The 2/11th on Hill B at Retimo

Sandover had commanded the 2/11th Battalion since Greece as a Major. He organized the defense of Hill B overlooking the Retimo airfield. There were Germans along the lower side of Hill B, outside the wire, that Sandover hoped to be able to deal with, but when night came, that became more difficult. Prior to darkness falling, the Australians had done well killing or capturing Germans. They were forced to quit when in the dark, the Germans were able to ambush the Australian patrols. They took 84 Germans prisoner. Sandover spoke German, so he talked with the prisoners and examined their documents. In the morning, he put out the signal asking for mortar bombs to be dropped which a German aircraft obligingly did. Not only did they take the prisoners, but they also collected a good number of weapons, which were needed. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The next events at Retimo on 20 May 1941

The Germans on Hill A anticipated an effort to push them off the hill, and they pressed the remaining Australians. They also captured the crews of the two Matilda tanks, which were from the 7th RTR. On the left, they had effectively dealt with all the paratroops which fell near their area. The 2/1th and 4th Greek Battalions were still in control of their area. The wired area controlled by the 2/11th Battalion on Hill B was also able to kill or capture all the paratroops who descended. There were 500 paratroops that were able to concentrate and move on Perivolia. The 2/11th tried to push north to clear the low area. Once night fell, the Germans were able to put any stop to Australian activity. The 2/11th pulled its men back into their wired area, once they realized that they would not be able to make progress in the darkness. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

Hill A near the Retimo air field on 20 May 1941

Hill A looked down on the east end of the air field at Retimo. In the initial attack by paratroops, a considerable number landed on Hill A. Hill A was an area of about 200 by 300 yards. The hill was held by one company of Australians along with six guns and four machine guns. The artillery were 75mm guns. Machine gun crews were repeatedly killed and the gunners were forced to retreat with their breach blocks. The Vickers machine guns were eventually disabled by a German mortar bomb. Lt-Col. Campbell ordered two platoons from one company to defend against a German advance west from Hill A. The defenders on Hill A still held part of the ground and they received a platoon of reinforcements. With the Australians and Germans mixed together on Hill A, German air power was neutralized, because they did not want to attack their own troops. Lt-Col. Campbell had ordered to tanks to help his troops on Hill A, but they both encountered mishaps which neutralized them. One stuck in a drain and the other fell into a Wadi. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

Retimo attacked on 20 May 1941

The attack on the airfield at Retimo started at 4pm when bombers and fighters strafed and bombed. The Greek 4th Battalion was not attacked, but they responded by moving back up the ridge overlooking the airfield. Australian senior enlisted were sent to them and led them back to their original positions and encouraged them in the initial battle. The initial attack came from 24 troop carriers dropping paratroops. Eventually, there were 161 troop transports (Ju-52's presumably). There were four areas with German paratroops. One was at Perivolia, just east of Retimo. Another, smaller group, was at Platanes to the east of the first. A third and larger group landed overlapping the 2/11th Battalion and the 4th Greek Battalion on the airfield. The fourth, and largest group of paratroops landed overlapping the 2/1st Battalion area and east to the olive oil factory. The troop transports dropped their paratroops from about 400 feet as they flew parallel to the coast. The drop was completed in 35 minutes. They counted seven troop transports shot down along with two other aircraft. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

More about Retimo in May 1941 on Crete

The 2/11th Battalion was the closest to Retimo on the west end of their position located by Hill B. To their right was the 4th Greek Battalion. About a mile to the south at Adhele was the 5th Greek Battalion. The 2/1st Battalion was on the far east of the position. They were spread from Hill A west to the 4th Greek Battalion. Hill A had two 100mm guns, four 75mm guns, and a machine gun platoon. Hill B had two 100mm guns and another machine gun platoon. The two tanks were hidden under the olive trees in the Wadi Pigi. The defenders of the Retimo apparently made good use of camouflage, because they found pictures on a crashed German reconnaissance aircraft that only showed one of the positions, which they altered. The assault on the airfield at Retimo began on 20 May 1941. The first 14 aircraft that they saw turned towards Canea. At noon, twenty aircraft flew over towards Heraklion. At 4pm, the Germans staged an attack with fighters and bombers on the airfield. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The situation at Retimo from 30 April 1941 onwards

Lieutenant-Colonel Ian Campbell became the commander of the forces defending the airfield at Retimo. He was an Australian commanding the 2/1st Battalion which arrived on the scene on 30 April 1941. His force was built up with another Australian battalion, the 2/11th and with the 4th Greek Battalion. They were woefully equipped in every respect. They had no anti-aircraft artillery, their communications equipment was minimal, and they had very little ammunition, and of that, none was armour-piercing. The airfield that they were trying to defend ran parallel to the shore, 100 yards from the beach. A ridge overlooked the airfield on the side away from the sea. They initially had but ten days food. They had to buy food locally from the market. The ridges had southern slopes covered with olive trees that masked any view. The field guns and most medium machine guns faced northward towards the sea. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The situation at Retimo, on Crete, starting from 19 May 1941

Retimo, and the airfield about five miles to the east, were still in the western half of the island of Crete. Retimo was on the north shore, a ways east of Suda Bay. The land near Retimo was very mountainous, and sloped down to the sea. The town of Retimo had a population of about 10,000. Due to the difficulty of the terrain, the town was concentrated. The airfield was dominated by the ridge to the south. The airfield was almost on the beach and ran parallel to the shoreline. The 2/1st Australian Battalion arrived on 30 April 1941. They relieved the previous Greek defenders. The hills were terraced and had vineyards. Additional men arrived at Retimo between 30 April and 19 May so that the force grew to brigade group size. They had four 3 inch mortars, but only 80 mortar bombs for each. They had some anti-tank rifles, but only had five rounds each. Overall, they were short of ammunition, so they started the campaign with difficulties. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

More from 27 May 1931 on Crete

The German 3rd Parachute Regiment had reached the wireless station by 10am. They eventually entered Canea by 2pm, along with Ramcke and the 100th Mountain Regiment. In the process, they captured about one thousand men and forty guns. During the day on 27 May 1941, the rest of the 5th Mountain Division, along with a battalion of the 6th Mountain Division were flown into Maleme. The rearguard, consisting of the 5th New Zealand Brigade, the 19th Australian Brigade, and the commandos of Layforce had fought their way to the road leading to Sfakia on the south coast of Crete. The road to the south was packed with retreating men and vehicles. The Official History is about to jump to talking about the troops defending Retimo and Heraklion. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

More about the alleged massacre at 42nd Street on 27 May 1941

Lt-Col. Walker commanded the 2/7th Battalion, one of Brigadier Vasey's Australian battalions. His battalion was the one accused by Major Forster of committing a war crime by shooting and stabbing unarmed men who would have surrendered. A number of battalions, including the New Zealand Maori battalion, who used a special knife as their personal weapon in addition for guns, had charged the Germans. Lt-Col. Walker wrote about the incident in 1952 to address the charge made by the Germans. The probable explanation was that the Australians had captured German machine guns and turned them on the Germans and quickly killed or wounded many men. I also thought that the Maoris could have knifed some Germans. The Australians did capture three wounded Germans after the fight. Lt-Col. Walker thought that other wounded Germans might have been able to retreat to their own positions. There was one instance where there were unarmed men shot at the foot of a wall. To the Germans, it appeared that they might have been lined up and shot. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

Alleged war crimes on 27 May 1941

Major Forster, commander of the I Battalion engaged with the Australian 19th Brigade west of Suda reported to his regimental commander that he thought that war crimes had been committed. He had found 121 dead Germans and he felt sure that some had been wounded and then had been knifed or shot when they were helpless by the Australians. Forster's battalion had been advancing towards the east in heavy olive trees when they ran onto a minefield which stopped the advance. He thought that they were in danger of being surrounded, so he had pulled his men back. His battalion was then withdrawn into an existing defensive position on high ground. He reported that some dead Germans had been stabbed or had broken skulls. When they checked the battle field, they found about 20 Australian and New Zealand dead, none with stab or butt wounds. Lt-Colonel Walker, reported that there had been automatic weapons forward for the Germans. These had been captured and they inflicted heavy casualties on the Germans nearby. He said that no one who wanted to surrender was shot, after the fighting slowed. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The Germans on Crete on 25 and 27 May 1941

The Germans had considerable success in their advance on 26 and 27 May 1941 on Crete. They were intent on still encircling Canea and pushing through to Suda Bay. Just like the Australians and New Zealanders, the Germans were taking losses. For example, the 3rd Parachute Regiment was now of battalion strength and had been reorganized accordingly. The Germans were planning on continuing to circle Canea on the 27th of May. From there, they planned to head for Retimo. At this point, they had five columns of troops headed east. It was the 141st Mountain Regiment which had fought the Australian 19th Brigade in Greece. They were the victims of the action at 42nd Street, near Suda. Early on 27 May, they were ordered to attack towards Suda Bay, at least partly to cut off the defenders. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The decision to withdraw from Crete on 27 May 1941

Because of the situation on the roads to the south of Crete, General Weston had lost his ability to control the rearguard action until Thursday, 29 May 1941. That anything good could happen was due to the efforts of the Australian and New Zealand brigade commanders and Colonel Laycock. By this time, the Greek forces had practically ceased to exist. The rout that had occurred spontaneously included men discarding their rifles and even their tunics due to the heat. The sort of input that General Freyberg received from General Wavell's headquarters in Egypt was totally useless. They had no idea of the situation on the ground and had responded to General Freyberg's message from 26 May by calling for withdrawing to the east and defending that part of the island. Freyberg's message on 26 May was that the situation was hopeless. Early on 27 May, General Freyberg informed the headquarters in Egypt that there was no food at Retimo, in the east, as well as no ammunition. They had lost all their artillery at Suda due to the lack of gun tractors. By the afternoon of 27 May, General Freyberg was told to abandon Crete by Wavell. General Wavell had asked London for guidance, as well he might, due to Churchill's involvement, but got no reply. General Wavell eventually received a message from London agreeing to withdrawing from Crete. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The rout begins: 27 to 28 May 1941 on Crete

General Weston was thinking in terms of withdrawal from the island of Crete when he went south, later on 27 May 1941. He intended to scout out the route that would be taken to the south of the island for withdrawal. Once he got south, he was trapped, because of road congestion. The mostly unarmed, disorganized groups of men were in a panic and were clogging the roads to the south. General Weston was unable to travel back north to Suda.

