that the Axis governments won the war. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

At least General Blamey kept the Australian Government informed

During the first half of 1941, General Wavell had an abysmal record in his relations with the Australian Government. Besides lying to the senior Australian Officers, he also lied to the Australian Prime Minister about the Greek campaign. He met with them separately and then told them, wrongly, tha the other had agreed with the plan for going into Greece. Of course, Wavell was taking being a "good soldier" too far, because he knew that Greece was a pet project for Churchill and his foreign secretary. Now, in the run up to occupying Syria and probably fighting the Vichy French forces, he did not bother to inform the Australian Government. The only reason that the Australian Government knew anything was because of communications from General Blamey, the senior Australian Officer at Wavell's headquarters. The Australian Government had received a message from General Blamey on 30 May 1941, prior to the end of the battle on Crete. Churchill did communicate with the Austrlian Prime Minister on 31 May about Syria. The Austrlian Official History notes that the Australian Government had not been informed about the plans until right before the attack. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

General Wavell's plans for Syria

By 22 May 1941, while the forces in Crete were still resisting, General Wavell was making plans for an operation into Syria. He expected to use two brigades from the 7th Australian Division, the Free French forces, and a portion of the 1st Cavalry Division. They would comprise about a division-and-a-half. There were almost no armoured forces involved, even though they would be desirable. Three days later, General Wavell traveled to Basra to meet with General Auchinleck, who was the commander in India. General Wavell thought that his forces could move on Syria by 7 June 1941. General de Gaulle and General Spears arrived in Jerusalem on 29 May. It seems that the British had decided to use the Australians without formally asking permission from the Australian government. General Blamey had given the government notice about what was planned. It was only late on 7 June that Mr. Menzies, the Australian Prime Minister received the word that the attack on Syria would start the next morning. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

Bad advice for the British about Syria and Lebanon

The British policy stance that would take direct action against the Vichy government whenever the opportunity presented itself obviously made any sort of compromise or negotiations impossible. The Middle Eastern leaders were very anti-French, as they resented France's continued occupation of countries on the Mediterranean Coast, such as Algeria, Tunisia, Lebanon, and Syria. Since the British government lacked a direct contacts in Syria and Lebanon, they had to rely on Middle Eastern sources and the people associated with Charles de Gaulle. The latter, in particular, always wanted to paint the French forces in Syria and Lebanon in the worst light, and would assert that they would surrender at the first sign of force. General Wavell's intelligence staff had a more cautious view. They had good intelligence of the size of the French military, naval, and air forces in Syria and Lebanon. The politicians insisted that Wavell's forces could walk into Syria unopposed. Churchill wanted Wavell to use "General Catroux" and his military force to take Syria. Wavell had a more realistic view and rejected the use of Free French forces of doubtful size and strength to take Syria. Wavell vowed to resign rather than rely on the Free French. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The campaign in Syria and Lebanon in June and July 1941

I was interested to read that for political reasons, the news about the fighting in Syria and Lebanon was suppressed in the Allied news media. There was a substantial Australian participation, hence the inclusion in the Australian Official History. The stage was set for this campaign when Admiral Darlan signed an accord with the Germans that gave them access to Syria. The Vichy Minister of War had sent orders to General Dentz to allow German and Italian aircraft to refuel in Syria. The Germans also wanted to be able to use rail lines in Syria to supply the Iraqi rebels with arms and supplies. One of the Vichy aircraft shot down during British air operations included a Martin 167F, which was used by the British as the Martin Maryland. The Vichy aircraft was shot down over Palestine, so they were apparently actively conducting air operations against the British. The initial French air strength consisted of 90 aircraft, but that was increased to 289 aircraft by reinforcements. There were also two French destroyers and three submarines available to participate in the upcoming battles. This is based on information from the Wikipedia page about the Syria-Lebanon Campaign.

Britain, United States, and the Vichy government in 1941

The United States policy towards Vichy France in early 1941 was to "humor them". The British disagreed with the concept, but allowed the United States to send wheat shipments to Marseilles. The British sources of information about Syria and North Africa tended to be anti-French and therefore painted a more negative picture of the situation in Syria than actually existed. The de Gaulle people were deeply involved with wishful thinking, crediting themselves with more capability and support than actually existed. Charles de Gaulle was a favorite of Churchill, so Churchill was somewhat caught up in the wishful thinking as well. Leaders in the Middle East tended to side with the British in wanting to see action taken against the Vichy French in the region. General Wavell had his own estimates of French strength that included some 28,000, although mostly African and Arab troops, and some 25,000 Syrian and Lebanese under their control. They also put the German presence at about 300 men. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The political situation with respect to the Vichy government and Syria

One interesting aspect of the Syrian situation in early 1941 was that the Syrian people were ashamed to be governed by a defeated country: France that had surrendered to Germany. Another aspect is that elements of French society admired the authoritarian German government and wanted to establish something similar for France. Elements of the upper class in France and in the army which liked the idea of setting up a "totalitarian" government in France. Along with that inclination was that there still existed a strong French nationalism and a desire to resist further encroachment on French national honor by both Germany and Great Britain. As we have noted, the Vichy government hated the British government under Churchill. Immediately after the fall of France, Churchill had shown his true colors by the attack on the French naval base at Mers el Kebir and the destruction and damage to the ships located there. This is baaed on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

French rule in Syria and Lebanon

The French policy in regards to occupied Middle Eastern countries was to try and build an educated populace who could eventually rule themselves. The British were in a rush to rid themselves of the occupied countries, but the French wanted to move slowly. From the perspective of the people involved, the process was too slow. They ruled some 3.3 million people in Syria and Lebanon. There was a mix of Christian, Muslim, and Jewish people. There were also smaller groups such as the Druse. At the Armistice in 1940, the British announced that they would not allow the Germans or Italians to occupy Syria. Now, we see in 1941, that the Germans were starting to stage aircraft into Syria, so we could expect the British to react. The Vichy government greatly disliked the British, and one supposes, Winston Churchill. The stage was set for a confrontation that was inevitable. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

France had a long relationship with Middle Eastern people

The Australian Official History notes that France had long been active commercially in the Middle East. France became seen by people in the Middle East as friends and trading partners. As the Ottoman Empire continued to decline, France moved in to fill the void left. Many Middle Eastern people learned French as a second language. People in the Levant and Egypt regarded France as the center of European culture. The French had many commercial and industrial relationships and established schools and missions. By the 19th Century, the British had moved into competition, but the French still had an advantage. After the end of the Great War and the peace with the new, post-Ottoman Turkey, the French were disappointed that they had lost power and prestige. France still occupied North African and Middle Eastern countries, such as Lebanon and Syria. France greatly valued their occupation of Syria and was ready to defend their ownership against attackers, even the British. This is based on the account in Vol. II of the Australian Official History.