Before he had left for the trip south, General Weston had ordered Laycock, the D Battalion commander of Layforce, to occupy the Babali Inn as a rearguard position. He had assigned him two of the remaining infantry tanks, along with three carriers.

The men walking or riding vehicles to the south included base troops from Suda Bay, Cypriots, Palestinians, and improvised infantry units. What vehicles they had, they eventually abandoned. What had started as a spontaneous retreat from the Suda Bay area had turned into a rout due to the panic of the men. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

Further developments at Suda on 27 May 1941

Despite the local success in the counter-attack on the Germans west of Suda, the situation was getting worse on 27 May 1941 as the day progressed. For one thing, the New Zealand and stustralian troops just west of Suda were out of touch with their commander, General Weston, the Royal Marine. Worse yet, the group now styled as the "rear-guard" could see German troops moving around the southern part of the line, as if to encircle them. The two brigadiers, Hargest of the 5th New Zealand Brigade and Vasey of the 19th Australian Brigade planned to withdraw during the night. They had met with a battalion commander of Layforce, the commandos, who was occupying a blocking point on the road. They had planned to withdraw from 42nd Street at 9pm, but it was not dark yet, so they waited until 10pm. We now find that General Weston had gone south to look at the retreat path and got caught in the flight of vehicles and could not make his way north. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The men charged the enemy on 27 May 1941 near Suda Bay

It was late in the morning, about 11am, when the Australians had seen the Germans advancing. There were two companies of the 2/7th Battalion deployed forward. Major Miller commanded the northernmost company on the far right. The company on his left charged when Miller's company charged. Miller had sent a patrol forward to observe the Germans, who were busy taking things from an abandoned depot they had found. Shots were eventually exchanged and Miller moved his company forward. When the second company arrived, they charged the Germans. The charge caused the Germans to turn and run, often dropping their weapons. The Australians eventually advanced a mile from their start. The New Zealanders made a similar charge, with the Maoris in the center and with the 19th and 21st Battalions on each side. They advanced about 600 yards and observed some 80 dead Germans. The Australians thought that they had killed as many as 200 Germans and also took three prisoners. The Australian and New Zealand losses were small. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The morning of 27 May 1941 at "42nd Street" near Suda

What the soldiers called "42nd Street" was a dirt road that ran towards the south-southeast through olive groves. The position was near the southwest corner of Suda Bay. General Weston was not at 42nd Street when the remnants of the New Zealand Division and the 19h Australian Brigade arrived. The Australians occupied the northern end of the line with the New Zealand battalions stretching to their south. The front they held depended on their remaining strength. General Freyberg was very anxious about getting the supplies delivered, so he was present during the night when the destroyers delivered the 80 tons of supplies at the pier. By 11am on 27 May, there were some 400 Germans heading towards the position, following the Suda Bay road. The Australians surprised the Germans, who were intent on looting an abandoned depot. They exchanged fire and then the Germans "broke and ran". This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

More about the night of 26-27 May 1941 in front of Canea

The commander of the Suda Brigade was Colonel Hely, an artillery-man. He had commanded the 106 RHA from 1939 to 1941. During 1941 to 1942, he commanded the 60 Field regiment. After the 5th New Zealand Brigade and 19th Australian Brigade withdrew, Colonel Hely thought that the Suda Brigade needed to withdraw, as well. That left the Composite Brigade without any support. They had followed orders that were a bad idea and advanced west of Canea about a mile. The withdrawal left the 5th and 19th Brigades just west of Suda. The commandos of A Battalion of Layforce were near the village of Suda. By the morning, the Australians were surprised that they did not see the Composite Brigade troops coming up as their rear-guard. When the Composite Brigade had been misplaced, Brigadier Inglis took back his command of the 4th New Zealand Brigade and Howard Kippenberger moved back to being the 20th Battalion commander.

When General Weston realized that the Composite Brigade was in trouble, he ordered the 1/Welch to withdraw, but they probably never got the order or it was too late in arriving. They were too far forward with the 1/Rangers and the Northumberland Hussars. As the Germans started to encircle the Composite Battalion, Two companies eventually reached Suda. They later found out that a sergeant and a few men from the 1/Welch had held up the German advance until early on 28 May. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

Communications and command gone wrong: the night of 26-27 May 1941 near Suda and Canea

Because of the command and communications situation, Brigadier Puttick, the New Zealand Division commander, and Brigadier Vasey, the Australian, were forced to act to keep their troops from being overrun by the advancing Germans. By 2:15am, General Weston thought that the New Zealand Division was acting independently, regardless of what he told them. When the New Zealand 5th Brigade and the Australian 19th Brigade withdrew, that triggered the withdrawal of the Suda Brigade, which had been in reserve at Mournies. The Composite Brigade had no idea about the withdrawals, especially of the Suda Brigade, and went on with their advance to a position west of Canea. The 5th and 19th Brigades were then in position to the west of Suda. One battalion of commandos were near Suda. General Weston realized at 1am that the Composite Brigade was in a dangerous position and sent orders to withdraw. Those orders were probably not received and the most forward companies were caught. One was caught and the other took heavy losses. The latest move left the surviving units at "42nd Street", preparing for the next day's action. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The defense in front of Canea collapsed: late on 26 May 1941

Both the Australians and New Zealanders in front of Canea were being pressed so hard that they felt the need to withdraw, later in the day on 26 May 1941. The command structure had been made more complicated when General Weston had been given command over the New Zealand Division. Worse yet, General Weston felt like major decisions about withdrawals were beyond what he was allowed to make. When the Australian Brigadier Vasey told General Weston that he would not be able to hold on overnight, General Weston felt like he needed to consult General Freyberg before agreeing to a withdrawal. Communications were so bad that the discussion meant a trip where General Weston was out of touch with the troops in the line for hours. The result of that issue was that by late in the day on 26 May, unilateral decisions were made which put the New Zealand and Australian troops into a withdrawal from the front before Canea. Brigadier Puttick, the New Zealand Division commander, kept trying to contact Weston, but General Weston had been forced to leave Canea due to the heavy bombing. Brigadier Puttick tried to contact General Freyberg by radio, but was told to take his orders from General Weston. From the distance of time, we can see that the situation before Canea was at the point of collapse, at least partly due to the command and communication arrangements that were in place. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

"The New Zealand Division can't hold another night": 26 May 1941

By the afternoon of 26 May 1941, the command structure for Crete was "showing cracks". The New Zealand Division commander, Brigadier Puttick read that General Freyberg intended that a new Composite Brigade would be commanded by Brigadier Inglis. The brigade was intended to relieve the 5th New Zealand Brigade in the line. Brigadier Puttick's opinion was that the New Zealand Division troops were at the end of their ability to fight. General Freyberg's headquarters were within walking distance, so Brigadier Puttick walked over to talk with him. General Freyberg told Puttick that they had to hold, because two destroyers were heading for Suda Bay with commandos and supplies. He also told Brigadier Puttick that since they were now in the area of Canea and Suda, that the New Zealand Division would fall under General Weston's command. While Brigadier Puttick was walking, which took three hours, the Germans continued to advance around the left of the line. Later that evening, General Weston informed General Freyberg that he thought that the New Zealand Division could not hold their positions for another night. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

Further events on 26 May 1941 in front of Canea

Later in the afternoon of 26 May 1941, the pressure on the Australian 2/8th and 2/7th Battalions on the left of the line in front of Canea was so great that they were withdrawn. They were moved back to their original positions with the Marines at Mournies. Earlier in the day, their brigade commander, Brigadier Vasey, had thought that they would be able to hold, but by 5pm, he recognized that the situation had become critical.

Also in the afternoon, Brigadier Puttick, the acting New Zealand Division commander, was in the process of moving his headquarters to a point south of Canea. While that move was happening, he received a letter from General Freyberg that asked him to co-locate his headquarters with General Weston. Freyberg also plotted to take Weston's best units and for a composite brigade from them. He wanted to use the Composite Brigade to replace the remnants of the 5th New Zealand Brigade in the line. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

26 May 1941 in front of Canea

The 5th New Zealand Brigade now was very much a scratch organization. They had company-sized battalions under their command, including the 19th, 21st, 22nd, 23rd, and the 28th (Maori) Battalions. They also had small groups of engineers and cavalry to help hold the line. At one point, an attack on the engineers in the 21st Battalion line were pushed back by a strong German attack. They were able to stage a counter-attack and push the Germans back. By 2pm, the 19th Battalion was under heavy pressure. Several platoons were pushed back and the battalion had to pull back 150 yards to a new line. They mustered enough force to retake the positions that were lost by 3pm. To the left, the Maori's were able to hold against German attacks. The next German attempt was to push between the Australians and the Greeks. Two Australian platoons were forced to withdraw towards Perivolia, but were able to hold their position at that point. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

General Freyberg reported to General Wavell on 26 May 1941

General Freyberg sent a cable to General Wavell, the theater commander, on 26 May 1941 that said that the situation on Crete was now hopeless and that only the Welsh Regiment and the Commando were able to conduct offensive operations. He said if the strategic situation demanded it, they would try and hold on for a while longer. Freyberg expected that the Germans were close to being able to fire on Suda Bay. He also reported that most of their artillery had been lost due to lack of mobility. General Freyberg also made a reorganization. He put Brigadier Inglis in charge of the reserve and promoted Howard Kippenberger to 4th Brigade commander. The 4th New Zealand Brigade now consisted of the 18th and 20th Battalions. The forward troops, including the 5th New Zealand Brigade were under heavy attack. The Official History says that the 5th Brigade battalions were reduced to company strength at this point. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

General Freyberg basically gave up on 26 May 1941

We can only guess that during the night of 25/26 May 1941, that Brigadier Puttick and General Freyberg had a mistaken idea of what was actually happening on the ground in front of Canea. We know that Howard Kippenberger had led the troops and had successfully recapatured Galatas. The Greek troops were doing well. So what did the higher level command think? On 25 May, Brigadier Puttick had told General Freyberg that the line at Galatas was "obviously broken", which seems to have not been the case. An order arrived at 1am on 26 May that agreed with the Puttick's decision to pull the New Zealand Division back to a line closer to Canea. A liaison officer to the Greeks had reported that the Greeks were close to breaking, which also seems to be not the case. The 21st Battalion would now be the unit on the right, with some of the cavalry, some engineers, and one company of the 29th Battalion. To their left was the 19th Battalion. To their left were the Maori's (the 28th Battalion). By the dawn, the 5th New Zealand Brigade was in the new position. The Australian 19th Brigade was to their left. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

Other action in front of Canea on 25 and 26 May 1941 on Crete

During the day on 25 May 1941, the Australians of the 19th Brigade were not challenged. They were to the left of the New Zealanders in front of Canea. During the night of 25/26 May, they continued to take casualties, and there were New Zealand troops mixed into the Australian front lines. The troops continued to experience heavy air attacks during the night. The New Zealand Division commander, Brigadier Puttick, decided to pull the 4th and 5th Brigades back to line up to the north on the right of the Australian 19th Brigade. The Greeks of the 8th Greek Regiment were actually doing very well. They were fighting the German 85th Mountain Regiment, and had kept them from encircling the defenders of Canea. They were actually reinforced by Cretan villagers. They had successfully fought the German Utz group and pushed them out of Aliakmon and to pull into a defensive position by the reservoir. At the end of the day on 25 May, Brigadier Puttick warned General Freyberg that he did not expect to be able to hold his position against constantly increasing German forces. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The situation in front of Canea turns nasty on 25 May 1941

Lt-Col John Russell commanded the New Zealand Divisional Cavalry in front of Canea. He reported to Howard Kippenberger that there were many men in retreat coming past his unit. The cavalry itself was being pressed by the Germans. Kippenberger sent his brigade major to tell Brigadier Inglis about the situation and to ask for help. Many men were being wounded and were taken by truck to the aid station. The situation worsened when Wheat Hill, just west of Galatas, was abandoned without orders. They were under attack by German mountain troops. The retreat was increasing and could easily have turned into a rout. Kippenberger tried to rally the men, shouting whatever he could think of to try and halt the retreat. Brigadier Inglis was sending reinforcements, and Kippenberger sent them into the weak spots in the line. When the 23rd Battalion arrived, Howard Kippenberger thought that they needed to retake Galatas if they were going to stop the Germans. He sent the 23rd off with two light tanks against Galatas. The attack succeeded in driving the Germans from Galatas. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The situation turns for the worse on 25 May 1941 for the New Zealanders on Crete

The 2nd New Zsaland Division forces on Crete were all massed to defend Canea when the day started on 25 May 1941. The 4th New Zealand Brigade was taking the brunt of the attack with the 5th Brigade in reserve, ready to be used. Ramcke's group was attacking along the coast against the 18th Battalion and the Composite Battalion. The Composite Battalion rapidly ceased to exist. The 18th Battalion was also in dire straits. The company nearest the sea was being swamped by the enemy. The center company was surrounded and under fire from all directions. The battalion commander took up a rifle with bayonet and led a group from his headquarters to attempt to restore the situation, but failed. Colonel Howard Kippenberger was in command at the front. The two companies from the 20th Battalion ordered forward to occupy the ground held by the remnants of the Composite Battalion. 2nd-Lieutenant Upton distinguished himself again in the effort. They were up against too many German troops and the situation was getting progressively worse as the Germans were pushing up the road from the prison towards Canea. This si based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

Germans on 24 May 1941 near Canea

On 24 May 1941, the Germans were massing to attack the New Zealand Division. They had two airborne and one mountain regiment on the move. Another mountain regiment was moving south towards the prime target, Suda Bay. The first step was to attack the heights at Galatas, to the west-southwest of Canea. The Assault Regiment would hit the heights near Galatas. The mountain troops of the 100th Mountain Regiment would attack Galatas itself. The 3rd Parachute Regiment would attack along the road to Canea. More reinforcements were landed on the 24th at Maleme, as well. These included one-and-a-half mountain battalions, a reconnaissance unit, and an anti-aircraft unit.

The New Zealanders were well-aware that an attack was imminent. The tired and depleted 5th New Zealand Brigade, or what was left of it, was to be ready to help the 4th Brigade. In preparation, the 4th Brigade was worked over by attacking aircraft on 24 May. Counting up the 5th Brigade, they had remnants of four battalions only totaling about 1,500 men. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

24 May 1941 near Canea on Crete

The western end of the forces defending Crete stretched out about three miles to the southwest of Canea on 24 May 1941. The troops near the sea were from the 5th New Zealand Brigade. This also included the New Zealand Divisional Cavalry. The 4th New Zealand Brigade was behind them in reserve. To their southeast were the Australians and Greeks. Behind them were forces commanded by General Weston, the Royal Marine. Called the Reserve Position, it was held by the "Royal Perivolians" and the Suda Brigade. The Royal Perivolians were the unit that included Royal Marines and the Australian 2/2 Field Regiment, fighting as infantry.

There was a strong German force moving through the hills, intent on cutting off the defenders around Suda Bay. They spent 24 May just making probing attacks against the 4th New Zealand Brigade. A stronger attack was launched at 4pm against the 18th New Zealand Battalion. They were pushed back, but counter-attacked to restore the line. The Germans staged air attacks all afternoon that seemed to be designed to wreck Canea. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

24 May 1941 from the Germans

Air attacks on 24 May 1941 had hit the mixed troops at Kastelli. Some German paratroops had been captured on the first day and had been held prisoner at Kastelli. The air attacks enabled them to escape. They obtained arms and attacked the New Zealand officers who were with the 1st Greek Regiment. They killed or captured several of them. The Greek regiment was really a battalion-sized unit of one thousand men, but they only had some 600 rifles and only had several rounds per rifle. After the air attack, a German mountain engineer battalion attacked and made good progress. The Greeks were able to resist until 26 May, which prevented the Germans from bringing in more reinforcements.

At about this time, a German naval officer was ordered to take two light tanks to Crete to support the attack. He was able to find a wooden lighter and was able to get the two tanks lowered onto the lighter. A small tug boat towed the lighter, but reports of British naval activity caused the German naval commander, Admiral Schuster, to order the tug and lighter to move into the harbor at Kithera. This is based on the account in Walter Ansel's and Peter Schenk's books.

The German view of the battle for Crete on 23 May 1941

The Australian Official History intersperses information from German sources with the story about the Australian, New Zealand, and British troops fighting the Germans on Crete. On 23 May 1941, when the 5th New Zealand Brigade was withdrawn into reserve after taking heavy losses, the Germans thought that the withdrawal was due to their concentric attack by the Utz group. Ramcke's group, which was know from later in the Western Desert, was following the retreating troops and fought the rearguards. During the night on 23 May, General Ringel sent what we would later call a battle group against Aliakmon and moving towards Suda Bay. He hoped that by outflanking the troops in the Galatas and Suda area that he could cause them trouble and also could ease the pressure on the 2nd Parachute Regiment, which was having difficulties. Because the German focus was on Suda Bay, the air attack concentrated there and let the 5th New Zealand Brigade withdraw without heavy air attack. The German forces at Maleme and the Prison area were able to connect and heavier reinforcements were flowin into Maleme, including airborne armour. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

Reinforcements for Crete

There were two infantry tanks that were landed at Timbakion the night before the German attack. By the 23rd of May 1941, they reached Heraklion. They also reported that the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders were traveling there, presumably on foot. They had landed with the tanks. With the arrival of the two infantry tanks, there were now three runners at Heraklion. They were put on a landing craft and sent to Suda with two 75mm guns.

The Glenroy was to have brought reinforcements to Timbakion, but was ordered to turn back due to the heavy air attack that sank destroyers. The fast mine layer Abdiel was sent with a commando force, eventually known as "Layforce". Layforce consisted of 195 commandos.

The Germans now turned their attention to capturing Suda Bay. The first step was to send a group of mountain troops from the 85th Mountain Regiment towards Alikianou and then east towards Suda Bay. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

Retimo, the isolated area on 23-24 May 1941

The only rather secure means that General Freyberg had available to communicate with troops at Retimo was by submarine cable. After having destroyed their ciphers at Heraklion on 20 May 1941, during the parachute attack, they were mostly left with using plain text communications. The Australian Colonel Campbell commanded the troops near Retimo. Colonel Campbell sent Captain Lergessner to travel to Suda to pass on information about their situation and ask for guidance. Captain Lergessner met the company of Rangers and two anti-tank guns that had been sent as reinforcements at about 8pm on 23 May. Captain Lergessner warned the Rangers against attacking up the road, as there was considerable German strength. He watched the Rangers make an unsuccessful attack that was repulsed before continuing to Suda along with the survivors from the Rangers company. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The defensive plan for Crete on 23 May 1941

At about 11am on 23 May 1941, Brigadier Puttick, the New Zealand Division commander, and General Freyberg met to discuss what to do next. They agreed to pull the 5th New Zealand Brigade into reserve, since the brigade had taken so many losses. Brigadier Inglis, the 4th Brigade commander, would have the 10th Brigade units under his control. He would be on the right of a new defensive line. The Australian 19th Brigade, commanded by Brigadier Vasey would take over the left of the line. The troops near Platanias walked to behind the 4th Brigade during the night. They were very short of vehicles and what remained were used to carry the wounded and weapons. The defense at Retimo was handicapped by having to send and receive all communications in the clear, because they had destroyed their ciphers during the parachute attack. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The New Zealand withdrawal on 23 May 1941