Syria: just when there seemed to be nothing left to use

By May 1941, there was an urgent need to rebuild divisions, repair warships, and bring in fresh air units and aircraft. Instead, there was a new military commitment to cover. At this time, the VIchy commander in Syria was General Henri Dentz. He had some 28,000 troops under his command. At this time, General de Gaulle was lobbying to get permission to attack Syria with his meager Free French force. So, when the CIGS, General Dill, warned of a possible German airborne attack on Syria, that was enough to push General Wavell into action. Already, by early May, General Dentz had been ordered by his government to allow German and Italian aircraft to overfly Syria and to shoot at British aircraft. By 12 May, there was news of German aircraft landing in Damascus. Air Marshall Tedder wsa the new British RAF commander in the Middle East. He was authorized to take action in response. British aircraft bombed the airfield at Damascus and shortly afterwards, two more. There was now more readiness to let General de Gaulle attack Syria with his small force of six battalions. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The focus shifts to Syria after the battle for Crete

The effect of the failed adventure in Greece and then the decision to defend Crete was to reduce the division-sized formations in the middle east from ten to five. The divisions available in March 1941 were the 2nd Armoured Division, 1st Cavalry Division, the British 6th Division, the 6th, 7th, and 9th Australian Divisions, the 4th and 5th Indian Divisions, the New Zealand Division, and the 1st South African Division. Many of the divisions had been split into their components to allow them to be spread across the many calls for the use of force. Then in North Africa, the 9th Australian Division had been left to hold Tobruk in the face of Rommel's attack. They were isolated and had to have been a source of concern to the Australian Government. The navy had also taken heavy losses, particularly in the battle of for Crete, although the cruise York had been torpedoed in Suda Bay before that battle had started. The air situation was also pretty desperate, with only about 200 aircraft left in the theater, including many obsolescent types. This is based on the account in Volume II of the Australian Official History.

Closing points about the Battle for Crete in 1931

The Australian General Blamey had sent the Australian government a cable where he expressed his concerns about the vulnerability of Cyprus, which included Australians in the garrison. As a consequence, Mr. Menzies, the Australian Prime Minister, responded with a message to the High Commissioner in London. He told him that either they should augment the garrison in Cyprus or withdraw, because there would be consequences in Australia over another disaster and withdrawal after Greece and Crete. Fortunately, concern over Cyprus was overshadowed by the German invasion of Russia and other events in North Africa. The Australian Official History suggests that the British were fortunate that the battle for Crete lasted such a short time, due to the naval losses incurred during the battle. Admiral Cunningham, the Mediterranean Fleet commander characterized the battle for Crete as "disastrous period in our naval history". This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

Cyprus in June 1941

Following the fall of Crete, the British commanders were concerned that Cyprus would be the next place attacked by the Germans. The Australian, General Blamey, sent his government a letter suggesting that the Germans might use 450 transport aircraft and land 7,000 to 8,000 troops in two days. There was no chance that any troops could be spared for Cyprus. At the time, Cyprus had the 7th Australian Cavalry Regiment (the cavalry regiment for the 7th Australian Infantry Division), 1/Sherwood Foresters, "C" Battalion of the commandos, "a battalion of Cypriots and a troop of field artillery." The British and Commonwealth did not realize that the losses incurred on Crete caused the Germans to never attempt another large-scale airborne attack. Soon, there was another distraction when the Germans attacked Russia on 22 June 1941. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

Lessons from Crete

The problem with British policy in early 1941 was that they were trying to operate with little or no prior planning or preparation. Once the decision to go into Greece had been made, they could have appointed a commander on Crete with authority to plan a defense and to accumulate supplies. Instead, General Freyberg, fresh from commanding the rearguard in Greece, landed on Crete on 29 April 1941. He was fatigued and had no staff. What staff he could gather was by taking men that were needed for the New Zealand Division. The situation was set up to be a problem where supplies would be exhausted, but there had been no accumulation prior to the landing of men from Greece. Worse yet, Crete had been a dumping ground for men who were non-combat and were not in organized units. All they did was to consume supplies. The Australian Official History suggests that warships could have been used, prior to the attack, to remove men and move them to Egypt, thus reducing the supply drain. Instead, nothing was done and the defense was fortunate to have done as well as they did. The only bright spot was that the Germans refrained from using airborne forces to take Cyprus which was defended by just one brigade. Things are put in perspective when you realize that in the Atlantic, from 23 to 27 May 1941 and had sunk the battle cruiser Hood had damaged the battleship Prince of Wales on 24 May. It was not that the commanders were without distractions. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The forces involved in the Battle for Crete in 1941

In the Battle for the island of Crete in 1941, the British and Commonwealth lost some 15,900 men. Of these, about 4,000 were killed or wounded. The Germans said that they took 5,255 Greek prisoners in the battle. There were about 14,000 Italians held prisoner on Crete and they were freed with the Germans won the battle. The German Fourth Air Fleet (Luftflotte 4) was involved in the battle. They lost 3,986 either killed or missing. Of these, 312 were aircrew. They also lost 2,594 wounded in the fight. During the battle, they lost 220 aircraft, of which many were Ju-52 transports. The 7th Air Division lost some 3,000 men killed, paratroops and glider-borne. They were elite troops, almost equivalent to modern special forces. Of the British, most of the losses were base troops, while the Australians took the greatest losses in combat troops. The Australians lost three infantry battalions and other fighting units. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

Crete: mistakes were made at a high level

The author of the Australian Official history blames the British high command for not taking effective action to play for defending Crete. They could only think of Crete as a base to strike at the Dodecanese, and to ignore what would needed to be done to defend the island. The recommendation was that policies be defined and a commander be appointed to carry out those policies. The expectation was that Crete would only be attacked if the Germans had air superiority. If they did, that would mean that sea traffic to Crete would be jeopardized. That would mean that the island would need to have supplies stockpiled before any attack. Apparently, a committee was appointed after the battle to study the mistakes. The main criticism was that for about six months, when steps could have been taken, nothing was done. Was not the theater commander, General Wavell, largely the responsible officer who did not take the necessary steps to defend the island. All during this period, Wavell seems to have been operating in the mode to only do what Churchill wanted, and did not do very well at that, and little else. This is baed on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

Crete was the latest of a series of mishaps that befell the British in 1941

To put the battle for Crete into context, this was just one of a series of operations that were conceived on short notice, without adequate planning or resources. Winston Churchill became Prime Minister when Neville Chsmberlain resigned in May 1940, when his policies had led to war with Germany and then to the fall of France. The army was extracted from the continent at Dunkirk, an epic episode. Almost immediately, Britain was attacked by heavy air attacks that were eventually defeated, with the air force being an important role. As early as late 1940, Churchill thought that they ought to be involved in the defense of Greece. The successful campaign in Egypt into Libya was halted and a portion of the force was sent to Greece. Both of those moves had great consequences. The Germans were allowed to send a mechanized force to Libya and Rommel proved superior to the generals that the British could field. General Wavell, the theater commander, had a role in all this, just as the Prime Minister had. Many of the moves were made on the spur of the moment, without adequate planning or supervision. Ultimately, after the defense in Greece collapsed, some of the force was withdrawn and some of the unfortunates were deposited on Crete. General Freyberg was thrown into the role of commander in Greece immediately after his withdrawal from Greece, where he had taken command of the rearguard. General Freyberg had little positive impact on the battle in Crete. The only successes were had by brigade and battalion commanders. The New Zealanders at Maleme failed in the defense. Suda Bay was ultimately lost. The defenders at Retimo did well, but were mostly surrendered when there seemed to be no escape for them. They were handicapped by not having secure communications. They were handicapped by having a commander who only recently had become a battalion commander and then he, Ian Campbell, was thrust into a brigade commander role. If they had been informed they might have withdrawn to the south. The only bright spot was the defense of Heraklion and then the successful embarkation of the force there. They had the luxury of having an experienced British brigade commander and a large force. The movement of men to the south beaches on Crete was without adequate supervision and men were lost who should have been able to have been saved. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

Losses in the Battle for Crete in 1941

When we look at the strength of the forces defending Crete on 20 May 1941, we immediately notice that the majority were British:

British:    17,000
New Zealand: 7,700
Australian:  6,500.

That totals to some 31,200 men. Of that total, about 16,500 were evacuated by ship. The total losses were about15,900 men, of which most were prisoners. The British lost mostly men from "base camp", the New Zealanders lost the most wounded: 1,455 men, and the Australians lost 3,102 men as prisoners. The Royal Marines lost 1,055 men as prisoners. The evacuation was attempted by the navy, and they paid a dear price in ships lost for the men that were evacuated. The defense of Crete was largely disorganized and everyone's favorite, General Freyberg never really had any positive influence on the defense. When we see the success achieved at Heraklion, we see what a better organized defense might have looked like. They held their ground and then were safely evacuated from the island. The defense at Retimo was in vain, as most of the men ended the battle as prisoners. Where the battle went poorly was at Maleme and Suda Bay. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The Greek caique

The references to the vessel in the Australian Official History call the small sailing vessel a caique. The actual Greekk word is soemthing like kaiki. The name is said to derive from the Turkish kayik. Historically, these small vessels were used for transportation and fishing in the Aegean and Ionian sea as well as the Bosphorus. They are said to be constructed from pine with a frame that is carvel planked, that is not overlapped. The size is typically small, perhaps 16 or 20 feet long, although there are pictures of somewhat larger vessels. The caique has pointed ends that are sharply angled. The bow is high and the greatest beam is far aft. Caiques seem to be generally two-masted with fore-and-aft sails and a bowsprit. I have seen pictures of caiques with a square stern, although the traditional caique seems to have a pointed stern. There is a Wikipedia article on the subject, although it is short on pictures.

More men escaped late in 1941

Even in Greece, there were still Australians who were looking for a way to North Africa or Turkey. In the Peloponese, near Neapolis, there were men, some even from Crete, who wanted to find transportation. One group decided to commandeer a fishing caique and sail to North Africa. They tried with one caique, but the captain was able to fool them into allowing him to escape. They tried again and succeeded. They sailed from Greece on 10 October and arrived west of Mersa Matruh a week later. They had been bombed by both German and British aircraft during the voyage. Another man, Lance Corporal Welsh, eventually wrote of his adventures. He had gone to Crete as part of the 17th Brigade Composite Battalion. His actual unit had been the 2/6th Battalion. He and another Australian, Lance-Corporal Welsh, had escaped from a prison camp at Skines. That was southwest of Canea. They had taken a rowboat, but were attacked by aircraft that drove them ashore and destroyed the boat. For now, they had gone back to the prison camp. By early July, some three thousand prisoners were shipped to Salonika. He was part of a group of thirty men who escaped from a very bad camp about 13 July 1941. Another group had gone out the sewer drain pipe from the latrines. The thirty men broke into three groups. Lance-Corporal Welsh led his group of ten men. He was making progress until he found a dead Cypriot lodged in the pipe. He struggled to either get past or to dislodge the body. They finally backed out of the hole, after fibbing that the Germans were ahead. Fifteen men got out of the manhole, but then one dropped the manhole cover and alerted the guards. They later found that the Cypriot had been shot six times. After a struggle, Welsh was hit on the head with a rifle butt and lost consciousness. He woke in the guard room. The men were against the wall and were being questioned by the camp interpreter. No one would give any information. He was released from the hospital after five days. He had to endure questioning by two men with the Gestapo. In August, he made a successful escape by having Greek clothing under his uniform. He got out of the camp with a working party with many prisoners who were employed grooming horses. He removed his uniform and looked for somewhere to go. He thought if he could find a woman with many children, that would be good. He did and she got him into her house and got her husband. They were not able to converse very well. He was taken to another house where there were six Australians. A priest helped them to escape to Imbros. In Turkey, they joined another group of men who had escaped. They eventually were able to cross the Turkish border to Syria, which by then had been occupied by the British. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

Escapes from Crete from July to September 1941

An Australian, Captain Embrey from the 2/1st Battalion estimated in early July 1941 that there were as many as 600 Australians and 400 New Zealanders living with the people of Crete in the western part of the island. He was one of three Australians who walked away from the Maleme prisoner of war camp on 3 July 1941. The way things were, there were several "English" soldiers living in the villages. Private Hoskins, who had escaped with Captain Embrey wrote of meeting what he thought was a Greek. When he said "Kalimera", the reply was "Hello George". Eventually, Captain Embrey met Lieutenant-Commander Vernacos, a Greek who was serving in the RNVR. They, along with two others, aailed in a Greek caique and eventually arrived in Turkey by 4 September 1941. Other groups escaped, as well. Three soldiers, one Australian and two New Zealanders, stole a boat and in the night of 15/16 July. They sailed south and landed at Sidi Barrani during the night of 19 July. A Greek navy captain, Captain Adonis, brought out a group of men in September on board a fishing board. The destroyer Kimberley found them about 40 miles from Bardia. This was on 20 September. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