As the battalions of the 5th New Zealand Brigade withdrew on 23 May 1941, the Germans came along behind and there was fighting. They fought on the road where the Platanias river was bridged. The New Zealand artillery contributed by putting the German light pieces out of action. The men watched 12 British bombers raid the Maleme airfield, where there were some 130 Ju-52 transports. They could see six of them burning after the raid. The 5th Brigade was now under attack by men from the prison area, attacking from the south. 150 Germans were on the heights at Stalos. The position was attacked several times and might have been dislodged, but the company commander mistakenly thought that there were more German troops than there actually were. There were changes coming, as Brigadier Puttick met with General Freyberg at 11am and they decided to pull the 5th Brigade back into reserve and replace them with the 4th Brigade. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The 5th New Zealand Brigade situation early on 23 May 1941

The Maoris and the battalions of the 5th New Zealand brigade were in positions along the Platanias line by early on 23 May 1941. The Maoris had moved back into their position where they had been, prior to the attack at Maleme. The 23rd Battalion may have been in the best shape of the 5th Brigade battalions. It was facing north next to the Maoris. The 21st and 22nd Battalions had taken losses and were low on strength. They were next to the 23rd Battalion. The New Zealand Engineer battalion was also in line with them. They stretched to the adjacent 4th New Zealand Brigade troops. They were all settled in by 10am. They were spared, for now, from heavy air attack. The air attacks were conducted against the roads that linked Canea and Suda, and against the town of Canea. General Freyberg thought that the air attacks were as heavy as he had seen. The artillery battery, the 27th, only was able to withdraw two French 75mm guns and had to abandon the rest. The new position had a small amount of artillery between the 27th Battery and the 2/3rd Australian Field Regiment. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

Freyberg's assessment from 23 May 1941

Later on 23 May 1941, General Freyberg received a message from Churchill that talked about what a splendid battle they were fighting and that "the whole world watches". Freyberg knew that the situation was deteriorating fast and that there was no "splendid battle". Freyberg only wanted to do what would be best for the defenders. Freyberg sent a message to General Wavell where he tried to portray just how desperate their situation was and tried to give a true picture of the situation. They were down to about 150 cwt trucks along with 117 other vehicles that could carry a load. There were troops who were cut off near Maleme. The Germans had troops blocking the road that went from Suda to Retimo. They lacked any vehicles at Retimo. He ordered the Argylls and Sutherlands to concentrate at Heraklion prior to attempting to push to Suda by road, if possible. Freyberg hoped to withdraw to within defensible lines to give the troops some rest and to better be able to withstand attack. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

Wavell and his staff make unrealistic suggestions late on 22 May 1941

General Freyberg received a message from General Wavell in the night of 22 May 1941 that showed just how out of touch Wavell was with the situation on Crete. The purpose was to inform Freyberg that reinforcements could not be landed at Suda Bay. Wavell expressed the hope that the Germans would not be able to stick with the attack much longer. There were plans to land commandos on the south coast who would then move north to assist the defenders. Wavell thought that if the "situation at Maleme is really serious hope to arrange for R.A.F. to send fighters to strafe enemy tomorrow until ammunition and petrol exhausted and then land within your protection." Wavell had suggested major troop movements that were highly impractical due to lack of transport and would involve major moves on foot. General Freyberg sent a message on 23 May that tried to portray the situation in a way that gave Wavell an idea of just how desperate their situation was at this point. Freyberg expected that they would have to fight to the end without any hope of relief, from a reading of what he told Wavell. Wavell's performance during the first half of 1941 is why he ultimately was sacked by Churchill. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The issue about mutilation and reprisals by German troops

The German troops on Crete after 20 May 1941 were quick to react to what they perceived as atrocities or mutilations. Eventually, an investigation was conducted of the alleged incidents during the battle for Crete. The investigation found that British and New Zealand troops always conducted themselves well and when they had German prisoners, protected them from Cretan attacks. There were fewer incidents of actual mutilations than originally were reported. These all seemed to originate with Cretan civilians, not Greek troops. The investigation was conducted in a fair and impartial way to learn the truth of what had happened and was conducted by the Germans. The German troops involved were too quick to resort to reprisals which would likely result in war crimes trials, post-war, if they were pursued. The report was issued by the "Chief Medical Inspector of the Luftwaffe". Clearly, the use of reprisal killings by the German airborne troops was a mistake. This is based on the account in Volume II of the Australian Official History.

The situation at Kastelli

The first group of German dispatched to protect Maleme on 23 May 1941 had reached Kastelli. There, they fought with troops from the 1st Greek Regiment, who were sniping at the German troops. The 5th Mountain Division commander had decided to do something about Kastelli. In the initial attack on 20 May, 57 paratroops were dropped at Kastelli. Of there they said that some forty were "mutilated" by the Greek troops. The remaining 17 took refuge in the local jail, as it could be defended. By 24 May, the attackers called for dive bomber support. By the afternoon on 24 May, the 95th Engineer Battalion took Kastelli. They had killed some 200 of the Greek defenders. Of the 15 prisoners taken, 2 where New Zealand officers. The Germans shot 200 men at Kastelli in reprisal for the reported atrocities. A New Zealand officer had reported that he had the remaining Germans held in the jail to keep them safe from the Greeks and had some New Zealanders in the guard to protect them. The New Zealand officer said that he had not seen any Germans mistreated by the Greeks. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

General Ringel's plan for 23 May 1941 on Crete

Late on 22 May 1941, General Ringel had organized the German troops into three groups. The plan was to use one group to protect Maleme from attack from the south and west. A second group, with most of the paratroops, would attack Canea along with the third group, the 100th Mountain Regiment. That third group would swing in an enveloping move to take the defending troops to the east by coming from the southern hills. Another 150 men under Colonel Heidrich's command moved north to Stalos to block the coast road. They reached their objective by early on 23 May. While moving west on 23 May, the first group ran into Greeks from the 1st Regiment acting as snipers. This was near Kastelli. They reported that the Greeks had committed "atrocities". This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

22 May 1941 from the German perspective

During 22 May 1941, two more German mountain battalions were landed by air at Maleme. The fighting was tough and many aircraft were destroyed on the landing field at Maleme, but many were able to land and unload. The Germans had captured some British tanks during the fight for Maleme, and some of those tanks were used to two damaged aircraft off the field. General Ringel was now in charge of the German troops fighting to capture Crete. His charter was to capture Maleme, capture Suda Bay and clear so that it could be used to receive seaborne traffic, and relieve the troops who were hard-pressed at Retimo. Ultimately, he needed to capture the island. The Germans had hoped to attack Canea, but the New Zealand counter-attack had changed the situation. The New Zealand troops were ultimately driven back towards Pirgos, but kept control of the heights to the south. That night, the Germans reorganized in preparation for the next day. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

Naval forces involved with the battle for Crete in May 1941

The naval battle for Crete in May 1941 was a case of ships fighting air attacks. The ships were in place to intercept the expected attack from the sea where small vessels would transport German troops to land on Crete. At the start of the battle on 20 May 1941, there was the 15th Cruiser Squadron positioned to the east of the island. The ships included the cruisers Naiad and Perth. They were accompanied by the destroyers Kandahar, Nubian, Kingston, and Juno. The Nubian was the oldest of the destroyers being a Tribal class ship. The others were J and K class, recently built. The ships to the west included the cruisers Dido, Ajax, and Orion. They had destroyers Janus, Kimberley, Hasty, and Hereward. There was also a reserve group consisting of the cruisers Gloucester and Fiji with two destroyers. The battleships were further to the west, ready to intervene if heavier Italian surface forces appeared. This is based on the account in the book A Midshipman's War: A Young Man in the Mediterranean Naval War, 1941-1943 by Frank Wade.

Naval operations in support of Crete on 23 May 1941

When Admiral Cunningham received information about declining anti-aircraft ammunition on ships supporting Crete, he ordered them all to withdraw to Alexandria. Losses had been heavy. The latest incident on the morning of 23 May 1941 involved Lord Mountbatten's destroyer Kelly and the accompanying Kashmir. They were dive-bombed and sunk. Suda Bay was filled with wrecked ships, the most notable being the cruiser York, which had been torpedoed by an Italian MTB on 26 March. Still, the navy continued to carry supplies to Crete. On the night of 23/24 May, two destroyers and the fast minelayer Abdiel carried supplies. They mainly carried ammunition and stored. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

More developments on Crete on 22 May 1941

The situation on Crete was very serious by 22 May 1941. There were enemy troops now blocking important roads. A group commanded by Colonel Campbell attacked at Retimo, but was not able to completely clear the road to the east and west. The Germans were reported to be blocking the road to the coast to the south where reinforcements would be landed. Late on 22 May, the 16th Brigade headquarters and one battalion sailed for Crete on the Glenroy. The plan was to land them at Timbakion to remove the Germans who were on the road.

There was a lot of naval action around Crete on 22 May. A force of three cruisers with destroyers attacked ships between Heraklion and a nearby island. They sank one caique, the ubiquitous type of Greek small vessel. Ships were running out of anti-aircraft ammunition and major units were lost. They included the cruisers Fiji and Gloucester. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

Nigel Richardson's father: Crete 1941

There is an interesting article in the Telegraph by Nigel Richardson that talks about his father and his fellows in the battle for Crete in 1941. The German invasion had started on Friday, 20 May 1941, as we know. One of those killed on 22 May 1941, which we have been reviewing, was a British spy, John Pendlebury. He had been an archaeologist and had the personal peculiarity of having a glass eye. Nigel Richardson was a member of the Northumberland Hussars. He had been evacuated from Greece when the campaign there was being wound down and the troops withdrawn. He ended up at Suda Bay, where many other soldiers were dropped by the navy.

Nigel Richardson notes that the area of Hill 107 has been a German cemetery. Hill 107 was the place abandoned by Lt-Colonel Andrew's battalion when they were in the process of collapse after being attacked while unsupported by the 5th New Zealand Brigade. The New Zealanders are commemorated by a street at Galatas named the Neozilandon Polemiston. At one spot in an alley, there is a gate made from a piece of a British tank.