A West-Australian escapes from Crete in June 1941

Private Carroll, from West Australia, found a Greek fishing boat and hoped to find companions to accompany him. He set out in the night on 11 June 1941. Every time he came close to the shore, there was gunfire, so he had to try to sail on his own. The boat was sixteen feet long, and was not intended for rowing. He rigged a piece of driftwood for the mast. He found a piece of canvas that he used as a sail. He had 350 miles to cover to the North African coast. He sailed slowly for six days until he was caught in a storm from the north-west. There were 20 to 30 foot waves, and all he could do is to sail downwind. About ten miles to go with land in sight, the bought filled with water and capsized. He managed to swim to shore and had a hard time in the breakers making landfall, as there were rocks. He managed to get shore on sand and had to lie on the sand to recover. He was found by Maltese soldiers who sent word to the command and he was picked up and taken to Mersa Matruh in the morning. The information that Private Carroll provided led the navy to attempt to take off more men by submarine. Lieutenant-Commander Poole went ashore and made contact with some men who were taken off on HMS Thresher. The officer stayed on Crete and found more men, including Major Sandover. On 18, 19, and 20 August, more than 100 men were embarked on HMS Torbay, another submarine. Among those embarked were 13 officers and 39 men from the 2/11th Battalion that had fought at Retimo. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

Other men left on Crete 31 May to 6 June 1941

One group still left on Crete were the men with Major Sandover and Captain Honner of the 2/11th Battalion who had left from Retimo on 30 May 1941 to avoid capture. They had also headed south and were ten miles from Ayia Galini. By the next day, they joined some 600 soldiers who were already there, perhaps mostly British. Another 200 Australians arrived. The senior officers were majors, including Ian Campbell's second-in-command, Major Hooper. He had been with the Greek troops. There were two landing craft beached there. Enterprising Australians got one in water after two days of work. Three men took a sailboat to Timbakion to collect provisions. They were caught by German motorcycles and the officer was wounded. They were able to get back to the landing craft with the provisions. The landing craft set off for Africa, but was intercepted by an Italian submarine, which took off nine of the eleven officers and took them as prisoners to Italy. The landing craft arrived at Mersa Matruh on 5 June. Germans arrived at Ayia Galini on 6 June and wanted the men to surrender. Most did, but Major Sandover and a few others did not. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The thrid landing craft at Sfakia from 1 June 1941

The third landing craft at Sfakia on 1 June 1941 was hidden in a cave by Private Harry Richards, who was in the 2/11th Battalion. The landing craft had 80 gallons of fuel. Private Richards thought that he could take fifty men to the African coast in the landing craft. He would stop at Gavdhos Island to get more fuel, food, and water and then head for Africa. They left Sfakia at 9:20pm on 1 June. They reached Gavdhos Island just before dawn on 2 June. At the island, there were only 55 gallon drums of fuel, which took a lot of space. Harry Richards asked for ten men to volunteer to stay on the island so that there was room for the fuel. They left the island and saw another landing craft in the distance. They ran out of fuel and Harry Richards also made a sail from blankets. They also landed at Sidi Barrani, in their case on 9 June. One of the men on the landing craft later wrote praising Harry Richards for the leadership that he provided to the group. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

Two groups escaped Sfakia on a landing craft

By the morning of 1 June 1941, there were still three landing craft at Sfakia. A group of five officers and 135 enlisted men escaped the island on one of the landing craft. 56 of the men were Royal Marines as one of the officers. They had problems, including a limited supply of fuel, food, and water. They were able to arrive at the island of Ghaydapoula on the first day. They had covered 18 miles. On the island, they overhauled the engines. By night, they set out for Africaa. They were out of fuel by the next day. They drifted for three days and then made a sail. They had some men were knew about sailing, so they reached the coast about 19 miles west of Sidi Barrani. They had arrived on 9 June 1941. A second, smaller group also set out from Sfakia on a landing craft on 1 June 1941. They were led by Lieutenant Day of the Welch Regiment. There were 44 men. They were better prepared and had help from Greeks, who gave them food and water. They also reached the beach near Sidi Barrani, this time on 10 June. They sailed much of the way. They were without food for five days. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

Obstruction of the escape route at Sfakia

There was active obstruction of the escape route at Sfakia. The 2/7th Battalion was a victim. The 19th Australian Brigade Headquarters was affected by the active obstruction of some men in the route leading to the beach. The Headquarters reported what was happening, once they reached the beach. The 2/7th Battalion commander had reached the beach and had thought that everything was moving along without a problem, so he embarked on a ship. He didn't learn the truth until he arrived at Alexandria. The officers in the group heading for the beach had been in Greece and knew that they had to move fast to keep from being left behind. They eventually reached the cliff that they had to descend to the beach. By the time the battalion had reached the beach, the ships had departed. General Weston had apparently ordered the men left behind to surrender to the Germans. Still, there were several thousand troops left on Crete and eventually some 600 were able to escape by sea to Egypt. Some went in landing craft. Some were picked up by submarine and others went by fishing boat. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The end of the line at Sfakia: 31 May 1941 on Crete

On the night of 30-31 May 1941, some 1,550 men were embarked from the beach at Sfakia by destroyers. After the embarkation, there were something like 1,250 Autralian, 1,200 New Zealand, and 1,550 British troops. Some of the latter were infantry improvised from artillery units. There were also as many as 5,000 depot troops. General Weston hoped to get about 2,000 off the beach on the night of 31 May to 1 June 1941. After a bad fight on 30 May, the Germans held back from attacking the rear guard above Sfakia. Brigadier Vasey knew that the Germans were forming a line, boxing in Sfakia so that there would be no other way out then ships from the beach. By the evening of 31 May, there was no longer water available to the men and there was no food. By now, there were few ships left in the Mediterranean. Crete had been a disaster, following closely on the disaster in Greece. Early in the morning on 31 May, a force under Admiral King's command sailed for Sfakia. The force consisted of the cruiser Phoebe, the fast mine layer Abdiel, and two destroyers. After the ships arrived off Sfakia at 11:20pm, they started loading men. They were able to lift 4,050 by the time they sailed at 3am. The commandos of Layforce and the Australian 2/7th Battalion had to be left. They should have been able to be evacuated, and a few were, but through bad management and maybe even ill-will, they were held up until it was too late. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