Nigel Richardson's father made his way to Sfakia, as the battle gave way to withdrawal. He was one of the about 5,000 men who were left behind to be taken prisoner by the Germans. He spent about four years as a prisoner of war in Germany. This is based on Nigel Richardson's article and what we know from Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

Other events relating to Crete on 22 May 1941

With Brigadier Vasey, the Australian, given command over troops in the Canea and Suda area, he was now under New Zealand command. He was put under Brigadier Puttick, the New Zealand Division commander. The only Germans in the area were small groups on the Akrotiri peninsula. Troops from the 1/Welch were able to capture some of the Germans on 22 May 1941. Brigadier Vasey had the 2/8th Battalion (Australians) and the 2nd Greek Regiment. Those units now moved west and occupied a line to the west of Mournies. The 2/2nd Field Regiment (Australian) and a mixed force would defend the area south of Canea. Canea was receiving bombing attacks at a scale that caused General Weston, the Royal Marine, to be concerned about the effect on the civilians in Canea. They were able to persuade them to move to the hills from the town. There were villages in the hills that might shelter the people. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The situation Crete deteriorates during late 22 May and early 23 May 1941

Once the commanders could clearly see that the attack on the airfield at Maleme by the New Zealand troops had failed, there was no other choice but to withdraw to the east. Freyberg wanted another attack on the airfield later in the afternoon, but when they realized that the Germans were attacking the 10th Brigade, that plan was dropped. Not only was there the threat to the 10th Brigade, but they learned that German troops had split the 4th and 5th New Zealand brigades by putting troops across the coast road. That evening, they made the decision to move the 5th Brigade to Platanias, perhaps 2-1/2 miles to the east. The 23rd Battalion received their orders at dawn on 23 May. The 28th Maori Battalion provided the rearguard and they had pulled out by 6:30am. At this point, Canea and Suda were still safe from German attack. The few Germans in the area were captured by the 1/Welch during the day. Brigadier Vasey now had troops to command and had moved forward and came under the New Zealand division command. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

Late on 22 May 1941 in the Prison Valley on Crete

Starting at about 3pm on 22 May 1941, the New Zealand 19th Battalion had attacked towards an old Turkish fort in the Prison Valley on Crete. They were repulsed with the loss of 12 men. In return, the Germans launched counter-attack towards Galatas at about 7pm. Kippenberger's troops immediately attacked the group. Some Greeks that were nearby, commanded by Captain Forrester, charged towards the Germans, yelling and screaming. That broke the German advance and they withdrew.

In the vicinity of the Maleme airfield, an attack had been planned, but when the New Zealand Division commander realized that there was a German group holding the coast road between the 4th and 5th New Zealand Brigades, he changed his mind. That evening, the decision was made to withdraw from the area near the Maleme airfield and to cede the ground to the Germans. The Australian Official History says that this was in recognition that the battle for Crete was lost. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

Were the Germans withdrawing? 22 May 1941 on Crete

At Brigadier Hargest's 5th New Zealand Brigade headquarters, there was a suggestion that the Germans might be withdrawing troops by transport aircraft. The suggestion was prompted by thoughts about German troops running to aircraft as they landed at Maleme. Someone had thought that the troops might be running to the Ju-52 transports to board them to be able to leave. The truth seems to be that the aircraft were landing under fire. Brave men were running to the Ju-52 transport aircraft to unload them as quickly as possible, in case that they would be hit by shellfire.

To test out the idea that the Germans were leaving, the New Zealand division commander, Puttick, ordered Brigadier Kippenberger to probe the enemy in the vicinity of the prison. The patrols encountered heavy resistance, indicating that the Germans were in strength, not reducing their forces. The 19th Battalion had also made an attack towards an old Turkish fort, but was rebuffed by a strong German defense. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The situation at Maleme and who was to blame (Crete 1941)

The more that we learn about the situation near Maleme airfield on 20 to 22 May 1941, we understand that the problems were at root in the 5th Brigade commander, Brigadier Hargest. He was a politician who had been said to not be suitable for overseas service, but through his use of political connections, he was appointed as the commander of the 5th New Zealand Brigade. The defense of the Maleme airfield was his responsibility. The battalions of the brigade were spread thinly on the ground near the airfield, with the 22nd Battalion given a large area to defend, too large for the number of men in the battalion. The battalion commander, Lt-Colonel Leslie Andrew, has been criticized for pulling back from a hill near the airfield on the night of 20/21 May, but his battalion was being hard-pressed by the German forces and Andrew had been wounded at that point. He had repeatedly asked Brigadier Hargest for support other battalions nearby, but Hargest did not understand the urgency and did not take action. Part of the problem is that while the New Zealanders had inflicted heavy casualties on the attacking German airborne troops, the fact was that the Germans were able to put a large number of men into the area by the airfield. While the airfield was not yet secured, Ju-52 transports were able to land supplies and mountain troops on the beaches and along a dry riverbed to the west. Within three days, the Germans outnumbered the New Zealanders near Maleme and the battle was lost. This is based on the account in New Zealand History Online as well as from Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The 28th (Maori) Battalion on 22 May 1941 at Maleme

After the 20th Battalion withdrew on 22 May 1941, this left the 28th (Maori) Battalion holding lines that faced two directions. On the left, they were facing west, while to their right, the line faced north. They touched the 23rd Battalion on the right. Lt-Col. Dimmer, the 28th Battlalion commander sent a message to their brigade commander, Brigadier Hargest, describing the situation. Essentially, the plan to counterattack had failed. They had not regained any critical ground and while they might have tried some other plan, the Australian Official History suggests that none could have succeeded due to the German strength at Maleme. Both the Germans and the defenders of Crete had little artillery. The Germans were now benefiting from the air supply from aircraft landing at Maleme and the improvised landing grounds to the west. They were receiving supplies while the defenders on Crete were starting to run low on supplies. At the same time, Brigadier Hargest got the impression from reports that were soon disproved, that Germans were abandoning Crete and running to board aircraft at Maleme. This is based on the account in Vol. II of the Australian Official History.

Sandy Thomas on the defence of Maleme on 20 and 21 May 1941

There is an interesting piece about Sandy Thomas, who was on Crete during the German attack in 1941. Sandy Thomas was a junior officer in the 23rd Battalion of the 5th New Zealand Brigade. The 22nd Battalion, commanded by Lt-Col. Les Andrew VC, held the Maleme airfield. During the day on 20 May 1941, they killed German paratroops as they descended. What Sandy Thomas, who was not at Maleme on 20 May, did not know is that the 22nd Battalion took heavy losses from the German glider-borne troops that landed to the west of the airfield. The 22nd Battalion had really lost cohesion as a unit. Sandy Thomas's remarks about Lt-Col. Andrew seem to be on the mark, however. Andrew may have had a VC from the Great War, but that did not automatically make him a good battalion commander. We suspect that giving up the hill overlooking the airfield was not that bad of a decision, although the common opinion was that giving up the hill was Andrew's big mistake. Andrew had asked the brigade commander, Brigadier Hargest, for help, and was turned down. Hargest had two battalions that he could have sent into Maleme in the night to replace the 22nd Battalion, but he did not. Brigadier Hargest was a politician-turned soldier, and he was unaware of what was happening and the situation of his battalions. We would blame Brigadier Hargest more than Lt-Col. Andrew over the loss of Maleme airfield and eventually the island of Crete. What Sandy Thomas did not know is that the Germans were landing Ju-52 transports on the beach and a dry riverbed to the west and they did not need Maleme to bring in troops and supplies. This is based on the article about Sandy Thomas and also on Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The 20th Battalion on 22 May 1941

Interestingly enough, the New Zealand 20th Battalion was formed in 1939 by the later to be famous Howard Kippenberger. The battalion was formed in New Zealand and was transported to the Mediterranean Theater. After arriving, they participated in the ill-fated Greek expedition under General Maitland Wilson's command. In Greece, the 20th Battalion was included in the 4th Infantry Brigade. The brigade attempted to defend the Aliakmon line. They were moved from the Aliaikmon line to the Servia Pass, which was a more defensible positiion. They were able to hold their position for three days before withdrawing. They were evacuated from Greece and transported to the island of Crete. Very quickly, after the German attack on 20 May 1941, when the battalion was pushed out of their position at Maleme, the second-in-command took control for the remainder of the campaign. The 20th Battalion had been in positions a ways away and was only able to participate in the attack on Maleme after being relieved  by Australian troops. Due to the last minute relief, the 20th was late arriving at Maleme. While the late arrival hurt the chances of success, the German strength was such that they were able to rebuff the attack. While the Germans suffered heavy losses, their control of the airfield at Maleme meant that more troops and supplies could be brought in to strengthen the defenses. This is based on the account in the New Zealand official history.

The New Zealanders in action on 22 May 1941 at Maleme

The New Zealand 20th Battalion only arrived near Maleme at 2:45am on 22 May 1941. There were only two companies at first. The attack started at 3:30am with the Maoris and 20th Battalion together. The Maoris had some tank support in the dark and they made good progress. As the sun came up, the tanks were stopped with one being hit. The 20th Battalion was able to get near to the airfield, but were stopped by heavy gunfire. The daylight had made them very vulnerable and they came under attack from both the ground and air. The 21st Battalion was able to capture the wireless station, but then was heavily opposed. By the afternoon, the troops were forced to give ground. With the 20th Battalion withdrawing behind the Maoris, they were forced to hold two fronts. Australian machine gunners in platoon strength were sent forward late in the day but were annihilated. While some other plan might have done better, such as to use the Australian battalion to attack, the Germans were now too strong at Maleme, with two brigades and part of another. Everyone had taken heavy losses, but the Germans had an advantage over the Australian and New Zealand troops. The Germans were able to fly in supplies while the Australians and New Zealanders were starting to run short. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

22 May 1941 at Maleme

The Australian 2/7th Battalion had completed the relief of the New Zealand 20th Battalion by 11:30pm on 21 May 1941. The Australians had suggested that the 2/7th Battalion used for the attack, rather than the 20th Battalion, as they were fresh and ready. The New Zealand attack was to commence at about 11:30pm, but while the Maori's were ready and had been waiting, the 20th Battalion was late arriving. The attack only started at 3:30am on 22 May. The Maori's had moved forward towards the airfield at Maleme, but the 20th Battalion had met stiffer resistance and was held up by German forces. The 20th Battalion had advanced near the airfield, but one company was under heavy fire, so the commander decided to withdraw behind the Maori battalion, so that if they were successful, they 20th could occupy the high ground in the south. There was hard fighting all day. There was air attack and German aircraft flying in mountain troops who got off the plane and went straight into combat. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The 2/7th Battalion moves west on 21 May 1941

The Australian infantry battalion, the 2/7th, had been ordered to move west to near Suda on Crete. They were to move starting late afternoon. The battalion commander had been west, looking at the situation, while his second-in-command got the men ready to move. Before the battalion commander had returned, the brigade staff captain had ordered him to get the battalion moving as close to 5pm as he could. They did not get their entire transport right away. The vehicles arrived in small groups. The drivers were very afraid of air attack and wanted to leave their vehicles, which seemed an obvious target. Major Marshall had used the same tactic that they had successfully used in Greece: keep moving fast and don't stop. The 2/7th moved west had a breakneck speed which Major Marshall found exhilarating. Marshall arrived at Suda with the first company and met Lt-Colonel Lunn, the battalion commander. Marshall then turned around to bring the other three companies forward. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The Greek plan to attack Valona in January 1941

The Greeks decided to attack the Italian port of Valona in Albania, following the failure of the Italian offensive. The Greek army had received captured Italian equipment from North Africa as well as British equipment. The British acquiesced to a Greek request for air support for the offensive. The Greeks committed almost all their army to the attack, leaving six weak divisions facing Bulgaria. Now, the situation changed radically in Greece, as General Metaxas died on 29 January 1941. In response, Churchill stopped the offensive in North Africa, so there would be forces to send to Greece. The British later found that Hitler had decided in November 1940 to attack Greece. The offensive would start in March 1941. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

German Strategic Objectives in early 1941

The Germans planned to invade Greece, probably in March 1941 to achieve two aims. One was to secure their rear prior to the planned attack on Russia in May or June 1941. The other was to prevent British bombers, based in Greece, from hitting the Rumanian Oil fields. The Germans felt increased urgency due to the British successes in North Africa and the Greek successes in Albania. The Germans wanted to ensure their success, so they planned to use a larger army than originally envisioned. Hitler was ready to use however large an army that could be supplied over the roads in the Balkans. The initial British force was planned to include the 2nd Armoured Divsiion, the New Zealand Division, and the 6th, 7th, and 9th Australian Divisions. The Australians would have a large role in the move into Greece, when it came. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The 2/7th Battalion on 21 and 22 May 1941 on Crete

The 2/7th Battalion commander was Lt-Colonel Walker. Early on 21 May 1941, his commander, Brigadier Vasey informed Lt-Colonel Walker that they were not to do the planned attack to clear the road to Maleme. Brigaider Vasey thought that they would be part of a counter-attack at Maleme, instead. Brigadier Vasey and Lt-Colonel Walker, with his Intelligence Officer, attended a New Zealand meeting where they heard what the actual plan was for the evening. The 2/7th was expected to move 18 miles in the night to relieve another battalion and they would be out of communication during the trip. The 2/7th Battalion did not have their own vehicles, so they would be carried in someone else's transport. The New Zealand Brigadier Inglis and Lt-Colonel Walker drove forward to see the position into which the 2/7th would be moving. When Walker expressed his doubts about the plan, Brigidier Inglis informed him that a "well-trained" battalion could carry out the operation in an hour. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The Australians on Crete during 21 and 22 May 1941

The commanders on Crete were playing the same sort of games that they played in the Western Desert later in 1941 and during the first part of 1942. They were breaking up brigades, rather than use them as a substantial combat unit. Instead, they took individual battalions and ordered them around, often without support so that they were either depleted or overrun. At least on Crete, the issue was the relative lack of forces to defend the island and the perceived need to provide a fighting force at all the remote points. That practice left the Australian Brigadier Vasey without any fighting battalions. He requested to be given command of the area where the two Australian battalions, the 2/7th and the 2/8th, were located. That only happened late on 22 May 1941. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

Australians on 21 May 1941 on Crete

The plan was for a counter-attack on the Germans at Maleme airfield on the night of 21/22 May 1941. One player in the scheme, the 2./7 Battalion (an Australian unit) had fought at Bardia in the route of the Italians in January. In February and March, they had been positioned at Mersa Brega and had been attacked by air and by Rommel's forces. From there, they had gone to Greece in the ill-fated venture. They were well-enough led that they had not suffered much loss from any of the air attacks. Brigadier Vasey had planned to use the 2/7th to clear the road to Retimo. Instead, higher command had decided to use them elsewhere. The 2/7th would replace the New Zealand 20th Battalion. The problem was that the plan was ill-conceived and didn't allow enough time for the 2/7th to travel and relieve the 20th Battalion. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The German plan for Crete for 22 May 1941

One critical event was that General Student appointed General Ringel, the 5th Mountain Division commander, overall German commander on Crete. The plan would be to take control of Crete from west to east. The Assault Group, the glider-borne troops, would hold the airfield with mountain troop help. The number of mountain troops would be increased by flying in more to the airfield. Once there were enough mountain troops, they would circle through the hills and clear them. The Germans felt that their hold on the airfield was tenuous, but would be strengthened if they could land another battalion of mountain troops. The planned counterattack was to take place on the night of 21/22 May 1941, but without Australian participation. The Australians at Georgioupolis had not been in action. The veteran 2/7 Battalion, which had achieved success in Cyrenaica, would be asked to clear the road to Retimo. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

In the prison valley on Crete on 21 May 1941

Colonel Heidrich was the airborne division commander on Crete on 21 May 1941, after the general commanding the division was wounded. Colonel Heidrich was on the scene, directing operations in the prison valley on that day. He fully expected to face a British counter attack, but none arrived. The British defence of Crete was in great disarray, despite the presence of good men who were in charge, such as General Freyberg, the overall commander of the defence. The great majority of the troops on Crete had been dumped there after the withdrawal from Greece at the end of April 1941, and they had never really recovered from that experience. As well, British communications gear was so bad that Freyberg was often totally out of touch with developments on the island. The two paratroop companies that General Student had dropped near Platanias area ran into trouble. They were again dropped on defenders who were waiting for them and lost heavily. Of these, only 80 men were able to land and occupied a farm near the beach at Pirgos. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The German results at sea near Crete by 21 May 1941

The German invasion force for Crete that was dispatched on ships consisted of 2,330 men. They were the 3rd Battalion of the 100th Mountain Regiment, part of an anti-aircraft unit, and a heavy weapons unit. They sailed early on 21 May 1941, but returned to port when there was word of British warships. They sailed again late morning and when they neared Crete, they were intercepted by the Brtish squadron with cruises and destroyers. They were fortunate to only lose 320 men. The Italian destroyer Lupo distinguished itself in the defence. Italian boats and destroyers rescued many men. The British Royal Navy was much better prepared than the land forces defending Crete, although they would pay dearly before the battle for Crete was over. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The German plans for the second day in the attack on Crete

On the second day of the German attack on Crete, the Germans decided that they had to secure control of the airfield at Maleme. General Student decided to drop his last two paratroop companies east of Pirgos. This was on 21 May 1941. The plan also included the glider-borne troops attacking from the west. They needed the supporting air force to destroy the artillery battery on the hill that had been shelling the airfield. A mountain battalion was loaded onto Ju-52 transports in Greece in ready to land on the airfield at Maleme. The mountain troops would start landing at 4pm on 21 May. The landing took losses, in that 20 transports were destroyed while attempting to land. The Germans attacked the airfield at dawn, took the hill, and moved across to the east of the airfield. Immediately after taking the airfield, they took the towns of Maleme and Pirgos. The 22nd New Zealand Battalion had abandoned these positions in the night. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

At sea near Crete on 21 May 1941

British naval forces sheltered south of Crete, preparing to resume sweeps across the northern part of the island. At this point,bombing had intensified, so that one force was continuously under bombing attack from 9:50am until 1:50pm. The air attacks sank the destroyer Juno, of the best new destroyers of the J class. The cruiser Ajax was damaged from near misses that did not directly hit the ship. After receiving reports of more small craft heading towards Crete, the naval forces felt obligated to make another northern sweep. They intercepted the convoy, sinking a steamer and caiques and damaging the Italian destroyer Lupo. This had been accomplished by the British cruisers Dido, Orion, and Ajax. They were accompanied by four British destroyers. By this point, the Germans were wary of any more seaborne attacks. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The planned attempt to recapture the airfield at Maleme

The plan to recapture the airfield at Maleme was to use the Maori battalion and the 20th (New Zealand) Battalion to attack during the night of 21/22 May 1941. The 20th Battalion was to be made available by replacing it by an Australian battalion brought from Georgioupolos. Aircraft from Egypt would bomb the German positions. The troops would have three light tanks on the road to support them. The first objective would be Pirgos and then they would attack t he airfield after resting. The rest of what happened on 21 May 1941 was pretty successful. An Australian battalion took the heights southeast of the airfield at Retimo. At Heraklion, the Germans were driven out of the harbour area by a counterattack. Both at Retimo and Heraklion, the Germans were kept from taking the airfields. At sea, a convoy with German troops was attacked and driven off with losses. The ships with German troops were escorted by Italian destroyers. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

21 May 1941 from the Australian Official History

From the Australian Official History, we see that there was a plan to recapture Maleme airfield, but that the situation was deteriorating elsewhere. The German air support was now so important that fighter aircraft on strafing runs were making movement by day difficult. The defenders of Crete were having to deal use battalion-sized units, rather than brigades. The plan was to bring an Australian battalion to replace the 20th (New Zealand) Battalion, which was to be brought to the area near Maleme for an attack on the airfield with the rest of the 5th Brigade. One problem was that German paratroops were infiltrating south of the Maori battalion and might pose a threat eventually. There was some concern that the New Zealand Division could be split into two parts by a German attack towards the north. Meanwhile, a small amount of artillery was ordered to the west to participate in the planned attack on the airfield. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

More about the first day in the invasion of Crete

As we have said, the German forces that were dropped close to the defending New Zealand troops from the 5th Brigade took heavy casualties. Many or most paratroops dropped over the defenders were shot and killed before they touched ground. Some fifty gliders were also dropped. The attack commenced at about 8am on 20 May 1941. The troops on the ground could see the aircraft towing gliders pass overhead and then saw other aircraft dropping paratroops and supply canisters. The gliders were mainly dropped near the Tavronitis dry riverbed. The defensive plan had mistakenly left this area undefended. The gliders were able to unload their troops who moved towards the Maleme airfield and attacked. The immediate area around the airfield was held by the 22nd NZ Battalion, commanded by Lt-Col. Leslie Andrew. He was a Great War VC recipient. The battle was going badly enough by afternoon that Col. Andrew requested help from the 23rd Battalion. The 5th Brigade commander, Brigadier Hargest, refused the aid, because he mistakenly thought that the 23rd Battalion was fighting paratroops dropped nearby. Col. Andrew ordered an attack by his reserve and the two tanks, but that failed when the tanks broke down. The 22nd Battalion withdrew, with the brigade commander's permission, into the area of the 21st Battalion. This is based on the account in the New Zealand Official History.