Freyberg stayed on Crete with the New Zealand division

The higher commanders had ordered General Freyberg to leave Crete, but he chose to stay on the island as long as there were substantial numbers of men, including the New Zealand division. He sent a message asking for more ships to come and remove men on the night of 30 May 1941. Four destroyers would come to evacuate men, and that meant that only 2,000 could be embarked. They were also sending some flying boats (Short Sunderland). General Weston, the Royal Marine, decided that they would embark the 4th and 5th New Zealand brigades. They were forced to leave the strongest battalion, the 21xt, as rearguard. They were left under Brigadier Vasey's command. In the event, the naval officer in charge only would take 1,000 men, so the 5th Brigade was left and the 21st Battalion was put under their command. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The embarkation from Sfakia in May 1941

The hope was to embark all the troops at Sfakia onto warships and carry them to Egypt. Four destroyers were present at Sfakia on the evening of 28 May 1941. They removed 230 wounded men and some 800 British troops, including some RAF personnel. In the north on 28 May was when the force at Heraklion was loaded onto three cruisers and six destroyers. That was almost all the British and Commonwealth troops there. Since the convoy from Heraklion was heavily attacked and took losses, that influenced plans for further withdrawals. The Glengyle and three extra destroyers besides what had already been sent were at Sfakia on 29 May. By early on 30 May, Sfakia was being hard-pressed by attacking German troops. Late on 29 May, ships arrived to take more men off the beach at Sfakia. They had removed some 6,000 men, including 550 wounded by 3:20am. At that point, the ships sailed. Even thought the situation was tense, the commanders had to deal with the fact that most of the New Zealand Division was still in Crete. Were they going to abandon them? This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian OFficial History.

At the rearguard position on 30 May 1941 at Sfakia

Brigadier Vasey, the Australian, commanded the rearguard position protecting Sfakia on 30 May 1941, as the day began. He had the 2/7th Battalion blocking the road. The 2/8th, which was very weak, was in a wadi on the left. He also had Royal Marines, which he held in reserve. As for artillery, he had the two 75mm guns of the 2/3rd Field Regiment. They were commanded by Capatain Laybourne-Smith. They were the only artillery pieces that they had been able to carry over the mountains. There were also two machine guns belonging to the 2/1st Machine Gun Battalion. This was now commanded by Lieutenant Bolton. The plan was for the 19th Brigade to hold the rearguard position through 30 May and 31 May and be evacuated by ship. To the north about a mile where the 3rd Hussars with three light tanks. They were accompanied by men of the 42nd Field Company (engineers). The engineers would explode craters into the road after the tanks withdrew. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The night of 29 May 1941 near Sfakia on Crete

After the 23rd Battalion had passed through the rearguard position held by hte 4th New Zealand Brigade, they began to move south. The 4th Brigade reached the road above Sfakia by 10 or 11pm. The 5th Brigade only reached that point by the morning of 30 May 1941. Thy had reached a critical point where the shortage of food and water as an issue. Most of the men headed for the beach at Sfakia came through a "sheeprace" setup by the men of the 2/3rd Field Regiment (Australians, fitting enough). The sheeprace was at Komitadhes, where men were routed to the beach. Ships reached the beach at Sfakia by 11:30pm on 29 May. Men were ferried out to ships by landing craft from the Glengyle. They left behind three landing craft for use in later embarkations. Interestedly enough, the cruiser Perth also carried two landing craft that were used in carrying troops out to ships. The ship had loaded about 6,000 men by 3:20am and then sailed. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

29 and 30 May 1941 near Sfakia

On 29 May 1941, hile the Australians were to hold the rear-guard position near Vitsilokoumos in the hills, there were still the New Zealanders of the 5th Brigade to talk about. The 5th New Zealand Brigade remnants were to move to the area above Sfakia. Layforce would then move to Komitadhes. Early on 29 May, the 23rd New Zealand Battalion was still at the entrance to the Askifou plain. They were down to a company-sized group of men and they were faced at 7:15am with a large number of Germans advancing towards them. They were short of water, but the 5th Brigade Major collected containers and water to them by truck. The battalion was withdrawn late in the day by truck and were carried across the plain and passed through the rear-guard position at the south end by late evening. The 4th Brigade then started to move back. The 5th Brigade reached the road about Sfakia by 10 and 11pm on 29 May. The 4th Brigade only reached theat by daylight on 30 May. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The plan for the Sfakia withdrawal from Crete

Major-General Evetts, who Wavell wanted to oversea the final withdrawal from Sfakia, flew from Alexandria to Cairo to meet with Wavell. General Cunningham had wanted to use the Glen ships and cruisers for the withdrawal, but Wavell insisted that only destroyers be used to remove the men. We can suppose that Wavell was concerned about the mounting naval losses from air attack. As it was, the Glengyle didn't receive the message in time, and Admiral Cunningham decided that the ship should continue towards Sfakia. Admiral Cunnningham sent another three destroyers, these being the Stuart, Jaguar, and Defender to Sfakia. The Royal Marine, General Weston, was still involved. He ordered the 4th New Zealand Brigade to the beaches from Askilou, where they had been in a rear-guard position. The plan was for Vasey's 19th Australian Brigade to hold a rear-guard position in the hills over Sfakia, with the two Australian Battalions, the 2/7th and 2/8th, along with the Royal Marine battalion, two guns from the 2/3rd Australian Field Regiment, and three light tanks from the 3rd Hussars. There were also three carriers from the 2/8th Battalion. This is based on the account from Volume II of the Australian Official History.

General Wavell gets involved

When the Major General was about to be dispatched to Crete on 28 or 29 May 1941, he was briefed by General Wavell, the theater commander. Thinking about the situation, I had some new insights that I wanted to share. General Wavell had a streak of "bad luck" that was only broken by the success against the Italians in Libya in late 1940 and into early 1941. The success against the Italians happened almost in spite of General Wavell. The great blitzkrieg campaign in western Egypt into Cyrenaica was due to Richard O'Connor and his assistant Eric Dorman-Smith. The 7th Armoured Division and the 6th Australian Division threw the Italians into disorder and captured large numbers of infantrymen. The offensive was halted by General Wavell, so that the resources could be diverted to the ill-conceived Greek campaign. I suspect that Wavell did not believe that there was any chance of the Greek campaign succeeding, so he lied to the Australian Prime Minister and the senior Australian officers to get them to agree to participate. Again, I suspect that Wavell thought he would be removed from his command if he opposed the Greek adventure, and that was probably true. He was not going to be able to persuade the Australians with the truth, so he lied. Wavell hung on through a series of disasters, the last being the operations against Rommel at the Libyan border that failed. Churchill had pushed to rush tanks to the Middle East through the Mediterranean Sea only to see them wasted. Wavell was finally fired and Churchill brought in another Indian Army officer, Claude Auchinleck.

28 and 39 May 1941 on Crete

While the troop movement to the south was underway, by 28 and 29 May 1941, the Royal Marine officer, General weston, was making preparations for the troop withdrawal. By the afternoon on 28 May, General Weston made arrangements for a group of men from the 2/4rd Field Regiment to be available to guide troops to the beach for embarkation. They had to climb from the top of the escarpment down to the beach to be ready. The plan worked and on the night of 28 May, they embarked 230 wounded and 800 British troops, including RAF, on four destroyers. At the same time, three cruisers and six destroyers were embarking the troops at Heraklion. Practically the entire group there was withdrawn. A force including four cruisers, some small, left Alexandria at 9pm on 28 May, heading for Sfakia. The plan was to embark more men on 29 May. Major General Evetts was to command the withdrawal, although he was new to the process and to Crete. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The Australian 2/7th Battalion, moving at night on the night of 28 and 29 May 1941 on Crete

On the night of 28 and 29 May 1941, the Australian Battalion, the 2/7th, was moving at night. They had a plan that they executed for what to do if a German reconnaissance aircraft dropped a flare. They had marched until they reached the Askifou plain. This was apparently just north of the village. They moved in sections along the side of the road. When a flare was dropped, the battalion commander blew his whistle, and the men were to lay face down off the road. The idea was to only show the empty road to the air, in the flare light. Afterwards, they resumed their march. Following them, the 2/8th Battalion marched towards Kerstes. They arrived there at about 5am on 29 May. Layforce came along behind and moved to Imvros, on the south side of the plain. The German mountain regiment that had captured A Battalion of Layforce waited all day on 28 May and planned to restart the pursuit in the morning of 29 May. The mountain division was still intent on cleaning up at Retimo, where they bagged the defenders. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The rearguard on the march south on 28 and 29 May 1941 on Crete

The Australian battalion, the 2/8th, arrived at Babali at about 2pm in the afternoon and took a defensive position with the commandos of Layforce. Once that happened, the 5th New Zealand Brigade Headquarters moved south to Vrises. They were accompanied by the 5th New Zealand Brigade and the Australians in the 2/7th Battalion, which had been in the rearguard. The Germans had reached Babali as early as 1:35pm and had started firing at Layforce troops. While the rearguard had seen air attacks, by this time, the Germns were concentrated against Heraklion. By later in the evening, the rearguard headed for Vrises. The 5th New Zealand Brigade and the rest of the 19th Australian Brigade were together at Vrises. The New Zealanders headed south, over a pass, starting at6pm. They were heading towards Syn Ammondari, which was a further 12 miles to the south. An unnecessary disruption happened when the engineers set off explosives to destroy the road before the rearguard had arrived. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The Germans on 27, 28, and 29 May 1941 on Crete

Even though the Germans knew of the British movement towards the south coast of Crete on 27 and 28 May 1941, General Ringel, the German commander, had two mountain regiments moving towards Retimo. One mountain regiment was pursuing the retreating British forces (British, Australian, and New Zealand). At Stilos, they had a hard fight and captured most of a battalion and destroyed two tanks. The battalion must have been A Battalion of commandos from Layforce. The regiment at Stilos was content to let the forces in front of him withdraw in the night, as the commander expected. General Ringel apparently expected a fight at Retimo, which is why he had two thirds of his mountain division moving in that direction. In fact, the commander at Retimo was ready to surrender in the face of overwhelming force. Only by 29 May was the 100th Mountain Regiment sent to chase the retreating force heading for the south coast. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

On the road: 28 May 1941, heading to the south on Crete

On 28 May 1941, the plan agreed upon was that after the 5th New Zealand Brigade headquarters reached the Babali Inn and Layforce, the 5th Brigade battalions and Brigadier Vasey's Australian would march south to Vrises, where the men would hide out during the hottest part of the afternoon. After the Australians of the 2/8th Battalion reached Babali, the 5th New Zealand Brigade headquarters moved south towards Vrises. The New Zealand battalions and the 2/7th Battalion then followed the headquarters to Vrises. The problem was that the Germans were fast approaching and attacked at Babali at 1:35pm. Layforce was under fire at Babali until dusk, but the German air attacks were diverted to the fight at Heraklion. By later in the evening, the rearguard withdrew towards Vrises. The troops rested at Vrises before moving onwards. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The airborne attack on Crete in 1941

With our hindsight, we can see that the German airborne force was insufficient to achieve a successful attack on Crete. We might say that in May 1941, everyone was a novice at mounting large airborne attacks. Crete was an opportunity for the Germans to have analyzed the battle and learned from the battle so as to better be able to make airborne attacks in the future. Instead, the Germans were afraid to mount another attack of the scale of Crete. The Allies were the ones who learned from Crete and built and used effective airborne forces. They were first used on a large scale in the attack on Sicily in 1943 and then again at Normandy. In many ways, the attack on Normandy repeated some of the German mistakes from 1941. Making the assault at night was asking for trouble, and then they made little attempt to drop the paratroops on the planned locations. That was one of the major mistakes at Heraklion on 20 May 1941. Most of the German paratroops were dropped in the wrong locations. Those who were dropped onto defended areas with troops ready to respond took heavy losses, as paratroops in the air in daylight with a long drop time were easily killed. By late 1944, there was no excuse for the bad planning involved with Operation Market Garden, the "A bridge too far" operation at Arnhem.

The withdrawal to the south from Suda Bay on 28 May 1941

The 5th New Zealand Brigade let a group of Italian prisoners through on the road to the south. The prisoners were under a white flag. The brigade commander let them through on the road, although they only reached Stilos, where they were scattered by German mortar fire. The Australian, Brigadier Vasey, attended Brigadier Hargest's conference with his battalion commanders. The consensus was that they needed to start moving south that morning, 28 May 1941, rather than waiting for dark. They did not think that the men could fight all day and have a chance at marching all night. Brigadier Vasey agreed with the decision and offered the 2/7th Battalion as a rearguard for the movement. The 5th New Zealand Brigade Headquarters would move south and reinforce the point held by the commandos of Layforce. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

More thoughts on the defense of Maleme at Crete in 1941

When we review the events at the beginning of the German attack on Crete, we can see what seems to indicate a failure of command at the highest level. In the west, at Maleme in particular, there seems to have been an opportunity to defeat the initial attack. That the defense failed was due to the lack of experience or expertise of the New Zealand commanders on the spot and the lack of oversight by General Freyberg. Lt-Col. Andrew, who commanded the western-most battalion lost control of the situation and his battalion was beaten and driven from the battlefield. The other commanders were not even aware of what was happening at the time. The 5th New Zealand Brigade commander was a civilian without very much experience and was more of a political appointee. They were the commanders at the spot at Maleme, and the Germans applied sufficient force and resorted to operating Ju-52 transports from the beach and from dry river beds until they took control of the airfield at Maleme. Instead of knowing that the situation was in doubt and sending reinforcements, the higher commanders were slow to respond, and General Freyberg was particularly hands-off at this time. Only during the withdrawal to the south was General Freyberg very involved in operations. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History. There is apparently a book that criticizes General Freyberg's performance in the Battle for Crete.