When the morning started on 21 May 1941, the remnants of the 22nd Battalion had withdrawn into the defensive positions held by the 21st and 23rd Battalions. They were all part of the 5th New Zealand Brigade. At dawn, stragglers from the Royal Air Force, the gunners for the disabled anti-aircraft guns, and Royal Marine artillery made their way to the New Zealand positions, The brigade was under almost constant air attack and was under attack from the German airborne troops. There had been a machine gun platoon on a height, and these withdrew after they exhausted their ammunition firing at the airfield. At a meeting the plan for 22 May was for the 23rd Battalion to retake the airfield and the surrounding area. By 8:10am, a Ju-52 landed, unloaded, and took off from Maleme airfield. Several aircraft carrying troops landed, unloaded, and took off at the west end of the airfield. Many German paratroops were dropped onto the Maori battalion, who cleared most of the Germans, but not all. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

A different topic :Auchinleck versus Rommel

We had a discussion this afternoon about the general topic of the war in North Africa in 1940 to 1943. Prior to the arrival of Bernard Law Montgomery on the scene, the only British general to beat Rommel in battle was Claude Auchinleck. He did it not just once but twice. As we well remember and have discussed in the past, the first occasion was when the Crusader battle, which had been commenced with great hope, had gone wrong. General Auchinleck had made a string of bad appointments in 1941 to 1842. The first time, Alan Cunningham, brother of the great admiral Cunningham, proved himself to be unsuitable for the position of Eighth Army commander. He had just fought a brilliant campaign in east Africa against the Italians. The battle was fast moving an mobile, but with small forces of colonial troops along with regular army units. Alan Cunningham was extremely tired and lacked experience with mechanized warfare in the desert. When Cunningham was ready to cede the battle to Rommel, Auchinleck stepped in and proceeded to beat Rommel, forcing him into a retreat from the area near Tobruk. The second occasion was when Neil Ritchie had lost Tobruk and there was danger of Rommel blitzing into the canal zone. Auchinleck stepped into the command again and after some maneuver, fought the First Battle of El Alamein and left the Axis forces stalled and disabled. The best source on this topic is the British Official History of the War in the Mediterranean and Middle East, along with Robert Crisp's book Brazen Chariots.

21 May 1941 in the morning

General Freyberg first learned of the deteriorating situation near Maleme on the morning of 21 May 1941. He had not realized that the Germans had made good progress pushing the 22nd Battalion off their positions. First thing in the morning, the artillery were keeping the Germans from using the airfield at Maleme, but it almost didn't matter, given the other news. The remainder of the troops defending the airfield were attacked by divebombers starting before 9am. Freyberg was then informed that there were more paratroops being dropped near Maleme. Ju-52 transports were also able to land and take off from the riverbed and beaches to the west. That meant that more troops and equipment were arriving. The intelligence officer, Puttick thought that there were two German regiments, one at Maleme and one near Galatas. Puttick thought that they needed to recapture the airfield as the main priority. At an early morning meeting at the 23rd Battalion, the consensus was that the 23rd Battalion should try and hold their defensive position. The 22nd should try to withdraw into the positions of the 23rd and 21st Battalions. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

Paratroops near the prison on 20 May 1941

Colonel Heidrich, who now command thed the German airborne division, personally led his 3rd Regiment near the prison on the island of Crete on 20 May 1941. His men were all paratroops, and were an example that they could succeed, if properly deployed and led. Colonel Heidrich landed near the prison at about 9am on 20 May 1941. He had almost the full strength of three battalions at his disposal at the start of the fight. The immediate problem was that there were British on the overlooking heights who commanded the battlefield. Two companies, by the afternoon, were able to take the Galatas heights. In error, during the evening, they abandoned the heights, and formed a defensive position. Two battalions of the four that Heidrich had under his immediate command had taken significant losses in the first day's fight. Colonel Heidrich thought that with his remaining strength, they might be able to defend against the expected attack the next day. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The force for Canea and Suda Bay

For the 20 May 1941 attack, the situation went badly for the force to attack Canea and Suda Bay. The division commander and his staff were in five gliders. One crashed on a Greek island near Athens and General Sussman and the others in his glider were killed. That left Colonel Heidrich, the 3rd Regiment commander, in charge of the division. One battalion of the 3rd Regiment landed near the prison, captured a commanding position overlooking the prison, and advanced to the east. They met a company from one of the other battalions. They were stopped by the "Royal Perivolians" and Greeks. Near galatas, another company of the third battalion of the 3rd Regiment took almost total losses. When Colonel Heidrich landed at 9am, near the prison, he took charge of organizing the forces nearby to make progress. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The West Group attack on 20 May 1941

Glider-borne troops were a key part of the West Group attack in Crete on 20 May 1941. The gliders were able to land where they were intended. They had three initial assignments: capture the camp near the airfield, capture the anti-aircraft guns "at the mouth of the Tavronitis", and also capture the bridge. The bridge was across the river, where the anti-aircraft guns were positioned. The III Battalion, which was to capture the airfield, was landed in the wrong place. They landed in the hills instead, as the aircraft commanders did not want to risk landing the men in the sea. Because of this, 400 of the 600 men were killed. The IV Battalion was planned to land west of the bridge. General Meindl landed with the IV Battalion and organized the attack on the airfield. The General had planned and executed an attack on the bridge, but was soon wounded. A major then took command of the leading troops. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The German force deployment for Crete

The German troops attacking Crete were divided into three groups. General Meindl commanded the West Group. The West Group had the entire Assault Regiment, except for a half-battalion, a mixed light anti-aircraft and machine gun battalion, along with a medical platoon. The West Group was intended to capture the airfield at Maleme and hold it so that transport aircraft could operate from the field. The West Group had other missions, as well. They were to conduct a reconnaissance to the west and to push to the south and east to join with the Center Group. General Sussman commanded the Center Group. General Sussman was commanding officer of the 7th Air Division. Center Group had the 3rd Parachute Regiment, the half-battalion of glider-borne troops from teh Assault Regiment, and the engineer battalion (pioneers). The Center Group was to capture Canea and Suda. Center Group also had most of the 2nd Parachute Regiment, except for one battalion. The 2nd Parachute Regiment was to capture Retimo. Once capturing Retimo, they were to head west to attack Suda Bay. The East Group consisted of four battalions of paratroops. They were to capture the airfield at Heraklion and the town. They were also to aid bringing in troops by sea. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

More about the original attack plan for Crete in 1941

The original German attack plan for Crete for May 1941 was that the 7th Air Division and the 1st Assault Regiment would be dropped on Crete. After the airfields were taken, some of the mountain troops would be flown in by transport aircraft (Ju-52). The rest would be brought by sea, probably carried by Greek caiques. There were 750 glider borne troops in the assault regiment and 10,000 paratroops. Some 5,000 mountain troops would be flown in to the captured airfields. The other 7,000 mountain troops would come by sea. They had enough planes to fly in 70 or 80 gliders and somewhere between 600 and 750 Ju-52 transport aircraft. In one lift, they could bring 5,000 t0 6,000 troops with their equipment. The VIII Air Corps would provide air support to the attack. They would start the operation with 430 dive bombers. There were only 180 fighter aircraft with which to establish control of the air. They were helped by the extreme scarcity of British fighter aircraft. The Germans also had 40 reconnaissance aircraft for the operation. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

General Lohr

When you realize that General Lohr was an Austrian, we can realize that he was an old Balkan hand. He had fought in the Great War, in the Austrian-Hungarian army. Postwar, he became involved with the Austrian air force, a very small organization. Before Austria was annexed into Germany, General Lohr was head of the Austrian air force. The second letter in his name actually was an O with an umlaut over it. General Lohr concocted the scheme to capture the bridge over the Corinth canal and successfully executed the operation. The operation was conducted without the knowledge of General Student, the head of the German airborne forces. General Lohr was the head of the operation to capture Crete in May 1941. He eventually ended up in the Balkans at the end of the Second World War and surrendered to Yugoslav partisans. They did not like his bombing of Belgrade during the initial attack and he was executed in 1947 for his part in the operation.

The XI Air Corps

The German airborne force included the 7th Air Division, which was the paratroops, the 1st Assault Regiment, the glider-borne troops, "and the aircraft group". The aircraft group was equipped with the transport aircraft that were used to carry troops. The glider troops had a regiment of four battalions. Each battalion had four companies (a square organization). The Air Division was not a square organization, as the division had three regiments of three battalions of paratroops. The regiments had an artillery company and an anti-tank company. The 5th Mountain Division was also part of the corps. The intent was that they would largely come by sea, but some would fly into Crete on transport aircraft. In the event, because of the strength of the Royal Navy, the mountain troops were flown into Crete in sufficient strength to overwhelm the defenders. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

Airborne attack lessons from Crete

The Germans overreacted to the problems with the airborne attack on Crete and decided to not make such an attack again. I would say that at least Hitler misread the situation. Yes, making a daylight parachute attack on defenders who expect the attack does not work well. The casualties among German paratroops at Crete were high because they were dropped onto defending troops who then shot the paratroops during the descent. The Allies were so impressed by the concept that they formed their own airborne divisions, including parachute-equipped paratroops.