28 May 1941, the force at Suda in route to the south

By early 28 May 1941, troops were heading south, hoping to be embarked eventually at Sfakia. General Freyberg had taken command of the troops that had been under General Weston's command. General Freyberg had a headquarters established at Akisfou, a plain. They hoped to embark as many as one thousand men that night and more on succeeding nights. On 28 May, there were still units within a half mile of Suda Bay. Early on 28 May, the rearguards were overwhelmed and surrounded. That was not a good sign for the plan. By 9am, the commanders on the scene decided to move out, as the men were not up to a day long fight and then a withdrawal. The Australian 2/8th Battalion arrived at Babali in the afternoon. The time was about 2pm. They were free from air attack, but the Germans were after the rearguard at Babali. By 9:15pm, they withdrew towards Vrises. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

Assessment of the German attack on Heraklion from 21 May to 29 May 1941

The German attack on Heraklion was based on a series of errors, both by the German High Command, and by the local commander. Heraklion was another case where paratroops were dropped onto a strongly defended area with trained troops waiting for the assault. That was an error by the High Command that happened in most paratroop attacks in Crete. The High Command also seriously underestimated the strength of the defending force. They also did not realize the danger to transport aircraft by ground fire, mostly from 40mm Bofors light anti-aircraft guns at Heraklion, but also 3 inch anti-aircraft guns. That caused heavy losses of transports in the first wave and caused the following waves to be understrength and delivered in small groups. The plan was also flawed in that the force was given too many objectives: the communications stie at Gurnes, the town of Heraklion, the airfield, and the protection on the west side. There was also the problem that Colonel Brauer did not concentrate his force and attack at a single point. Even after being reinforced, he was struggling to even concentrate his force. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The German overview for Heraklion in May 1941

The successful defense at Heraklion disrupted the German plans for the attack on Crete. The German attack at Heraklion failed due to the combination of greatly underestimating the defending force, allocating too few resources, and then scattering what attacking force was provided. The grand German plan had been to take the town and port of Heraklion and the airfield, and then bring part of the 5th Mountain Division in by sea and by air. The small vessels that had been destined for Heraklion were turned back and returned to the Piraeus. What German forces that survived from the 1st Parachute Regiment at Heraklion were to prevent British aircraft from being able to operate from the airfield. After seeing British aircraft on the airfield on 23 and 24 May, General Student decided to send in reinforcements to try and take the airfield. To try and get the force on the ground safely, the reinforcing battalion-sized group was dropped to the west. They killed or captured a British platoon after landing. The commander, Major Schulz, directed his troops to take Apex Hill in the morning of 26 May and then beat off Greek attackers from Knossos. On 37 May, another improvised battalion was landed at Gurnes. The original commander was not ready to attack on 28 May, but the British were withdrawn by sea on the night of 28-29 May and left the airfield and town for the Germans. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

Losses on the way to Egypt from Heraklion: 1941

The first loss on the way to Egypt from Heraklion in late May 1941 was the destroyer Imperial. The Imperial had taken damage from what must have been a near-miss by a bomb. The crew and troops were moved to the destroyer Hotspur. The Imperial was then sunk by a torpedo. This was early on 29 May 1941. At 6am, about 100 German dive bombers attacked. Another destroyer, the Hereward, was damaged had to be beached while passing through Kaso Straight at the east end of Crete. The crew and troops were captured by the Germans. The two cruisers were hit by bombs. The Orion took three bomb hits and the Dido was hit by one bomb. There were 100 men killed and 200 wounded on the Orion. The Dido had 103 men from the Black Watch killed out of the 240 on board. The ships neared the Egyptian coast by 2pm and the bombing attacks stopped. They finally reached the shelter of Alexandria harbor by 9pm. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

Withdrawal from Heraklion

To get a message to General Freyberg, Brigadier Chappel, commander of the troops at Heraklion, had to send the message by way of Egypt. This was in the night of 26 and 27 May 1941. He stated that the Germans were in control of heights that commanded their position at Heraklion. The road to the south was controlled by the Germans, and more paratroops were being landed outside of his position. They were starting to run short of food and ammunition at Heraklion. He asked if they should try to break out to the west or south. He received a reply on 27 May that Crete was to be abandoned. He informed his commanders early on 28 May of the situation. The troops would be embarked at night. Early on 28 May, ships sailed from Alexandria, including the cruisers Orion, Ajax, and Dido with destroyers. Ajax was damaged and had to return to Alexandria. The rest arrived off Heraklion at 11:30pm. The destroyers entered the harbor in groups of four and embarked troops. Everyone was embarked but troops holding a road block at Khoudesion and those left at the aid station at Knossos. No attempt was made to inform or embark the Greek troops. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The situation becomes more intense at Heraklion from 26 May 1941

There was concern that the German moves were intended to cut off the troops at Heraklion to keep them from being able to move to the south. After all, it would be the Knossos road that would be the natural route to reach Pirgos in the south. There was actually cooperation between Australian and German medical staff where the Germans would put wounded Australians where they could be recovered and carried into the Australian position. There was frequent fighting near the village of Babali, where there were but twelve houses. The Germans would often raid there looking for food. There was a situation where there were Greek civilians fighting as guerrillas and killing Germans. The Germans, for their part, would retaliate and kill Greek civilians in retaliation. The German paratroopers seem to have been particularly atrocity-prone for some reason, perhaps due to training. The Germans would drop pamphlets making threats of violence in Greek and English. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The situation becomes more serious on 26 May 1941 at Heraklion

The Agylls were attacked early on 26 May 1941 by some 300 Germans. They were on Cemetery Ridge, just east of Heraklion. The situation was restored by the Leicesters, who attacked along the ridge. They had beat back the Germans, but took some heavy losses in the process. The Argylls became confused about the situation and started shooting at the Australians of the 2/4th Battalion. The Australian Intelligence sergeant made contact with the Argylls and corrected the situation. The Germans had moved onto Apex Hill and were between the 2/4th Battalion and Kesteven's platoon. Germans were on the move with some 500 moving through the Wadi and another 200 moving north toward the ridge. Kesteven had been ordered to fight his way out, if he encountered overwhelming force. Kesteven's platoon attacked the smallest German group, while moving down the rocky north face of the hill. Kesteven was among the wounded early in the fight. They charged the Germans and overcame them. They were able to reach the Black Watch and then to rejoin the 2/4th Battalion. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