The glider-borne troops were much more successful. They were largely dropped and landed near, not on, the targets to be attacked. A few gliders were dropped too far at sea and were lost with their passengers, but most were able to land on the island. They were in numbers large enough to form cohesive units that were able to capture the airfield at Maleme. After the airfield was secured, transport aircraft were able to bring in a large number of mountain troops who were then able to overwhelm the defending force. The defenders were at a disadvantage due to the poor command communications systems. General Freyberg often was uninformed about the course of the battle, until the battle was lost.

The capture of the bridge over the Corinth canal in Greece in April 1941 was a good example where paratroops were used with the element of surprise. There was considerable secrecy involved (apparently), and the paratroops were dropped and caught the largely undefended area by surprise and took the bridge. To achieve a degree of surprise needed for the successful use of paratroops was why the British and American airborne troops were dropped at night at Normandy in June 1944. The operation still went awry due to the air transports totally ignoring the need for navigation. The paratroops ended up being scattered across Normandy in small parties, not able to reform units.

Now, special forces are dropped by parachute with an eye to achieving surprise and a degree of stealth. That is what is needed for any successful use of parachutists.

The German plan for Crete in 1941

The proposal for the airborne attack on Crete had only been made on 15 April 1941. There was only time for five weeks of planning and preparation prior to the attack on 20 May 1941. General Lohr had made the pitch to Field Marshal Goering. General Lohr planned to use General Student's XI Air Corps and General von Richthofen's VIII Air Corps for the attack. The units and aircraft were only in place on airfields in Southern Greece by 14 May. The Germans expected to be fighting one division, plus remnants evacuated from Greece in late April. General Student wanted to make four attacks in Crete, but there were insufficient aircraft to provide air cover for more than three simultaneous attacks. The plan then tried to accommodate that by making two attacks int morning and two in the afternoon on 20 May. That immediately handicapped the attacking force and reduced the chances for success. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

Naval support at Crete early in the attack

Admiral Cunningham, the Mediterranean Fleet commander, had a plan in place to keep seaborne invaders of Crete at bay. He had three cruiser-destroyer groups with supporting battleships to their westward. There were more ships at Alexandria, including the aircraft carrier Formidable (with only four aircraft) and two more battleships. On the evening of 20 May-21 May 1941, one cruiser-destroyer group fired on Italian motor torpedo boats and damaged four. The British had expected to see German troops brought to Crete by sea in caiques, but they were absent in the first day or two. So, the initial German attack was left to airborne troops supported by land-based aircraft from the Balkans. General Lohr commanded both the airborne troops and their transports and supporting fighter and bomber aircraft. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

Retimo and Heraklion on the first day or so

The attacks on Retimo and Keraklon (on Crete) came later in the day on 20 May 1941. At Retimo, the attackers were paratroops. They were countered and most were beaten, but one group held a ridge that commanded the airfield from the southeast. In the vicinity of Heraklion, paratroops that landed in the defended areas were beaten, although there were snipers still at work by the end of the day. The town of Heraklion was being disputed by the end of the day. There was fighting in progress there between the attackers and defenders. The quality of communications was so poor, that General Freyberg was uninformed about the status at Retimo and Heraklion. The General reported to his superiors that he thought that Retimo and Heraklion were still in British hands. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The battle for Crete was really lost on the second day

Informed opinion says that the battle for Crete was lost on the second day, 21 May 1941. By then, the Germans had secured the airfield at Maleme, west of Suda Bay. Having the airfield allowed the Germans to fly in the mountain troops from the 5th Mountain Division. The mountain troops overwhelmed the defenders and ultimately captured Crete. The original German plan may have been to bring the mountain troops in by sea, but the Royal Navy had maintained control of the seas around Crete, although at great cost, so that the mountain troops arrived by Ju-52 transport aircraft at Maleme. Maleme had been a problem since the first day, when the New Zealand battalion designated to protect Maleme had collapsed. The battalion commander, Colonel Andrew, was a Victoria Cross recipient from the Great War, but that did not guarantee success. The remnants of the 22nd Battalion straggled away from the Maleme area leaving the Germans in possession of the landing field. The 21st and 23rd battalions had done better and were left to oppose the Germans.

Near Canea and Suda Bay

On 20 May 1941, some anti-aircraft guns south of Canea were captured by the Germans who landed nearby. The 1/Rangers and some carriere from the 1/Welch were eventually reinforced with two platoons of Royal Marines and some Greek troops from the 2nd Regiment. They were able to recaptured the guns. By late on 20 May, only small groups of Germans were left near Suda Bay and Canea. By late afternoon, reinforcements arrived from Georgioupolis, in the form of the 2/8th Battalion (presumably Australians). They were in line west of Mournies with the Composite Battalion, the 2/2nd Field Regiment, and the 2nd Greek Regiment. Further west, the Greeks were holding the harbor at Kastelli. During the attack, Germans landed nearby and were attacked by the Greek unit. The Greeks were largely successful with only one small German group resisting. A New Zealand platoon that was nearby captured the remaining Germans. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

Suda Bay on 20 May 1941

The New Zealand Division was located west of Suda Bay. General Weston commanded the force at Canea and Suda Bay. German paratroops had landed in the wooded area near Perivolia and were dealt with by the Composite Battalion, which had a strength of some 700 men. Paratroops actually landed in the area where the King of Greece was staying, but the New Zealanders and some armed Cretan men were able to extricate the King and keep him safe. He evacuated to the nearby hills. A glider attack had been mounted on the Akrotiri peninsula, but of the 15 gliders released over the sea, only 11 made the land. Some of the 11 were shot down, but most landed. The Northumberland Hussars were able to deal with the glider-borne troops. More gliders landed near some anti-aircraft guns south of Canea. The Germans captured the guns and gunners, but were surrounded by men from the 1/Rangers and carriers from the 1/Welch. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

Late on 20 May 1941 on Crete

When they heard on late 20 May 1931 that the Germans were clearing a landing ground near the prison, Colonel Kippenberger suggested to the division commander that they attack the prison area and recapture it. In the event, the attack happened at about 7:15pm. The attack was mounted by the 19th Battalion with three light tanks from the 3rd Hussars. By 8:30pm, they were within 1400 yards from the prison, on the north. Because of the darkness, the tank commander thought that they should stop for the night. The troops formed a surrounding perimeter around the tanks. By morning, the attackers withdrew. Only after the attack was Colonel Kippenberger given command of the 19th Battalion. They thought that the attack failed by being too late in the day and without adequate command from the senior commander in the area. By the night of 20 May, the Germans were left in possession of the airfield at Maleme, although it was under fire from the nearby artillery. The Germans also held the slopes near the prison and the reservoir and would be difficult to dislodge. This force threatened to break the New Zealand Division in two parts. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

Command on 20 May 1941 on Crete suffered from poor communications

The British army, in early 1941, suffered from unreliable radio communications. To compensate, they tended to rely on landlines. On 20 May 1941, wire line communications were disrupted by the German attack. That left General Freyberg and his commanders without adequate ability to communicate. We suspect that early during the German attack on Crete, the British were dependent on messengers, as that was all that they had left. Despite the communication situation, General Freyberg had learned enough to understand that the Maleme area was "the danger point". He ordered two battalions of the 4th Brigade to be put under the division commander's control. He also wanted to give him the entire reserve for use at Maleme. Brigadier Puttick, the division commander, was receiving "cheerful and confident" reports from the 5th Brigade, thought that he needed to keep the reserves to use against the expected attack by troops brought in by ship. By afternoon, he decided to attack the prison area, despite the fact that it was late in the day. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The Galatas area on 20 to 21 May 1941

During the initial German attack on Crete on 20 May 1941, the 6th Greek Regiment quickly ran out of ammunition, with the remnants falling back towards Galatas. Captain Forrester, the British liaison officer, was able to rally some of the troops and linked up with the 19th Battalion and the Composite Battalion. The German attack was heading up the road by the prison and Galatas at 4pm. The defense held and the attack was repulsed for the moment. At the same time, the cavalry had arrived at Galatas. They had been out of touch, north of the reservoir. The cavalry was positioned to support the Greeks to the east, near Galatas, and were connected to the petrol company and the 19th Battalion. The 8th Greek Regiment was fighting, but was isolated. They heard that the Germans at the prison were making a landing field. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

The rest of Crete on 20 May 1941

A strong German paratroop and glider force had landed in the area protected by the 10th New Zealand Brigade. They were at Galatas, Alikianon, and the Aghya prison. About 1500 Germans had landed. Colonel Kippenberger went to the small house that he planned to use as a headquarters and found a German sniper, whom he killed. The 6th Greek Regiment quickly ran out of ammunition and was useless as a unit. A British officer was able to rally 400 of them who had fallen back towards Galatas. One bright spot was that the Germans at Galatas were captured by midday on 20 May 1941. By late in the day, the Germans were thought to be in control by the prison and were clearing an landing area to bring in more troops. In the 4th Brigade area, the hospital had been captured by the Germans, but was retaken. The 4th Brigade area included the New Zealand Division headquarters. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

At dawn on 21 May 1941 on Crete

The 5th New Zealand Brigade was in a good position at the beginning of the second day of the German attack on Crete on 21 May 1941. They had four battalions, of which only the 22nd Battalion had been disrupted. The NZE Detachment (New Zealand Engineers) was sitting to the east of the others. They had the 27th Battery, which was also partly in the territory of the 21st and 23rd Battalions. The 27th Battalion had a mixture of nine pieces, including two 3.7in Mountain Guns, three Italian 75mm and four classic French 75mm guns. The guns had survived the parachute drop, as did the NZE and the 28th (Maori) Battalion. The Maoris also cleaned out a group of Germans that were in a mill in front of the NZE Detachment. The Germans maintained air superiority over the brigade, however, and could hit the troops by air. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.