24 to 26 May 1941 at Heraklion

Information had been received on 24 May 1941 at Heraklion that there were large numbers of Germans moving through the hills towards the east. The assumption was that they were preparing to attack Heraklion from the east. The defenders at Heraklion also learned that German transport aircraft were landing on the beach at Mallia. Mallia was on the coast, about fifteen miles east of Heraklion. Early on 25 May, the Germans attacked the town of Heraklion from the west. Heraklion was defended by "two companies of the York and Lancasters and one of the Leicesters". The lead troops of the Argyll and Sutherland reached the Heraklion defended area. The rest, about two companies, arrived on 25 May. They arrived on foot, having moved throough the hills. They were positioned in the line previously occupied by the Leicesters. The Leicesters that were then available became the reserve. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The bombing attack on Heraklion on 24 May 1941

As we saw, the British took over the defense of the town of Heraklion on 23 May 1941 after ordering the civilians to leave. The Greeks were no longer responsible for the defense of the town. The surviving Greek troops were organized into two one thousand man battalions. They were positioned around Arkhania. They were to protect the hospital at Knossos and hold the road and keep that open for traffic. Note that Arkhania is to the south of Heraklion, on the way to the south coast.

The bombing attack on Heraklion started early in the day and continued. That morning, more paratroops and supplies were dropped to the west by forty transport aircraft. They were caught in a battle between the 1/Argyll and Sutherland and Germans that were occupying the road. The British troops had taken losses and were forced to retreat. Still, during the day, a British truck convoy succeeded in passing to the south towards Ayia Deka where they were to build a landing ground for aircraft. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

Hurricanes at Heraklion on 23 May 1941

An attempt was made on 23 May 1941 to bring some Hurricane fighters to Heraklion so as to be able to attack the transport aircraft landing at Maleme. Six Hurricanes arrived at Heraklion, but it was a surprise and two were shot down by naval anti-aircraft guns. One landed at Heraklion while three returned to their base. Even later in the day, another six Hurricanes arrived, engaged the attacking bombers and then landed. Four of those that landed had their tail wheels damaged, so they were not operable. Meanwhile, the town of Heraklion was hit hard by a bombing raid. The Germans sent a message threatening to destroy the town if they did not surrender. The bombing raid had started fires on the dock where chemicals were stored. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

23 May 1941 at Heraklion

One feature of 23 May 1941 at Heraklion was that there was a great deal of German air activity. This included dropping bombs and strafing the British troops. The Germans were also busy dropping supplies to their troops on the ground. Since the Germans were in strong positions on the east side of the airfield, the supply drops were concentrated in that area. There was also a report that German transport aircraft were operating at a suitable location to the east of "East Ridge". Two companies from the Leicesters made a reconnaissance raid to the east. They reported that the Germans were weak, but heavily armed with machine guns. The defenders of the airfield at Heraklion worked at expanding the perimeter of their defended area. Also on 23 May, two Inf.Mk.II Matilda tanks arrived from the south coast. They were to proceed to Suda Bay. The only surviving Matilda at Heraklion, along with two field guns were sent on to Suda Bay by lighter. The Germans staged a destructive bombing raid on the town of Heraklion and demanded the surrender of the town. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

John Pendlebury, the archaeologist, at Heraklion on 22 May 1941

John Pendlebury was a British archaeologist who was working on reconstructing the bronze age on the island of Crete. During the war, he was apparently working for British intelligence. He had been in Britain for training from the outbreak of the war until May 1940, when he returned to Heraklion. He was near Heraklion during the initial attack on 20 May 1941. He spoke Greek like a native and was assimilated into Cretan society. With his Cretan companions, he was going to participate in an attack on German troops. Along the way, he fired on some Germans. There were Ju-87 divebombers overhead and John Pendlebury was shot in the chest. He was taken to a house. He was eventually treated by a German doctor, but some passing German paratroops took him outside and executed him. His body was eventually transported to the cemetary near Suda Bay. This is based on the account in the Wikipedia.

More about 22 May 1941 at the town of Heraklion

During the day on 22 May 1941, at the town of Heraklion, there were no attacks by either the Germans or the Allies. This was a day when the Allies worked at collecting and burying the dead Germans in particular. What you would think would become a major complication was that the Greek civilians armed themselves with German weapons and started firing them. West of the town, the Germans were reported to be driving women and children in front of them. When the Greek commander heard this, he warned the Germans to stop or he would kill the German prisoners. Not only was there the town of Heraklion, but there were small villages, as well, in the area. When there were German air attacks, the women and children would take cover in the British and Australian trenches. In the 2/4th Battalion area, there were two families living near the battalion headquarters. There were also caves nearby where there were some 200 civilians taking cover. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

22 May 1941 at Heraklion

The York and Leicesters cleared the last Germans from the town of Heraklion on 22 May 1941. There had been Germans on the east end of the airfield, but the Black Watch cleared them. They found, though, that the German defensive positions "at Rattling Bridge, in East Wadi, amd on A.M.E.S Ridge" were too strong to be attacked. Brigadier Chappel hoped to be able to attack the ridge, but the Black Watch battalion commander thought that he did not have enough strength to attack them. The British looked to find and bury the German dead. They found some 950, which they buried, and in the Greek area found about 300 more. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

Developments at Heraklion on 21 May 1941

Part of the I/1st Battalion, commanded by Lt. Count Bluecher, arrived at the eastern edge of the airfield at Heraklion shortly after midnight on 20/21 May 1941 and found that the airfield was still under British control. They had assumed that the plan had worked and that a parachute battalion would be in control. The regimental commander, Col. Brauer, had decided to attack the airfield from east and west on 21 May. The attack was made in small pieces and failed. Count Bluecher held a position on the eastern side of the airfield. Count Bluecher was killed and the Germans withdrew to the edge of a ridge. Col. Brauer sent a radio message to Major Schulz did not get the message, but did hear that an air attack was planned on the town of Heraklion from 9am to 10am. The Germans succeeded in penetrating the town, but were pushed out. The Greeks had been ready to surrender but were forced by the British to no surrender. By the morning of 22 May, the British were still in control, but Brigadier Chappel had concerns about the strong German position on the ridge to the east. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.